J. N. Sarma, J.— This appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 29.10.91 passed by Shri OP Lytand, Special Judicial Officer, Meghalaya, Shillong in LA Case No.31 (M) to 36 (M) of 1990. 2. The brief facts are as follows : The Collector Mawkyrwat Sub-Division on behalf of the PWD Department acquired some of land for construction of Explosive Magazine at Mawten Village near Mawkyrwat. The Collector gave the award as follows : (a) Paddy field … Rs.9/-per sq.m. (b) Forest Land ... Rs.4/- per sq. m. (c) Arable Land ... Rs.3/-per sq. m. 3. Compensation was paid to all the interested parties. There was 13 interested parties. All of them received compensation money and out of it, 6 persons claimed the enhancement by filing an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Accordingly, 6 Misc. Cases were registered. They are as follows : (i) Shri Wardington Lyngdoh - Misc Case No.31 (M)/90 (ii) Shri Dwelishen Kharlyngdoh - Misc Case No. 32 (M)/90 (iii) Ka Kriep Nongsiej - Misc Case No. 33 (M)/90 (iv) Ka Shering Nongsiej - Misc Case No. 34 (M)/90 (v) Ka Kbintina Tongwah - Misc Case No. 35 (M)/90 (vi) Shri Leningstar Tongwah - Misc Case No. 36 (M)/90 4. The learned Special Judicial Officer, Shillong by his judgment and decree enhanced the compensation and paid 30% Solatium on the above enhanced market value of the land and 12% interest per annum on the enhanced amount wef 6.12.88 ie the date of notification and further rate of interest @ 9% on the excess amount wef 5.7.88 to the date of payment of the decretal amount in Court. 5. All 6 cases were taken up for hearing together and common judgment was passed but separate decrees were drawn up. Before the learned Judge, the following witnesses were examined : (i) CPWI - Wardington Lyngdoh; (ii) DK Lyngdoh; (iii) Ka Kriep Nongsiej; (iv) Ka Shering Nongsiej- (v) Ka Kbintina Tongwah. (vi) Leningstar Tongwah; (vii) W.Lyngdoh. (viii) D.Lyngkhoi. (ix) Everlin Snaitang; (xi) Kumari Kwar Knar Lyngdoh; (xi) WL Lyngdoh; (xii) Blishon K. Lyngdoh; (xiii) Skendfo Kharjahrim; and (xiv) L.Lyngskor. 6. The following documents were exhibited : Ext. (vi) Leningstar Tongwah; (vii) W.Lyngdoh. (viii) D.Lyngkhoi. (ix) Everlin Snaitang; (xi) Kumari Kwar Knar Lyngdoh; (xi) WL Lyngdoh; (xii) Blishon K. Lyngdoh; (xiii) Skendfo Kharjahrim; and (xiv) L.Lyngskor. 6. The following documents were exhibited : Ext. I a deed of sale dated 23.3.87 in Siej Lyngdoh between Ka Thrin Lyngdoh from Mawten and Ka Kwirshi Kharlyngdoh Nonglang @ Rs.16/- per square foot (This deed is not a registered deed and the area sold was 462 square feet only) This deed is in Khasi but it was translated to English by the lawyers of both the sides. (Exhibited by Shri DK Lyngdoh) Ext. A : the notice from the Government regarding acquisition of land. Ext. B: Agreement regarding the receipt of compensation as fixed by the Collector. Ext. 2 : A certificate granted by D. Lyngodoh regarding the value of the first class paddy field. Ext. 4 : A certificate of registration and Ext. 5 : is the deed. These are for homestead land and situated in market area. Ext. 6 : The Deed of Sale dated 22.3.87 (not registered). Ext. 7 : Certificate issued by WL Lyngdoh, occupation - Myntri of Maharam Syiemship. Ext. 3 : Sale Deed dated 12.8.88 (not registered). 7. We have heard Shri MM Lahifi, learned Advocate General for the appellant and Shri AM Mazumdar, learned Advocate assisted by Shri DK Das, learned Advocate for the respondents. 8. The first preliminary objection raised by Shri Mazumdar is regarding maintainability of one appeal against the separate decrees passed in these Misc. Cases as indicated above and in this connection he relies on the following 3 (three) decisions : (i) AIR 1971 SC 2355 (Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal vs. Dossibai NB Jeejeebhoy) where he relies on paragraph 9 and 11 of the judgment. The Supreme Court pointed out as follows: "9. A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the stature the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not, in our judgment, operate as res judicata. Similarly by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which is does not possess under the statute the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise. 11. Similarly by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which is does not possess under the statute the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise. 11. If the decision in the previous proceeding be regarded as conclusive it will assume the status of a special rule of law applicable to the parties relating to the jurisdiction of the Court in derogation of the rule declared by the Legislature." (ii) AIR 1966 SC 1631 (Jang Singh vs. Brij Lal & others) where the Supreme Court pointed out in paragraph 6 as follows : "There is no higher principle for the guidance of the Court than the one that no act of Courts should harm a litigant and it is the bounden duty of Courts to see that if a person is harmed by a mistake of the Court he should be restored to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake." ' (iii) 1970 ALR 320 (Lalnmana & others vs. The State of Assam & others) where he relies on the following passage quoted from Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 22 para, pages 799-800 : "The Court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if given per incuriam. A decision is given per incuriam when the Court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a Court of a co-ordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, or when it has acted in ignorance of a decision of the House of Lords. In the former case it must decide which decision to follow, and in the latter it is bound by the decision of the House of Lords." 9. On behalf of the respondents reliance is placed on these decisions to urge that the earlier Division Bench decision of this Court given on 26.6.92 is not binding on the respondents. Before the Division Bench on that day two questions came up for consideration : (i) Condonation of delay in filing an appeal. (ii) Maintainability of one appeal against these 6 separate decrees. 10. Before the Division Bench on that day two questions came up for consideration : (i) Condonation of delay in filing an appeal. (ii) Maintainability of one appeal against these 6 separate decrees. 10. Regarding maintainability of the appeal in paragraph 5 of the judgment, the Division Bench of this Court relying on AIR 1984 SC 1004 (Ghanashyam Das vs. Dominion on India) observed as follows : "Our laws of procedure are based on the principle that as far as possible no proceeding in a Court of law should be allowed to be defeated on mere technicality." 11. The Court considering the matter held as follows : "We, therefore, accept the combined appeal against the 6 decrees subject to the d condition that this should not be treated as an authority for future appeals." 12. So, the final seal was put on the matter by the Division Bench and it is not open for the respondents to re-agitate this matter again. 13. Shri Lahiri appearing for the appellant urges that the Judge had no jurisdiction to enhance the value and to entertain the application for enhancement. In this connection Shri Lahiri draws our attention to the different provisions of e the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Before we go to that it will be pertinent for us to note that the Land Acquisition Act was made applicable to the Khasi Hills by notification dated 9th July, 1951 (published in the Assam Gazette on 11th of July, 1951). By this notification, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended from time to time was made applicable to Khasi Hills. The notification reads as follows : "All the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and all rules and orders made thereunder subject to the any amendments to which the Act for the time being subject in the rest of the State of Assam, shall be applied to, and be deemed to be in force in the said areas from the date of commencement of this Regulation." 14. It was further provided by this Regulation as follows : "Any Court or authority may construe the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No.1 of 1894) and/or any rules and orders made thereunder with such modifications not affecting the substance, as may be necessary or proper to adapt them to the matter before that Court or authority." 15. It was further provided by this Regulation as follows : "Any Court or authority may construe the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No.1 of 1894) and/or any rules and orders made thereunder with such modifications not affecting the substance, as may be necessary or proper to adapt them to the matter before that Court or authority." 15. So, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act applies to Khasi Hills by this notification and the Court is empowered to adopt such modifications not affecting the substance. In that view of the matter also the appeal against these separate decrees may be held to be maintainable as section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act provides for appeals in proceedings before the Court which provides that appeals shall lie subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to Khasi Hills, only the spirit of Code applies to Khasi Hills. Order 41 which provides for filing of appeals is a procedural law and the Division Bench of this Court found that this procedural law should not be allowed to defeat the substance. 16. Shri Lahiri draws our attention to section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 18 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act provides that any person interested who has not accepted awards (emphasis supplied by us) may by written application required the matter to be referred to the Collector. Section 20 (b) of the Land Acquisition Act provides for service of notice on making such a reference on the persons interested in the objection except such (if any) of them as consented without protest to receive payment of the compensation award. Section 31 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act also refers to the consent in receiving the award. Second proviso to section 31 (2) of the Act provides as follows : "Provided that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under section 18." 17. Now let us have a look at Ext. B which is the document by which all these persons received award. The Ext. B is quoted below : "Agreement between Collector and the persons interested on matters to be included in the Award. Now let us have a look at Ext. B which is the document by which all these persons received award. The Ext. B is quoted below : "Agreement between Collector and the persons interested on matters to be included in the Award. (See section 11 sub-section (2) and para 23) We, the undersigned to hereby agree and accept as final and satisfactory the Award in Land Acquisition Case No.7 of 1986-87 in respect of acquisition of land for construction of Explosive Magazine to be made hereinafter by the Collector provided it included the following matters which to our minds are true, just and equitable. The total amount of compensation that arrived at is fully acceptable to us. 1. Situation and extent of the land in CCS System - 1,39,702.50 Sqm. 2. Description of the land - Paddy field, Arable land, Pine Grove land. 3. Names of persons interested. As per list enclosed on Annexure I. 4. And in respect of each of the persons interested individually : (i) Amount allowed for the land itself without the treeSy building etc. if any. As per list enclosed in Annexure I. (ii) Amount allowed of such sum as compensation for interest in the land. As per list enclosed in Annexure I. (iii) Amount allowed for trees, houses or any other immovable things. (iv) Amount allowed for crops or huts. (v) Damages under clauses 3,4 and 6 and expenses incidental to change of residence under clause 5 of section 23 (i). (vi) Additional compensation @ 30% on the market value under section 23 (2) amended by Act 68 of 1984. As per list enclosed. (vii) Interest under section 34 as amended by Act 68 of 1984 (viii) Interest under section 23 (3) as inserted by Adt 68 of 1984. As per list enclosed. 5. Total amount from (i) to (viii) of 4 above. As per list enclosed. Accepted Sd/Collector 5.7.89 Signatory/Signatories" 18. That there is no denial of the fact that this exhibit was signed by all the 6 respondents to made the application for enhancement. In this connection let us also have a look at the depositions of the witnesses on these points. 19. CPW 1 Shri Wardington Lyngdoh in Case No.31 (M)/90 deposed inter alia as follows : "I received the amount under protest at the time of payment of compensation on 5.7.89 for the OP." 20. In this connection let us also have a look at the depositions of the witnesses on these points. 19. CPW 1 Shri Wardington Lyngdoh in Case No.31 (M)/90 deposed inter alia as follows : "I received the amount under protest at the time of payment of compensation on 5.7.89 for the OP." 20. But a bare perusal of the Ext. B will show that this is not the correct statement of the witness. No document has been produced to show that the amount was received by this-claimant on protest. 21. CPW - DK Lyngdoh in Case No. 32 (M)/90 deposed as follows : “I signed in Ext.B. Ext.B(2) is my signature. There was an agreement executed in Ext. B but I do not know the contents thereof as I signed in blank paper. Before I signed some of the land owners have already signed. I did not file any protest at the time of receiving the compensation but later on. I do not remember the date and year when I filed the protest." 22. Witness Kriep Nongsiej in Case No.33(M)/90 deposed as follows : "I do not file any protest at the time of receiving the payment. I just put my signature in Ext. B without knowing the contents of it." 23. Witness Ka Shering Nongsiej in Case No.34 (M)/90 deposed as follows : " I also signed in Ext. B. Ext. B (4) is my signature. I was not explained as to the contents of Ext. B but I just signed in a mere paper...... I did not make any protest at the time of receiving the award " 24. Witness Ka Kbintina Tongwah in Case No.35 (M)/90 deposed as follows : "I also signed in Ext. B at the time of payment of compensation but I do not know the contents therein. I do not file the objection at the time of receiving money but later on." 25. Witness Leningstar Tongwah in Case No. 36(M)/90 deposed as follows : "I objected to the rate after one week of receipt of the compensation...... I received compensation. I signed in blank paper. The signature of Ext. B is mine...... I was not explained about the contents of Ext. B. I do not file protest petition at the time of receiving money but only after a week when I know about the rate is low." 26. I received compensation. I signed in blank paper. The signature of Ext. B is mine...... I was not explained about the contents of Ext. B. I do not file protest petition at the time of receiving money but only after a week when I know about the rate is low." 26. Shri W. Lyngdoh claimant in Case No.31 (M)/90 deposed as follows: "The Collector told me to sign that Ext. B but I do not know the contents therein. Ext. B (1) is my signature. I did not make any protest at the time of receiving the award as I do not know the rate per square feet." 27. OPW 1 Shri L. Lyngskpr deposed that Ext.B was signed by all the claimants and on the basis of Ext B money was received by all the claimants without protest. So, it is established beyond reasonable doubt as follows : Ext.B was signed by all the 6 respondents and from the evidence it is further established that they all received the compensation money without protest. 28. In the claim petition which has been submitted under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act in paragraph 7 it is stated as follows : "That the offer or the award made by the Collector, Civil Sub Divisional, Mawkyrwat was accepted under protest by the petitioner on 5.7.89." 29. In the objection it is stated in paragraph 3 as follows : "That the instant case is barred by the principle of res judicata, estoppel, waiver and acquiescence ...... Moreover, the claimant has also received the compensation money under the consolidated voucher on the same date without any protest whatsoever. Copy of the agreement dated 5.7.89 and consolidated voucher dated 5.7.89 are enclosed herewith and marked as Annexure I and II respectively." 30. In paragraph 4 it is stated inter alia as follows : "That the proteset is made afterthought and in contravention of the aforesaid agreement dated 5.7.89. A copy of the protest petition received on 10.8.89." 31. In paragraph 13 it is stated inter-alia as follows : "The answering opposite party denied that the claimant has received the compensation money under protest as alleged by him in the first part of the paragraph." 32. The following issues were framed on this point: Issue No. 1. Whether the claimant has any cause of action ? Issue No. 2. In paragraph 13 it is stated inter-alia as follows : "The answering opposite party denied that the claimant has received the compensation money under protest as alleged by him in the first part of the paragraph." 32. The following issues were framed on this point: Issue No. 1. Whether the claimant has any cause of action ? Issue No. 2. Whether the petition is barred by the principle of acquiescence, waiver, estoppel, res judicata and limitation ? Issue No. 3. Whether the amount of award made was just, fair, adequate and equitable and whether the petitioners received the amount of award under protest ? 33. The decisions on the issues given by the learned Judge were as follows : Issue No. 1: The OP by letter dated 22.5.90 referred the matter under sectiqn 18 of the LA Act to this Court for redetermination of the award of compensation already awarded. Hence, I find that the claimant has cause of action in this case. Issue No. 2: These are issues of law. Being issue of law it ought to have been moved right at the first hearing of the case. None of the parties pressed these issues. Issue No.3: The remaining part of the issue is whether the petitioner received the award under protest is left for discussion and determination. OPW 1 in his evidence has stated that at the time of the payment of the award the claimant objected verbally to the amount of the award. Moreover, the OP by letter dated 22.5.90 referred the matter under section 18 of LA Act to this Court and also as per evidence of OPW 1 that the claimant objected to the amount of compensation verbally, I do not feel proper to discuss further into this matter. 34. As indicated above, these findings of the learned Judge are incorrect and against the evidence on record. It would appear from Ext. B and the statements of the witness quoted above that at no point of time, the claimant at the time of receipt of the money objected to the award and/or received the money under compensation with protest. 35. This being the position, these findings of the learned Judge are liable to be set aside which we hereby do and we hold that the claimant received the compensation money/award without any protest at the time of receipt. 36. 35. This being the position, these findings of the learned Judge are liable to be set aside which we hereby do and we hold that the claimant received the compensation money/award without any protest at the time of receipt. 36. No doubt, the memo of appeal which has been drawn up against this decree is absolutely in a laconic manner and no specific ground has been taken up regarding these findings. The learned Advocate General when confronted with this position in the memo of appeal, he argued that this being the pure question of law can be raised at any time with the leave of the Court but at the same time we would like to point out that this is not the way to draw memorandum of appeal and that also in a case which involves huge amount. Some amount of thought should have been given in drawing up of the memorandum of appeal and the memorandum of appeal drawn in a laconic manners leaves much to be desired. The only ground on which reliance was placed is on Ground No.I, II and IX. Ground No.I - For that the learned Special Judicial Officer erred both in law as well as in facts in passing the impugned judgment and decree. Ground No.II - For that the learned Special Judicial Officer acted illegally and arbitrarily in granting the enhanced rate of compensation to the claimants. Ground No.IX - For that in any event the impugned judgment and decree are not justified by the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 37. Order 41 Rule 2 provides that the memorandum of appeal shall set forth under distinct heads the grounds of objection to the decree appealed from without any argument or narrative. Order 41 Rule 2 provides ground which may be taken up in appeal even though not taken in the memorandum of appeal. As stated in the first part of this rule, no party can without leave of the Court raise any ground not set forth in the memorandum of appeal. Under the letter part of the rule, the appellate Court can take cognizance and pass its decision on any ground not set forth in a memo but the party affected must be given an opportunity of meeting the point. Under the letter part of the rule, the appellate Court can take cognizance and pass its decision on any ground not set forth in a memo but the party affected must be given an opportunity of meeting the point. A question of jurisdiction, question of limitation arises on the face of the proceeding though not raised in the memo, may be allowed to be raised in appeal or second appeal if fresh question of fact is not to be enquired into. Taking into consideration Order 41 Rule 2 and considering the facts that the justice demands that this should be allowed, the learned Advocate General is allowed to argue this point with notice to the other side. The learned Advocate General in this connection relies on the following two decisions : (i) AIR 1975 Punjab & Haryana (Full Bench) 66 (The State of Punjab vs. Smti Harcharan Kaur). The Punjab High Court in that case considered the number of decisions including AIR 1937 Calcutta 680 (Ananta Ram Banerjee vs. Secretary of State) and AIR 1964 Calcutta 283 (Suresh Chandra Rai vs. Land Acquisition Collector) and pointed out as follows : (a) Suffice it to say that one of the conditions precedent to the making of an application under section 18 of the Act to the Collector for referring the case to the Court is that the applicant must not have accepted the award, as such a person is not entitled to make the application in view of second proviso to sub-section (2) of section 31 of the Act. (b) The policy of the Legislature is clear from the collective reading of sections 18,20 and 31 that any persons who has accepted the award is not entitled to make an application under section 18 of the Act. (c) Since section 31 (2), second proviso creates a statutory bar to a person who has accepted the compensation without protest from making an application under section 18 it is the duty of the Court, if an objection is raised by the respondent to determine whether the applicant has the right to make the application or not. (c) Since section 31 (2), second proviso creates a statutory bar to a person who has accepted the compensation without protest from making an application under section 18 it is the duty of the Court, if an objection is raised by the respondent to determine whether the applicant has the right to make the application or not. (ii) AIR 1992 SC 974 (Ashwani Kumar Dhingra vs. State of Punjab) where the Supreme Court in paragraph 10 pointed out as follows : " It is clear from the provisions of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act that the person interested, in order to enable him to seek the remedy of reference can do so only if he does not accept the award. In order to show that the person concerned had not accepted the award the claimants accept the compensation only under protest because once the compensation awarded in pursuance of the award is accepted without protest the person concerned may lose his right to a reference for various matters mentioned in section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act." 38. On the other hand Shri D. Das relies on a Full Bench decision reported in AIR 1994 Karnataka 112 (The Special Land Acquisition Officer vs. Kallangouda & others). This is a case regarding section 25 of the amended Act of 1984. This case lays down the law as follows : "Section 25 as it now stands totally liberates the claimant from all restraints that in check earlier from making a claim before Court for the first time even where he had not made any claim before the Collector and even if he had made some claim the section in its new orientation gives him full liberty to hike his claim before Court without furnishing any reasons or affording an explanation for making lower claim before the Collector." 39. This case does not help the respondents as an answer to objection raised by the learned Advocate General. 40. This case does not help the respondents as an answer to objection raised by the learned Advocate General. 40. Having considered all the matter from these angles and having perused the materials on record and after hearing the earned counsel of both the parties, we hold that as the compensation/award was accepted by the claimant without protest, they have no right to claim for enhanced rate under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and in that view of the matter, the Special Judicial Officer had no jurisdiction to enhance the claim as done by him in the reference cases No.31 (M) to 36 (M)/90 and the claimants would be entitled only to the compensation awarded by the Collector and ate not entitled to any enhancement. 41. The next question is that as we have accepted the contention made by the learned Advocate General on this point whether it is necessary for us to go to the merit of the case for the interest of justice. We thought it proper to have cursory glance at the merit as decided by the learned Judge. The learned Judge took up for consideration Issue No. 5. It is to be made clear that the learned Judge considered the oral evidence, the learned Judge relied on Ext.2 a valuation certificate issued by one D. Lyngdoh. Ext. 2 is dated 2.12.88 and much after the acquisition proceeding. He further states that the rate mentioned by him is meant for first class paddy field and he further deposed that the rate of paddy field varies from time to time and he also deposed that the lands acquired are not first class paddy fields. So, this witness is absolutely of no help in determining the compensation of the acquired land. 43. The next document on which reliance is placed is Ext.7 issued by W.Lyngdoh. Ext. 7 is also dated 10th of October, 1988. He deposed that there is no rate to the acquired land and he further deposed that the rate of land at Mawkyrwat with that of Mawten is far different. So, this exhibit as well as the deposition of this witness does not help the claimants in determining the compensation, 44. The next documents considered are Ext. 4 and 5. Ext. 4 is not the registered document but only the certificate of registration dated 14th May, 1988 by the Syiem of Mawkyrwat Ext. So, this exhibit as well as the deposition of this witness does not help the claimants in determining the compensation, 44. The next documents considered are Ext. 4 and 5. Ext. 4 is not the registered document but only the certificate of registration dated 14th May, 1988 by the Syiem of Mawkyrwat Ext. 5 which is the Deed and the valuation certificate is valued at Rs. 15,000/- and only for 90 square metres and the land is situated at Mawkyrwat. So these two documents also do not help the claimant. This is also a homestead land and is not comparable with the acquired land. The learned Special Judicial Officer also took into consideration the potentiality of the acquired land but as admitted that this land is at a distance of 6 Kms. from the Head Quarter Towns of the Sub-Division and it cannot be said with all certainty that it will develop as envisaged by the lower Court. 45. Accordingly, considering the matters we are also of the opinion that the assessment of compensation made by the lower Court at the rate of Rs.60/-, Rs.50/-and Rs.40/- per square metre for paddy field, garden land and arable land respectively is not the proper market value of the land at Mawten Village. We also do not find that this rate fixed by the lower Court is reasonable fair and adequate. Rather, we find that there was absolutely no materials before the lower Court to assess the market value at the rate of Rs.60/-, Rs.50/- and Rs. 40/- per square metre for paddy field, garden land and arable land. It is established law that the burden for establishing the claim for enhancement is on the claimants and the claimants in the instant case absolutely failed to establish that the rate fixed by the Collector was inadequate and that they were entitled to enhanced value of the land. 46. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and decrees passed by the Special Judicial Officer, Shillong in LA Case No.31 (M)/90 to 36 (M)/90 are set aside and quashed. 47. We leave the parties to bear their own costs.