JUDGMENT - M.S. VAIDYA, J.:--Heard Mr. S.A. Deshmukh for the petitioners and Mr. Varale, A.P.P. for the State. 2. This is an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, praying for quashing of the criminal proceedings instituted in Regular Criminal Case No. 340 of 1991, in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Latur. 3. Respondent No. 1 Asrabai had instituted the aforesaid criminal case on a private complaint against 19 persons for offences punishable under sections 494, 109 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. After recording the verification on 6.8.1991, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate directed the issuance of process against all the petitioners under his order dated 14.8.1991. Having felt aggrieved by that order, the petitioners have preferred this application, contending that the impugned order was passed by the Magistrate without any application of mind. They had stated in the petition that the petitioners had not preferred any previous appeal or application in this Court or in the Supreme Court of India, but there was no mention of a criminal revision, which was preferred by the petitioners in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Latur being Criminal Revision Application No. 47 of 1992. Mr. Deshmukh, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, therefore, stated at the outset, that he was not aware of the fact that such a revision was preferred and was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge. He, therefore, sought leave to amend the petition appropriately. The leave is granted to him to amend the petition and to annex a copy of the decision given in the revision petition. Accordingly, he produced before us a copy of the aforesaid order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Latur. 4. The learned Additional Sessions Judge had dismissed the revision petition on 19.7.1993. The contentions urged before the learned Additional Sessions Judge appear to be that the learned Magistrate ought to have passed a speaking order under section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, while directing the issuance of the process against the petitioners, that in the absence of prima facie evidence on record for formulating the opinion regarding the purpose of the alleged second marriage between petitioners No. 1 and 2, the process could not have been issued and that, therefore, the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate directing the issuance of process was an instance of non application of mind. The learned Additional Sessions Judge found that the aforesaid contentions were not legally tenable and that so long as it was not contended that the discretion exercised by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in issuing the process was capricious or arbitrary, the order in question need not be interfered with in the revision. The contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners in the Court below were rejected by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. It is against this judgment and the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, that the petitioners have approached this Court. 5. It may be noted, at the outset, that it was not the contention of the petitioners before the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the complaint, as it stood, did not disclose any offence what-so-ever against any of the petitioners or at least against many of them. It was submitted here, on behalf of the petitioners, that the complaint, as it was drafted, did not indicate to which caste and creed the parties belonged, what were the customs prevalent between the relevant community as regards the rites to be performed for solemnization of a marriage, whether or not, such rites were performed while solemnizing the alleged marriage with the complainant or the alleged marriage between petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 and whether or not, in law, either of the aforesaid marriages was a legally subsisting marriage. It was submitted that even in the verification recorded by the learned Magistrate, the Magistrate had failed to secure the information on those points and that, therefore, the order passed for issuance of process was obviously without any application of mind. It was further contended that the learned Additional Sessions Judge also did not advert to any of the aforesaid contentions and proceeded to dismiss the revisions petition merely on the basis of the limited submissions which were made before him. It was fairly conceded that the points which are taken up now on behalf of the petitioners were neither urged nor argued before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate or before the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Indeed, it was submitted that the petitioners had not yet put in their appearance before the learned Magistrate, though the order for issuance of process, namely issuance of summons was passed as far back as on 14.8.1991. 6. Indeed, it was submitted that the petitioners had not yet put in their appearance before the learned Magistrate, though the order for issuance of process, namely issuance of summons was passed as far back as on 14.8.1991. 6. As stated above, the contentions urged before the learned Additional Sessions Judge were only a few and rightly and wrongly, the learned Additional Sessions Judge had negatived them. We need not go into the merits of those contentions, because the points which are urged before us are altogether different. The question whether or not, the learned Additional Sessions Judge should have adverted to the points, which were never pressed before him, need not be gone into. The fact remains that the points which are urged before us in the context of the facts and pleadings in the complaint, were not submitted for consideration before the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 7. It is needless to say that in a criminal case of the present type, where the validity of one marriage or the other was at issue, it was necessary for the complainant to state the adequate facts in the complaint itself. If she had not stated the adequate facts in the complaint, it was the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain them at the time of verification, or at least, before the issuance of process. It does not appear from the orders passed below the complaint by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate that the learned Magistrate had required the complainant to examine before him some witnesses on the relevant points. Without adopting such a procedure, the learned Magistrate had proceeded to pass the order. It was certainly desirable on the part of the Magistrate to have adverted to the considerations on the aforesaid points. 8. The question that falls for consideration before us is, whether or not, under such circumstances, this Court should exercise its jurisdiction, vested in it under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for quashing the aforesaid order passed for issuance of process, especially when the petitioners had not even appeared before the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and had not made any motion to the Magistrate to contend that in the absence of the aforesaid facts on record, the learned Magistrate had, indeed, no jurisdiction to issue the process. 9. 9. Attention needs to be invited, in this context, to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in (K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala and another) 1, 1992(1) S.C.C. 217 , in which case the learned Magistrate had issued against the petitioner before Their Lordships of the Supreme Court a process for an offence punishable under section 500 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, after examining the complainant on oath. The petitioner had appeared before the Magistrate and had applied for recalling of the order in view of the facts and circumstances placed by him before the Court. The learned Magistrate had acceded to this prayer and had recalled the order for granting process. In revision, the High Court had set aside that order on the ground that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to do so. When the matter went to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court held that particularly in summons cases, the Magistrate has a power to drop the proceedings against the accused in certain contingencies, and that when the accused enter his appearance in response to the summons, the Magistrate has to take proceedings under Chapter XX of the Code, but the need to try the accused can arise, it was pointed out, when there is an allegation in the complaint that the accused has committed the crime. If there is no allegation in the complaint involving the accused in the commission of the crime, it is implied that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to proceed against the accused. We had an occasion to consider this question in the context of an offence triable as a warrant case in (Pandey Ajay Bhushan and others v. Sureshkumar Bhikamchand Jain and others) 2, Criminal Writ Petition No. 414 of 1993, decided on February 10, 1994 and we had held that in view of the interpretation put on section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Supreme Court, and in view of the view taken by Allahabad High Court in (Kailash Chaudhari v. State of U.P. and another) 3, 1994 Cri.L.J. 67, it was open to the Magistrate to drop the proceeding if the complaint, on very face of it, did not disclose any offence against the accused, if the accused puts in an appearance before the Court and moves the Court for that purpose. We have also considered, whether or not, in the face of such a right, to the accused, the High Court should exercise its discretion and jurisdiction to quash the order directing the issuance of process in a proceeding under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the basis of the material placed before the High Court, for the first time without moving the Magistrate as aforesaid for dropping the proceeding. We have held that as it was a consistent view of this Court and the Supreme Court that the High Court should exercise its such powers and jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure very sparingly, it was not proper for the High Court to quash the order directing the issuance of process unless the accused had appeared before the Court below and had moved that Court for quashing the proceeding on the basis of material placed by him before that Court or on the basis of legal contentions, which could be urged on the relevant points. 10. Mr. S.A. Deshmukh, the learned Counsel for the petitioners wanted us to reconsider that view because, according to his submission, one of the points indicated by us in the aforesaid judgment was the point as to whether or not the order issuing the process was an interlocutory order. We had referred to therein the decision in (Shriram and another v. Thakurdas and another)4, 1978 Cri.L.J. 715 (Bombay), in which a view was taken that ordinarily such an order was an interlocutory order. Mr. Deshmukh wanted to contend that the decision in (Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra) 5, 1978 Cri.L.J. 165 was not placed for consideration either before us while deciding Ajay Pandeys case or before the Supreme Court while deciding K.M. Mathews case and that in Madhu Limayes case, the Supreme Court itself had taken a view that an order regarding the issuance of process was not an interlocutory order. Indeed, this was not the decision in Madhu Limayes case at all. What was pointed out by Supreme Court in Madhu Limayes case was that though ordinarily and generally, the expression interlocutory order has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term final order, such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order, is neither warranted nor justified. The Supreme Court pointed out that the finality of the order is not to be judged by corelating it with the controversy in the complaint and that the fact that controversy still remained was irrelevant. It was said that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, would conclude the particular proceeding, would surely not be interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. While applying this principle, this Court has pointed out in (M/s. Bush India Ltd. and another v. Lekharaj and others) 6, 1984 Cri.L.J. 346 (para 10 of the report), that an order which terminates a proceeding will obviously be not an interlocutory order, inasmuch as it is a final one. But, the reverse of the proposition is not always true because, in other words, in a situation, an order which is not final, can also be a non-interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If a particular order goes in favour of the accused, it may terminate the proceeding and, then, it will not amount to an interlocutory order. But, if the order goes against the accused, though it will not terminate the proceeding, the order will remain non-interlocutory and it will not attract the bar under section 397(2). Therefore, the decision in Madhu Limayes case also does not lay down that every order meant for issuing of the process was not an interlocutory order. The question is again to be decided on facts and circumstances of each case as is explained by the Supreme Court itself. 11. The question, whether or not, an order directing the issuance of process is interlocutory order may not even be directly relevant for the interpretation of section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and indeed, while deciding K.M. Mathews case, the Supreme Court has not at all dwelt on that consideration. 11. The question, whether or not, an order directing the issuance of process is interlocutory order may not even be directly relevant for the interpretation of section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and indeed, while deciding K.M. Mathews case, the Supreme Court has not at all dwelt on that consideration. The Supreme Court has interpreted section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in that case so as to mean that if the material was placed before the Magistrate by the accused, after his appearance before the Magistrate to indicate that no offence was disclosed on the facts of the case against all or some of the accused, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to issue the process and that, therefore, he had jurisdiction vested in him to drop the proceeding against the accused persons, against whom no offence is disclosed in the complaint. In Madhu Limayes case or in M/s. Bush India Ltd.,s case, this aspect which arises out of the interpretation of section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was not at all before the Court for consideration. Therefore, even if we consider Madhu Limayes case or M/s. Bush India Ltd.s case, we do not think that would require us to re-consider the view taken by us in Pandey Ajay Bhushans case. 12. In this context, it may also be pointed out that the provisions contained in sections 200 to 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are provisions applicable equally to summons cases as well as warrant cases within the meaning of the terms as defined in section 2(w) and (x) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The aforesaid provisions apply to the cases instituted on private complaints. It could not, therefore, be urged that the interpretation that we have put on section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could apply only to the summons cases and not to the warrant cases. The aforesaid provisions contained in sections 200 to 205 would regulate the criminal proceedings instituted on private complaints, whether the cases were triable as summons cases or, as warrant cases. 13. Mr. The aforesaid provisions contained in sections 200 to 205 would regulate the criminal proceedings instituted on private complaints, whether the cases were triable as summons cases or, as warrant cases. 13. Mr. Deshmukh, then, advanced argument which is most popular at the Bar in such matters, namely that if at all it was shown to the High Court that the complaint did not disclose any offence, why should the High Court require the accused to appear before the Magistrate and to move the Magistrate for dropping the proceeding. An answer to this question requires a study of some other provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure also. Section 204(1) lays down that if "in the opinion of a Magistrate taking the cognizance of an offence" there is a sufficient ground for proceeding and the case appears to be a summons case, then he "shall" issue summons for attendance of the accused or if it is a warrant case, he "may" issue a warrant, or if he thinks fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has no jurisdiction) before some other Magistrate having jurisdiction. The criterion here is `the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence. Therefore, when a Judicial Officer is of the "opinion" that a person should be required to appear before him, he could adopt one of the courses indicated in the provisions contained therein. The law does not require that in every case, the Magistrate shall require the personal attendance of the accused before the Court. Section 205(1) lays down that whenever a Magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason to do so, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his Pleader. Sub-section (2) of that section, however, adds, "but the Magistrate inquiring into or trying the case may, in his discretion, at any stage of the proceedings, direct the personal attendance of the accused, and, if necessary, enforce such attendance in the manner hereinbefore provided." It is not unknown that the provisions contained in section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are being availed of in various courts for seeking exemption from personal appearance. It is not a question left unattended to by the law. It is not a question left unattended to by the law. The law requires that when in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence it is necessary to have the accused present in the Court, it shall be the duty of that accused to attend the Court. The matter is not left to the option of the accused, but to the discretion of the Magistrate. Ordinarily, the High Court has no reason what-so-ever to interfere with the judicial exercise of discretion of the Magistrate in that behalf. It is, therefore, obligatory on the accused, as soon as a summons or a warrant is issued against him, to present himself before the Magistrate. Then, he may choose to put up his case before him and seek the appropriate relief, may be as one contemplated by section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as indicated above or may be otherwise. But, this is to be done in accordance with law and not otherwise. The provisions meant for enforcing the attendance of an accused before the Court are also included in the Code of Criminal Procedure and they are in sections 61 to 87. Unless such powers are allegedly exercised by the Magistrate capriciously or otherwise than in accordance with law, the High Court will not ordinarily interfere with the discretionary order of the Magistrate passed according to law, requiring an accused before him to respect a summons or to respect a warrant, issued against him. It is certainly not desirable that the High Court itself should encourage, among the accused persons, directly or indirectly, expressly or impliedly a tendency to defy a summons or warrants issued by the Magistrate, unless and until the issuance of summons or warrant is said to be capricious or malicious. It is certainly not desirable that the High Court itself should encourage, among the accused persons, directly or indirectly, expressly or impliedly a tendency to defy a summons or warrants issued by the Magistrate, unless and until the issuance of summons or warrant is said to be capricious or malicious. When the law thus casts a duty on an accused to respect the summons or as the case may be, the warrant to appear before the Magistrate and when the accused chooses to move the High Court to quash the order directing the issuance of process without even showing his basic tendency to abide by the process of law, by respecting the summons or the warrant, as the case may be, issued by a Magistrate, we think, there is no question of the High Court giving such accused persons any cover or protection so as to encourage them to defy the said summons or the warrant, as the case may be. 14. May it be so, that, where the number of accused persons is large, or may it be so that, where the accused persons live at a far distant place, the attendance in the Court of a Magistrate may entail some hardship to all or some of the accused, but in every case, it is open to them to make arrangements to appear through a lawyer before the Magistrate to respect the summons for the warrant, as the case may be, issued by the Magistrate and to move the Magistrate under section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for exemption from personal attendance. The all pervading omnibus and vague argument that ordinarily there is no reason to require an accused person to appear before the Magistrate in response to the summons before moving the High Court for quashing the proceeding, is not tenable even according to the aforesaid provisions of law. 15. We may also point out the consequences which flew in the courts below if a liberty is given to the accused to move the High Court directly for quashing of the proceedings without putting in his appearance before the Magistrate. Invariably, in such matters, stay of the proceedings before the Court below is sought in the absence of the complaint before the High Court. When the stay is so granted, it has a tendency to perpetuate itself. Invariably, in such matters, stay of the proceedings before the Court below is sought in the absence of the complaint before the High Court. When the stay is so granted, it has a tendency to perpetuate itself. It is not unknown that several years pass in the High Court before a proceeding admitted under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is finally disposed of. If at the end of such a long period, the application under section 482 is rejected, the case before the Magistrate, which stood stayed all those years, stands in square one after several years. By that time, the accused persons, who could have been traced easily immediately after the institution of the complaint, may not become available on those addresses. This drives the complainant to an unprecedented situation which means virtually a denial of justice to him, though in law, he is the aggrieved person. If such matters remain pending for long, for service of summons it becomes more easy to the accused at that juncture, to evade the service of summons or the warrants so as to protract further, the proceedings before the Magistrate. Even after the appearance of the accused before the Magistrate after several years, the agony of the complainant does not come to an end. His witnesses do not become available at that time either on the given addresses or on account of deaths. The evidence does not become available to the Court at all on account of their deaths. This adds insult to the agony of the complainant, because he stands virtually deprived of an opportunity to seek the redress to his grievance at law, which otherwise he would have become entitled to. It need not be said that a justice in a criminal case does not always lie in ensuring the acquittal of the accused or in acquitting the accused. Many a times, the aggrieved person remains with a feeling at the end of the trial, that his wrong stood unredressed despite the conclusion of the proceeding in a Court of law. We think that it is high time for the courts now to think over these matters and to ensure that the course of justice is not obstructed by putting such interpretations on the legal provisions could generate and perpetuate injustice. 16. We think that it is high time for the courts now to think over these matters and to ensure that the course of justice is not obstructed by putting such interpretations on the legal provisions could generate and perpetuate injustice. 16. Therefore, we do not think that the argument advanced before us as to why the accused persons should not be required to put in appearances before the Magistrate and to move the Magistrate for dropping the proceeding in appropriate cases, should be not insisted upon, can be sustained on the principles of fair play, justice, equity and good conscience. 17. It was also contended that such complaints lodged particularly against many persons at distant places could, in certain cases, amount to abuse of the process of law and that it was the duty of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to prevent the abuse of the process of law. This argument persumes that if the Magistrate was moved for the purposes of preventing the abuse of the process of law, the Magistrate would not exercise his powers properly. We cannot proceed on any such assumption. If inspite of the fact that such a motion is made before the Magistrate and the Magistrate has ignored the points urged before him by and on behalf of the accused, it would certainly be open to the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction to prevent the abuse of the process of law. But, that does not mean that in each and every case, such an argument should be availed of for enabling the accused to appear in the High Court directly, without putting in his appearance before the Magistrate and to challenge the order of Magistrate in a proceeding under section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Indeed, we may point out not only that in K.M. Mathews case the accused had approached the Magistrate and had applied for dropping the proceedings before the occasion for further stages of proceedings could arise in the case, but also that the similar were the facts in Madhu Limayes case. Indeed, we may point out not only that in K.M. Mathews case the accused had approached the Magistrate and had applied for dropping the proceedings before the occasion for further stages of proceedings could arise in the case, but also that the similar were the facts in Madhu Limayes case. The appellant in that case, Madhu Limaye, against whom the proceedings under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code were initiated by the State Government for defamation of a Minister, in a Sessions Court, when took cognizance, had contended that the allegations made against the Minister were made in his personal capacity and not in his capacity as a Minister, that therefore, the Sessions Court had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter without a complaint by the Minister and proper committal to the Sessions Court and further, that the sanction given by the Chief Secretary, not being by the Government, was bad. The Sessions Judge had rejected those contentions and the High Court, without entering on the merits of the contentions, had rejected the revision petition, the Supreme Court had thought it necessary to interfere in the matter. This was not a case where the accused had not put in the appearance before the Court of the first instance. In M/s. Bush India Ltd.s case also, a process for offence under sections 403, 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code was served on the accused and, then, he had filed an application before the learned Magistrate for stay of the further proceedings pending the decision of the case. The Magistrate had passed his own orders in the matter and, then, the matter had come before the High Court for a challenge. This also was not a case, like the present case, where the accused had not put in their appearance at all before the Magistrate. Therefore, we do not think that any of the aforesaid rulings conflict with the view that we have taken in Pandey Ajay Bhushans case. 18. Coming, then, to the facts of the present case, the learned Additional Sessions Judge had dwelt upon the considerations which were only urged before him. Indeed, he dwelt upon the question of "adequacy of evidence" rather than the adequacy of averments in the complaint so as to disclose the offence while dismissing the revision petition. 18. Coming, then, to the facts of the present case, the learned Additional Sessions Judge had dwelt upon the considerations which were only urged before him. Indeed, he dwelt upon the question of "adequacy of evidence" rather than the adequacy of averments in the complaint so as to disclose the offence while dismissing the revision petition. His order dismissing the revision application need not be disturbed in the present case, but we will have to direct that if the Magistrate is now appropriately moved by the petitioners for dropping the proceeding under section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the ground that no offence is disclosed in the allegations made in the complaint, the Magistrate need not consider himself bound by any of the observations made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in his judgment delivered in Criminal Revision Application No. 47 of 1992. 19. At this stage, Mr. Deshmukh, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners would appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Latur in Criminal Case No. 340 of 1991 within four weeks from today. We would rather specify a date on which they shall appear in that Court, either in person or through their Advocate. Hence, the order. ORDER The Criminal Application is summarily dismissed. The petitioners shall appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate at Latur in Regular Criminal Case No. 340 of 1991 on 29th March, 1994, at 11.00 A.M. Initially, they are allowed to appear under section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure through their Advocate. The Magistrate may consider if at all any prayer is made by them for further dispensation of their personal appearance, that prayer in the light of section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Criminal Application dismissed.