Judgment : In all these four writ petitions, the proceedings for acquisition of lands belonging to the petitioners are being challenged. Three contentions are raised on behalf of the petitioners. (1) There is a long gap of four months between the date of notification under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and publication thereof in the locality. The notifications are dated 22. 1983 and they were published on 26. 1983. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that as per the judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court the entire proceedings are vitiated and they should be quashed. 2. Reliance is placed upon thejudgments inNarinderjit Singh v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 552: (1972)2 S.C.W.R. 766: 1972 S.C.D. 1123: (1973)1 S.C.C. 157 , Deepak Pahwa v. Lt.Governor of Delhi, A.I.R. 1984. S.C. 1721: (1984)4 S.C.C. 308 , State of Tamil Nadu v. Thangavelu, (1985)2 M.L. J. 91, Nandakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, 1986 W.L.R. 164, P. Venkatarathinam Naidu v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1990 T.L.N.J. 264, Narayana Rajoo v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 1991. W.L.R. 147. In all the above cases it has been held that there should not be undue delay between the notification and publication. It is also held that the provision in the Act is mandatory and even if the person concerned had taken part in the enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act, the proceedings would still be void if the statutory requirement of publication is not complied with. In those cases it has been generally held that any delay beyond a period of two months was unreasonable and it would lead to invalidity of the proceedings. 3. The question has been considered in detail recently by a Division Bench of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu and another v. Rajendran, (1993)2 L.W. 352 . After referring to all the earlier judgments the Bench has stated the propositions as follows: “Thus, the following propositions emerge from the decision of the Supreme Court, (i) it is mandatory to comply with the provisions of Sec.4(1), (ii). After referring to all the earlier judgments the Bench has stated the propositions as follows: “Thus, the following propositions emerge from the decision of the Supreme Court, (i) it is mandatory to comply with the provisions of Sec.4(1), (ii). The publication of the Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Official Gazette and public notice of the same in the locality need not be simultaneous or immediate and can be contemporaneous as it involves a gap of time; therefore, both must necessarily be separated by a gap of time, (iii) the time gap between the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette and public notice of the substance of the notification in the locality does not by itself render the acquisition void, (iv) If the two events are unlinked from each other by a gap of time so large as may lead to the prima facie conclusion of lack of bona fides in the proceedings for acquisition then it may become necessary to probe further to discover if there is any cause for the delay and if the delay has caused prejudice to anyone.” 4. The Bench pointed out that unless the delay is wholly unreasonable and it has caused some prejudice to the party concerned, it cannot vitiate the proceedings. 5. On the facts of this case, the delay if at all is only two months as evident from the following circumstances. No doubt, the notification was issued in the first instance on 22. 1983. But it was found by the respondents that it contained certain errors and therefore, the Government published errata on 20.4.1983. Thereafter corrected notification was published in the village on 26. 1983. Thus, the delay is only about two months and odd and having regard to large extent of lands involved, the delay is not unreasonable. I hold that on the facts of this case, the delay in publication if any, is quite reasonable and it does not vitiate the proceedings. Further, the petitioners have taken part in the enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act and no prejudice whatever has been caused to them on account of the publication of the notification in the village after a period of two months. 6. The second contention is that Rule 3(b) of the Rules framed under the Land Acquisition Act have not been complied with in this case. 6. The second contention is that Rule 3(b) of the Rules framed under the Land Acquisition Act have not been complied with in this case. According to the petitioners, when they gave their objections at the time of enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act they were forwarded to the Requisitioning Body and remarks were called for. According to the petitioners such remarks were not communicated to the petitioners as required by the Rules. This contention is not sustainable, in view of the factual position brought to my notice by the respondents. In paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit it is stated clearly that the remarks sent by the Requisitioning Body viz., Director of Technical Education Madras, were forwarded to the petitioners and they had acknowledged the same on 19. 1983. In those circumstances, there is no merit in the contention that Rule 3(b) of the Rules has not been complied with. Hence the rulings in Sunnaiyan v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, (1971)1 M.L.J. 342 and Kadirvelu Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1987 W.L.R. 182 do not apply to the facts of this case. 7. The third contention raised is to the effect that no award has been passed as contemplated by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 within the period prescribed therein. It is stated that Sec.11-A of the Act as amended prescribes a period of two years from the date of declaration under Sec.6 of Act. According to the petitioners, no award has been passed within that period and therefore, the entire proceedings have to be quashed. The petitioners admittedly obtained an order of stay after filing these writ petitions. Interim order of stay was passed on 211. 1983 and it was made absolute later on 3. 1987. It is contended by the petitioners that the said order of stay related only to dispossession and not further proceedings of acquisition. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners the respondents could well have gone on with the proceedings of acquisition and passed awards within the time contemplated by the amendment act. 8. There is no merit in this contention. The question is not res Integra. It has been considered fully by the Supreme Court in Yusufbhai Noormohamed Mandoliya v. State of Guajarat, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 2153. 8. There is no merit in this contention. The question is not res Integra. It has been considered fully by the Supreme Court in Yusufbhai Noormohamed Mandoliya v. State of Guajarat, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 2153. A Division Bench of this Court to which I was a party has discussed the entire case law on the subject and held that if there is stay of dispossession that will be sufficient to stay all the proceedings and a person who has obtained an order of stay of dispossession cannot contend that award could have been passed inspite of that order of stay. We have held that the limitation prescribed in Sec.11-A of the Act will not apply in such cases where orders of stay have been passed with regard to dispossession alone vide Ramanujam, N.D. v. Collector of Madras, (1994)1 L.W. 519 . 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners brings to my notice a Government order to the effect that some of the lands sought to be acquired were proposed to be exempted from acquisition. The Government has passed G.O.Ms.No.65, dated 11. 1987. As seen from the said Government Order, on a representation by Diocesan Teachers Housing Welfare Society, the Government has directed exemption of certain specified lands of an extent of 119.94 acres. Learned counsel for the petitioners is not in a position to say whether any further proceedings have been taken pursuant to the said order of the Government. Learned Government Pleader states that in view of the pendency of the writ petitions, further proceedings had been stopped because the order of exemption has no bearing on these writ petitions. In these circumstances it is for the parties concerned to work out their rights on the basis of the said order of exemption. 10. In the result, all the three contentions of the petitioners fail and writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.