JUDGMENT 1. - This writ-petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India by, the above named petitioner involves the interpretation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred as `the Act'), more particularly S. 25-G & 25-H and Rules 77 and 78 of the Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred as the `Rules'). The brief facts giving rise to the filing of this writ petition are that the petitioner after being duly selected through the Departmental Selection Committee and after having passed the typing test through the employment exchange was given appointment vide office order dated 1-9-88. The petitioner continued to work in the office of respondent No. 2, i.e. Assistant Director, Sikar up to February, 1988 and thereafter the services of the petitioner were sought to be extended by the Sikar office of respondent No. 2, which was duly communicated in terms of office order dated 2-2-88. It has been averred in the writ petition that the services of the petitioner were taken in the month of March, 1988 for the whole month by the respondents in the Sikar Office without any written order of fresh appointment. 2. It has been further averred that the petitioner having become aware regarding fresh appointment of new candidates on the post of LDC by the respondents without considering the candidature of the respective candidates who have already gained service experience in the Department like the petitioner and those who were duly appointed by the earlier Departmental Promotion Committee through the Employment Exchange were ignored. 3. It has been further contended by the petitioner that the provisions of S. 25-H of the Act deals with re-employment. Section 25-H of the Act reads as under:- "25-H. Re-employment of retrenched workmen.- Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for re-employment, and such retrenched workmen who offer themselves for re-employment shall have preference over other persons." 4. Thus in view of the above provisions of the Act which casts a statutory duty on the employer that in the event of offering fresh appointment to employees, preference will be given to the workmen who were earlier retrenched by the employer and thus who offer themselves for re-employment, shall have preference over other persons. It was enjoined upon the respondent No. 2 to have duly considered the candidature of the petitioner who was earlier in the employment of the respondents and who had offered himself for re-employment. It has been contended by the petitioner that the above provision of law was ignored by respondent No. 2. It has been further contended that by virtue of Rr. 77 and 78 of the Rules which stipulate a statutory duty upon the employer to prepare a seniority list of all the workmen in the particular category from which retrenchment is contemplated and those who were working in the Department earlier, in the event of re-employment, the respondents could have given preference to the earlier candidates in the matter of appointment has also been ignored inasmuch as the respondents neither gave any intimation of vacancies by registered notice to the petitioner nor displayed the vacancies which are to be filled up in the office of respondent No. 2 by displaying the vacancies on a conspicuous place in the premises of the industrial establishment as contemplated by the aforesaid Rr. 77 and 78, which are reproduced hereinbelow:- "77. Maintenance of seniority list of workmen. The employer shall prepare a list of all workmen in the particular category from which retrenchment is contemplated arranged according to the seniority of their service in that category and cause a copy thereof to be pasted on a notice board in a conspicuous place in the premises of the industrial establishment at least seven days before the actual date of retrenchment. 78. Re-employment of retrenched workmen.- (1) At least ten days before the date on which vacancies are to be filled, the employer shall arrange for the display on a notice board in a conspicuous place in the premises of the industrial establishment details of those vacancies and shall also give intimation of those vacancies by registered post to every one of all the retrenched workmen eligible to be considered therefor, to the address given by him at the time of retrenchment or at any time thereafter." 5. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the provisions of law were grossly overlooked and violated by the respondents. It was further contended that any vacancies which were subsequently filled up by the respondents in utter disregard of the aforesaid provisions of the Act and the Rules deserve to be declared invalid and the entire action of the respondents to fill up the posts of LDC of about 233 persons in the Department in the month of December, 1988 or January, 1989 was based on extraneous considerations and the exercise undertaken in lieu thereof was mala fide. It has been further contended that the working of the petitioner was satisfactory and there was no complaint with regard to performance of his duties from any quarter by the respondents and furthermore the petitioner being a scheduled caste candidate belonging to reserved category should have been given preference in the matter of appointment against the reserved post of S. C. of L. D. C., and any vacancies filled up by the respondents in utter disregard to the provisions of the Act and the Rules, as referred to above, deserve to be declared invalid and the entire exercise done by the respondents to fill up 233 posts of LDCs in the Department during the period December, 1988 and January, 1989 is based on extraneous considerations and suffers from the vice of malice both in fact as well as in law. It has been further averred in the writ petition that the impugned action of the respondents in giving appointment to the persons as LDCs earlier on daily wages and subsequently on regular basis to fresh candidates is illegal and the said practice has been considered as unfair labour practice by virtue of Item 10 of Vth Schedule of the Act. Further it has been contended that the petitioner's appointment was against the sanctioned and permanent post of LDC and the petitioner was discharging regular work as LDC like the regularly selected candidates but the petitioner was illegally deprived of the payment of regular pay scale as admissible to other LDCs in the Department. Further it has been contended that the petitioner's appointment was against the sanctioned and permanent post of LDC and the petitioner was discharging regular work as LDC like the regularly selected candidates but the petitioner was illegally deprived of the payment of regular pay scale as admissible to other LDCs in the Department. Consequently the petitioner has prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondents to comply with the provisions of Rules 77 and 78 of the I. D. Rules read with S. 25-H of the I. D. Act and that the petitioner be given an appointment in preference on the post of LDC on regular pay scale in the Department and earlier appointment made by the respondents in contravention of Rules 77 and 78 of the I. D. Rules be declared void and action be taken under R. 79 of the Rules. 6. In reply to the writ petition filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2, it has been contended that the qualified persons were selected and appointments were made against those candidates strictly on the basis of merit since the name of the petitioner was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange, Sikar, he was not called for interview, and that the petitioner was appointed as daily wager on the post of LDC which was temporary and consequently the services of the petitioner alongwith the similarly placed candidates involving different districts of the State were terminated on the expiry of the term of services against which they were appointed. Since the name of the petitioner was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange he was not called for interview and since the State Insurance Department is not an industry, Rr. 77 and 78 of the I. D. Rules are not attracted to the facts of the present case. 7. During the course of hearing Shri S. P. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the matter of Surendra Kumar Gyani v. State of Rajasthan and others, SBCWP No. 1720 of 1985 decided on 29-11-85 , and also in the matters of Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Presiding Officer, Central Govt. 7. During the course of hearing Shri S. P. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the matter of Surendra Kumar Gyani v. State of Rajasthan and others, SBCWP No. 1720 of 1985 decided on 29-11-85 , and also in the matters of Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Presiding Officer, Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and another, reported in RLR 1991(2) 158 , General Manager, Northern Railway, New Delhi v. Judge, C.I.T. and another, reported in 1991 (2) WLC (Raj) 640 , Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 682 , and in the matter of Hariprasad Shivashanker Shukla and another v. A.D. Divelkar and others, reported in AIR 1957 SC 121 . 8. In the matter of Surendra Kumar Gyani SBCWP No. 1720, 85, D/- 29-11-1985 (Raj) (supra), the question which had arisen for consideration of this Court was as to whether the Department of State Insurance and Provident Fund of the Government of Rajasthan is an industry as the said expression is defined in Section 2(j) of the Act. As revealed by the facts of the said case, the petitioners in the said writ petition were employed as LDC in the Department of State Insurance and Provident Fund of the Government of Rajasthan on daily wages of Rs. 15/- per day and by order dated 15-6-85 the services of the petitioners were terminated, by a subsequent order the petitioners were reappointed as LDCs on daily wages. By separate orders the services of petitioners were terminated and feeling aggrieved from the said orders of termination the petitioners had moved this Court by way of bunch of writ petitions. Placing reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court in the matter of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Jajeppa, reported in AIR 1978 SC 548 , the Apex Court while reaffirming the principles laid down in the matter of D.N. Bannerji v. P.R. Mukherjee, reported in AIR 1958 SC 58. Placing reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court in the matter of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Jajeppa, reported in AIR 1978 SC 548 , the Apex Court while reaffirming the principles laid down in the matter of D.N. Bannerji v. P.R. Mukherjee, reported in AIR 1958 SC 58. The State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, reported in AIR 1960 SC 610 , it was held by this Court that the Insurance Department of the State is an `industry' within the ambit of Section 2(j) of the Act and that the activities under taken by the Government in the interest of socio-economic activities of the country as beneficial measures are not exempted from the operation of the Act which in substance is a very important beneficial measure itself. It was further held that in view of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court what is to be seen is as to whether the activity undertaken by a particular department of the State can be regarded as a sovereign function of the State strictly understood. It was consequently held by this Court that for the above mentioned reasons it must be concluded that the Department of State Insurance and Provident Fund falls within the ambit of `industry' as defined under Section 2(j) of the Act. It was further held by this Court that termination of the services of the petitioners constitute retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of the Act, as it was not disputed by the respondents. 9. It was further held by this Court that termination of the services of the petitioners constitute retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of the Act, as it was not disputed by the respondents. 9. I am of the view that the decision of this Court in the matter of Surendra Kumar Gyani SBCWP No. 1720/85, D/- 29-11-85 (Raj) (supra) is not attracted to the facts of the present case inasmuch as this is not a case of retrenchment as the learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that those cases being of contractual employment for a fixed period and the said period having been over, the services of the petitioner automatically came to an end on the expiry of the contractual period of employment and since the petitioner was appointed on temporary basis and since his name was not sponsored through Employment Exchange, he cannot claim any legal right of continuity in service or to claim any preference being given to him qua other candidates whose names were sponsored through Employment Exchange and whose appointments were made after interview and selection and I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner does not fall in this category of employees and hence no legal right accrues to him to claim fresh appointment as LDC inasmuch as his name was neither sponsored through Employment Exchange nor he had opted for fresh appointment and, therefore, the question of his being considered for reemployment does not arise as it is not a case of retrenchment. 10. In the matter of Hari Prasad Shivshanker Shukla, AIR 1957 SC 121 (supra) the question which had arisen for consideration of the Apex Court was as to whether 'retrenchment' and 'termination' of service on bona fide closer of business, whether constitutes a retrenchment as defined in Section 2(oo) and as used in Section 25-F of the Act. 10. In the matter of Hari Prasad Shivshanker Shukla, AIR 1957 SC 121 (supra) the question which had arisen for consideration of the Apex Court was as to whether 'retrenchment' and 'termination' of service on bona fide closer of business, whether constitutes a retrenchment as defined in Section 2(oo) and as used in Section 25-F of the Act. It was held by the Apex Court that retrenchment with discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer for any reasons whatsoever otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action and it has no application whether the services of all workmen have been terminated by the employer on real and bona fide closure of business or where the services of all workman have been terminated by the employer on the business or undertaking being taken over by another employer in circumstances like those of Railway Company which is purchased and taken over by the Govt. under the terms of the contract under which the Company constructed the railway and operated it. It was held by the Apex Court that the appellants are not liable to pay any compensation under Section 25-F of the Act to their erstwhile workmen who were not retrenched within the meaning of that expression in that section. 11. In my opinion the facts of the aforesaid case are distinguishable from the present one inasmuch as the case before the Apex Court was regarding the payment of retrenchment compensation by the employer to the erstwhile employees and it was held by the Apex Court in that context that the workmen who were declared surplus and whose services were terminated were entitled to compensation within the ambit of Section 25-F of the Act. In my view the ratio of the said decision is not attracted to the facts of the present case since it is neither a case of retrenchment nor any question with regard to compensation has been urged, whereas in the present case it is a case of re-employment sought by the petitioner. 12. In the matter of G.M. Northern Railway, 1991(2) WLC (Raj) 640 (supra), it was held by this Court that the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act and Rule 77 of the Rules of 1958 are only directory and not mandatory in nature. 12. In the matter of G.M. Northern Railway, 1991(2) WLC (Raj) 640 (supra), it was held by this Court that the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act and Rule 77 of the Rules of 1958 are only directory and not mandatory in nature. It was further held that Rule 77 is neither contrary nor beyond the scope of Section 25-G of the Act. 13. I am of the opinion that the present case is distinguishable from the above decision of this Court both on facts as well as in law and in my opinion the ratio of the decision of this Court in the above matter is neither attracted nor applicable to the facts of the present case. 14. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration and on perusal of the documents as well as the reply filed by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and after examining the rival claims and contentions of the parties, I am of the opinion that the present writ petition lacks merit and the question of the petitioner being given any appointment in preference to others on the post of LDC in contravention of Rules 77 and 78 of the Rules or in contravention of Rules 77 and 78 of the Rules or in contravention of Section 25-H of the Act does not arise. 15. The writ petition is consequently dismissed, as indicated above with no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******