Judgment Anandamoy Bhattacharjee, C.J. 1. I have gone through the draft of the judgment prepared by Asok Kumar Ganguly, J. appearing hereinafter, and I agree that the appeal must be allowed and the writ petition giving rise to this appeal must be dismissed. 2. As to the proceeding under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, I reiterate what I stated in Gopalji Prasad vs. State (1981 Criminal Law Journal, page 61) and I am glad that this decision has also earned the concurrence of my learned brother. 3. Ganguly J. has referred to the decisions of Lord Denning in R. vs. Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1968-1 All. E.R. page 763) and R. vs. Chief Constable of Devon (1981-3 All. E.R. page 826) to the effect that Writ Court cannot be moved for issuing a Mandamus upon the police to do specific acts. I do not know why. I would like to think that in a given case a Writ Court may have to mandate the police or some such authority to do the specific act which such authority was otherwise bound to do. But in the case at hand, however, on the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not think this was a fit case which warranted any such mandate from the Writ Court to the police. (Anandamoy Bhattacharjee, C.J.) 4. Asok Kumar Ganguly, J.: The subject matter of Appeal in this case is an Order dated 6th January, 1994 passed by the learned Trial Judge on the writ petition filed by the first Respondent. In the said writ petition the first Respondent virtually prayed for a direction upon the police for implementing the Order dated December 18, 1993 passed by the Executive and Metropolitan Magistrate, 11th Court, Calcutta on a petition under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code filed by the first Respondent. There is also a prayer for removal of some of the employees who are members of the appellant's Union from the Office Premises of the first Respondent situated at the 3rd floor of Premises No. 11/1A, Sarojini Naidu Sarani for the purpose of ensuring free ingress of the first Respondent's Officers, employees and callers and for carrying out its lawful activities and foc removal of some records and documents. 5. 5. With the consent of the parties we decided to hear the present appeal finally and also the Writ Petition and informal paper books have been filed. 6. As the members of the appellant were resisting removal of certain documents, papers etc. the petitioner moved an application before the Executive Magistrate's Court under the provision of s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code whereupon an Order was passed on 18th December, 1993 by the Executive Magistrate Court, Calcutta to the following effect :- "Heard the Learned Advocate, considered. O.C. Park Street, P.S. is to enquire into the matter and report by 20.1.1994 and to see that the O.Ps. and their men and agents to not cause any obstruction in removing the documents belonging to the third parties and to see that the functioning of the firm is not affected in any manner by the wrongful acts of the aced. persons. And further, the O.C. is to provide police picket at the cost of the petitioner if necessary to keep the situation under control and to prevent commission of any cognizable offence. Sd/ - A. K. Gupta, Executive Magistrate, 11th Court, Calcutta." 7. On 6th January, 1994 the learned Trial Judge passed an order inter alia appointing two learned Advocates of this Court as Special Officers to take possession of all documents, papers, books, records, registers including the shares, stock, debentures, dividend, interest, fixed deposit receipts belonging to Respondents Nos. 9, 10, 11 and 12 in this Appeal and to hand over those documents to the said Respondents. At the time of such removal of documents the Joint Secretary of the registered Union was also allowed to be present. The learned Trial Judge was also pleased to direct police assistance to be given to the Special Officers and further restrained the members o£ the appellant from causing any interference in the work of the Special Officers. 8. Mr. Arun Prakash Chatterjee, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant attacked the maintainability of the Writ Petition and the Order of the learned Trial Judge and also the legality of the proceedings under s. 144 on various grounds. 9. The main contention of Mr. 8. Mr. Arun Prakash Chatterjee, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant attacked the maintainability of the Writ Petition and the Order of the learned Trial Judge and also the legality of the proceedings under s. 144 on various grounds. 9. The main contention of Mr. Chatterjee has been that it is a dispute between two sets of private individuals and the same has been dressed up in such a fashion as to invoke the jurisdiction of Writ Court and for the said purpose recourse has been taken to the proceedings under s. 144 of, the Criminal Procedure Code. 10. The learned Counsel further submitted that the rights of the parties are governed in the pending suit and he has drawn the attention of the Court to the two orders both dated 13th February, 1992 passed in the Suit No. 862 of 1991. The first order of the learned Judge of this Court is set out below :- "The Court: This Court by various orders have allowed the company to shift the documents and papers belonging to the third parties, i.e. their company's client. Those papers and documents have no connection whatsoever with the terms and conditions of the services of the workmen. This Court confirms the said interim order. However, this order will not in any manner prevent the respondent from carrying out their legitimate Trade Union activities. Costs, costs in the cause. All parties to act on a sign copy of the minutes of this order on an usual undertaking". 11. The other Order also dated 13th February, 1992 records that the plaintiff in the said suit (the first Respondent in this Appeal) does not press the application on which the order for shifting the documents has been passed by the Court. The said stand was taken by the first Respondent in view of certain understanding between the union and first Respondent. 12. It is, therefore, clear that principal dispute is between the two groups of private individual and is over an attempt for removal of documents by the first Respondent and the alleged registance given to such attempts by the workers and employees who are members of the appellant Union. Over the self same dispute suits have been filed by the first Respondent and an order for removal of documents have been obtained. Over the self same dispute suits have been filed by the first Respondent and an order for removal of documents have been obtained. Those suits are pending and it is open to the parties including the first Respondent to file necessary application in connection with the said suit for obtaining an order for removal of documents as has been done in the past. But instead of doing so, the first Respondent this time initiated a proceeding under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and obtained an Order dated 18th December, 1993 and thereafter, filed this Writ Petition on 6th January, 1994 for implementing the said Order. 13. In this context, we may examine the prayers made in the Suit (Suit No. 862 of 1991) and in the Writ Petition and in both the proceedings the prayers are strikingly similar. Prayer (b) of the plaint :- Perpetual injunction restraining the defendants each of them by themselves or by their supporters, associates, servants, agents and nominees or members of the defendant No. 1 from preventing the plaintiff and or its servants and agents from carrying and/or taking out documents records of the plaintiff and I or its clients to or from the offices of the plaintiff at 11/1A, Sarojini Naidu Sarani, 3rd and 8th Floor, Calcutta and "Poonam Building", 5/2, Russel Street, Calcutta, the plaintiff's computer centre at 14/2, Townshend Road, Calcutta ; Prayer (d) of the Writ Petition: Mandatory order directing the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 to remove the respondent Nos. 5 to 11, their members, supporters, associates and syimpathisers from the office of the petitioner situated at 3rd floor of premises No. 11/1A, Sarojini Naidu Sarani, Calcutta and to ensure free ingress and egress of petitioners' officers, employees, callers to the offices of the petitioner and free movement and carrying out an its lawful activities in the said offices without any interference or obstruction whatsoever from the respondent No. 5 to 11, their members, supporters, associates or sympathisers." 14. It has been well settled by the Supreme Court and it is almost trite to repeat that when adequate remedies are available to a party for redressal of its grievances the Writ Court should not ordinarily be approached. It has been well settled by the Supreme Court and it is almost trite to repeat that when adequate remedies are available to a party for redressal of its grievances the Writ Court should not ordinarily be approached. In the particular facts of this case it is not only a case of alterative remedy being available but in facts such a remedy was availed of as would appear from the order dated 13th February, 1992 passed by this Hon'ble Court in connection with the Suit of the first Respondent being No. 862 of 1991. Those suits are still pending. Therefore, he instant Writ Petition cannot be sustained where in fact, the substantially same relief has been prayed for and obtained in a pending suit. 15. It is unfortunate that the petitioners while moving the Writ Petition made a very scanty reference about the proceeding in connection with the pending suit, being title Suit No. 862 of 1991 and 198 of 1991, but have not disclosed the orders date 13.2.92. This amounts to suppression of a very material fact of the case. It is the bounden duty of the first respondent to disclose these facts with sufficient candour and clarity that they have obtained similar Orders for removal of records and have later on did not press for those Orders in view of the understanding between the parties. 16. It is expected that the first respondents will discharge their duty as writ petitioners on their own on the principle of uberrima fides. These principles are as old as the bills having been affirmatively laid down in the celebrated decision of Rex. vs. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners, [1917 (1) King's Bench Division page 486]. But unfortunately in practice these principles are honoured more in their breach than in their compliance. But the Court should, and we hereby do, condemn such practice in no uncertain time. 17. Apart from the aforesaid infirmities in the initiation of the writ proceedings there are some other legal impediments also. 18. Proceedings under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code are very often abused and the instant case is not an exception. But the Court should, and we hereby do, condemn such practice in no uncertain time. 17. Apart from the aforesaid infirmities in the initiation of the writ proceedings there are some other legal impediments also. 18. Proceedings under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code are very often abused and the instant case is not an exception. In a Single Bench judgment reported in 1981 Criminal Law Journal, page 61 (Gopalji Prasad vs. The State of Sikkim) one of us had held that the proceeding under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be resorted to when the disturbance complained of "assume sufficiently grave proportions to bring the matter within the interest of public order." 19. In this case, the dispute over removal of documents is squarely covered in the pending suit and there is no element of public order involved in this. Nor is there any element of immediate urgency of law and order inasmuch as the said dispute is pending between same parties from 1992. 20. This case is therefore, covered by the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1993 Supreme Court page 1226 (Mohan Pandey & Another, Appellant vs. Usharam Rai Garia). Even though the factual matrix in the Supreme Court decision is different, but the principle decided in the said decision is applicable in the present case. In Mohan Pandey's case (supra) the Supreme Court observed at page 1227- "The High Court cannot allow the Constitutional Jurisdiction to be used for deciding the disputes, for which remedies, under the general law, civil or criminal, are available. It is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a suit or application available to a litigant. The jurisdiction is special and extraordinary and should not be exercised casually or lightly". 21. There is also another infirmity in the said 144 proceeding inasmuch as, the Magistrate while invoking the provisions of s. 144 has not stated in the order "the material facts of the case" nor has he drawn up any proceeding under the provisions of s. 144 but has passed an order restraining the members of appellant Union from causing any obstruction in the removal of the documents. 22. 22. The requirement of s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code is that the said Section requires the Magistrate to state by a written order the material facts of the case and then direct the person concerned to abstain from doing certain act or to do certain act in respect of subject matter of dispute. 23. It has been authoritatively held by the Supreme Court in Babulal Parete's case, reported in AIR 1961 Supreme Court page 884 at page 890 "that sub-so (1) of s. 144, requires a Magistrate who makes an order thereunder to state therein the material facts upon which it is based and thus the High Court will have before it relevant material and would be in a position to consider for itself whether that material is adequate or not". In the instant case, the 144 order passed by the Magistrate does not make any whisper of the materials considered by him nor is there any recital of material facts of the case. As such we hold that the order passed in the 144 proceeding in this case is wholly unsustainable in law. 24. When the 144 proceeding is thus inherently defective, no writ petition can be filed to implement it. In this connection, we respectfully agree with the Single Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Dayamoyee Bhattacharjee vs. Surya Kanta Sur & Drs., reported 'in 1989 Cal Cr.L.R. p. 86. In the said decision, Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. (as His Lordship then was) was placed to hold relying on the decision in Babulal Parete's case (supra) that the order of the learned Magistrate must set out the material facts of the case to indicate his satisfaction and in the absence of such a recording the proceeding becomes without jurisdiction and consequently the writ petition filed to implement such an order of the Magistrate is also not maintainable. 25. Mr. Gautam Chakraborty, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent did not make an attempt to sustain the legality of the 144 proceedings. His only submission with regard to the 144 proceedings is that the aggrieved party can ask for rescinding the order under S. 144(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code. 26. Mr. 25. Mr. Gautam Chakraborty, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent did not make an attempt to sustain the legality of the 144 proceedings. His only submission with regard to the 144 proceedings is that the aggrieved party can ask for rescinding the order under S. 144(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code. 26. Mr. Chakraborty has placed his reliance on the provisions of S. 19(A) of the Calcutta Police Act, 1966 and with special reference to sub-so (f) of S. 10(A) of the said Act. 27. Placing reliance on the said provision, Mr. Chakraborty submits that the police has failed to discharge its duty imposed upon it by law for the time being in force. 28. Whether the Writ Court can interfere on the failure on the part of the police to take action on the basis of specific complaint made to it, is a question which is becoming increasingly relevant in the present day context. In England, in such a situation, the position was summed up by Lord Denning in two of the judgments noted below. 29. The first decision was of R. vs. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex. P. Blackhurn, reported in 1968 Vol. I All England Reporter page 763. At page 769 of the said Report, the learned Law Lord was pleased to say as follows: "It is for the Commissioner of Police or the Chief Constables, as the case may be, to decide in any particular case where enquiries should be persued or whether an arrest should be made or a prosecution brought. It must be for him to decide on the dispositions of his force and the concentration of his resources on any particular crime or area. No Court can or should give him direction on such matter". Again in the subsequent decision of R. vs. Chief Constable of Devon, reported in 1981 (3) All England Reporter, page 827 at page 833, Lord Denning, sitting in the Court of Appeal was pleased to observe, "It is of the first importance that the police should decide on their own responsibilities what action should be taken in any particular situation". (Emphasis supplied). 30. In this country a given situation, the matter cannot be allowed to rest solely on the discretion of the authority. (Emphasis supplied). 30. In this country a given situation, the matter cannot be allowed to rest solely on the discretion of the authority. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that in many cases the police unfortunately fail to act as the guardian of law and order and the only place where the harassed citizen can go is the Court of Law and, of course, need be it the Writ Court in all cases. So the authority of Courts in general to direct the police to do its statutory duties cannot be doubted and we do not at all propose to do so in this judgment. 31. But the facts of the present case are not such M to call for mandate or direction upon the police. 32. Mr. Sakti Nath Mukherjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 12 in this appeal cited a few decisions in support of his contentions that it is the duty of the police to prevent a law and order situation and if the police fails to do so, the writ petition is maintainable. Mr. Mukherjee further submitted that police excess and inaction stand on the same footing and a person who is aggrieved either by police inaction or police excess can come to this Court in its writ jurisdiction. 33. When it was pointed out to Mr. Mukherjee that his client respondent No. 12 in this appeal has not filed any independent proceeding in this Court complaining of police inaction, Mr. Mukherjee took rather a peculiar stand and stated that the writ petition was filed for the benefit of his client and he is, therefore, entitled to submit in favour of the writ petitioners. We do not, however, decide the question whether it is permissible for the petitioner to file a writ petition for the benefit of the respondent or whether respondent without filing any independent proceeding before the Court can seek a relief which is to the advantage of the writ petitioner. We only say that we do not approve of such a ciruitous stand taken by any litigant before the Court, specially, when the proceeding initiated is one for issuance of high perogative writ. 34. The decision reported in AIR 1954 SC page 415 cited by Mr. We only say that we do not approve of such a ciruitous stand taken by any litigant before the Court, specially, when the proceeding initiated is one for issuance of high perogative writ. 34. The decision reported in AIR 1954 SC page 415 cited by Mr. Mukherjee (Wazi Chand vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh) is about an illegal seizure of goods by the police without any authority of law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold that such seizure has the effect of infringement of fundamental right and proceeding under Article 226 are maintainable and the remedy under s. 523 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, is not an adequate one. We fail to appreciate the relevance of the said decision to the facts of this case. The only fundamental right, in respect of which Mr. Mukherjee complained of alleged violation, is the right under Article 14. His contention is that the police authorities by their inaction has violated that right. On this submission of his we wanted to here the police but the police authorities were not appearing. When we asked him how the police authorities have been served in this proceeding, the reply, which the learned Counsel could give on being instructed by the petitioners' learned Advocate on record, was not at all satisfactory in the sense that the Court was told that the police authorities were served on 5th January, 1994 and the writ petition was moved on 6th January, 1994 and that too the service was made not on the police authorities themselves but on the advocate on record of the State of West Bengal. It is, therefore, obvious that the police authorities were not properly served in this proceeding As such, their version is not available at all either before the Trial Judge or before the Appeal Court. Therefore, in the absence of proper service on the police authorities, the Court is reluctant to come to any conclusion that the police authorities have acted in an arbitrary and in a high-handed manner as has been argued from the Bar. 35. Mr. Hirak Mitra appearing for some of the added parties adopted the submissions of Mr. Sakti Nath Mukherjee and Mr. P.K. Roy, appearing for some of the respondents tried to contend that the proceeding under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in this case, are sustainable. 35. Mr. Hirak Mitra appearing for some of the added parties adopted the submissions of Mr. Sakti Nath Mukherjee and Mr. P.K. Roy, appearing for some of the respondents tried to contend that the proceeding under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in this case, are sustainable. But, for the reasons stated above, we are unable to accept the said submissions of Mr. Roy. 36. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that the writ petition is misconceived inasmuch as it has been initiated over purely civil disputes over which suits between the parties for almost similar or identical reliefs are pending and where almost identical orders have been passed and in the factual background of this case, we hold that resort to Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the same relief just by alleging police inaction is wholly misconceived and is an instance of abuse of, the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution. 37. After careful consideration of the entire matter and the legal position, we give the following directions to the police authorities, namely, respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 in this appeal, to the effect that in respect of the pending complaint or any future complaint made to them within a period of one month from this date by the first respondent alleging commission of any cognizable offence, the police authorities are to take those complaint into consideration and take action on them expeditiously and in accordance with law. 38. With these directions, we dismiss the writ petition, set aside the order dated 6th January, 1994, passed by the learned Trial Judge, and allow the appeal. 39. There will be no order as to costs. Asoke Kumar Ganguly, J.: I agree. Appeal allowed; Writ Petition dismissed.