Judgment : The unsuccessful defendant in Original Suit No.119 of 1982, filed this appeal, challenging the correctness of the decree and judgment passed in the said suit, by the Principal Subordinate Judge, Erode, on 210. 1983, which was filed by the respondent herein praying for the delivery and possession of the suit property as well as the mesne profits. 2. The Brief facts of the case, among the parties are extracted hereunder: The non-residential building, bearing door No.300, situated at Nethaji Street, Erode town is the suit property, and it absolutely belongs to the respondent herein, which is a trust established by a few persons, by purchasing the said property for running the mosque. The defendant in the suit, the appellant herein, being the tenant, was inducted into the possession of the said premises, originally at a very low rate and then on being revised from time to time, the agreed rent, at the last time, was at Rs.2,500 per mensem payable on the 5th day of every succeeding month, regularly. Being a tenant, allowed to be in occupation of the suit property, the appellant herein is carrying on a cloth business under the name and style of “Silk Emporium”. He has paid all the rent due to the suit property till the end of September, 1981 and from 10. 1981 onwards till the date of filing the suit, he has not paid the rent which according to the plaintiff comes at Rs.14,250 in all. This act of the defendant/ appellant forced the respondent/ plaintiff to issue a notice under Ex.A-1 whereby not only the demand for the payment of arrears was made, but also the delivery of the possession, as contemplated by the law, was also sought for. However, there was a reply under Ex.A-2, dated 27. 1981, given by and on behalf of the defendant, repudiating the contentions made in Ex.A-1. 3. As the property was purchased by an instrument under Ex.A-4, by means of an outright sale deed in the year 1951 and thereby the respondent trust was created and accordingly for the reason that it was the trust property, it was exempted from the operation of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lwease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 by passing special Government orders by the Government of Tamil Nadu in G.O.Ms. No. 1998, dated 18. 1974 and in G.O.Ms. No.2000, dated 18. 1976. No. 1998, dated 18. 1974 and in G.O.Ms. No.2000, dated 18. 1976. Accordingly since the trial court had the jurisdiction to try the dispute, the suit for the reliefs claimed therein, O.S.No.119 of 1982 was filed before the trial court. 4. The appellant being the defendant resisted the suit and filed a written statement, contending inter alia among other grounds that the plaintiff failed to show that the suit property belongs to a public trust, that G.M.Hajee Khaja Hussain is not the Secretary of Munirul Islam Majeed, that he has not been authorised to file the suit as Secretary of Munirul Islam Majeed and that therefore, the suit as framed, is not at all maintainable and liable to be rejected in limine. He further contended that though there was a written agreement dated 6. 1960 mentioning the old rate of rent, it was renewed lastly on 4. 1980 and that the same has not been registered. While referring to the said unregistered sale deed, the defendant would admit that it was executed for a period of five years from 4. 1980 onwards and that before the expiry of the said period stipulated, the suit cannot be maintained by the plaintiff for any reason. He would further contend that so far as the non-payment of rent is concerned, he has paid a sum of Rs.5,000 along with reply notice, which is marked as Ex.A-2, for two months rent at the rate of Rs.2,500 per month and for all the subsequent arrears during the pendency of the suit, he has paid a total sum of Rs.32,126.32 after filing an application in I.A.No.780 of 1982 on the file of Principal Sub Court, Erode, praying for the attachment of the movable kept in “Silk Emporium” belonging to the defendant and therefore every thing has been paid by way of rentals due to the plaintiff and on that score, the suit filed by the plaintiff, cannot be maintained for delivery of possession. Lastly, the defendant contended that there was no valid notice under Sec. 106 of the Act, and that even assuming so, the acceptance of the rent would raise a presumption under Sec.l13 of the Transfer of Property Act, that the acceptance of the plaintiff would amount to the waiver of his claim for possession and that therefore, the plaintiff has to be non-suited. 5. 5. Upon the above rival pleadings the trial court has settled the following issues for trial; .(1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the delivery of possession of the suit property from the defendants? .(2) Whether the defendant is liable to pay the damages at Rs.14,250 to the plaintiff for having used the suit property? .(3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to future damages? .(4) Whether the suit as framed is not maintainable? .(5) Whether the trial court has got jurisdiction to try the suit? .(6) Whether the defendant is entitled to be in possession of the suit property for a period of five years from 4. 1980 onwards? .(7) To what relied if any, the plaintiff is entitled to? 6. On recording the oral evidence given by P.W.I G.N.Hajee Khaja Hussain, Secretary of Munirul Islam Majeed, the plaintiff and the documentary evidence marked under Exs.A-1 to A-4 on the side of the plaintiff, and the oral evidence of the defendant as D.W.I and the documentary evidence marked under Exs.B-I to B-5 on the side of the defendant and on consideration of the entire matter on record and in the context of the rival arguments, the learned trial Judge has found all the issues in favour of the plaintiff, who is the respondent herein, and accordingly decreed the suit with costs. However, while decreeing the suit as above referred, the learned trial Judge has relegated the decision of future mesne profits to be decided, subsequently under O.20, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But for the first period from the date of plaint till the date of decree, as the claim of Rs.14,250 is concerned, the learned trial Judge has upheld the claim of the plaintiff/ the respondent herein. 7. I have heard the Bar for the respective parties in this appeal and the arguments for and against the judgment rendered by the trial court and in the context of the rival arguments, above referred, the following points arise for consideration in this appeal. .(1) Whether the trial court is right in holding that the suit of the plaintiff is perfectly maintainable and to say so has it got jurisdiction to try the suit? .(2) Whether the trial court is right in holding that the defendant was in arrears and accordingly liable to vacate and deliver the possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff? .(2) Whether the trial court is right in holding that the defendant was in arrears and accordingly liable to vacate and deliver the possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff? .(3) Is the trial court correct in holding that the relegation of the future damages can be decided under O.20, Rule 12, C.P.C.? 8. Points 1 to 3: There is no controversy among the Bar, with regard to the fact that the suit property was purchased under Ex.A-4 in the year 1951, by four persons of Pallapatti village Karur Taluk, for and use of a trust called by name and style of Munirul Islam Majeed for a consideration of Rs.30,000 by means of a registered sale deed, as evident from the contents of the said document, marked as Ex.A-4. It was in evidence of P.W.I that he was recognised as Secretary of the Executive Committee of the said Majeed and he has been authorized to carry out his duties and functions as the Secretary which includes the taking of present legal action, against the defendant for his illegal lapses. This factum, has been clearly demonstrated before the trial court, under Ex.A-3, the minutes book and the entry of the resolution dated 17. 1977. A perusal of Ex.A-3, the minutes of Munirul Islam Majeed would clearly go to show as to how the Majeed is being maintained by taking resolutions pursuant to the creation of the trust, by appointing the trustees and also appointing P.W. 1 as its Secretary. It is thus identified that the plaintiff is a legally constituted trust, carrying on its functions, through its appointed trustees and the Secretary having the administrative domain over the suit property. That apart it was the candid admission of the defendant that the property belongs to the Majeed and in that capacity only, he had entered into a lease with them. However, he clarifies that his lease agreement was with the trust and not with the present Secretary. Even assuming for a moment that the said contention is worth while for some consideration, I do not know under what basis, he is resisting the suit, which is one filed for the recovery of the arrears of rent when it was admitted by the defendant that he is liable to pay. Even assuming for a moment that the said contention is worth while for some consideration, I do not know under what basis, he is resisting the suit, which is one filed for the recovery of the arrears of rent when it was admitted by the defendant that he is liable to pay. For the recovery of the rent arrears, if any if the secretaries of the trust is not entitled to be authorised to file a suit and collect the rent from the tenants like the defendant herein, who is in occupation of the suit property, then who is entitled to be authorised to file a suit? Therefore, for the said reasons alone, I am not inclined to accept the contentions of the revision petitioner. Nor I found any force in the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant on this aspect. On the other hand, I have to hold that the learned trial Judge was perfectly correct in holding that the plaintiff is entitled to file the suit and therefore the suit is maintainable in law. 9. As far as the tenancy is concerned, barring the elaborate discussions and observations made by the learned trial Judge, I have to take note of the fact that the appellant defendant himself had admitted that he was a tenant and in actual occupation of the suit property, that he never disputed the quantum of rent payable by him at Rs.2,500 per mensem, that he admitted that the arrears was payable only from 10. 1981 on wards and that after the receipt of Ex.A- I, though he replied under Ex.A-2 for the rentals accrued for a period of three months, the defendant has claimed that he has sent only a sum of Rs.5,000 alone instead of a sum of Rs.7,500. This portion of the established fact would go a long way to prove the recalcitrant and indifferent attitude of the tenant. That apart during the pendency of the suit, I.A. No.780 of 1982 has been filed by and on behalf of the plaintiff seeking for the attachment of moveables for the purpose of recovering the arrears which was then due. To the counter filed to the said interlocutory application, the defendant has stated that on 111. 1982, he has paid a sum of Rs.32,126.32 being the rent arrears, to the plaintiff. To the counter filed to the said interlocutory application, the defendant has stated that on 111. 1982, he has paid a sum of Rs.32,126.32 being the rent arrears, to the plaintiff. It is significant to note at this stage, that the present suit has been filed in the trial court on 6. 1982 itself. Calculating the rental from 10. 1981, till the date of filing the suit, it is seen that the total areas claimed under the suit, tallies with the figure at Rs.14,250. In the context of the above position, clearly made out through the records, it has been clearly demonstrated that the defendant, being the tenant in the suit property failed to fulfil his part of the obligation to pay the accrued monthly rental regularly, at every month, as provided by Sec. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. The non-compliance of which clearly entitles him to be dispossessed in this legal process. 10. One another plea was projected before the trial court on behalf of the appellant was that there was a custom prevailed and followed by the parties herein, that the rentals would be paid at random and not at every month regularly, as pleaded by the plaintiff. In my view, the defendant tenant has deliberately failed to prove that the above custom has been in vogue or being followed by the respective parties herein. Therefore, the defence taken as referred to, is to be deemed as only a device intended to escape from the clutches of law. 11. With regard to other contentions that since the accrued renewal lease deed, for a period of five years, was executed among the parties herein on 4. 1980, that the same has not been produced, that it has not been registered at all and that therefore it cannot be looked into for any valid purpose, as stipulated under Sec.107 of the Transfer of Property Act, I am in full agreement with the view of the learned trial Judge, for the simple reason that if there is any dispute, with regard to the suit property among the parties, herein pertaining to the nature of the possession or the quantum of rent, then we can look into the unregistered lease deed for the collateral purpose. Buthowever, in this case, the tenant has admitted the quantum of rental arrears as well as the ownership and the period for which the arrears had accrued. Therefore I am fully constrained to hold that their exhibits need not be looked for collateral purpose, in this case. In this regard also, I am fully constrained to endorse my view with the findings, given by the learned trial Judge, and to state that the defendant has miserably failed to establish his case. 12. It is worthwhile at this stage to note that the quantum of rental agreed upon between the parties herein was Rs.2,500 per month and that it has not been disputed at all. It is not the case of the plaintiff respondent that the defendant is liable to pay more amount by way of damages, or amounts more than the same rate of rent, till he hands over the possession to the plaintiff. If such being the case, the principle of law would clearly enunciate and provide guidance to the trial court that future damages can be fixed at the same rate at Rs.2,500 per month and accordingly, the appellant could have been directed to pay the future damage at the same rate, i.e., at Rs.2,500 per month, till he hands over the possession of the suit property. But the learned trial Judge has not done so. It is not known under what circumstances and as to why, he has relegated the quantum of future damages under O.20, Rule 12, C.P.C. No reasonings or grounds were given by the learned trial Judge for relegating this matter, as referred to. Therefore, I am not in full agreement, with the relegation of the quantum of the future damages in a separate proceedings, under O.20, Rule 12, C.P.C. On the other hand, I fix the future damages also, at the same rate of Rs.2,500 per month payable by the appellant defendant tenant to the respondent herein till he hands over the possession of the suit property. 13. Thus, having gone into the entire recorded evidence both oral and documentary, rival contentions of the respective parties, with their pleadings, and the established facts, as above referred to, I do not come across any lapse or erroneous approach or misconceived conclusion, committed by the trial court, in passing the decree and the judgment, under this appeal. 14. 13. Thus, having gone into the entire recorded evidence both oral and documentary, rival contentions of the respective parties, with their pleadings, and the established facts, as above referred to, I do not come across any lapse or erroneous approach or misconceived conclusion, committed by the trial court, in passing the decree and the judgment, under this appeal. 14. To substantiate the contention of exempting the suit property from the purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and the Government orders referred to in the plaint, regarding the validity and confirmation of the same Mr.Sampathkumar, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in S.Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1985 S. C. 257, imparting the legal ratio, confirming the validity of the above Government orders, exempting the trust property from the purview of the Buildings Act, 1960 referred to above. I am constrained to hold that the suit property is exempted from the purview of the act, referred to above, and for the said reason, the Judgment rendered by the trial court is within the legal competency and it has got every jurisdiction to do so. 15. On the other hand, if the two decisions, one rendered by a Full Bench of this Court in Sankara Narayanan Iyer v. Poovanathaswami Temple, Koilpatti, (1949)2 M.L.J. 171 : A.l.R. 1949 Mad. 721: 62 L.W. 508: 1949 M.W.N. 476: I.L.R. 1950 Mad. 191 and another decision is Vedakannu Nadar and others v. Nanguneri Taluk. Singikulam Annadana Chatram through its Huktdar Medai Dalavel Ranganatha Mudaliar and others, (1938)2 M.L.J. 663 relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, were looked into the principles imparted out from the case laws, in my respectful view, do not render any help to the appellant herein, for the simple reason that he had admitted that the suit property is belonging to the Munirul Islam Majeed and that he had entered into a lease with the said Majeed, which is a public body. Therefore, I am at every difficulty to express my endorsement with the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant. Therefore, I am at every difficulty to express my endorsement with the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant. Then it was contended that the Wakf Board is the authority expected to have every control over the said property and in the absence of it, the plaintiff cannot sue against the defendant, I have no other option except to reject the said contention as untenable, for the simple reason that the appellant has not entered into any agreement with the Wakf Board and if the Wakf Board has taken over the suit property or Majeed, it is always open to them to take necessary steps and extend their jurisdiction and certainly it is not open to this defendant/ tenant, to raise such a question. The contention, in my respectful view, is out of point and therefore, I am not in a position to countenance the same. 16. No other points were argued. Thus, for the foregoing reasons given by me, fully endorsing the elaborate discussion and the findings arrived at by the learned trial Judge, on par with law. I am constrained to hold that it is a correct view and cannot at all be touched with. 17. In the result, the appeal fails and accordingly, it is dismissed and consequently, the decree and Judgment passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Erode, in O.S. No.119 of 1982 dated 210. 1983 is hereby confirmed. In the light of the discussion held at para 12 of this judgment it is directed that the appellant/ tenant has to pay the future damages also at the rate of Rs.2,500 per month to the respondent herein, till he hands over the possession of the suit property. However, there will be no order as to costs. As requested by the Bar for the appellant, in the context that the defendant/ tenant is carrying on textile business in the suit property, three months time is granted to the appellant/ defendant, to vacate and hand over the possession of the suit property, to the respondent.