Judgment : Learned counsel for the petitioner urges four contentions in this revision petition. The necessary facts are: The main petition for eviction has been filed by the respondent on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent. The petitioner contended that the claim of the landlord is not correct as he has already paid rent upto April, 1990 and there were arrears only for June and July. The Rent Controller passed an order under Sec.11(4) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act directing the petitioner to pay the arrears of rent of Rs.16,000 payable from September, 1989 to December, 1990 and to continue to pay the subsequent arrears. That order was passed on 9.4.1991. Time was granted upto 2.5.1991. On 2.5.1991, the amount was not deposited. On 3.5.1991 counsel prayed for extension of time. In the application for extension of time, the prayer was to grant extension for payment of admitted arrears. The Court passed an order that time was extended upto 11.6.1991. The amount directed to be deposited by the court was not deposited even till 11.6.1991. Hence, an order of eviction was passed by the Rent Controller. Against that order, an appeal was preferred by the petitioner herein. The appeal was dismissed and the aggrieved tenant has filed this revision. 2. The first contention is that the order granting extension of time till 11.6.1992 meant only the deposit of the admitted arrears and time was granted till 11.6.1991 to pay the admitted arrears. Reliance is placed on the prayer in the petition and the order passed thereon. There is no merit in this contention. When the earlier order passed by the court specifically directed the tenant to pay a particular amount being the arrears within a particular time, the tenant ought to have paid that amount, but he prayed for extension. While doing so, he-had cleverly included in the prayer the words “payment of admitted arrears”. But the court in its order, did not grant the said prayer. The court only extended the time till 11.6.1991. The order read as follows: “Notice given. Heard. Time extended till 1.6.1991. Petition allowed.” Now, it is contended that when the court allowed the petition it meant that the petitioner was permitted to pay the admitted arrears before 11.6.1991 .‘The petitioner is really trying to be too clever and trying to play with the court. The order read as follows: “Notice given. Heard. Time extended till 1.6.1991. Petition allowed.” Now, it is contended that when the court allowed the petition it meant that the petitioner was permitted to pay the admitted arrears before 11.6.1991 .‘The petitioner is really trying to be too clever and trying to play with the court. Without there being a petition to review or to modify the earlier order passed on 9.4.1991 directing the tenant to pay a sum of Rs.16,000 being the arrears payable for September, 1989 to December, 1990, there could not have been any order by the court directing the tenant to pay only the admitted arrears of rent without modifying the earlier order or reviewing the earlier order. In the absence of such a petition either for modifying or reviewing the earlier order, the contention that the tenant was permitted to pay the admitted arrears of rent by order dated 3.5.1991 before 11.6.1991 cannot be accepted. The Appellate Authority has rightly rejected the said contention. 3. The second argument is that the order passed under Sec. 11 (4) of the Act is a nullity. It is contended that the Rent Controller is bound to make an enquiry under Sec.11(3) when an application is filed and decide what is the amount to be paid by the tenant to the landlord. As the Rent Controller has not done so, and passed an ex parte order, it is a nullity. I do not accept this contention. It is not a case of want of jurisdiction on the part of the Rent Controller. If there was an ex parte order, the remedy of the petitioner was to file an application to set aside the ex parte order. Not having done so, and long after the order had become final, it is not open to the petitioner to now claim that the order is a nullity. 4. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in S.S.Khader Mohammed Rowther and Company v. G.S.Sundaram, 91 L.W. 122. In that case, on a petition filed by the landlord for eviction for personal occupation under Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act, the court passed an order stating that the respondent was absent and no representation was made on his behalf. The court set the respondent ex parte and stating that P.W.1 was examined, eviction was ordered with costs. In that case, on a petition filed by the landlord for eviction for personal occupation under Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act, the court passed an order stating that the respondent was absent and no representation was made on his behalf. The court set the respondent ex parte and stating that P.W.1 was examined, eviction was ordered with costs. The order was challenged in revision before this Court. This Court held that the order did not satisfy the requirements of Sec.10(3)(e) of the Act because it did not show that eviction had been ordered on the basis of the Rent Controller’s satisfaction that the landlord’s claim was bona fide. On that ground, the order was set aside. That ruling cannot in any way help the petitioner, to contend in this case that the ex parte order is a nullity, when there is a provision for passing such orders. The Rent Controller is certainly entitled to pass an ex parte order if the party chooses to be absent after due service when there is a provision in the Act to get it set aside by the person aggrieved if the circumstances warrant the same. Hence, the order is not a nullity. 5. The third contention is that the delay on the part of the tenant in making the deposit having been explained, it is the duty of the court to have considered that explanation and passed an order accordingly. My attention is drawn to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Manmohan Kaur v. Surya Kant Bhagwani, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 291. In a case arising under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, the court said that the court must from a proper perspective judge the question whether the delay or failure to deposit the rent in terms of the order under Sec.13 of that Act has been properly explained, then the court has a discretion to excuse the delay, but if the delay has not been properly explained then the court has no discretion. The decision will not apply in the present case. Admittedly, an order has been passed on 9.4.1991 directing the tenant to pay a particular sum of money. Not having done so, the tenant applied for extension of time for deposit and it was granted by the Rent Controller till 11.6.1991. Even then the tenant failed to deposit the amount, even on the extended time. Admittedly, an order has been passed on 9.4.1991 directing the tenant to pay a particular sum of money. Not having done so, the tenant applied for extension of time for deposit and it was granted by the Rent Controller till 11.6.1991. Even then the tenant failed to deposit the amount, even on the extended time. In such circumstances, the explanation sought to be projected by the tenant is that he was permitted to pay the admitted arrears of rent as per the order dated 3.5.1991 and not the entire arrears as prescribed by the earlier order. This explanation is obviously spurious and unacceptable as pointed out already that explanation cannot at all be considered to be an explanation of the delay on the part of the tenant. Hence, that contention is rejected. 6. Finally learned counsel for the petitioner prays for time to vacate the premises. I have never been in the habit of granting time for vacating the premises. Particularly in this case, I have found that the tenant has been trying to play with the court and in that view also, I am not inclined to grant time. 7. These revision petitions are, therefore, dismissed.