Judgment : The defendant aggrieved by the concurrent judgments of both the courts below has preferred this second appeal. Admittedly, the defendant is a tenant under the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a suit, O.S.No.280 of 1991 on the file of the District Munsif, Pollachi on the footing that the defendant was a licensee and that the licence had been cancelled. That suit was dismissed on the ground that the defendant was a lessee and not a licensee. After that, the plaintiff issued a notice on 21. 1991 through his lawyer, terminating the tenancy. According to the plaintiff, he found certain defects in that notice and issued another notice on 3. 1991 terminating the tenancy. Thereafter, the present suit was filed. In the said suit the defendant contended that he had put up superstructure at a cost of Rs.25,000 and that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover vacant possession from him. Both the courts below have negatived that contention and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff. But the trial court in the course of its judgment observed that the defendant might be entitled to get compensation for the superstructure put up by him. The trial court also observed that if at the time of execution, in case the defendant does not want to remove the superstructure put up by him, but claims compensation therefor the question should be gone into by the Executing Court. But the said observation was only a part of the judgment and there was no direction in the decree as such. The decree merely directed the delivery of possession within a period of two months from that date. With regard to the claim of mesne profits, the decree directed the plaintiff to take separate proceedings under O.20, Rule 12 of Code of Civil Procedure in separate proceedings. The appellate court confirmed the decree for possession, setting aside the observations made by the trial court in its judgment that the question of compensation will be gone into in the execution proceedings. The appellate court held that the defendant was not entitled to claim any compensation as he was only a lessee and he had taken the vacant land on lease and as such, he was bound to deliver possession of the said land in tact to the owner of the property, viz., the plaintiff. 2. The appellate court held that the defendant was not entitled to claim any compensation as he was only a lessee and he had taken the vacant land on lease and as such, he was bound to deliver possession of the said land in tact to the owner of the property, viz., the plaintiff. 2. The appellant has now raised four contentions: the first contention is that the notice dated 3. 1991 refers to an earlier notice stated to have been issued in February, 1991 and also terminated the tenancy with effect from 30.9.1991. In another sentence, the notice terminates, the tenancy on the date of expiry of the next month. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the termination of tenancy was on 30.9.1991, but another date mentioned in the said notice was 30.4.1991, as per the next sentence contained in that notice. According to learned counsel, the suit having been filed on 24. 1991 is not maintainable. This contention was not urged before the lower court. The suit was disposed of after the trial, viz.; on 10. 1993. Obviously, the date 30.9.1991 mentioned in the notice is a typographical error. The tenancy is not one for manufacturing purpose. It is not the case of the defendant that he should have been given six months’ notice as contemplated under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. A notice of 15 days is sufficient under that section insofar as the defendant is concerned. He took the property on lease only for the purpose of running a firewood shop. Hence, a notice issued on 3. 1991 granting more than fifteen days time is sufficient for termination of the tenancy and it also satisfies the requirements of Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The suit having been filed on 24. 1991 and disposed of only on 10. 1993 has not caused any prejudice whatever to the defendant and it cannot be said to be not maintainable in law. 3. The second contention is that the appellate court is in error in exercising its power under O.41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure and setting aside the observation made by the trial court that the question of compensation will be gone into in the execution proceedings, in case the defendant does not want to remove the superstructure put up him, from the land. The lower appellate court has correctly understood the principle of law that in case of tenancy of vacant land, the defendant is bound to redeliver possession of the vacant land and that he cannot claim any relief on the basis of the superstructure put up by him. It is always open to him either to remove the superstructure or to leave it there to be taken by the owner of the land. He cannot claim any compensation for such superstructure in this case. The appellate court has only adopted that principle and has correctly concluded that the observation made by the trial court is erroneous. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that having failed to file any appeal or memorandum of cross-objection against the judgment and decree, the plaintiff is not entitled to contest that portion of the judgment in which the right of the defendant to claim compensation for the superstructure has been recognised. It is also argued by learned counsel that the appellate court is in error to exercise its power under O.41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of his contention learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in Poomalai Ammal v. Subbammal, A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 566: (1952)2 M.L.J. 884 . In that case, the trial court granted a decree against the first defendant. There was no appeal or cross-objection by the first defendant in the lower appellate court. When the matter was taken up before the High Court in a second appeal, the first defendant filed a memorandum of cross-objection, challenging the decree passed by the trial court against her. Learned single Judge of this Court in the said judgment held that the first defendant having failed to file an appeal before the lower appellate court, is not entitled to maintain the memorandum of cross-objection in this Court in a second appeal for the first time. Learned single Judge also held that the provision of O.41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not meant to be exercised, in that case and that the first defendant cannot invoke that provision. The relevant passage in the Judgment reads thus: "A memorandum of cross-objections has been filed by the first defendant who did not file an appeal against the Judgment of the trial court decreeing the suit against her. The relevant passage in the Judgment reads thus: "A memorandum of cross-objections has been filed by the first defendant who did not file an appeal against the Judgment of the trial court decreeing the suit against her. For the first time she has filed a memorandum of cross-objections here which, in effect, is only an appeal against the decree of the trial court invoking O.41, Rule 33, Civil P.C. I do not think that provision is meant to be exercised in favour of a party who did not choose to file an appeal against the Judgment of the trial court and allowed it to become final. Therefore, O.41, Rule 33, C.P.C. does not avail him. Even otherwise this is not a case in which this Court would exercise its discretion under O.41, Rule 33, C.P.C. In the result, the memorandum of cross-objections is dismissed with costs...." The said ruling is not applicable to the facts of this case and it will also not help the appellant, in any way. Learned counsel for the appellant also drew my attention to the decision in T.Atchaiah v. V.Narasingarao, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 725, wherein the trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff and granted a decree for cancellation of the assignment deed and condition of the plaintiffs paying a sum of Rs.13,000 to the defendant. The defendant took the matter on appeal before the High Court. He also filed a cross-objection, but the defendant did not attack the decree of the trial court making him liable to return the sum of Rs.13,000. The High Court reduced the amount to Rs.7,600 by exercise of its powers under O.41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court in the said decision held that the High Court was wrong in taking recourse to O.41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court further held that without a specific ground in the cross-objection and without payment of court fees on the said amount, the plaintiff was not entitled to get any relief from the court, under O.41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said decision also will not apply to the case on hand. In this case, as stated already there is no decree whatever in favour of the defendant by the trial court. The said decision also will not apply to the case on hand. In this case, as stated already there is no decree whatever in favour of the defendant by the trial court. The entire decree passed by the trial court was only against the defendant and there was only an observation in the judgment that the defendant’s right to claim compensation could be considered in the Executing Court. The Appellate Court rightly exercised its power under O.41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure and set aside the said observation. 5. The third contention is that the plaintiff is not the owner of the land and that the land belongs to the Corporation. It is contended that the defendant was not aware of the ownership of the Government at the time, when he took the land on lease. According to learned counsel, the question of ownership has to be decided in the present suit and that the matter ought to have been remanded by the appellate court to the trial court for deciding the question of title. There is absolutely no substance in this contention. The defendant is estopped from disputing the title of the plaintiff to the land. Being a tenant, the defendant ought to have surrendered vacant possession of the land to the plaintiff and he cannot dispute the title of the plaintiff. There is no necessity whatever title, since that issue does not at all arise for consideration in these proceedings. 6. The fourth contention that was urged by learned counsel for the appellant is that the Government of Tamil Nadu issued a Notification on 17. 1994 in G.O.Ms.No.109, (Adi-Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department). It can be seen from the said notification that all house sites encroachments in poramboke lands in the Adi-Dravidar habitations except odai and water course poramboke should be regularised and pattas should be issued to Adi-Dravidar occupants and that the Government also directed that a special drive be organised for that purpose and the work completed in about three months period viz., 30th September, 1994. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the law relating to Adi-Dravidar habitations having been changed by the said Government Order, the appellant being an Adi-Dravida is entitled to the benefit of the said Government Order and that therefore the decree for delivery of possession in favour of the respondent cannot stand. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the law relating to Adi-Dravidar habitations having been changed by the said Government Order, the appellant being an Adi-Dravida is entitled to the benefit of the said Government Order and that therefore the decree for delivery of possession in favour of the respondent cannot stand. There is no merit whatever in this contention also. As pointed out earlier, the appellant is estopped from disputing the title of the respondent. There is nothing before this Court to show that the land belongs to the Government as such. The Government Order refers only to the poramboke lands consisting of house sites occupied by the Adi-Dravidar by way of encroachments. In this case, the land was given to the appellant on lease by the respondent for the purpose of running a firewood shop. It was not really a habitation occupied by the appellant. Even assuming that the appellant is an Adi-Dravida, he is not entitled to the benefit of the said Government Order, as no material is produced before this Court to establish that the said poramboke land belongs to the Government. Therefore, the appellant cannot rely on the said Government Order in support of his contention. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Syed Unnisa v. Rathimuthunissa, A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 445 and that of Rajasthan High Court in Bahimmal Bagdev’s Case, A.I.R. 1976 Raj. 244, wherein it was held that a court of appeal has not only power but a duty to apply the law as it stands on the date of the hearing of the appeal. In this case, according to learned counsel, the law changed with the said G.O.Ms.No.109, dated 17. 1994 and the appellate court ought to have applied it or at any rate thisCourt should apply it and set aside the decree for eviction. I have already given the reasons as to why the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of the above referred GO. Hence the question of application of the alleged change of law does not arise for consideration, as pleaded by the appellant. 8. In the result, there are no merits in the second appeal and the same shall therefore stand dismissed.