JUDGMENT 1. - This judgment shall dispose of all the writ petitions shown in Schedule 'A. 2. For the purpose of appreciating the facts, the case of Notan Das Rupani (S.B. Civil W.P. No. 7319/93) is taken into consideration. 3. The petitioner submitted an application for registration and allotment of a house in Jaipur City on hire purchase basis under the General Registration Scheme, 1979 of the Board on 29th January, 1980 and a sum of Rs. 500/- was deposited. The Certificate of Registration for allotment was issued to the petitioner. The initial registration was in E.W.S. group. Subsequently, the petitioner applied for change of his income group for E.W.S. ground to MIG 'B' which was accepted by the respondent and a Certificate of Registration was issued on depositing the balance amount for change of the said group. 4. Under the Disposal of Property Regulations, 1970, the Board has to reserve/allot ready-made house to the registered applicant on the basis of availability of tenements/houses by draw of lots or otherwise on the mode of payment as indicated in the registration form. There had been number of the schemes since 1979 with regard to self-finance and out-right sale basis. 5. The petitioner received a letter dated 1.11.1993 requiring him to deposit a sum of Rs. 40,000/- in three instalments mentioned therein. It was intimated to the petitioner that the Board is not in a position to allot the house under the hire purchase scheme that the allotment is on out-right basis. It was also informed that the facility of the loan can be obtained from other financial institutions like HDFC, Canfin Homes Ltd., LIC Housing Finance Ltd., and any shortfall of the loan is to be arranged by the allottee from his own sources. Failure to do so was threatened with the consequence of cancellation of the registration. The representation was submitted to the respondent and since no action was taken by them the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 raising the following questions : (1) That the Board has no jurisdiction/authority/power/justification for changing the facility of procurement of houses from hire-purchase to out-right sale. (2) That the respondents are estopped on the doctrine of promissory estoppel to change the system of allotment, it was agreed and assured as per terms of registration scheme. (2) That the respondents are estopped on the doctrine of promissory estoppel to change the system of allotment, it was agreed and assured as per terms of registration scheme. (3) That the resolution of the Board dated 26.11.91 would be prospective and not retrospective and would be applicable only for those applicants who have applied for registration after the said date. 6. The Rajasthan Housing Board Act, 1969 was promulgated to provide for measures to be taken to deal with and satisfy the need of housing accommodation in the State of Rajasthan. The procedure for establishment of the Board have been provided in the said Act with powers and duties of the Board to undertake housing scheme. Under Section 33 of the Act, after the budget is approved by the State Government the scheme has to be published in the Official Gazette. Under section 53 the Board has been empowered to make regulations with the previous sanction of the State Government in respect of the principles to be followed in allotment of tenements and premises and for regulating its procedure and the disposal of its business. 7. On behalf of the respondents it is submitted that there is no infringement of any constitutional or statutory rights of the petitioner or failure to perform any constitutional or statutory duty on the part of respondents and in respect of the contract, the extraordinary remedy cannot be availed of. It is also submitted that the petitioners are registered under the General Registration Scheme which does not confer any right for allotment of houses on hire purchase basis. It is also submitted that the Board is empowered under section 34 of the Act to vary the housing scheme and the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable and the action cannot be said to be arbitrary or capricious. 8. The General Registration was opened in the year 1979 and thereafter in 1982, and, at that time no public financial institutions were involved but, subsequently the Housing Development Financial Corporation, Canfin Houses Ltd., Life Insurance Corporation of India etc. have come out with their schemes of granting financial assistance and 85% of the loan of the cost of construction was allowed which was re-payable in instalments spread- over to 20 years. have come out with their schemes of granting financial assistance and 85% of the loan of the cost of construction was allowed which was re-payable in instalments spread- over to 20 years. According to the hire purchase policy evolved by the Housing Board the applicants were required to pay 35% of the cost of construction as registration amount and seed money/initial deposit and the balance 65% was payable in instalments over a period of 10 years. The Housing Board was required to allot the house on out-right sale basis and on hire-purchase basis in the ratio of 45:55. It appears that the said ratio could not be maintained, the reason of which has been stated by the respondents that the houses constructed and offered to the various applicants were not taken by them on outright sale basis and therefore, they were allotted on hire purchase basis and thus the percentage is increased resulting in extra financial burden and stringency as a result of which the Board had taken the decision to allot the houses/flats only on outright basis. The problem with regard to the realisation of instalment have also been pointed out for which nothing is to be said except that the respondents are themselves responsible for their inaction and not keeping the proper and up-to-date accounts and not taking the action for realisation of the dues timely. There cannot be a bigger proof of such inefficiency, then the contention of the respondent that, to the, 90,350 persons to whom houses/flats have been allotted on hire purchase basis, 65% of such allottees have committed default a sum of Rs. 433 crores have been blocked out of the total amount of Rs. 667 crores. Even if there is no power of attachment or resumption of property in case of default, it was the duty of the respondent to take timely legal action and also to move to the State Government for appropriate legislation/regulation conferring such power, so that public money is not retained by the persons who were not law abiding. The regulation 5 authorises the Board to decide the criteria for disposal of the property. 9. In the General Registration Scheme of 1979 in para 2.4(g) it is mentioned that the reservation shall be done on out-right sale basis and hire-purchase basis in the ratio of 45% and 55%. The regulation 5 authorises the Board to decide the criteria for disposal of the property. 9. In the General Registration Scheme of 1979 in para 2.4(g) it is mentioned that the reservation shall be done on out-right sale basis and hire-purchase basis in the ratio of 45% and 55%. Power has been given that, if sufficient options of out-right sale are not received, then the balance houses could be reserved on hire purchase basis. According to the said scheme, a person can change the category from hire-purchase to out-right, but, vice-versa is not possible. Registration Fee has been prescribed depending on the yearly income of the applicant and such applicants could be divided in 5 categories. Sizes of the house, their value have also been given in the said scheme. 10. The scheme of General Registration 1982 is also on the same line, wherein in Para 1.5.3. the reservation on hire- purchase basis have been specified at 55% and on out-right sale basis 45%. In Para 1.8 the amount of registration has been specified based on yearly income for the .5 categories of applicants. In Para 1.9.1 it has been provided that, on the basis of reservation on the house of the applicant, the seed money has to be paid on demand in two equal instalments, the first instalment is payable within one month of the receipt of the demand note and second instalment within six months. Penalty and interest have also been specified. In Para 1.12 it has been mentioned that the Board is, fully authorised to fix the price of the houses constructed by it on out-right sale and hire- purchase basis and its decision shall be final. The registration has been contemplated only in one city of applicants and it has also been provided that after the registration is done, the permission for change of group will not be given. 11. The Rajasthan Housing Board (Disposal of Property) Regulations 1970 was approved by the Government vide letter No. E 9 (17)TP/70 dated 19.5.71. The registration has been contemplated only in one city of applicants and it has also been provided that after the registration is done, the permission for change of group will not be given. 11. The Rajasthan Housing Board (Disposal of Property) Regulations 1970 was approved by the Government vide letter No. E 9 (17)TP/70 dated 19.5.71. The disposal price has been defined in Clause 2(13) as under:- "Disposal Price', "means when applied to a property, the price at which the property is to be disposed of by sale or hire-purchase, the amount being fixed for each case on the basis approved by the Board from time to time." The hire-purchase or hire purchase system in Clause 2(21) is as under : " 'Hire-Purchase' or 'Hire-Purchase System' means a system in which a participant takes steps to secure rights in a property under a scheme by payment of deposit and also a specified number of monthly instalments spread over a specified number of years during which he remains a tenant on the terms and conditions set for the purpose and on the expiry of the said years ceases to be a tenant and becomes owner after payment of all dues." 12. The procedure for disposal of property including the registration has been given in the regulations. The disposal of the property is to be effected either by hire-purchase or sale on outright basis by the Board and the hire- purchase or the disposal price is to be fixed by the Board. The manner of payment of hire-purchase price and the period of hire-purchase have also been specified. 13. From the registration schemes of General Registration 1979 and 1982, it is clear that the Board has specified the percentage of houses to be given on hire-purchase basis in respect of the various categories of persons of whom the registration is made. It appears that on account of the practical problems and financial difficulties and other restrains, a resolution dated 26.11.91 was passed in the 158th meeting of the Board, wherein it was resolved that in respect of the categories of Higher Income Group, Middle Income Group, 'B', and Middle Income Group W, the option for registration is abolished. It appears that on account of the practical problems and financial difficulties and other restrains, a resolution dated 26.11.91 was passed in the 158th meeting of the Board, wherein it was resolved that in respect of the categories of Higher Income Group, Middle Income Group, 'B', and Middle Income Group W, the option for registration is abolished. The said decision was come into effect in respect of registration after 1.1.1992 as is evident from the Officer Order dated 20.12.1991 : " jktLFkku vkoklu e.My] t;iqj dzekad % eq0l0iz0@91@4392 fnukad 20-12-1991 dk;kZy; vkns'k fo"k;% mPp vk; oxZ ,oa e/;e vk; oxZ esa fdjk;k dz; i)fr dk fodYi lekIr fd;s tkus ckcrA e.My dh 24oha cSBd fnukad 9-4-73 ds fu.kZ; fcUnq la[;k 24-6 ds vUrxZr fy;s x;s fu.kZ;kuqlkj e.My }kjk izR;sd oxZ esa 45 izfr'kr vkoklksa dk vkoaVu udn Hkqxrku i)fr ds vkosndksa dks vkSj 55 izfr'kr vkoklksa dk vkoaVu fdjk;k i)fr ds vkosndksa dks fd;k tkrk gSA mDr izdj.k ds lEcU/k esa e.My dh 158oha cSBd fnukad 26-11-91 ds fcUnq la[;k 158-12 esa iqu% fy;s x;s fu.kZ;ksa ds ifjizs{; esa fnukad 1 tuojh 1992 ls mPp vk; oxZ vkSj e/;e vk; oxZ c ,oa e/;e vk; oxZ v esa iathdj.k djokus okys vkosndksa ds fy, fdjk;k dz; i)fr dk fodYi lekIr fd;k tkrk gS A fnukad 1 tuojh] 1992 ls mDr vk; oxksZa ds vkosnd dsoy uxn Hkqxrku i)fr esa gh viuk iathdj.k djok ldsaxsA g0@& ( izfeyk lqjk.kk ) eq[; lEink izcU/kd " 14. In few of the cases besides the registration money, the applicants were required to deposit the seed money in 3 instalments which has been deposited by them and thereafter they were informed that the house cannot be allotted on hire-purchase basis and will be allotted only on out-right sale basis. The finances could be arranged only by the institutions providing the loan for such purposes. On the point of estoppel, the following authorities have been relied upon : (1) Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, 1988-1 SCC 86 wherein the following observations were made : "It is true, that in the formative period, it was generally said that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked by the promisee unless he has suffered 'detriment' or 'prejudice'. It was often said simply, that the party asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment. It was often said simply, that the party asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment. But this has not been explained in so many decisions all over. All that is now required is that the party asserting the estoppel must have acted upon the assurance given to him. Must have relied upon the representation made to him. It means, the party has changed or altered the position by relying on the assurance or the representation. The alteration of position by the party is the only indispensable requirement of the doctrine. It is not necessary to prove further any damage, detriment or prejudice to the party asserting the estoppel. The court, however, would compel the opposite party to adhere to the representation acted upon or abstained from acting. The entire doctrine proceeds on the premise that it is reliance based and nothing more. The concept of detriment as we now understand it is whether it appears unjust, unreasonable or inequitable that the promiser should be allowed to resile from his assurance or representation, having regard to what the promisee has done or refrained from doing in reliance on the assurance or representation. It is, however, quite fundamental that the doctrine of promissory estoppel, cannot be used to compel the public bodies or the Government to carry out the representation or promise which is contrary to law or which is outside their authority or power. Secondly, the estoppel stems from equitable doctrine. It, therefore, requires that he who seeks equity must do equity. The doctrine, therefore, cannot also be invoked if it is found to be inequitable or unjust in its enforcement" (2) Amrit Vanaspati Ltd. v. State of Punjab, 1992-85 STC 493 wherein it was observed by the Apex Court that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an extension of the principle of equity, the basic purpose of which is to promote justice founded on fairness and relieve a promisee of any injustice perpetrated due to the promiser's going back on the promise, is incapable of being enforced in a court of law if the promise which furnishes the cause of action or agreement express or implied, giving rights to a binding contract is statutorily prohibited or is against policy. In the present, case, it has not been pointed that there is any statutory prohibition or the earlier policy of registration was against public policy. In the present, case, it has not been pointed that there is any statutory prohibition or the earlier policy of registration was against public policy. (3) Narendra Kumar Maheshwari v. Union of India and Others, 1990 Supp. SCC 440 . In this case, the non-statutory guidelines framed by the Statutory Authority or Government were considered as binding on the doctrines of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel. It was observed that the doctrine of legitimate expectation applies only when a person had been given reason to believe that the State will abide by a certain policy or guideline on the basis of which such applicant might have been led to take certain actions. This doctrine is akin to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. It was observed that it has to be borne in mind that the guidelines on which the petitioners have relied are not statutory in character. These guidelines are not judicially enforceable. The competent authority might depart from these guidelines where the proper exercise of its discretion so warrants. The judicial review was held possible where there was arbitrariness and malafide and where the purpose of an authority in exercising its statutory power and that of legislature in conferring the powers are demonstrably at variance. It was held to be exercised cautiously and soberly. It was further observed that guidelines are issued by the Governments and Statutory Authorities in various types of situations. Where such guidelines are intended to clarify or implement the conditions and requirements precedent to the exercise of certain rights conferred in favour of citizens or persons and a deviation therefrom directly affects the rights so vested the persons whose rights are affected have a clear right to approach the court for relief. (4) Indian Aluminium Company Ltd. v. Karnataka Electricity Board and Others, 1992-3 SCC 580 . In this case, the power tariff was increased uniformly for all power intensive industries by annulling the existing agreements. It was held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not attracted in the sphere of statutory power. (5) Union of India v. J.K. Industries Ltd., RLR 1989(II 662) wherein it was observed by this Court that "it is well settled that any Government in exercise of its powers conferred on it by a Statute or the powers of subordinate legislation cannot act contrary to the terms of representation it had earlier made. (5) Union of India v. J.K. Industries Ltd., RLR 1989(II 662) wherein it was observed by this Court that "it is well settled that any Government in exercise of its powers conferred on it by a Statute or the powers of subordinate legislation cannot act contrary to the terms of representation it had earlier made. It can only do so in the following well-recognised exceptional cases : (1) that there can be no promissory estoppel against the Legislature in the exercise of its legislative functions; (2) that the Government or public authority cannot be debarred by promissory estoppel from enforcing a statutory prohibition; (3) that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation on or promise which is contrary to law; (4) that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable in cases where the authority or power of the Officer of the Government or the public authority is outside the authority or the power to make that; and (5) that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires. If it can be shown by the Govt. that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired it would be inequitable to hold the Govt. to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an enquiry in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Govt. Except these exceptions, the Law is now well-settled that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Govt. in exercise of its Governmental, public or executive functions." (6) Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., 1985-4 SCC 369 wherein it was observed by the Apex Court "now the doctrine of promissory estoppel is well-established in the administrative law of India. It represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and, though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. The basis of this doctrine is the interposition of equity which has always, true to its form, stepped in to mitigate the rigour of strict law. This doctrine, though of ancient vintage, was rescued from obscurity by the decision of Mr. Justice Denning as he then was, in his celebrated judgment in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. . This doctrine, though of ancient vintage, was rescued from obscurity by the decision of Mr. Justice Denning as he then was, in his celebrated judgment in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. . The true principle of promissory estoppel is that where one party has by his word or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise or representation which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise or representation is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise or representation would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties. It has often been said in England that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot itself be the basis of an action : it can only be a shield and not a sword : but the law in India has gone far ahead of the narrow position adopted in England and as a result of the decision of this Court in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P. , it is now 'well-settled that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not limited in its application only to defence but it can also found a cause of action. The decision of this Court in Motilal Sugar Mills case contains an exhaustive discussion of the doctrine of promissory estoppel and we find ourselves wholly in agreement with the various parameters of this doctrine outlined in that decision." The doctrine of promissory estoppel held applicable against the Government in exercise of its Governmental or executive functions and the doctrine of executive necessity or freedom of future executive action cannot be unfettered to defeat the purpose of doctrine of promissory estoppel. (7) Bakul Cashew Co. v. STO, 1986-2 SCC 365 . (7) Bakul Cashew Co. v. STO, 1986-2 SCC 365 . It was held "'for the purpose of applicability of doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government it must be established (i) that there was a definite representation by the Government; (ii) that the persons to whom the representation or promise was made in fact altered their position by acting upon such representation or promise; and (iii) that they suffered some prejudice sufficient to constitute an estoppel. The evidence of the alleged representation should be clear and unambiguous showing it to be certain to every intent. Vague assurances cannot form the basis for a plea of estoppel." (8) Vij Resins Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, 1989-3 SCC 115 . In this case "the petitioners were invited to set-up industries by assuring them supply of the raw-material. They changed their position on the basis of representations made by the State and when the factories were ready and they were in a position to utilise the raw-material, the impugned Act came into force to obliterate their rights and enabled the State to get out of the commitments. It was observed that no estoppel against the legislature and the vires of the Act cannot be tested by invoking the plea but so far as the State Government is concerned the rule of estoppel does apply and the precedents of this Court are clear". The petitions were allowed and the petitioners were given the benefit. 15. It is thus evident that the Board is constituted under the Act of 1970 and is a Statutory Body. If there is an arbitrary decision, then irrespective of the fact that the petitioners have an efficacious alternate remedy, the writ jurisdiction could be invoked. Besides, this matter is likely to affect a big section of the society who are aggrieved by the action of the respondents. In the various advertisements and schemes issued from time to time including the General Registration Schemes and the Regulations, it is evident that the Board contemplated the registration in the categories of out-right sale as well as hire-purchase basis and the same is to be specified in the application form which the applicant is not entitled to change in a case from out-right basis to hire-purchase basis while the other is permissible. The facility which the HUDCO was providing to the Housing Board might not be available to it and may be available directly to the applicants, but, it is very much certain that the respondents are not exempt from their liability to carry-out the representation which they have made in the schemes and advertisements issued and for any reason including the grounds of necessity or of expediency there cannot be any failure on their part to carry-out the promises which they have made. I am not deciding the issue as to whether the facility for providing the houses on hire-purchase basis could be abolished altogether or not. But, in view of the Office Order of the respondent dated 20th December, 1991, in which it has been clarified that the decision of the Board dated 26.11.1991 shall be applicable only in respect of the registrations which are affected after 1st January, 1992, it is not a matter of contract alone, but is for resiling (by) the respondents from the promises which they have given to the needy persons while submitting their application for registration and is based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel as well as on the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The equity is in favour of the petitioner. The various factors which have been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents are also taken into consideration so as not to affect their rights. In these circumstances, it is held; (i) that the decision of the Board dated 26.11.1991 in respect of the policy of non allotment of houses on hire- purchase system would be applicable for registrations which have been done from 1.1.1992 in respect of Higher-income Group, Middle-income Group 'A and Middle-income Group 'B' alone. However, no registration shall be cancelled of the applicants, if they have failed to make the payment on out-right basis and were registered giving their option for hire-purchase basis. The respondents would depute an Officer notifying to all the applicants, his name, place and time to contact him, who will assist the applicants in getting the loan sanctioned from I-IUDCO and other financial institutions. If such institutions are providing the loan, the applicants will have no objection in executing the documents and paying their charges as the said loan is provided on the lesser rate of interest and for a larger period. If such institutions are providing the loan, the applicants will have no objection in executing the documents and paying their charges as the said loan is provided on the lesser rate of interest and for a larger period. If any applicant is not being granted the loan, then it would be the duty of the respondent to allot the house on hire-purchase basis. If the applicant is not eligible on account of any fraud, mis-representation or any other reason like, registration having been obtained, in two cities etc. the respondent would be free to cancel the registration in accordance with law. The allotment in the categories other than Higher-income Group, Middle income Group 'A and 'B' on hire-purchase basic shall not be denied. The respondent would be under duty to provide full facility to the petitioners in assisting to get the loan from the financial institutions on their failure to provide the facility by themselves. The writ petition stand disposed of in accordance with the above directions Writ Petitions Disposed of Accordingly. *******