M. Poomalai v. The Special Tribunal for Co-operative Cases at Madras &
Others
1994-01-20
K.A.SWAMI, SOMASUNDARAM
body1994
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- K.A.Swami, C.J. This appeal is preferred against the order dated 3rd December, 1992 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P.No. 18397 of 1992. Learned single Judge has dismissed the writ petition. Hence, the petitioner therein has come up in appeal. 2. In the writ petition, the petitioner sought for quashing the order dated 5. 1992 passed by the court of Special Tribunal for Co-operative Cases, Madras, on the interlocutory application (unnumbered) of 1992 filed in S.T.C.A. (unnumbered) of 1992 registered as S.R.No.566 of 1992 on the file of the said Tribunal. 3. The petitioner/appellant preferred an appeal against the order dated 38. 1989 passed by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, At-tur, in Na.Ka.23617/87 Tha.Va., directing the petitioner/appellant to pay a sum of Rs.28,225.43 by way of surcharge, under the provisions of Sec.71 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, with interest at 15% from the date of the order. 4. That appeal was returned for rectification of defects. The same was not re-presented within the period allowed by law. There was a delay of 818 days in re-presentation of the appeal papers. The tribunal rejected the application filed for condoning the delay in re-presentation of the appeal papers by the order dated 8th May, 1992. Learned single Judge has also agreed with the order of the tribunal, holding that the delay being large, it cannot be condoned, even if the matter is viewed very liberally. 5. Learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 in the appeal contend that there is virtually no explanation offered for the delay of 818 days in preferring the appeal, therefore, the tribunal as well as the learned single Judge are justified in refusing to condone the delay. 6. The tribunal as well as the learned single Judge have not taken into consideration the fact that the appeal was filed in time. It related to a matter, wherein surcharge order was passed against the appellant/petitioner, directing him to pay a huge sum. No doubt there was a delay in re-presentation of the papers. It was explained by the petitioner/appellant thai no due certificate was required to be obtained from the Cooperative Department. It was because of non-production of no due certificate, surcharge proceedings were taken out and an order was passed, therefore, production of no due certificate was vital to the appeal, that such a certificate was issued only on 8.
It was explained by the petitioner/appellant thai no due certificate was required to be obtained from the Cooperative Department. It was because of non-production of no due certificate, surcharge proceedings were taken out and an order was passed, therefore, production of no due certificate was vital to the appeal, that such a certificate was issued only on 8. 1991. Even though the papers were returned much earlier for re-presentation, on removing the defects, the same could not be re-presented without the no due certificate, inasmuch as without the no due certificate, he could not have put forth any sustairanable contention against the order of surcharge. That he obtained a no due certificate dated 8. 1991 has been shown by producing a copy of the same at page 1 of the typed set of records. We will not go into the question as to whether production of a no due certificate was necessary for the purpose of re-presentation of the appeal papers. However, we are of the view that if the delay in representation of the appeal papers is not condoned, there will be a failure of justice inasmuch as there will be no determination of the substantive right of the appellant/petitioner who claims that the order of surcharge is not sustainable even (hough the appeal is filed in time. We are also of the view that the delay in re-presentation has not caused any irreparable loss to the respondents nor has it altered the circumstances. Therefore, taking into consideration of the fact that the failure to condone the delay will result in miscarriage of justice and condoning of the delay would not also either take away the right of the respondents or affect them in any manner, as the appeal which is filed in time, has to be decided on merits, we are of the view that the delay has to be condoned. 7. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the order dated 3rd December, 1992 passed in the writ petition and allow the writ petition, quash the order dated 5. 1992 passed by the tribunal and remit the matter to the tribunal with a direction to take the appeal on its file and decide it on merits and in accordance with law. However, we make no order as to costs.