Judgment :- This writ petition seeks to quash the order dated 30.9.1989 of the 6th respondent confirming the order dated 30.1.1987 of the 5th respondent which reversed the order dated 27. 1986 of the 4th respondent. These orders were passed under the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands (Record of Tenancy Rights) Act (Tamil Nadu Act X of 1969). The original order of the 4th respondent- Record Officer was pursuant to the application made to him by the 1st respondent for recording him as the cultivating tenant of the petition land. It held that he was a cultivating tenant under the petitioner herein. In his application before the 4th respondent, he impleaded the writ petitioner herein as the 1st respondent and one Ramakrishna Pillai, said to be the power agent of the writ petitioner herein. After the death of the said Ramakrishna Pillai his son, the 2nd respondent herein has come on record. 2. The defence to the said application by the petitioner herein is that, only the 3rd respondent herein Parasakthi Ammal is the cultivating tenant of the land in question under the petitioner herein and not the 1st respondent herein. The original order of the 4th respondent accepted the said defence and dismissed the abovesaid application of the 1st respondent. However, in the subsequent appellate order of the 5th respondent and revisional order of the 6th respondent, the applicant (1st respondent herein) has succeeded, they having concurrently held that the 1st respondent is the cultivating tenant under the petitioner herein. Aggrieved by the said two orders, this writ petition has been filed to quash these orders. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, inter alia, makes two main submissions. One submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is: Contrary to what has been held by this Court in Kunchithapatham Pillai v. Ranganadham Pillai, (1958)1 M.L.J. 272 : 1958L. W. 231: 1958 M. W.N. 160 the 6th respondent has held that since the 3rd respondent has not contributed her own physical labour on the land she could not be taken as cultivating tenant. W. 231: 1958 M. W.N. 160 the 6th respondent has held that since the 3rd respondent has not contributed her own physical labour on the land she could not be taken as cultivating tenant. In (1958)1 M.L.J. 272 , no doubt Balakrishna Ayyar J., has held that in order to qualify as a "cultivating tenant" it is not necessary that a person should put his own muscular effort into the soil and that it is sufficient if the land is cultivated under his direct supervision and if further he assumes the risks of the cultivation, and is not the paid agent in this respect, of some one else. But, a Division Bench of this Court in a latter judgment in Abubucker Lebbai v. Zamindar of Ettayapuram, (1961)1 M.L.J. 256 has held differently that in order to fall within the definition of "cultivating tenant’ a person should carry on personal cultivation which again requires that he should contribute physical labour that the use of physical labour connotes the idea of physical strain, the use of muscles and sinews and implies a distinction from mental or intellectual work and that mere supervision of the work of cultivation or maintaining of account or disbursement of wages will not be such contribution of physical labour as to attract the definition. Further, in Sudalaimuthu v. Palani-yandavan,A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 469: (1965)2 S.C.J. 871: (1966)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 7: (1966)1 S.C.W.R. 205: 1966 S.C.D. 365: (1966)2 An.L.T. 6: (1966)1 S.C.R. 450 , the Supreme Court also concurred with the abovesaid view of the Division Bench of this Court. Further in Subbiah Nadar v. Nallapemal, A.I.R. 1973 Mad. 432: (1973)1 M.L.J. 459 : 86L.W. 314, Ramanujam, J., following the same view, held that where a tenant, who is an old man of 70 years and is rich and owns a car and lands and houses and was himself conducting business, while his sons were also carrying on independent professions it could not be inferred that he or his family members contributed their own physical labour in the cultivation of the leased land and that the fact that he directed the spraying of insecticides or demarcated the lines for planting would not make him a "cultivating tenant". 4. In the present case, also the abovesaid 3rd respondent herein, Parasakthi Ammal is none other than the wife of the writ petitioner Sivarama Sethu Pillai. 4. In the present case, also the abovesaid 3rd respondent herein, Parasakthi Ammal is none other than the wife of the writ petitioner Sivarama Sethu Pillai. Further, as per the order of the 6th respondent, she was rich and aged 60 years. In the above circumstances, the conclusion reached by the 6th respondent insofar as the 3rd respondent is concerned, could not be stated to be not sound or suffering from any infirmity. 5. Now, the next submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is: The 6th respondent, in his order, has not considered at all, a very material admission of the 1st respondent himself, which has been adverted to in the order of the 4th respondent. Further the 5th respondent, in his order, erroneously considered the said admission. The said admission, as found in the order of the 4th respondent is that the 1st respondent has executed a muchilika in June, 1972 in favour of the 3rd respondent, agreeing to act as watchman in respect of the abovesaid land and he has also received Rs.50 for rendering duty as watchman. In that context, the order of the 4th respondent states that while the plea of the 1st respondent is that he was cultivating tenant of the abovesaid land for about 35 years, there is no explanation, at all how he executed such a muchilika in favour of the 3rd respondent. But, the said admission by the 1st respondent in his evidence has not been considered at all, as stated above. 6. As against this contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the 1st respondent could not make any serious argument contra. 7. In fact, the affidavit in support of the writ petition refers to the abovesaid feature in paragraph 2 thereof. But, for all the allegations in the affidavit in support of the writ petition, no counter affidavit at all has been filed by the 1st respondent, even though several years have passed since the date of filing of the writ petition. 8. No doubt in the order of the 5th respondent the abovesaid admission by the 1st respondent in the abovesaid muchilika has been referred. But, the 5th respondent simply states that the said muchilika is not reliable, and is not in conformity with the present day conditions and that, therefore, the said muchilika could not be taken as true. 8. No doubt in the order of the 5th respondent the abovesaid admission by the 1st respondent in the abovesaid muchilika has been referred. But, the 5th respondent simply states that the said muchilika is not reliable, and is not in conformity with the present day conditions and that, therefore, the said muchilika could not be taken as true. But, how this conclusion has been reached by the 5th respondent, is not clear at all, particularly when the 1st respondent himself is said to have admitted the execution of the said muchilika. No doubt, a copy of the deposition given by the 1st respondent has not been actually produced before me and I have to go by what has been extracted by the 4th respondent in his order relating to the abovesaid admission of the 1st respondent in the abovesaid muchilika executed by him. Any way, the 6th respondent, in his order, has not considered at all, the abovesaid admission contained in the abovesaid muchilika, despite the fact that the writ petitioner has raised the said point as one of his grounds in his revision before the 6th respondent. In fact, the 6th respondent, in his order itself, extracts all the 21 grounds (including the ground relating to the abovesaid admission) raised by the writ petitioner, before him in the revision. Therefore, it is clear that the 6th respondent has not applied his mind to the case as expected of him. Therefore necessarily the order of the 6th respondent has to be quashed. 9. In the result, the order of the 6th respondent is quashed and the matter is remitted back to the 6th respondent for fresh disposal in accordance with law. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed. No costs.