JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma, J.—This appeal under Paragraph 32 of Himachal Pradesh Courts Order is directed against the decree and judgment dated 4-12-1982 passed by Additional District Judge, Shimla whereby the decree and judgment dated 14-6-1978 of Sub-Judge 1st Class, Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla was confirmed and the suit of appellant-plaintiff Inder Dass was dismissed. 2. The subject-matter of the litigation between the parties is and measuring 11 biswas, comprised in Khasra No 275/2, situate in Chak Shathala, Pargna Kothi-Kotgarh, Sub-Tehsil Kumarsain District Shimla (hereinafter called the land in dispute). For it suit was filed by Inder Dass as far back as on 30-12-1972 for permanent injunction restraining the respondent-defendant State of Himachal Pradesh from interfering in his possession, which according to him was of half a century old, since his fore-fathers. Inder Dass claimed that he was using the land in dispute as his courtyard, he had constructed kitchen and planted ten apple trees therein para 5 of his plaint his averments are that:— "The defendant and its officials never objected to the construction of the kitchen and planting of the trees on the land. The plaintiffs action and the possession was open, visible as an owner and hostile to the knowledge of the defendant. Now the defendant is estopped from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff." According to Inder Dass, cause of action arose to him when proceedings under section 163 of Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act (hereinafter called the Act) were held against him ia which eviction order was passed ; his appeal against the eviction order was dismissed and respondent-defendant No. 1 tried to dispossess him from the land in dispute 3. The suit was resisted by the respondent-defendant No. 1 and others who filed separate written statements. Their main contention was that Inder Dass had no right, title or interest over the land in dispute and he was rightly being dispossessed in pursuance of the eviction order passed under section 163 of the Act. They have pointed out that the land in dispute is part of Khasra No. 275, which is recorded as Charand and in possession of right-holders. 4. Both the courts below have dismissed the suit mainly on the ground that the adverse possession of Inder Dass over the land in dispute was short of statutory period of 30 years on the date of filing suit by him i. e. 30-12-1972. 4. Both the courts below have dismissed the suit mainly on the ground that the adverse possession of Inder Dass over the land in dispute was short of statutory period of 30 years on the date of filing suit by him i. e. 30-12-1972. While discussing the evidence produced by Inder Dass the trial Court has observed that:— "It is also on record that the Apple trees planted in the suit land are 30 to 35 years old and that the plaintiff had constructed the Kitchen in the suit land only 25 years back, The statement of the plaintiff and his witnesses were recorded in April, 1978. Therefore, as per the statement of the plaintiff and PWs it would be deemed that at the time of the filing of the suit in 1971, the Kitchen was constructed only 18 years back and the Apple trees were only 27 years old at the time of filing the suit." 5. The trial Court has further accepted the submission made on behalf of Inder Dass that his possession was deemed to be open, hostile and notorious since he had constructed his kitchen and planted orchard on the land in dispute but it found the period of such possession as of about 27 years and suit was dismissed The findings of the trial Court have been confirmed by the first appellate Court. Hence the present regular second appeal. 6. In the facts and circumstances of this appeal the real point for consideration is, when the possession of Inder Dass became adverse and whether it had continued for a statutory period of 30 years without inter- , ruption on the date of filing the suit, if not, whether the period after institution of the suit can be counted for completing the statutory period ? By now it is well settled that for claiming possessory title on the basis of adverse possession, not only the plea of adverse possession should specifically be taken but it must also be shown that since when the possession of the person claiming adverse possession became adverse to the true owner. In the precise words of learned Judges of Supreme Court in S. M. Karim v. Mst. In the precise words of learned Judges of Supreme Court in S. M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254 : "Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found...........Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea". 7. The elements which convert the peaceful possession into adverse possession are that it is aclusl, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous for a period of twelve years in case of private property and for a period of thirty years in the case of Government property. It is correct that in the present case the possession of predecessors-in-interest of Inder Dass and Inder Dass himself was not adverse till March, 1945 when they were in possession of the land in dispute considering it their own but their possession became open, notorious and hostile to the State of Himachal Pradesh, the real owner, when on demarcation of land in dispute by Ganga Ram, Patwari in March, 1945 Inder Dass was told that the land in dispute belonged to the State of Himachal Pradesh and despite this he continued in possession claiming it as his own. 8. It is also on record that at no point of time his possession was interrupted despite the ejectment order passed against him under section 163 of the Act as well as during the pendency of present litigation since 30-12-1972. From March, 1945 till the institution or" suit on 30-12-1972 the period of his adverse possession was about 2 7 years 9 months. Therefore, the real question is, whether for making good the deficiency in statutory period of 30 years he can be given benefit of uninterrupted adverse possession during the pendency of present litigation for acquiring possessory title over the land in dispute? 9. By now it is trite law that a person in adverse possession acquires title by prescription despite a decree against him both in regart to title and possession if physical possession continues to be with him uninterruptedly throughout the period of presciption. 9. By now it is trite law that a person in adverse possession acquires title by prescription despite a decree against him both in regart to title and possession if physical possession continues to be with him uninterruptedly throughout the period of presciption. Starting from Privy Council, in Subaiya Pandaram v. Mohmed Mustapha Maracayar, AIR 1923 PC 175, the facts of which case were that during the pendency of a suit for declaration that a certain property was subject to a trust, the property was sold in execution of another decree and the auction purchaser was put in possession of the same. Subsequently the suit ended in a declaration that the property was trust property and such a declaration was made with the auction purchaser on record. All the same no steps were taken to disturb his possession and he continued to be in possession for more than 12 years. When the second suit was instituted by the trustee for recovery of possession of the property the auction purchaser contended that on account of adverse possession and limitation he had perfected title to the property. The plaintiff opposed it on the ground that in the earlier suit the property was declared trust property. Learned Judges of Privy Counsel upheld the plea of limitation and observed that the declaratory decree had no effect on the nature and quality of the auction of the auction purchasers possession. In considering the effect of that decree the learned Judges observed:— "At the moment when it was passed, the possession of the purchaser was adverse, and the declaration that the property had been properly made subject to a trust disposition, and therefore ought not to have been seized, did not disturb or affect the quality of his possession ; it merely emphasised the fact that it was adverse. No further step was taken in consequence of that declaration until the present proceedings were instituted, when it was too late." 10. The principle underlying this decision has been accepted by other High Courts as well as Supreme Court Dagadabai v. Sakharam, AIR 1948 Bern 149 ; Padmanabha v. Velayudha Nair, AIR 1957 Trav Co. 32 ; Nagu and others v. Bhanwarsingh and others, AIR 1987 MP 102 ; Thimaiah v. Made-gowda, AIR 1989 Kar 83 and Soul Lalji Jetha {deceased) Through His L. Rs. v. Soni Kalidas Devchand, AIR 1967 SC 978. 32 ; Nagu and others v. Bhanwarsingh and others, AIR 1987 MP 102 ; Thimaiah v. Made-gowda, AIR 1989 Kar 83 and Soul Lalji Jetha {deceased) Through His L. Rs. v. Soni Kalidas Devchand, AIR 1967 SC 978. In view of this clear position of law this Court holds that passing of ejectment order under section 163 of the Act as well as passing of decrees against Inder Dass rejecting his suit by the trial Court as well as first appellate Court did not arrest the limitation of statutory period of 30 years for acquiring possessory title by him as admittedly his actual and physical possession over the land in dispute was not interrupted. 11. There is another aspect of this matter that if during the pendency of this litigation his actual and physical possession was protected by injunction order issued by the Court, will he still get benefit of this period for completing statutory period of maturing his title by way of adverse possession ? This Court need not answer this question as it finds that neither the trial Court nor the first appellate Court at any stage passed interim order protecting the possession of Inder Dass over the land in dispute by restraining the respondents from taking over the possession thereof. This Court further finds that despite no restraint order the respondents, especially State of Himachal Pradesh, made no attempt to take over possession of the land in dispute which might have interrupted the continuous adverse possession of Inder Dass over the land in dispute disentitling him from acquiring possessory title. In the result this Court holds that despite the ejectment orders under section 163 of the Act and the pendency of the present litigation Inder Dass has completed statutory period of 30 years of his adverse possession over the land in dispute which has matured into his title. 12. The result of above discussion is that the appeal is accepted, the decree and judgment dated 4-12-1982 of Additional District Judge, Shimla and decree and judgment dated 14-6-1978 of Sub-Judge 1st Class, Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla are set aside and the suit of the appellant-plaintiff is decreed as prayed for. There is no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.