Judgment :- First Judgment Debtor in O.S.219 of 1986 is the revision petitioner. For executing the decree, the respondent-decree holder filed E.P.3 of 1993. In answer to the notice of delivery revision petitioner filed objections. He contended that as he is entitled to Kudikidappu right with respect to the building in the plaint schedule property the execution has to be stayed under S.125(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964 (for short 'the act) and the said question has to be referred to the land tribunal. The execution court over ruled the objection by the impugned order dated 1-2-1994. This revision is directed against the said order, 2. The decree declared the plaintiff's title and possession over the plaint A schedule properly measuring 11/2 cents and restrained the defendants by a permanent prohibitory injunction from commuting waste in the plaint A schedule properly or making any alteration to the structures in it. First defendant was directed by a mandatory injunction to vacate the B schedule building within a period of six months from the dale of the decree, and also decreed if the first defendant failed to vacate the building the plaintiff is at liberty to evict him through court. Since the first defendant did not vacate the build ing as directed in the decree the E.P. was filed for delivery of the said building, 11 is against the said execution petition that the revision petitioner filed the aforesaid objection. 3. It is admitted that against the said decree the revision petitioner preferred A.S.73 of 1992 before the Sub Court, Atlingal and the appellate court dismissed the-appeal on 30-7-1993. 4. The question now for consideration is whether in the circumstances the execution court was bound to stay suit under S.125(3) of the Act and refer the said question of kudikidappu to. the Land Tribunal for adjudication. That will depend upon the quest ion whether I he question of kudikidappu 'arose' within the meaning of S.125(3) of the Act. A Full Bench of this court in the decision in Kesava Bhat v. Subraya Bhat (1979 KLT 766) held: "Unless the question actually "arises' for consideration, there is no obligation under S.125(3) to make a reference to the Land Tribunal". It was contended by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the question did arise as a claim is made in the objection to the execution petition. It was contended by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the question did arise as a claim is made in the objection to the execution petition. He also maintained that, though he made such a claim on the trial side itself, the trial court did not refer the question to the Land Tribunal for adjudication. If as a matter of fact the question arose at the trial side and the that court failed to refer the question to the Land Tribunal, the validity of the decree itself would be affected. In such circumstances it is necessary to see whether there was a claim of kudlkidappu before the trial court. This aspect has got importance in deciding whether he is entitled to raise the said question in execution. 5. What the learned counsel for the revision petitioner would maintain is though there was no contention in the written statement to the effect that the revision petitioner is a kudikidappukaran, he filed LA. 1959 of 1991 for amending the written statement to incorporate a contention that he is a kudikidappukaran. But that petition was dismissed and the order became final. The effect is that there was no claim of Kudikidappu in the written statement. The impugned order slates that the said application for amendment and the order passed on that application were incorporated in the execution proceedings as per Order in E.A.213 of 1993. Thus it is not possible to accept the contention of the revision petitioner that there was a claim of kudikidappu while the suit was pending trial. As noticed, he (revision petitioner) filed A. S.73 of 1992 be fore the Sub Court, Attingal, that appeal was dismissed. 6. Now, the only question for consideration is whether in such circumstance the revision petitioner is entitled to raise the claim of kudikidappu in execution. The ratio of the decision in Macllmvctn v. Bhavani (1980 KLT 315) (DB) would support the view that a party who had opportunity to raise the question of Kudikidappu at the trial side but did not raise it, he cannot raise the said claim of Kudikidappu in execution. But the learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied on the decision in MiiluinurwclKimlii .v. Abdulklmder Haji (1991 (2) KLT 532) to contend that, though he had claimed tenancy right and was not successful, the same would not a bar for claiming kudikidappu right. But the learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied on the decision in MiiluinurwclKimlii .v. Abdulklmder Haji (1991 (2) KLT 532) to contend that, though he had claimed tenancy right and was not successful, the same would not a bar for claiming kudikidappu right. Here the bar is on account of his failure to make aim of kudikidappu when the suit was pending. Reliance was also made by the learned counsel on the decision reported in Ratiumuna v. Kanmlainnui Pillai (1983 KLT 227) wherein in a suit for redemption the defendant claimed tenancy right and was found against sought to raise the question of kudikidappu. The court held that the claim of kudikidappu made in the execution is not barred as the same accrued to him only by the decree for redemption passed later which snapped the;) of mortgagor and mortgagee. Certainly the said decision cannot have application:;, the facts of this case. Thus the view of the execution court that the question of kudikidappu does not arise because the claim barred can only to-be confirmed. 7. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner then submitted that if his contention is not acceptable, he must be given atleast three months' time for vacating the building. With due regard to the fact that the revision petitioner is residing with his family in the building, I consider that reasonable time should' be given to him for vacating the premises. He is granted two month's time from the date of this order for vacating the building. The C.R.P. is dismissed subject to what is stated above.