Judgment : By G.O.Ms.No.1674, Labour Department, dated 30.7.1987, the Government referred an Industrial Dispute arising between the workmen and the management of Veerasamy Motor Service, Coimbatore-9 to the Labour Court, Coimbatore. The dispute referred was whether the non-employment of about 10 workmen was justified and if not to what relief they were entitled to. However, it is not disputed that on 29. 1986 the Union submitted a charter of demands with regard to minimum wages, permanency provision of amenities etc. Conciliation proceedings were initiated and during conciliation proceedings the management had refused to give work to some of the workmen. It is under such circumstances that the above reference had been made. The management namely Veerasami, Motor Service filed a writ petition W.P.No.5435 of 1988 challenging the order of reference and obtained stay of further proceedings. However, the stay was vacated on 19. 1990. Thereafter, when the dispute was pending adjudication, the said management (second respondent) filed I.A.No.483 of 1992 to implead certain third parties on the ground that those third parties had purchased buses from the second respondent. The said application was dismissed by the Labour Court on the ground that the workmen were never in the employment of the said third parties. Earlier the workmen had filed Application in I.A.No.81 of 1991 for impleading the wife of V.Veeraraghavan, the writ petitioner, and her daughter Sujatha and son Sathishkumar, as parties to the dispute. That application was allowed, but without notice to the petitioner herein. Thereupon W.P.No.17039 was filed and the same was allowed on 11. 1992. Thereafter, the present application in I.A.No.624 of 1992 had been filed to implead the petitioner alone as a respondent. The petitioner filed a detailed counter opposing the application on the ground that she had nothing to do with the dispute. By an order dated 9. 1993 the application was allowed and the petitioner was directed to be impleaded as party respondent to the dispute. It is this order which is sought to be quashed in this writ petition. According to the petitioner, the workmen never approached by Government to modify the order of reference by seeking relief against the petitioner also. Even under Sec.18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as “the act)” summons cannot be issued reference, to parties and thereby enlarging the scope of the reference. 2. According to the petitioner, the workmen never approached by Government to modify the order of reference by seeking relief against the petitioner also. Even under Sec.18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as “the act)” summons cannot be issued reference, to parties and thereby enlarging the scope of the reference. 2. In the counter-affidavit filed by respondents 3 to 12 it is pointed out that one V.Veeraraghavan was operating a number of buses in the name and style of Veerasami Motor Service (V.M.S.) Prior to that his father Veerasami and the other members of the family were running Bus Services in the name of Gobald Motor Service and V.M.S. Private Limited. In an arbitration award a partition arrangement was arrived at giving a number of buses to Veeraraghavan and some buses to his wife (writ petitioner). According to the counter-affidavit of respondents 3 to 12 they were working in the nine buses allotted to Veeraraghavan. It transpires that some of the buses were transferred by Veeraraghavan to his minor children and the petitioner acted as a guardian of the children. The writ petitioner is said to have sold all the buses allotted to her. According to them they have filed the application in I.A.No.624 of 1992 to implead the writ petitioner on the ground that the family of Veeraraghavan comprises of his wife, the writ petitioner and their two children viz. Sujatha and Sathishkumar. In particular on 212. 1988 one of the buses namely, T.A.P. 8125 was transferred by Veeraraghavan to the petitioner and the route permit was also transferred in her name. On the above pleadings the first respondent has passed the impugned order. The first respondent has observed that since the buses are being transferred in the name of the petitioners and her children there was a likelihood of difficulties arising in the execution of any award that may be passed. Reference is made to the arbitration award and the fact that these properties were ancestral properties. Evidence was let in on behalf of the workmen to show that all the buses were working under the management of V.M.S. even though some of the permits had been transferred to the petitioner and her children. The Labour Court also holds that it was one family and there was no scope for the petitioner and her children separately acquiring buses. The Labour Court also holds that it was one family and there was no scope for the petitioner and her children separately acquiring buses. The first respondent disbelieves the allegation that all of them have separate establishments. While meeting the allegation that even the bus transferred to the writ petitioner had been subsequently sold, the first respondent says that even assuming that the bus had been sold by the writ petitioner he would hold that she is necessary party to the dispute. 3. Mr.Vijaya Narayan for the petitioner has taken me through Sub-secs.(4) and (5) of Sec.10 and Sec.18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). According to him parties cannot enlarge the scope of the reference. In particular he lays stress on Sub-sec.(5) of Sec. 10 which provides for the appropriate Government to make any reference to respect of such other matters which may subsequently come up for dispute at any time before the award is passed by the Labour Court. Says Mr.Vijay Narayan except in this way, there is no other way of impleading a third party to an Industrial Dispute. He, however, admits that under Sec. 18(3) of the Act, there is scope for summoning other parties as parties to the dispute, but this cannot be done unless in such a manner so as to enlarge the scope of the reference. He seeks support for this proposition from the last sentence of Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.18 of the Act. Reliance is placed on Arunachalam Pillai v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, (1957)2 M.L.J. 283 .A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 614: 1957. M. W.N. 532: (1957)2 L.L.J. 682 as well as Hochtiev Gammon v. Industrial Tribunal, (1964)2 L.L.J. 460 . 4. As against the above argument Mr.N.G.R.Prasad lays stress on the findings of the Labour Court that Veeraraghavan was doing a family business along with the petitioner and their two children. He refers to the Arbitration Award Ex.W-1. and the allotment of the buses to Veeraghavan and the writ petitioner to buttress his argument that it was ancestral property allotted to the family. He also refers to the various proceedings initiated by the Management to protract proceedings. According to him, the present writ petition against an interlocutory application is nothing but an attempt to drag on the proceedings. and the allotment of the buses to Veeraghavan and the writ petitioner to buttress his argument that it was ancestral property allotted to the family. He also refers to the various proceedings initiated by the Management to protract proceedings. According to him, the present writ petition against an interlocutory application is nothing but an attempt to drag on the proceedings. He argues that so long as employer-employee relationship is established between the workmen and the writ petitioner, she has to be impleaded as a party to the dispute. He relies on a number of decisions in support of his argument. 5. The principles of law and the scope of impleading third parties in an Industrial Dispute came up for consideration in Hochtiev Gammon v. Industrial Tribunal, (1964)2 L.L.J. 460 . In my opinion, there is sufficient guidance for the exercise of the power in the matter of impleading third parties. After holding that the provisions of O.1, Rule 10 of Civil Procedure Code will not get attracted to such cases, the apex court proceeds to say, "Thus we are inclined to take the view that Sri Chatterji is right in contending that Sec. 18(b) as it originally stood postulates that the tribunal had an implied power to summon parties, other than parties to the industrial dispute to appear in the proceedings before it. That naturally raises the question about the extent of this power." The present Sec. 18(3)(b) of the Act is then referred to and it is pointed out that the new provision was identical to the unamended Sec.18(b) of the Act. The Supreme Court then fixes the parameters within which the power can be exercised. In particular it is observed that if the employer named in a reference does not fully represent the interest of the employer as such other persons who are interested in the undertaking of the employer may be joined. Observes the Supreme Court, "The test always must be the addition of the party necessary to make the adjudication itself effective and enforceable? In other words the test may well be would the nonjoinder of the party make the arbitration proceedings ineffective and unenforceable? Observes the Supreme Court, "The test always must be the addition of the party necessary to make the adjudication itself effective and enforceable? In other words the test may well be would the nonjoinder of the party make the arbitration proceedings ineffective and unenforceable? It is in the light of this test that the implied power of the tribunal to add parties must be held to be limited.“ On the facts of the case, the Supreme Court however, held that by impleading one M/s.Hindustan Steel Limited would give rise to an entirely different dispute between one Gammon Ltd. and its alleged principal (Hindustan Steel Limited). Accordingly, the Apex Court held that the same would be wholly foreign to the Industrial Dispute which has been referred to the tribunal. 6. I am of the opinion that it is not necessary to refer to any other citation on behalf of both the parties because this judgment of the Supreme Court is clear and categorical on all the aspects of the case relating to impleading of parties in an Industrial Dispute. On the facts of the present case, only question therefore, to be decided, is whether the relationship of employer and the employee has been proved or established between the workmen and proposed party (writ petitioner). If such a relationship is not established, the writ petitioner will not be a necessary party to the dispute and cannot be summoned under Sec.18(3)(b) of the Act. Unfortunately, while the workmen adduced evidence to show that irrespective of the ownership of the buses all of them were employed by Veerasamy Motor Services and that it was a family business, there was no plea in the affidavit filed in support of the I.A. The application was,filed on the basis and transfer of a bus. On the other hand, the petitioner never cared to file the necessary documents to show that Veerasamy Motor Service is an independent entity with which she was not concerned. For instance, a document is now filed as the partnership deed dated 14. 1982 constituting the Veerasamy Motor Service. It shows that a partnership firm comprised of Veeraraghavan and his daughter Suganthamala. Therefore, it is now argued that the Management is an independent partnership firm in which the petitioner had no interest or involvement. For instance, a document is now filed as the partnership deed dated 14. 1982 constituting the Veerasamy Motor Service. It shows that a partnership firm comprised of Veeraraghavan and his daughter Suganthamala. Therefore, it is now argued that the Management is an independent partnership firm in which the petitioner had no interest or involvement. It is not proper on my part to accept the document at this stage and hold that the petitioner is not an employer of the workmen. Mr.Vijay Narayan also points out that even on the basis of the transfer of bus TAP. 8125 in favour of the writ petitioner on 24. 1986, it cannot be held that the dispute related to the writ petitioner because the non-employment is said to have occurred in or about November, 1986. Further, the bus is said to have been sold away by the petitioner subsequently. I am of the opinion that (the argument of either counsel that merely because certain buses are transferred to a particular person along with the route permit, it would not mean that the employees’ had been transferred to the respective owners of the buses. In fact this was the view taken by the Labour Court itself on the earlier occasion when the second respondent’s application in I.A.No.483 of 1992 seeking to implead certain purchasers was dismissed. I am of the opinion, after giving a careful consideration to the judgment of the Supreme Court above cited, that the question is whether there is employer- employee relationship between the parties proposed to be added and whether for an effective and final adjudication of the dispute, the proposed party is necessary to be impleaded. In S.R.Mudaliar Bros, andothersv. P.O., I.T., Madras and another, (1992)1 L.L.J. 9 , a Division Bench of this Court observed: ”This indicates clearly that the Tribunal is entitled to issue summons to necessary parties. The only relevant question will be whether the parties are necessary for proper adjudication of the dispute without the presence of such parties will be complete and effective.“ 7. On an analysis of the entire issue with reference to the rival submissions I am of the opinion that there are certain defects, in the pleadings, of the parties as well as in the failure to adduce proper evidence, respondents 3 to 12 came up with a case that because certain buses had been transferred the transferees are necessary parties. On an analysis of the entire issue with reference to the rival submissions I am of the opinion that there are certain defects, in the pleadings, of the parties as well as in the failure to adduce proper evidence, respondents 3 to 12 came up with a case that because certain buses had been transferred the transferees are necessary parties. They never averred that the writ petitioner along with her husband and children were running a family business and that the second respondent Veerasamy Motor Service constituted entirely of this family. Equally, the petitioner did not file the partnership deed, before the Labour Court to prove that the second respondent Veerasamy Motor Service only comprised of two partners named thereunder namely, Veeraraghavan and his daughter Suganthamala. In this state of affairs I find a way out based on the arguments of Mr.N.G.R.Prasad. According to him the cardinal principle is that the adjudication of the Labour disputes should not be delayed or postponed on account of flimsy technical objections. Therefore, the mere fact that the petitioner has been impleaded as a party to the Industrial Dispute. There is no need to get alarmed about the same because merely by impleading a party his liability is not finally determined. In this connection, he refers to the provisions of Sec.18(3)(b) of the Act. It is as follows: ”(b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute unless the Board (arbitrator). Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause." He lays emphasis on the last sentence. ‘Unless the Labour Court records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause. Therefore at the time of final adjudication of the industrial dispute the Labour Court should bestow its attention to this aspect of the case and decide whether the writ petitioner had been summoned without proper cause. In other words, at the time of final adjudication there is scope for exonerating the writ petitioner. This must be kept in mind by the first respondent at the time of final adjudication of the Industrial Dispute. It appears to me that this will take care of the apprehension of the writ petitioner. 8. The writ petition is ordered in the following terms: The order in I.A. No.624 of 1992 dated 9. This must be kept in mind by the first respondent at the time of final adjudication of the Industrial Dispute. It appears to me that this will take care of the apprehension of the writ petitioner. 8. The writ petition is ordered in the following terms: The order in I.A. No.624 of 1992 dated 9. 1993 is upheld with the specific direction that the first respondent shall decide at the time of final disposal of the case as to whether the writ petitioner had been summoned without proper cause. The writ petition is ordered in the above terms. There will, however, be no Order as to costs.