Judgment : The plaintiff is the appellant. He filed a suit for damages claiming Rs. 10,000 with interest at 6% per annum against the defendant. The courts below dismissed the suit, and therefore, the plaintiff is before this Court. The facts which had given raised to the second appeal are not very much in dispute. Before I advert to the point of law that I have to deal within this matter, I have to notice a few facts. The plaintiff is an Advocate. There was no love lost between the plaintiff and the defendant and their neighbours. The plaintiff had a sister by name Devaki. She was suffering from illness for a long time and she was a spinster. Inspite of the best treatment given to her she died on 212. 1976. On 30.12.1976 the defendant gave a complaint to the police stating that there was difference of opinion between the plaintiff and his deceased sister Devaki. In the night of 212. 1976 there was quarrel between the plaintiff and his sister and the next day he came to know that Devaki died in the night of 212. 1976 under suspicious circumstances. In short, the complaint given by the defendant to the police was the that the plaintiff and his family members had done away with Devaki and the body of the deceased was disposed of secretly. Thuckalay Police registered a criminal case in Cr.No. 1848 of 1976 of Thuckalay Police Station. The defendant gave such a false information without any justification and knowing fully well that, if the police complaint is given the news will spread all over Tamil Nadu and the news item will appear in the newspapers next day. Pursuant to the complaint, given by the defendant, the police set in motion the criminal law and ultimately, the police dropped further proceedings being convinced that the complaint had emanated from the defendant be caused of the enmity between the defendant and the plaintiff. On these allegations, the plaintiff laid the suit stating that the defendant had defamed the name of the family and he and his family members were put to mental agony and pain and his status as an Advocate is very much affected and he come to a low odd in the eyes of the brother members of the Bar. The plaintiff sent a lawyer’s notice to the defendant on 12. The plaintiff sent a lawyer’s notice to the defendant on 12. 1977 and the defendant sent a reply on 112. 1977 justifying his action. 2. The defendant filed a written statement contending inter alia the plaintiff has to prove that his sister was suffering from asthma, that the defendant had no direct knowledge of the cause of the death of his sister, that he was not aware of the circumstances under which Devaki died, that it is for the plaintiff to prove that the sister was given treatment for ailment, that the defendant did not give any statement before the Thuckalay Police on 30.12.1976, that the defendant did not give any signed statement before the police station, and that during investigation the police got the signatures of the defendant in various papers. It is further stated in the written statement that whatever facts stated by him before the police during investigation were passed on hearsay reliable information. According to him no false information was given by him to defame the plaintiff and that he was not at all responsible for publication and that he was not aware of the same. The plaintiff has no active practice as an advocate and he was not affected much in his practice by this action and that the plaintiff and the members of his family were not put to any loss of reputation, as alleged. Lastly, the defendant contended that the amount claimed is excessive. 3. The plaintiff filed Ex.A-1 a paper publication in “Dinamalar” dated 1. 1977 which is a Tamil Publication, Ex.A-2, a similar Tamil Publication in “Dhinathanthi” dated 1. 1977, Ex.A-3, paper publication in “Malaimurasu” and evening Tamil daily dated 1. 1977, Ex.A-4, death extract certificate dated 4. 1977,Ex.A-6 reply notice dated 112. 1977Ex.A-7 statement of the defendant given before the Sub-Inspector of Police, Thuckalay, dated 30.12.1976, Ex.A-8 first information report dated 30.12.1976, Ex.A-9 notice to the complainant dated 33. 1977 and Ex.A-10 signature of the Deputy Superintendent of Police Thuckalay, in the grave Crime Report No.9/ 78 of Thuckalay dated 312. 1976. Besides filing these documents the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and one A.Kumaresan as P.W.2. 4. The defendant did not filed any documents. He examined himself as D.W. 1. 1977 and Ex.A-10 signature of the Deputy Superintendent of Police Thuckalay, in the grave Crime Report No.9/ 78 of Thuckalay dated 312. 1976. Besides filing these documents the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and one A.Kumaresan as P.W.2. 4. The defendant did not filed any documents. He examined himself as D.W. 1. Learned Subordinate Judge, Padmanabhapuram, observed in paragraph 13 of the judgment, “Consideration of the arguments of the learned counsel for both sides makes it clear that it is true that there is enmity due to litigation between the family of the plaintiff and the family of the defendant for a long time.” Learned Subordinate Judge further observed in the same paragraph: “Therefore in such circumstances in the present case though the defendant had uttered defamatory statements under Ex.A-7 about the death of the plaintiffs sister, such statement is a privileged statement as referred supra and the same could not have given a cause of action for the plaintiff for a suit for damages for defamation. Therefore, in such circumstances I hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to any damages and claimed in the plaint.” The learned Subordinate Judge has noted the two facts, one is that there was enmity between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the other is that there was a statement by the defendant to the police. Applying the law referred to by the learned Subordinate Judge in the case mentioned in the said judgment, learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. As regards costs he directed the parties to bear their respective costs. 5. The plaintiff preferred A.S.No. 211 of 1978 before the District Judge, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil. The defendant preferred cross appeal claiming costs. Learned District Judge by judgment dated 12. 1981 concurred with the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge, both on the plaintiff’s claim and on awarding costs. Learned District Judge confirmed the judgment as I had mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment and noted the following facts: “Point in the appeal: The facts proved or which cannot be denied are these: The appellant (plaintiff) and the respondent (defendant) are neighbours. The house of the respondent is just 150 feet away from the house of the appellant. There had been litigation between the two families since 1958 and they are on inimical terms. Devaki was the younger sister of the appellant (P.W.1.) she took ill on 212. The house of the respondent is just 150 feet away from the house of the appellant. There had been litigation between the two families since 1958 and they are on inimical terms. Devaki was the younger sister of the appellant (P.W.1.) she took ill on 212. 1976 and she was taken to the hospital at Polliadi for treatment. She died in the evening of the same day. Her body was cremated the same night. The respondent D.W.1 preferred a complaint to the Thuckalay Police under the original of Ex.A-7 on 30.12.1976, before P.W.2 the then S.I. of Police Thuckalay. On the basis of the said complaint, P.W.2 prepared the printed F.I.R. under the original of Ex.A-8. The case was investigated and ultimately the complaint was referred. Ex.A-9 dated 33. 1977 is the copy of the refer notice given to the respondent herein. The original of Ex.A-7 has given the cause of action for the appellant to file the present suit. Admittedly, the deceased Devaki was unmarried and she was aged 25 at the time of her death. The gist of the allegations in the abovesaid complaint against the appellant is, that Devaki was often quarrelling with her elder brother Neelakantadas the appellant herein demanding partition, that about a month prior to her death, there was partition and Devaki got a share that she was pestering her elder brother the appellant herein to get her married to an educated and employed bridegroom and since she did not succeed in her attempts, she become frustrated and on that account, there was wordy quarrel on the night of 212. 1976 between her and the appellant and the noise of her cries were heard and that since Devaki died on 212. 1976, her brothers cremated her the same night and he came to know about it only on the morning of 30.12.1976 and that it is a case of suspicious death. The respondent in the said complaint seems to suggest that the appellant herein his brothers and brother-in-law have murdered Devaki and cremated her the same night and it is a cause case of suspicions death.” 6. In paragraph 9, learned District Judge has come to the definite conclusion that, “The allegation per se in the abovesaid complaint is defamatory.” But, learned District Judge has posed the question whether the complaint containing allegations made to police officer is absolutely privileged. 7. In paragraph 9, learned District Judge has come to the definite conclusion that, “The allegation per se in the abovesaid complaint is defamatory.” But, learned District Judge has posed the question whether the complaint containing allegations made to police officer is absolutely privileged. 7. I have heard Mr. Srikumaran Nair, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr.P. Gopalan for the respondent. 8. Mr. Srikumaran Nair, contended that the defendant cannot claim any absolute privilege and the learned District Judge has completely misunderstood the score of privilege that has to be claimed in such cases. Learned District Judge has come to the conclusion that the defamatory statement made to a police is absolutely privileged and that cannot be made as basis for allegations and the doctrine of absolute privilege bars any enquiry into motive of the person who made the complaint. Learned District Judge, according to the learned counsel has completely misapplied the law by stating: “The plea of absolute privilege means that by a sort of legal fiction the law, owing to compelling consideration of public policy invests statements made upon certain occasions with a special protection so that all statements made so such occasions even though they may be defamatory cannot be made the subject matter of litigation in courts of law and no action of defamation will lie in respect of them.” Further, learned District Judge while referring to the publication has observed that there is no proof that the publications were made at the instance of the defendant and therefore, the light of the ratio decided in the decision referred to, the statement made to a police officer is absolutely privileged. 9. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and the finding rendered by the courts below, I could not completely accept on the prima facie consideration of the matter that the lower courts were right, but at the same time while listening to the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant, I could not have a complete hand over the matter with reference to the principles stated in the cases and therefore, I wanted to have an examination of the cases on the point. But the examination of the cases by me would persuade me to take a different view of the matter, because the question of privilege depends upon the act complained of on the basis of which the plaintiff claims to have been defamed by the defendant. Therefore, drawing analogy from the facts of the decided case, we cannot come to the conclusion on the facts of this case that the defendant is entitled to the privilege. 10. Sec. 182 of the Indian Penal Code has to be borne in mind. The marginal note of the section reads, “False information with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another person.” The section reads as follows: “Whoever gives to any public servant any information which he knows or believes to be false, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, such public servant- .(a) to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true state of facts respecting which such information is given were known by him, or .(b) to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any persons, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.” Therefore, the ingredients of the offence mentioned in the section are, .(i) give a false information; .(ii) to public servant; (iii) the informant knew that the information is believed to be false, and (iv) he gave the information in order to annoy the public servant to behave in a way in which he ought not to behave when the true state of facts were known to him. 11. Therefore, it is clear on the facts of the case before me that the defendant ought to come within the perspective of Sec. 182 of the Code. Therefore, here is a person who has committed on offence under Sec. 182 of the Code and that is the finding given by the courts below on the basis of Ex.A-7. Therefore, the question I asked myself is whether the person who could be found guilty of an offence under the Indian Penal Code could take umbrage under the obsessive description of an unknown phrase “absolute privilege”. 12. Therefore, the question I asked myself is whether the person who could be found guilty of an offence under the Indian Penal Code could take umbrage under the obsessive description of an unknown phrase “absolute privilege”. 12. Learned counsel Mr.P. Gopalan brought to my notice the decision in Bapalal and Company v. Krishnaswami Iyer, (1940)2 M.L.J. 556 : A.I.R. 1941 Mad. 26: I.L.R. 1941 Mad. 332: 52 L.W. 519: 1940 M.W.N. 1054. In that case, a medical practitioner at Madras who was the respondent took some diamonds from the appellants firm of jewellery, in April, 1936. In May, the appellants presented the respondent with an invoice for their costs. By 29. 1936 the money have not been paid by the respondent. On that date, the appellants sent a letter to the Inspector of Police, Flower Bazaar Police Station, which is claimed by the respondent to be defamatory, as being equivalent to a charge against him of criminal breach of trust. In the written statement, the appellants contended that this communication was privileged, having been sent bona fide with the sole purpose of protecting their own interests. The City Civil Court held that the occasion was privileged and if the letter were in fact bona fide the suit must be dismissed, but he held further that the letter did not state the true facts. The suit was decreed. On appeal, it was contended that this letter in question was privileged absolutely and consequently, the civil court was precluded from adjudicating upon the question whether it was sent maliciously or not. King, J. observed. "On a careful consideration of the authorities I think this contention must prevail. The principal authorities to which I have been referred to in the course of the arguments are Sanjivi Reddi v. Koneri Reddi, I.L.R. 49 Mad. 315, Sadap Jan v. Bholanath, 38 Cal. 800, Madhab Chandra v. Nirode Chandra, I.L.R. (1939)1 Cal. 574 and Majju v. Lachman Prasad, I.L.R. 46 All. 671. All those authorities are unanimous in holding that the common law of England which grants an absolute privileged to all statements made in the witness-box should be applied in India. That privilege extends in England to the preliminary examination of witnesses, by a solicitor to find out what they can prove. The question than is how for this principle derived from Watson v. M’Ewan, 1905 A.C. 480, should be extended. 49 Mad. That privilege extends in England to the preliminary examination of witnesses, by a solicitor to find out what they can prove. The question than is how for this principle derived from Watson v. M’Ewan, 1905 A.C. 480, should be extended. 49 Mad. 315 (cited supra) dealt with a complaint to a Magistrate requesting him to take action under Sec. 107, Criminal Procedure Code and to statements made by the complainants to a police officer investigating that complaint. Both were held to be absolutely privileged. No actual evidence was given in this case, as the Magistrate eventually refused to take any action under Sec. 107. In 38 Cal. 880 (cited supra) a complaint laid before a Magistrate for criminal breach of trust which led to no trial but was dismissed under Sec. 203, Civil Procedure Code was held to be absolutely privileged. In I.L.R. (1939)1 Cal. 574, it was held that both a report to the police alleging the commission of a crime and evidence given in court in support of the accusation were absolutely privileged. In 46 All. 671 a distinction was drawn between a complaint to the police which in fact led to judicial proceedings and one which did not. A complaint in the latter case was held not to be privileged. Learned Judge concluded by saying, "I am accordingly of opinion that the weight of authority is in favour of the view that a complaint to a police officer from its very nature as a statement which the complainant is prepared later, if called upon to do so, to substantiate upon oath is absolutely privileged." The appeal by the plaintiff was dismissed by the learned Judge. 13. In Sanjivi v. Koneri, A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 521, the view taken was that all statements made by a potential witness as a preliminary to going into the witness-box are equally privileged with the statement made when actually in the box in the court. In V.Narayana v. P. Subanna, A.I.R. 1975 Karn. 162, the view taken by the learned single Judge is that defamatory statements made in complaint to a police officer are absolutely privileged and no action in damage can lie regarding such statements. In V.Narayana v. P. Subanna, A.I.R. 1975 Karn. 162, the view taken by the learned single Judge is that defamatory statements made in complaint to a police officer are absolutely privileged and no action in damage can lie regarding such statements. Alagiriswami, J. (as he then was) had an occasion to deal with the point in K. Ramdass v. P. Soma Pillai, 69 M.L.J. 338 and held that a complaint to a police officer from its very nature, as a statement which the complainant is prepared later, if called upon to do-so, to substantiate upon oath, is absolutely privileged and no action for defamation in respect thereof is maintainable. 14. Learned Judge relied on Sanjivi v. Koneri, A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 521 and also Bapalal and Company v. Krishnaswami Iyer, (1940)2 M.L.J. 556 : A.I.R. 1941 Mad. 26: I.L.R. 1941 Mad. 332: 52 L.W. 519: 1940 M.W.N. 1054. Learned Counsel relied on the judgment in Maruti Sadashiv v. Godubai Narayana Rao, A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 443 wherein Dator, J. observed as follows: "A statement if made before an officer who was not acting in judicial capacity or who was not exercising the attributes of a court cannot be said to be absolutely privileged. Hence, defamatory statements made before the police officer in the course of the investigation carried on under Criminal Procedure Code cannot be regarded as absolutely privileged, but only a qualified privilege attaches to them which is liable to be destroyed by proof of malice." Lower appellate court has referred to this judgment and has referred to the view taken by this Court earlier. 15. On hearing Mr. Sreekumaran Nair, learned counsel for the appellant, I reacted very sharply and felt that the act of the defendant was defamatory and and he cannot claim absolute privilege. But, in the light of the view taken by this Court I do not want to take a different view and the learned counsel for the appellant did not produce any weighty authority which can persuade me to differ from the view taken by this Court on the earlier occasions. Therefore, I have to confirm the judgment and decree of the courts below. The second appeal is dismissed. No costs.