Judgment : This revision is against the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Periyar District at Erode in Crl.R.P. No.38 of 1991 reversing the order of the Judicial Magistrate, Kangeyam in M.C.No. 11 of 1990 in the claim of maintenance under Sec. 125, Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The first respondent herein is the wife of the revision petitioner and after the birth of the second respondent herein, due to the incompatibility between them, they were living separately from the year 1982 onwards. The first respondent filed the petition under Sec. 125 Code of Criminal Procedure claiming maintenance alleging that her husband, the revision petitioner herein, had deserted her and also has married a second wife and therefore she is entitled to claim maintenance. She has also mentioned in the petition that on 17. 1982 in the presence of the Panchayatdars Rs. 3,000 to the first respondent and Rs. 1,000 to the second respondent was paid as an interim arrangement for their maintenance and as the husband is now employed in Jeeva Transport Corporation drawing a salary of more than Rs. 1,500 they are entitled to maintenance at the rate of Rs. 300 and Rs. 200 respectively. The learned Magistrate, Kangeyam, dismissed the petition holding that the wife has executed a registered release deed giving up her claim for maintenance after receiving a lumpsum payment of Rs. 4,000 towards maintenance for herself and her children and she is not entitled to again claim maintenance under Sec. 125, Code of Criminal Procedure. On revision before the learned Sessions Judge, Periyar District, he reversed the findings of the learned Judicial Magistrate holding that the arrangement under the release deed 17. 1982 was only temporary and therefore the revision petitioner herein is bound to pay maintenance to his wife and daughter. He fixed the maintenance at Rs.300 to the wife and Rs. 200 to the child. As against this order of the learned Sessions Judge, the husband has come forward with this revision. .3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits before me that though the first respondent herein was married to the revision petitioner in the year 1977, after a few years. She was reluctant to live with the revision petitioner, resulting in a panchayat, in which both parties had agreed to live separately and Ex.R-1 registered agreement also was executed by the first respondent after receiving a sum of Rs. She was reluctant to live with the revision petitioner, resulting in a panchayat, in which both parties had agreed to live separately and Ex.R-1 registered agreement also was executed by the first respondent after receiving a sum of Rs. 3,000 for herself and Rs. 1,000 for her daughter towards their maintenance and having agreed to live separately from her husband after receiving a lumpsum payment and also after giving up her right of maintenance under this document, the wife is not entitled to invoke Sec. 125, Code of Criminal Procedure claiming maintenance now. The learned counsel relied upon two decisions of this Court in Mohiswara Rao v. Durgamba, I.L.R. 47 Mad. 308 and Kameswaramma v. Thammanna, A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 798, wherein it was held that a contract by a Hindu widow with her husband’s coparceners to receive a fixed sum for maintenance and not to claim any increase in future maintenance even in case of change of circumstances, is a valid agreement and the widow is not entitled to claim any increase in the maintenance amount originally fixed even if there was change of circumstances. According to the learned counsel, in view of these decisions, as the first respondent had accepted Rs. 3,000 as maintenance for herself and Rs. 1,000 for her daughter under Ex.R-1 and has given up here right also to claim any maintenance in future, the right given up by them voluntarily under the registered instrument cannot be revived and therefore, the learned Sessions Judge is not correct in fixing the maintenance to the respondents herein. The learned Sessions Judge, Periyar District, has found that the arrangement under Ex.R-1 was only interim and therefore the wife and child are entitled to claim maintenance. But on a perusal of Ex.R-1, it does not seem to be an interim arrangement. It reads that the wife had given up her right of maintenance as she had received Rs.4,000 as maintenance for herself and her daughter. Therefore, certainly it cannot be treated as an interim arrangement. 4. Even if it is taken that it is a release deed giving up the right to claim maintenance in future, the question is whether the wife and child are entitled to revive the claim of maintenance even if a lumpsum payment was made initially. Therefore, certainly it cannot be treated as an interim arrangement. 4. Even if it is taken that it is a release deed giving up the right to claim maintenance in future, the question is whether the wife and child are entitled to revive the claim of maintenance even if a lumpsum payment was made initially. It should be borne in mind that the relationship of husband and wife, between the revision petitioner and the first respondent is not snapped and still it continues. Secondly, it is admitted by the petitioner that he has married a second wife, and is living with her. Therefore, the first respondent herein is entitled to live separately. Simply, because the revision petitioner herein had paid certain amount in the presence of the panchayatdars towards the maintenance of the respondents herein, he is not entitled to take a second wife. Even if he felt that he could not live with the first respondent herein, he should have initiated the proceedings for the divorce of the first respondent and then married a second wife. Without doing that, as he has married a second wife when his first wife is alive, the first wife is certainly entitled for a separate residence. .5. Even though the first respondent has executed the release deed Ex.R-1 for herself, and on behalf of her daughter, if the terms of the document are adverse to the interests of the minor, certainly the document is not binding upon the minor. Under this document only Rs. 1,000 has been paid to the minor daughter, for her maintenance. This cannot be said to be an adequate amount for the maintenance of a minor girl till she attains majority. Even this Rs. 1,000 may not be sufficient to maintain a minor girl for one year. Therefore, the first respondent cannot act against the interests of her daughter, the second respondent, and on this ground also, the second respondent is entitled to ignore this agreement between her parents. .6. Then coming to the binding nature of this document upon the first respondent/wife, any agreement between the parties should be equitable and it should serve the purpose for which it was executed. Only Rs. 3,000 has been received by the first respondent for her maintenance till her life time. Within 5 years after the marriage, this agreement came into existence. Then coming to the binding nature of this document upon the first respondent/wife, any agreement between the parties should be equitable and it should serve the purpose for which it was executed. Only Rs. 3,000 has been received by the first respondent for her maintenance till her life time. Within 5 years after the marriage, this agreement came into existence. Therefore, the first respondent must have been in her early 20s and therefore it cannot be stated that Rs. 3,000 paid under this document will be sufficient for her maintenance till her life time. In Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fisslli, 1979 Crl.L.J. 151. The Apex Court, while considering the claim of the maintenance of a divorced Muslim wife, has observed that the payment of illusory amounts by way of customary or personal law requirement will be considered in the reduction of maintenance rate but cannot annihilate the rate unless it is a reasonable substitute. It is further observed that the purpose of the payment under any customary or any personal law must be to obviate destitution of the divorce and to provide her with wherewithal to maintain herself, that the whole scheme of Set. 127(3)(b) is manifestly to recognise the substitute maintenance arrangement by lumpsum payment organised by the custom of the community or the personal law of the parties and there must be a rational relation between the sum so paid and its potential as provision for maintenance to interpret, otherwise is to stultify the project. Even though the above expression refers to the project. Even though the above expression refers to the customary or personal law, by which lumpsum payment is payable, the ratio of the decision is that a lumpsum payment must be reasonable to meet the requirement and it cannot be to obviate the right to claim maintenance. Even though in the latest decision in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 945, while referring to the above decision, the mistake therein with regard to the mehar amount, which is not intended for the maintenance, but is paid only as a mark of respect, the principle therein has been accepted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. In paragraph 10 of the latter Judgment, it is observed, though Bai Tahira was correctly decided, we would like respectably, to draw attention to an error which has crept in the Judgment. In paragraph 10 of the latter Judgment, it is observed, though Bai Tahira was correctly decided, we would like respectably, to draw attention to an error which has crept in the Judgment. Therefore, the principle laid down in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fisalli, 1979 Crl.L.J. 151, has been approved by the later decision also. Therefore, the lumpsum payment by the husband to his wife towards maintenance, cannot be illusory but to meet the real needs of the wife towards her maintenance. It is needless to say that the paltry sum of Rs. 3,000 paid to the first respondent herein in the year 1982, will not be sufficient for her till her life time when especially she happens to be a young woman in the early twenties. Therefore, certainly, she is entitled to claim additional maintenance due to the change of circumstances, viz., the cost of living going up day by day. 7. In addition to these circumstances referred to above, the law also is settled now that irrespective of an agreement between the husband and wife with regard to any maintenance the wife is entitled to claim for increase of maintenance after the commencement of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. This aspect has been considered by a Bench of this Court in Seshamma v. Thiyuuammal, (1963)2 M.L.J. 408: A.I.R. 1964 Mad. 217. In that case, when the Hindu wife agreed to receive maintenance at a particular rate in a court proceeding, entered into a compromise and a compromise decree was passed fixing the rate of maintenance and also restricting her right to claim additional maintenance. However, this Court has found that after commencement of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 Sec. 25 of the Act gives right to the wife to claim enhanced maintenance in the event of change of circumstances. Sec. 25 reads, “the amount of maintenance, whether fixed by a decree of court or by agreement either before or after the commencement of this Act may be altered subsequently if there is a material change in the circumstances justifying such alteration.” Therefore, even if an agreement came into existence after commencement of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, the wife is entitled to ask for additional maintenance if the change of circumstances is proved. At the time of Ex.R-1 agreement, the revision petitioner was only a lorry driver and admittedly now he is permanent employee in Jeeva Transport Corporation drawing a minimum salary of Rs. 1,500 per month. This is a change of circumstance No. 1. The second change of circumstance is that the cost of living has gone up steeply and the meagre sum of Rs. 3,000 paid in the year 1982, may not be sufficient for her maintenance even for one year. Therefore that change of circumstances also cannot be disputed. Hence, certainly, the respondents who are the wife and daughter of the revision petitioner, are entitled to claim additional maintenance and invoke Sec. 125, Code of Criminal Procedure. 8. Coming to the quantum of maintenance as the revision petitioner’s salary is around Rs. 1,500, he has to maintain himself and other family members. Therefore, I feel that Rs. 200 to the first respondent and Rs. 150 to the second respondent will be a reasonable amount taking into consideration the lumpsum payment made already. Therefore, the maintenance amount fixed by the lower court has to be modified accordingly. 9. In the result, subject to the modification of the maintenance amount to Rs. 200 and Rs. 150 to the first respondent and second respondent respectively, the revision is otherwise dismissed. In view of the order passed in the revision no order is necessary in Crl.M.P. No. 4533 of 1992.