Judgment : These petitions have been filed under Sec. 482, Criminal Procedure Code to quash the order of compromise recorded in C.C.Nos. 1923 to 1925 of 1989 on the file of the IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras. .2. The allegations in these three petitions are common. The petitioner claiming to be the social worker for the uplift of women and as the chair-person of the Madras Citizens Progressive Council has filed these petitions mentioning them as public interest litigations to protect the interest of the weaker sex. The second respondent is a cine actor. Three girls by names, Lakshmi, Beena and Sheela lodged complaints against the 2nd respondent individually in May, 1985. The complainant Lakshmi alleged that the 2nd respondent had committed the offences under Secs. 520, 376 and 354, Indian Penal Code on her. Whereas the second complainant Beena alleged that the second respondent had committed the offences under Secs.420, 354 and 506, Part II of the Indian Penal Code. The 3rd complainant Sheela alleged the offences under Secs. 420, 376, 307, 506, Part-II and 292-A, Indian Penal Code against the 2nd respondent. Though very serious allegations were made against the second respondent by those girls even for the allegations under Secs. 326 and 307 of Indian Penal Code after investigation by the Saidapet Police charge-sheets were filed only for the offences under Secs. 354 and 470 of Indian Penal Code that too in March, 1988. After the filing of the charge sheet on 16. 1988 the complainants and the accused filed a petition under Sec. 320(2), Criminal Procedure Code seeking permission to compound the offences and on the permission of the learned IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, the offences were compounded in all the three cases and the accused was acquitted. The petitioner is challenging this order of compounding and the acquittal of the accused. According to the petitioner a fraud was played upon the court by the 2nd respondent/accused and the police in their joint effort by impersonating the complainants before the court for the purpose of compounding the offences and therefore, the order permitting for compounding the offences is illegal and is in effective. According to the petitioner a fraud was played upon the court by the 2nd respondent/accused and the police in their joint effort by impersonating the complainants before the court for the purpose of compounding the offences and therefore, the order permitting for compounding the offences is illegal and is in effective. It is stated that the real complainants did not appear before the court, but in their names three girls were produced before the learned Magistrate in connivance with police as though the real complainants had agreed to compromise the matter with the 2nd respondent and the court also was made to believe that the complainants were before the court agreeing to compound the offences and thus the fraud was committed upon the court by the Inspector of Police, Saidapet and also second respondent/accused and the entire judicial proceedings was made a mockery and by such fraud the people will loose faith in the court proceedings. Hence it is stated that the fraud committed on the court has to be set right by setting aside the orders of permission granted to compound the offences by the learned IX Metropolitan Magistrate in C.C.Nos. 1923 to 1925 of 1988. 3. Both the respondents have filed counters denying the allegation of impersonation and fraud on the court. They also have disputed the locus standi of the petitioner to maintain these petitions as she is a third party to the proceedings. .4. With regard to the locus standi of the petitioner to maintain these petitions the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Mr.S.K. Sundaram contended that the petitioner herein being a social worker engaged in the service for the uplift of women is entitled to represent the case of the exploited weaker sex in the public interest litigations and in this case apart from the compounding of the offences behind the back of the three victim girls who are the aggrieved persons a fraud has been played upon the court by impersonation of the complainants and the petitioner as a citizen of this country is entitled to bring it to the notice of the court as she is very much interested in the proper functioning of the judiciary to set right the wrong done to the complainants and to rectify the wrong order of the Magistrate by this public interest litigation. The learned counsel Mr.S.K. Sundaram has referred to a few decisions to support his argument for the maintainability of these petitions. The decision relied on by him is Emperor v. Nisheshwar Prasad Sinha, I.L.R. 56 All. 158. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in that case had permitted the mother of the convict to file an appeal against the conviction of her son. It happened during the freedom struggle period and in that case Bisheshwar Prasad Sinha who was a congress man was convicted under Sec. 17(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. The accused on certain principles refused to take part in the proceedings and defend himself and therefore, he was convicted to undergo the imprisonment. In view of his attitude, his mother intervened and she filed the revision on behalf of her son challenging the conviction. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court permitted her to file the revision exercising the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Sec. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code (old Act), though the petitioner therein viz. the mother of the accused was a total stranger to the proceedings. The High Court took the view that if there was an illegality in the proceedings it can be brought to the notice of the High Court irrespective of the fact whether he was a party to the proceedings or a stranger, as the illegality in the order has to be set right by the court. Therefore, in that case the revisional jurisdiction was exercised by the High Court when the mistake in the proceedings was brought to the notice of the court by the mother of the convict. Even though at that time was the view of the Allahabad High Court, now the Supreme Court has taken a different view holding that if an injury was caused to an individual and if that individual was not interested in seeking the remedy in the court a third party who is unconnected with that case cannot seek the remedy on behalf of the victim. I shall refer to this view of the Supreme Court in the decision which I am going to cite later, while referring to the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents. 5. I shall refer to this view of the Supreme Court in the decision which I am going to cite later, while referring to the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents. 5. The next decision relied on by the learned counsel Mr.S.K. Sundaram in Palanivel v. B. Saraswathi, 1993 L.W. (Crl.) 283, wherein this Court in a proceedings under Sec. 125, Criminal Procedure Code the father of a woman who was mentally deranged was permitted to file the petition for maintenance against the husband. According to the learned counsel Mr.S.K. Sundaram though under Sec. 125, Criminal Procedure Code only the aggrieved person is entitled to seek the maintenance, as this Court has permitted the father of the woman to institute the complaint it shows that even the third party is entitled to initiate proceedings in the interest of justice for seeking the remedy. But in that case as the wife was mentally deranged, the father of the woman was permitted to initiate the proceedings under Sec. 125, Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, that cannot be compared to these proceedings which are initiated by a third party. The third decision relied on by Mr.S.K. Sundaram in Ashwin v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 983. That was a case in which the complainant who initiated the proceedings against the accused for the offences under Secs.493 and 496, Indian Penal Code died during the pendency of the proceedings and his mother filed petition to substitute her as the complainant. As the complainant died the Supreme Court took the view that under Sec. 198 of Code of Criminal Procedure (old Act) aggrieved person includes that legal heir of the original complainant and therefore, the mother of the deceased complainant was permitted to continue the prosecution. As the complainant died the mother was permitted to continue the proceedings and therefore, that decision also is not on the point which is in controversy now. Another decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is Kamaraj v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1992 Writ L.R. 610, which also is not in any way helping the petitioner. In that case it was filed as public interest litigation to stop the quarrying operation by some of the villagers, alleging that the quarrying operation was a grave threat to the edifice of rock temple which is an accident monument. In that case it was filed as public interest litigation to stop the quarrying operation by some of the villagers, alleging that the quarrying operation was a grave threat to the edifice of rock temple which is an accident monument. Bakthavatsalam, J. found that the quarrying operation was in no way affected the ancient monument and the litigation itself was instituted by the unsuccessful bidder in the auction of the lease by the Government for quarrying. The learned Judge referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Sri Sachidhananda Pandey and another v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1109, dismissed that petition as the same was not filed in the public interest. Therefore, I am unable to understand how the learned counsel Mr. Sundaram draws support from this decision. 6. The other decisions relied upon by him are Ayodhya v. Ram Sumer Singh, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1415, S.K. Grover v. Chandra Prakash, 1986 Crl.L.J. 56. In both these cases the orders of acquittal were set aside by the High Court on the ground that the trial court did not give weight to the testimony of the eye witnesses and the material evidence and therefore, as no valid reasoning was given for the acquittal of the accused, the illegal order was bound to be set aside by the High Court. It must be borne in mind that in both the cases only aggrieved persons filed petitions before the High Court. As the aggrieved persons had initiated those proceedings against illegal order of acquittal, the courts gone into the merit of the orders passed in those cases. Therefore, these cases also are not lending any support to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 7. The learned counsel for the second respondent and the Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the first respondent Inspector have cited a series of decisions to support their argument that a third party who is not aggrieved or unconnected with the proceedings cannot intervene in a proceedings under the garb of the public interest litigation. The learned counsels draw my attention to the leading decision on this point relied upon the High Court in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 S.C.C. (Supp.) 1983, which deals with the public interest litigation and the maintainability of the proceedings by third parties. The learned counsels draw my attention to the leading decision on this point relied upon the High Court in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 S.C.C. (Supp.) 1983, which deals with the public interest litigation and the maintainability of the proceedings by third parties. As some of the Judges of the High Courts were transferred from one High Court to other High Court the members of the Bar who are the officers of the court filed writ petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the powers of the Government to pass such an order of transfer. The Supreme Court observed in page 219 as follows: “But we must be careful to see that the member of the public who approaches the court in cases of this kind is acting bona fide and not for personal kind or private profit or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The court must not allow this process to be used by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political objective. These are some of the dangers, in public interest litigation which the court has to be careful to avoid. It is also necessary for the court to bear in mind that there is a vital distinction between the locus standi and justiciability and it is not every default on the part of the State or a public authority that is justificable.” Again in the same page the Apex Court observes: “Before we part with this general discussion in regard to the locus standi, there is one point, we would like to emphasis and it is, that cases may arise whether there is undoubtedly public injury by the act or omission of the State or a public authority but such act or omission also causes a specific legal injury to an individual or to a specific class or group of individuals. In such cases, a member of the public having sufficient interest can certainly maintain an action challenging the legality of such act or omission, but if the person or specific class or group of persons who are primarily injured as a result of such act or omission do not wish to claim any relief and accept such act or omission willingly and without protest, the member of the public who complains of a secondary public injury cannot maintain the action, for the effect of entertaining the action at the instance of such members of the public would be to foist a relief on the person or specific class or group of persons primarily injured, which they do not want.” These above observations of the Apex Court will be the answer to the view taken in the early decision of the Allahabad High Court Emperor v. Nisheshwar Prasad Sinha, I.L.R. 56 All. 158, referred supra. It is the view of the Apex Court that even if a legal injury was caused to an individual but when such person does not want a remedy by maintaining an action a third person cannot find a relief for such person. Therefore, in this case as the three girls who were the complainants in the case mentioned above should be the victims on account of the compounding of the offences in their absence. But they have not come forward to challenge the order of compounding the offences. The petitioner claiming herself to be a social worker cannot thrust a relief on the unwilling parties. The learned counsel for the respondents referred to the expression of the Supreme Court in Thakkur Ram v. Slate of Bihar, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 911 and the Supreme Court has observed: “It would however, not be irrelevant to bear in mind the fact that the court’s jurisdiction was invoked by a private party. The criminal law is not to be used as an instrument of wreaking private vengence by an aggrieved party had caused injury to it. The criminal law is not to be used as an instrument of wreaking private vengence by an aggrieved party had caused injury to it. Barring a few exceptions in criminal matters the party who is treated as the aggrieved party is the State which is the custodian of the social interests of the community at large and so it is for the State to take all the steps necessary for bringing the person who has acted against the social interests of the community to book.” Therefore, the Supreme Court recognises only aggrieved person to be a party in the criminal proceedings. In Nandji Singh v. P.G. Medical Students Association, A.I.R. 1993 S.C.2284, also the Apex Court discourages the interference of the third party in the proceedings between private parties. In that case the appellant therein claimed that he was a teacher in the Bio-chemistry Department in the Medical College and filed an application in the University for the registration as a student in M.D. course. As the college objected for his registration in the University on the ground that he was not posted in any of the teaching post in the Medical College, he filed a writ for direction to the University to permit him to submit his thesis in M.D. (Medicine) examination. In that proceedings the Post Graduate Medical Students Association intervened as a Public Interest Litigation. The Supreme Court held that the facts narrated revealed that it was a dispute relating to an individual and there was no question of law involved in it. Therefore, the Supreme Court observed that how the Post Graduate Medical Students Association could convert an individual dispute into a Public Interest Litigation which should not be encouraged. Again in Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India, 1993 Crl.L.J. 37, the Apex Court repeated that neither under the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code nor under any of the statute a third party stranger is permitted to question the correctness of the findings and sentence imposed by the court and the plea that it is public interest litigation cannot be allowed when a total prosecution challenges the conviction of the accused. In the murder of General Vaidya, some persons were prosecuted and certain persons were convicted. Some persons who were unconnected with the proceedings filed a petition alleging violation of fundamental right under Art. 32 of the Constitution by the such conviction. In the murder of General Vaidya, some persons were prosecuted and certain persons were convicted. Some persons who were unconnected with the proceedings filed a petition alleging violation of fundamental right under Art. 32 of the Constitution by the such conviction. The Supreme Court in that case observed that the aggrieved party who was affected by any order has a right to seek redressal by questioning the validity, illegality or the correctness of the order and unless such a party is a minor or an insane or suffering from any other disability which the law recognises as sufficient, to permit another person to move the court no other person much less a stranger can intervene in the proceedings. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, 1993 Crl.L.J. 600 in the Bofars case Apex Court in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, 1993 Crl.L.J. 600 in the before case the Apex Court has made this expression about the public interest litigation in the following words: "The expression ‘litigation’ means the legal action including all proceedings therein initiated in a Court of Law with the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking the remedy. Therefore, lexically expression ‘PIL’ means a legal action initiated in a Court of Law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. Therefore, lexically expression ‘PIL’ means a legal action initiated in a Court of Law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. There is a host of decisions explaining the expression TIL’ in its wider connotation in the present day context in modern society, a few of which we will refer to in the appropriate part of this judgment." In para 62 the Apex Court continues: "In contrast, the strict rule of locus standi applicable to private litigation is relaxed and broad rule is evolved which gives the right of locus standi to any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in instituting an action for redressal of public wrong or public injury, but who is not a mere busybody or a meddlesome interloper; since the dominant object of ‘PIL’ is to ensure conversance of the provisions of the Constitution or the law which can be best achieved to advance the cause of community or disadvantaged groups and individual or public interest by permitting any person, having no personal gain or private motivation or any other oblique consideration but acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in maintaining an action for judicial redress for public injury to put the judicial machinery in motion like action popular is of Roman Law whereby any citizen could bring such an action in respect of a public delict." Therefore, public interest litigation can be an action for redressal of public wrong or public injury. In Gopalan v. Shanthi alias Vennira Adai Nirmala, 1989 L.W. (Crl.) 117, this Court also has taken a view that a third party cannot intervene in a proceedings unconnected with him. In that case the second respondent therein the Assistant Director of Inspection (Investigation) Office of the Director of Inspection filed a complaint before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate against the first respondent for violation of certain provisions of the Income Tax Act, punishable under Sec. 276-DD of the said Act. The first respondent filed a petition in this Court to quash that proceedings on certain grounds and also questioning the constitutional validity of Sec. 269-SS read with 276DD of the Act. The first respondent filed a petition in this Court to quash that proceedings on certain grounds and also questioning the constitutional validity of Sec. 269-SS read with 276DD of the Act. One ‘G’ calling himself to be a social worker filed a petition under Sec. 482 of Criminal Procedure Code to implead himself as a respondent to the petition of R.I. to treat his petition as a public interest litigation on the allegation that the second respondent Income Tax Assistant Director failed to discharge his obligations properly in that proceedings. This Court while dismissing the petition has observed: "It is fairly obvious, that if the petitioner has no right to set the law in motion he can have no locus standi to intervene at this stage especially when the prosecution has to be at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-Tax and which could not be launched in any other manner, is also capable of being compounded at any stage, by the Commissioner. There is no public wrong or public injury involved in this prosecution and the first respondent is entitled to approach this Court for quashing of the proceedings initiated against her, if she felt aggrieved that the prosecution was not maintainable." In another decision of this Court in Gopalan, Public Interest Litigant, General Secretary, Madras District Social Welfare Association v. Union of India and others,. 1990 Writ.L.R. 296, the petitioner Gopalan filed the writ petition calling it to be a public interest litigation to seize the passport of Mr.V. Gopalaswami a politician and to prosecute him for reaching Srilanka on 2. 1989 without valid travelling documents issued by the Government of India. In that case relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta and others v. Union of India, (1981) S.C.C. (Supp.) 1983, this Court has held that me petitioner had no case of the public to file the writ petition and therefore, he was not entitled to the remedy. In Manoharan, General Secretary, (PUCL), etc. v. THE D.I.G. of Police, (1994)1 L.W. (Crl.) 254 also a writ petition was filed by 55 persons claiming themselves to be the villagers in and around Kolathur Panchayat Union of Mettur Taluk in Salem District to release certain persons detained and also for payment of compensation for such detention. In Manoharan, General Secretary, (PUCL), etc. v. THE D.I.G. of Police, (1994)1 L.W. (Crl.) 254 also a writ petition was filed by 55 persons claiming themselves to be the villagers in and around Kolathur Panchayat Union of Mettur Taluk in Salem District to release certain persons detained and also for payment of compensation for such detention. The petition was named as public interest litigation alleging that the police in the course of their operations against Veerappan (a notorious sandalwood smuggler) has been harassing the villagers indiscriminately by beating up several of mem and taking away their property or destroying the same and the women folk were subjected physical and verbal sexual abuses and the petitioners prayed for writ of habeas corpus to produce the detenues mentioned in the annexure to the petition had also to pay compensation to those detenues and for initiation of me disciplinary proceedings against the police personnel responsible for such illegal detention and harassment. This Court dismissed the petition holding that if mere was any illegal detention of any of the associated persons, it was open to mem to move the appropriate court for appropriate reliefs and me petitioners therein were not the aggrieved persons. .8. In the light of me observations made in the above decisions it is clear mat the public interest litigation can be for me redressal of me public wrong or injury on account of which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest or as observed in Janatha Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, 1993 Crl.L.J. 600, the strict rule of locus standi is recognised in relation to public interest litigation, for private action, only when a member of the public having no personal gain or obligue motive to approach the court for enforcement of the constitutional or legal rights of the social or economically disadvantaged persons who on account of their poverty or total ignorance of fundamental rights are unable to enter me portals of the courts for judicial redressal. In mis case, me public or a section of the community is not affected by me order of me learned Magistrate permitting for compounding offence and if at all any legal injury has been done by such an order of the learned Magistrate it must be only to those three complainants who are not before me court. In mis case, me public or a section of the community is not affected by me order of me learned Magistrate permitting for compounding offence and if at all any legal injury has been done by such an order of the learned Magistrate it must be only to those three complainants who are not before me court. When they themselves have not chosen to challenge the order for compounding the offences, on me ground of illegality, me petitioner a third party has no locus standi to seek the remedy on their behalf, because they are not suffering from any infirmity to seek the remedy in the court. 9. Mr.S.K. Sundaram submitted mat the compounding of the offences might have been between two individuals and the petitioner would not have come forward with these petitions if the compounding was recorded in me proper manner according to the wishes of both parties, but in this case a fraud had been played upon the court which is an institution of delivering justice, to meet the private gains of the accused and the police officers and therefore, mis fraud cannot be treated as a matter of dispute between two individuals who are the parties to the compromises, but affecting the institution of the judiciary in which every citizen of the country is very much interested and therefore, any person who has knowledge about this fraud is entitled to bring it to the notice of the court for the rectification of mis irregularity and therefore, the petitioner, has locus standi to initiate these proceedings. Assuming that the fraud was played upon the court in obtaining the order, in compounding the offences, on account of such compounding, the public at large are not affected, and if at all, any legal injury has been inflicted, it could have been only to those three complainant girls. Therefore, they are the affected parties. .10. But the learned counsel for petitioner Mr.S.K. Sundaram submitted that those three poor girls have been threatened and driven away from the city by the police joining hands with the accused/ second respondent and therefore, they are now afraid of coming to the court to seek the redressal for their grievances. Therefore, they are the affected parties. .10. But the learned counsel for petitioner Mr.S.K. Sundaram submitted that those three poor girls have been threatened and driven away from the city by the police joining hands with the accused/ second respondent and therefore, they are now afraid of coming to the court to seek the redressal for their grievances. The learned counsel Mr.S.K. Sundaram represents before me that, the victim girls met him some time before these petitions and they expressed their grievances for compounding the offences even without their knowledge and thereafter he could not contact them on account of the police atrocity driving those girls to a far of place. He also represented that he has filed a habeas corpus petition for the production of those girls and still it is pending as the girls were not produced by the police before the court. If those girls met him expressing their grievances to him, these petitions could have been filed in their’ names and there is no averment in the petition that these three girls met the petitioner Mr. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan expressing their difficulties in filing the petition or any other problem they faced with the police or any specific direction to her to represent their case in the court. There is nothing to prove that the complainant girls are prevented from seeking justice in the court on account of the compounding of the. offences. The learned counsel appearing for the second respondent Mr.B. Kumar submitted that the petitioner issued a notice dated 111. 1989 calling upon the second respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 10,00,000 to each of the girls, but without even mentioning the address of the girls and this shows that the petitioner was interested in extracting money from the second respondent, utilising the name of the three girls under the robe of public litigation and these petitions have not been filed with a genuine intention of seeking justice. Even though it is baldly mentioned that the second respondent should pay Rs. 10,00,000 as compensation to each of the girls, the addresses of those girls are not furnished in the notice for contacting them. Anyhow, there is nothing to show that the three complainants are unable to protect their interest, arising from the alleged legal injury, giving way for the public interest litigation. 10,00,000 as compensation to each of the girls, the addresses of those girls are not furnished in the notice for contacting them. Anyhow, there is nothing to show that the three complainants are unable to protect their interest, arising from the alleged legal injury, giving way for the public interest litigation. Hence applying the dictum of the courts in the decisions cited above, I hold that the petitioner has no locus standi to file these petitions. .11. Then coming to the correctness of the allegations made in the petitions, that also lacks support of any acceptable evidence. The petitioner who is a third party to those proceedings alone is alleging that impersonation has been made for obtaining permission of the court for compounding. It is not the case of the petitioner that she was present at the time, when the order was passed by the court, and that the real complainants known to her, were not present in the court. But the learned counsel for petitioner Mr.S.K. Sundaram points out only few circumstances to draw the inference that the real complainants could not have been present in the court on 18. 1988 for compounding the offences. According to the learned counsel the three cases were stood adjourned to 18. 1994 and then to 18. 1994 and no summons were issued for the production of the complainants and therefore, the complainants could not have come to the court on 18. 1988. This is one of the circumstances according to him to suspect the identify of the persons who signed for the compounding of the offences. The second circumstances pointed out by the learned counsel is that the signatures of the complainants found in the petition for compounding the offences are found to be different from the signatures of the complainants in their respective complaints filed in May, 1985. So only from these two circumstances the theory of impersonation has been raised by the petitioner. It is not that only on the issue of summons to the witnesses, they would be able to attend the court. If the parties had met outside the court and compromised the matter between themselves, the witnesses may attend the court, on the hearing date as agreed between themselves. In the counter filed by the second respondent it is stated that on 18. 1988, the complainants were brought by the police themselves. If the parties had met outside the court and compromised the matter between themselves, the witnesses may attend the court, on the hearing date as agreed between themselves. In the counter filed by the second respondent it is stated that on 18. 1988, the complainants were brought by the police themselves. Probably there might have been compromise between the complainants and the accused and the police might have been informed about the compromises. Therefore, on the hearing date viz., 18. 1988, the complainants might have come along with the police because as the police was prosecuting the accused, the complainants had to be identified only by the police. When such possibility exists, we cannot infer that, as no summons were issued to the complainants witnesses, there was no chance for their presence in the court on 18. 1988. 12. The second circumstances viz., the signature of the complainants, the signatures of the victim in Crl.M.P. No. 16272 of 1989 by name Beena are identical both in the complaint dated 15. 1985 and also in the petition for compounding of the offences filed on 16. 1988. The signature of the other victim by name Sheela also almost tally in the complaint and the petition for compounding. But the victim Lakshmi in Crl.M.P. No. 16271 of 1989 in her complaint she has signed as ‘ ‘where as in the petition for compounding the offences she has signed as ‘ ‘and there is very much difference in the appearance of the signature also. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that as three years after the complaints, the complainants had signed the petition for compounding the offences, the difference in the signature are bound to be and that cannot be taken as a positive circumstance to suspect their presence for compounding the offences. This possibility also cannot be ruled out because a girl who was writing as ‘might have learned to sign her name as ‘in the course of three years and there is also possibility for the slight changes in the signatures because some times due to more opportunities to read and write in the subsequent years the handwriting may improve. When this possibility also exists, the court cannot come to a definite conclusion that the complainants could not have been present in the court on 18. 1988. When this possibility also exists, the court cannot come to a definite conclusion that the complainants could not have been present in the court on 18. 1988. The suspension and surmises along cannot take the place of proof to negative the participation of the complainants in the proceedings for compoundings the offences. .13. These petitions have been filed in the year 1989 and in the last five years the petitioner who claims to be serving for the cause of the weaker sex could have arranged to contact those girls and either brought them before the court to support the allegations in the petitions or secured affidavits from them to narrate the alleged atrocities on them, by driving them away from the city or for the acquittal of the accused who had committed the offences on them. When these complainants who are alive and who will be able to speak about the correctness as to the signatures in the petition for compounding the offences, are not before the court, the inferences on the basis of the allegations of a third person who is totally unconnected with the complainants, cannot assume importance. Therefore, on this ground also the petitioner is not entitled to reopen the criminal proceedings. 14. As found above, both, on the ground of the locus standi to maintain the petitions and on the correctness the offences have been found against the petitioner, the petitions are not sustainable. Accordingly, all the three petitions are dismissed.