Judgment :- Srinivasan, J. Broadly stated, two contentions are mainly urged in this batch of writ petitions, one relating to the validity of some of the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (Act No.68 of 1986), (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) and the other relating to the applicability of the Act to imparting of education and matters connected therewith. It is only in W.P. No.6447 of 1993 a prayer is made for declaration that Secs.l0(l)(b) and (c), 13(3), (4) and (5), 14(l)(c), 16(l)(b), 20(1)(b) and 27 and other provisions of the Act as unconstitutional, ultra vires and unenforceable. In all the other writ petitions the prayer is for either issue of writ of prohibition prohibiting the Consumer Forum from dealing with the specified complaints or for issue of a writ of certiorari to call for the records and quash the orders passed by the Consumer Forum on specified complaints. 2. The petitions can be classified into three Groups: A. Writ Petitions filed by Educational Institutions: B. Writ Petitions filed by Universities, and C. Writ Petitions filed by the Director of Government Examinations. Writ Petitions falling in Group ‘A’: W.P.Nos. 6446, 6447, 7577, 9585, 15743, 19409, 19410, 19411, 19412, 19461, 19462, 20608, 20609, 20894, 20895 and 21083 of 1993. Writ Petitions falling in Group ‘B’ W.P.Nos. 1700 of 1992 and W.P.No. 5262 of 1993. Writ Petitions falling in Group ‘C: W.P.Nos. 9425 and 20165 of 1993. A. Writ petitions filed by Educational Institutions: 3. In Group ‘A’ W.P.No.15743 of 1993 is filed by the Loyola Institute of Business Administration while all the other petitions are filed by Dr. Alexander Educational Foundation. 4. The case of Alexander Educational Foundation as set out in the affidavits is shortly as follows: The Foundation is a Charitable Organisation, registered under the Societies Registration Act for the purpose of running Educational Institutions, particularly in medical and para-medical fields. The Management is carried on by a Board consisting of eminent persons in the field of medicine and medical education and the trustee is himself a Doctor and his entire family consists of medical practitioners, running a highly successful and reputed General Hospital at Tambaram under the name of Philips Hospital. It has completed 25 Years of service to the patients in the area. It has completed 25 Years of service to the patients in the area. The Foundation was started with the express intention of setting up medical/para- medical educational institutions in the Union Territory of Pondicherry, where it was found that no adequate or proper educational institutions were available, apart from the nationally renowned institution Jawaharlal Nehru Institute of Post Graduate Medical Education and Research (JIPMER). The petitioners sought to establish two institutions, one a Polytechnic for grant of Diplomas and another a full fledged institute for the grant of Degrees in the field of Pharmacy, Medical Lab Technology and Nutrition. Consequently, the Pondicherry Community Polytechnic was started in 1985 with the affiliation of the Board Technical Education, New Delhi and recognition of the All India Council of Technical Education, New Delhi. The Polytechnic has also been recognised as a community Polytechnic by the Government of India, Ministry of Human Resources Development, entitled to receive grant-in-aid from the Central Government, though the grant has not been received yet on account of non-cooperation and refusal by the Government of Pondicherry to give a No Objection letter for receipt of the grant. The Pant Institute of Technology was started in the year 1987 for giving education leading to grant of Degrees in the three subjects mentioned earlier. The petitioner required affiliation with the Pondicherry University and sought the same for the course of the Bachelor of Pharmacy. After inspections by a Committee appointed by the University, affiliation was granted to the same by the University subject to certain conditions. The Government of Pondicherry passed an order on 20.6.1988 calling upon the petitioner to show cause why the recognition granted in 1985 should not be withdrawn. The University also passed an order seeking to withdraw the affiliation granted in 1987 for the three courses, viz., B.Sc, Pharma, B.Sc, M.L.T. and B.Sc, Nutrition, citing the Government’s derecognition alone as the cause. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed W.P. Nos.7797 and 7798 o. ‘1988 for issue of certiorarified mandamus to quash the show cause notice and to forbear the Government from interfering with the administration of the Polytechnic. A mandamus was also prayed for directing the University to continue the affiliation already granted. The writ petitions were admitted and interim stay of the notice issued by the Government was granted. A mandamus was also prayed for directing the University to continue the affiliation already granted. The writ petitions were admitted and interim stay of the notice issued by the Government was granted. However, the court dismissed the petition for direction permitting the petitioner to admit students to the three courses pending the writ petition. The petitioner filed W.A. No.1110 of 1988. A Division Bench called for a report from the Inspection Committee whether the conditions imposed for affiliation were complied with. It was found on the report that almost all the conditions were satisfied and consequently, the Bench passed an order directing the University to grant provisional affiliation for six years from the acadamic year 1988-89 subject to certain terms regarding creation of an endowment to the tune of Rs.15 lakhs in instalments. Pursuant thereto, the University granted affiliation on 211. 1988 for B .Pharma course. With reference to B.Sc, M.L.T. and B.Sc, Nutrition, the petitioner approached the University independently and applied for affiliation. After the Inspection Committee submitted its report, recommending the grant of affiliation for the academic year 1989-90, the Academic Council and the Executive Council of the University concurred with the recommendation. Accordingly, the affiliation was granted by letter dated 12. 1989 for B.Sc, M.L.T. and B.Sc, Nutrition Courses for the academic year 1989-90 onwards. Thereafter, both the Institutes were conducting courses for Diploma and Degree respectively. The Institutes were subjected to ten inspections between 1987 and 1990 and all the reports were substantially in favour of the petitioner and they recognised unequivocally that the Instituted were well-equipped and had the necessary infrastructure to impart education on Degree/ Diploma level in the field of para medical sciences. The petitioner was called upon by the University to make available all the records and the premises for one more inspection on 23. 1991. Despite the petitioner’s request for postponing the same, it was said to have taken place in the absence of the petitioner and based on a report by the Inspection Committee, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 4. 1991 as to why the affiliation granted for the three degree courses be not discontinued on the ground of insufficiency of infrastructural facilities. The petitioner filed W.P. Nos.7725 and 7726 of 1991 challenging the same. 1991 as to why the affiliation granted for the three degree courses be not discontinued on the ground of insufficiency of infrastructural facilities. The petitioner filed W.P. Nos.7725 and 7726 of 1991 challenging the same. The writ petitions were admitted and interim orders staying the implementation of any final order which may be passed in such proceedings was granted. The University passed final orders disaffiliating the petitioner Institution in respect of B.Sc, M.L.T. and B.Sc, Nutrition. Later an order was passed disaffiliating the petitioner in respect of B.Pharm. course also. Thereafter, the prayers in the writ petitions were suitably amended challenging the orders of disaffiliation. The petitions were dismissed by a Division Bench on 10. 1991. The petitioner preferred a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court of India in S.L.P. Nos.850 to 853 of 1992. At that juncture,the affiliation granted in respect of Diploma Courses was also discontinued by the Board of Technical Education and that is challenged by the petitioner in W.P. No.13755 of 1991. The same is pending. 5. In that situation, the Student Body started agitating and the petitioner was subjected to lot of litigation at the instance of students. The Government and the University started diverting the existing students of the institute to other colleges to complete their courses. As the petitioner had already invested crores of ruppes in setting up the institution in Pondicherry and with a view to find a permanent solution to the problems, the petitioner approached the Government and the University of Pondicherry to bring about an amicable and permanent solution. They requested the petitioner to withdraw the appeal before the Supreme Court as a pre-condition to have any settlement talks. Accordingly, on 17. 1982 the petitioner withdrew the S.L.Ps. with the permission of the Supreme Court. On 8. 1992 the Secretary of the petitioner had a meeting with the Hon’ble the Chief Minister of Pondicherry and the Vice-Chancellor of the Pondicherry University. It was decided in that meeting to constitute a Committee comprising the Registrar of Pondicherry University, the Dean of the College Development Council and the Director of Education, Government of Pondicherry along with the Secretary of the petitioner Foundation. The Committee was to go into the various issues involved and submit a report for the purpose of enabling the University to decide on the reaffiliation of the institution. The Committee was to go into the various issues involved and submit a report for the purpose of enabling the University to decide on the reaffiliation of the institution. In spite of lapse of seven months and odd, the Committee had not met: nor had it submitted any report to the University to reconsider the affiliation. In spite of the above circumstances the petitioner continued to conduct the classes for the existing students who had joined the course when the petitioner had a valid affiliation. However, there was a tremendous student unrest resulting in a major law and order problem in the Institute. If the Government and the University co-operate, the Institute could be run properly and impart excellent education to the student body. 6. At this juncture, several students instituted complaints before the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum under the Act claiming refund of their fees, alleged capitation fees and damages on the allegation that the petitioner has provided a deficient service and that they are consumers within the meaning of the Act. The Consumer Forum has taken on file such complaints and issued notices to the petitioner. In some matters, orders have been passed by the Forum against the petitioner. The petitioner is, therefore, obliged to approach this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer for issue of a writ of prohibition prohibiting the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum from entertaining, hearing or disposing of complaints filed by the students and for a writ of certiorari to quash the orders passed by the Forum. 7. In W.P.Nos.6446, 7577, 9585, 20608, 20609, 20894, 20895 and 21083 of 1993, the prayer is for issue of writ of prohibition. In W.P. Nos.19409, 19410,19412, 19461 and 19462 of 1993, the prayer is for issue of writ of certiorari to call for the records in C.Nos.71,73, 69,70 and 72 of 1993 and quash the orders passed on 28. 1993 by the Forum. Similarly W.P. No.19411 of 1993 is for issue of a writ of certiorari to call for the records in C.No.66 of 1993 and quash the order passed on 19. 1993. 8. In W.P. 15743 of 1993, the petitioner is Loyola Institute of Business Administration, whose case is shortly as follows: It is an educational institution approved by All India Council for Technical Education, conducting Post Graduate Diploma Course in Business Administration. 1993. 8. In W.P. 15743 of 1993, the petitioner is Loyola Institute of Business Administration, whose case is shortly as follows: It is an educational institution approved by All India Council for Technical Education, conducting Post Graduate Diploma Course in Business Administration. It is managed by a governing body and the syllabus is fixed by the Board of Studies constituted by the Governing body and chaired by the Dean of Studies. It is a course of three years with six semesters of five subjects each and examinations are conducted by the Board of Studies, which will be responsible for awarding marks. The second respondent in the writ petition joined the Institute in 1984 and discontinued his studies in 1986 leaving arrears in the first, second and third semesters. He rejoined the Institute for fourth semester on 11. 1991. He had to complete nine subjects in the first, second and third semesters together with other subjects in the subsequent semesters (4th, 5th and 6th. After completion of his studies, cumulative grade certificates were issued and he attended the convocation on 23. 1993. He laid a complaint before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission alleging that he did not get full marks for class participation, corrected versions of cumulative grade sheets were not issued to him and that he was not invited for the convocation held on 23. 1993. He claimed compensation on the above grounds. The petitioner filed objecttions to the complaint stating inter alia that the commission had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. Even on merits, the petitioner contended that the second respondent was not entitled to any relief and that he got the marks due to him as per the norms and Rules of Board of Studies as all other arrears students appearing along with the second respondent had been dealt with. The petitioner contended that the second respondent was not a ‘consumer’ and the petitioner was not rendering any service as contemplated by the Act and that imparting education and holding examinations are outside the scope of the Act. The Commission has no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. The petitioner having no alternative remedy, has approached this Court with a prayer for issue of writ of certiorari calling for the records relating to the complaint O.P.No.165 to 1993 on the file of the first respondent in the writ petition and quash the same. The Commission has no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. The petitioner having no alternative remedy, has approached this Court with a prayer for issue of writ of certiorari calling for the records relating to the complaint O.P.No.165 to 1993 on the file of the first respondent in the writ petition and quash the same. B. Writ petitions filed by the Universities: 9. In this Group, W.P. No.1700 of 1992 is filed by the Registrar, University of Madras and the Director of Institute of Correspondence Education, Madras University while the other writ petition. W.P. No.5262 of 1993 is filed by the Registrar, Madurai Kamarajar University. The case of the petitioners in W.P. No.1700 of 1992 is as follows: The fourth respondent was student of M. A. Degree Course conducted by the Institute of Correspondence Education (I.C.E.) University of Madras. He appeared for the second Year Examination held in May 1990. He failed in two papers. He had not paid the tuition fees in one lumpsum within the prescribed date. He was accordingly informed of the same. Later it was verified and found that necessary fees had been received by the Examination Section on 210. 1991 and immediately the results were announced. Alleging that the delay in publishing the results has caused great loss to him, the fourth respondent filed a complaint before the Consumers Disputes Redressal Forum, Coimbatore claiming a compensation of Rs.1,00,000 and prayed for a direction to publish the results of the Second Year Final M.A. Economics Course. An ex parte order was passed directing payment of Rs.28,000 as compensation and also publication of the results and issuance of mark sheets. But, even by that time, the results had not been published. The Form had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as the fourth respondent is not a ‘consumer’ within the meaning of the Act and the University is outside the scope of the Act, as the functions of the University do not fall within the definition of ‘service’ in the Act. Hence, the writ petition is filed for a declaration that the provisions of the Act do not have any application to the petitioners and the functions of the University. 10. Hence, the writ petition is filed for a declaration that the provisions of the Act do not have any application to the petitioners and the functions of the University. 10. In the other writ petition filed by the Registrar, Madurai Kamaraj University, the prayer is for issue of a Writ of certiorari calling for the records of the District Consumer Redressal Forum, Sivaganga in O.P. No.l of 1992 on its file and to quash the orders dated 110. 1992 passed by the Forum. The second respondent in the writ petition passed B.Sc, examination in July. 1991. He was a student of the third Respondent. According to him, though results were published, the Mark Sheets were not issued to him and on account of the delay in issue of the same, the admission given to him by the Loyola College in the M.Sc, course was cancelled resulting in heavy loss and mental agony to him. He prayed for a compensation of Rs.13,000. The petitioner filed a statement of objections contending that the mark sheets could not be issued since the internal marks in two subjects were not sent to it in time by the third respondent college and that there was no delay on its part. The Forum, however, held that the petitioner was alone to be blamed for the delay and granted a compensation of Rs.3,500 to be paid within one month and in default to pay a penalty of Rs.8,000 in addition. Contending that the matter is not governed by the Act and the Forum has no jurisdiction to deal with the complaint of the second respondent, the writ petition has been filed with the prayer already set out. C. Writ petitions filed by the Director of Government Examinations: 11. In W.P. No.9425 of 1993, the first respondent was a candidate, who appeared in the Higher Secondary Examination held in March, 1991. The results were published in the third week of May, 1991. The results of some of the candidates were withheld as they could not be released for want of vital particulars from the Examination Centre or due to certain discrepancies at the time of processing results by the computer. The certificate of the first respondent was despatched on 7. 1991’ and she received the same on 7. 1991. The results of some of the candidates were withheld as they could not be released for want of vital particulars from the Examination Centre or due to certain discrepancies at the time of processing results by the computer. The certificate of the first respondent was despatched on 7. 1991’ and she received the same on 7. 1991. However, she filed a complaint before the Kanyakumari District Consumer Grievances Redressal Forum claiming a compensation of Rs.15,000 alleging that the delay in sending the Certificate to her prevented her from applying for higher studies and getting admission in any college. The Forum passed an order granting a compensation of Rs.15,000 plus costs of Rs.1,000 overruling the objection of the petitioner that the Act will not apply to the petitioner. Challenging the validity of the said order, the petitioner has filed the Writ petition for issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the records in Consumer Grievances Application No.112 of 1992 on the file of the second respondent and quashing the order dated 14. 1993 on the ground that the Forum had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 12. In the other writpetitionW.P.No.20165 of l993, the first respondent appeared in the Higher Secondary Examination held in March-April, 1992. After the receipt of Mark Sheets, he applied for retotalling on payment of necessary fees. It was found on such retotalling that there was an error in the marks awarded earlier and the mistake was rectified. The Examiner had correctly valued the answer papers and awarded 123 marks for the particular test, but while entering the same in the Mark Sheet, it was entered as 42 marks by mistake. When the mistake was found out, action was taken immediately and it was rectified. But, the first respondent instituted a proceeding before the District Consumer Redressal Forum. Tirunelveli claiming a compensation of Rs.93,060 alleging that on account of the error in the mark sheets supplied to her earlier, she could not sit for the Entrance Examination held for M.B.B.S., course on 26. 1992. According to her, she was also not able to join the Group desired by her in the B.Sc, course. The Forum overruled the objection of the petitioner as to its jurisdiction and passed an order awarding compensation in a sum of Rs.10,000 and costs of Rs.500. It is the validity of the said order which is challenged in that writ petition. The Forum overruled the objection of the petitioner as to its jurisdiction and passed an order awarding compensation in a sum of Rs.10,000 and costs of Rs.500. It is the validity of the said order which is challenged in that writ petition. Validity of some of the provisions of the Act: 13. As stated earlier, it is only in W.P. No.6447 of 1993 a prayer is made for issue of a writ of declaration declaring that the provisions of Secs.l0(l)(b) and (c), 13(3) (4) and (5), 14(1)(c), 16(1)(b), 20(1)(b) and 27 and other provisions of the Act are unconstitutional, ultra vires and unenforceable. The writ petition was filed on 30.3.1993 and admitted on 4. 1993. But in June, 1993, Presidential Ordinance 24 of 1993 was passed amending several Sections of the Act including Secs.10, 13, 14, 16, 20 and 27. The petitioner has not filed any petition for amendment of the prayer in the writ petition or any supplemental affidavit setting out grounds attacking the sections as amended. That has given rise to an argument by the respondents’ counsel that the writ petition has become infructuous in view of the amendment. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, argued that some of the objections as to the validity of the provisions continue to hold good and the court has to decide the same. 14. The main objection of the petitioner is that the provisions of the Act are violative of Arts. 14,19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as it seeks to deprive an individual of a fair trial before a civil court of competent jurisdiction. The argument is developed as follows: The composition of the Forum at the various levels under the Act takes away the guarantee of a fair trial before the Forum as the majority of the members are legally untrained. Sec. 10 does not lay down definite guidelines as to the persons who will satisfy the description contained in the section. In the normal course the disputes would have been taken to Civil Courts and the parties concerned will have a fair trial in accordance with the prescribed procedure which ensures the observance of the principles of natural justice. Sec. 10 does not lay down definite guidelines as to the persons who will satisfy the description contained in the section. In the normal course the disputes would have been taken to Civil Courts and the parties concerned will have a fair trial in accordance with the prescribed procedure which ensures the observance of the principles of natural justice. But, the provisions of the Act and in particular Sec. 13 (3) expressly provides that the proceedings of the Forum cannot be called in question on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been complied with. The procedure prescribed in Sec.13 is hardly sufficient to ensure a fair trial. The Act has also vested the powers of a civil court on the Forum and also empowers the Forum to adopt summary procedure. Even so, the Forum has been empowered to punish the party even with imprisonment besides fine. Thus, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, the sections referred to above are unconstitutional and unenforceable. 15. Referring to Secs.lO(l)(b),16(l)(b)and20(l)(b), learned counsel submits that the Forum in the three levels, District, State and Nation, have to adjudicate on contentious claims and decide not only questions of fact but also important questions of law. The majority of the Forum comprises of persons who are not judicially trained. The trial would certainly not be fair and it would be unfair and unjust. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon an unreported judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in Canara Bank v. State of Tamil Nadu and Tamil Nadu Sugar Corporation Limited, W.P.No.7562 of 1987, Judgment dated 11. 1988. The Bank was granting loans to Madurai Sugars Limited, a company registered under the Companies Act. The company had to face certain problems and the Government of Tamil Nadu intervened by passing an Act called Madura Sugars Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1984, (Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1984). Under Sec.15 of the Act, a Commissioner was appointed for payment of amounts pay able under Sec.9. The Bank made a claim before the Commissioner for the amount due from the Company. The Commissioner, by order dated 27. 1986, determined the amount payable to the Bank at Rs.3,03,87,487.07 and by order dated 10. 1986 directed payment of a sum of Rs.35,00,000. By a further order dated 210. The Bank made a claim before the Commissioner for the amount due from the Company. The Commissioner, by order dated 27. 1986, determined the amount payable to the Bank at Rs.3,03,87,487.07 and by order dated 10. 1986 directed payment of a sum of Rs.35,00,000. By a further order dated 210. 1986 another sum of Rs.144 lakhs was paid making a total of Rs.179 lakhs. As per the report of the Commissioner, the net value of the assets of the company was determined to be Rs.3,11,03,8368. The Commissioner held that a sum of Rs.1,24,87,487.07 remained unpaid in so far as the Bank was concerned. Though the bank had claimed interest, the Commissioner had disallowed the same. In spite of repeated requests made to the Government by the Bank, no payment was made and the writ petition was filed. One of the points framed by the learned Judge, was relating to the manner of appointment of the Commissioner of Payments. While dealing with that point, the learned Judge observed that the Commissioner of Payments had no judicial experience at all to deal with a huge claim running to crores. The learned Judge said: “Law is a deep science. It is by a process of great experience, judicial experience is evolved. It is not acquired overnight. If that were not so, any one without qualification could occupy that exalted position. In this connection, it is worthwhile to quote the remarks of Lord Coke who, addressing James I, stated as follows: ”The King in his own person cannot adjudge any case, either criminal or treason, felony, etc. of betwixt party and party, concerning his inheritance, chattels or goods, etc., but this ought to be determined and adjudged in some court of justice according to Law and custom of England. God had endowed His Majesty with excellent science and great endowments of nature, but His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason, but by artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an art which requires long study and experience, before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it. The Law is the golden met- wand and measure to try the causes of the subjects, and which protected His Majesty in safety and peace “. It will also be useful to quote the definition of a Judge by Baker: ”A man of learning who spends tirelessly the weary hours after midnight acquainting himself with the great body of traditions and the learning of the law. A man who bears himself in his community with friends but without familiarities almost lonely, devoting himself exclusively to the most exacting mistress that man ever had, the law as a profession in its highest reaches where he not only interprets the law, but applies fearing only one thing in the world, that in a moment of abstraction, or due to human weakness he may in fact commit some error and fail to do justice. That is the Judge.“ Tennyson so poignantly remarked: ”An infant crying in the night: An infant crying for the light; And with no language but a cry.“ It is a matter of regret that the Government did not bear these vital considerations in mind. After all, if the High Court was unable to spare a Judicial Officer in service, there are a number of retired Judicial Officers, who could have well adjudicated upon the claims. That should ”have been the proper thing too, having regard to the enormity of the claim. The reason why I am so much emphasising this, will be apparent when I come to the merits of the award. There, I leave this at this.“ The learned Judge proceeded to hold that there was no investigation and no application of mind before the Commissioner of Payments, put his seal of approval on the report of the Chartered Accountants. The learned Judge said that there ought to have been an investigation of the claims and the lack of it showed the abysmal ignorance of the functions under judicial process and constituted nothing but an abdication of Judicial power. Referring to the absence of any discussion with regard to Exs. The learned Judge said that there ought to have been an investigation of the claims and the lack of it showed the abysmal ignorance of the functions under judicial process and constituted nothing but an abdication of Judicial power. Referring to the absence of any discussion with regard to Exs. A-1 to A-83 marked in that case, the learned Judge observed that it would be a pointer as to why persons who are not trained on the judicial line of thinking should not be entrusted with the task of adjudication and if it was persisted with, dreadful results would follow because of the incompetence of the executive taking the role of the Judges. The learned Judge said: ”It is high time that this practice is discontinued. This will apply not only with regard to the present Act but even with regard to other enactments. Wherever rival claims require to be decided and the rights to be decided and the rights of parties require to be determined, no person who does not have the proper training and who does not possess the Judicial frame of mind should ever be appointed." Ultimately, the claim of the Bank was negatived and the writ petition was dismissed. 16. According to learned counsel the principles laid down by the learned Judge in the above case would apply here with greater force. We are unable to agree. Whatever might have been the position before Ordinance 24 of 1993 was passed, the provision as found in the sections for constitution of the Forum after the amendment, is sufficient to ensure a fair trial. Under Sec.10(1) each District Forum shall consist of a person who is, or who has been, or is qualified to be, a District Judge who shall be its President. Under Clause (b) of Sec. 10(1) the other two members shall be persons of ability, integrity and standing, and have adequate knowledge or experience of, or have been shown capacity in dealing with problems relating to economics, law, commerce, accountancy, industry, public affairs or administration. Having regard to the wide scope of the subjects which may have to be dealt with by the Forum, the Legislature has taken care to introduce such a provision. Having regard to the wide scope of the subjects which may have to be dealt with by the Forum, the Legislature has taken care to introduce such a provision. While the President of the Forum is a person who has sufficient knowledge of the Judicial procedure, it is not necessary that he is versatile or well versed in other subjects, such as economics, commerce, accountancy etc. The combination of judicial knowledge and expertise in other subjects will certainly prove to be very valuable and useful in deciding the disputes in a fair and competent manner. Similar provision is found in Sec.l6(!)(a) and (b) relating to the State Commission. Under Clause (a), the President of the Commission has to be a person who is or has been a Judge of a High Court. The proviso to Sec.l6(l)(a) requires the State Government to consult the Chief Justice of the High Court before appointing the President of the Commission. Under Sec.20, which provides for the composition of the National Commission, the President has to be a person, who is or has been a Judge of the Supreme Court. The proviso to clause (a) of Sec.20(1) enjoins the Central Government to consult the Chief Justice of India before making any appointment of the President of the Commission. The other four members of the National Commission have to possess similar ability, integrity and standing and adequate knowledge or experience in the subjects referred to therein. 17. Further, under Sec.10(1 A) the appointment of the President and the Members of the District Forum shall be made by the State Government on the recommendation of a selection committee consisting of .(i) The President of the State Commission- Chairman. .(ii) Secretary, Law Department of the State-Member, (iii) Secretary in charge of the Department dealing with consumer affairs in the State Member. Thus, the appropriate guidelines are found in the Section itself for constituting the District Forum. The Section as it stands now, after the Amendment of 1993, does not give rise to any ambiguity or room for mischief. We do not accept the argument that the judicial Member or rather the President of the Forum being in the minority and the other members forming the majority, will always be prevailed over by the other members and it will lead to transgression of principles of fair play and natural justice. There is no basis for any such apprehension. We do not accept the argument that the judicial Member or rather the President of the Forum being in the minority and the other members forming the majority, will always be prevailed over by the other members and it will lead to transgression of principles of fair play and natural justice. There is no basis for any such apprehension. In any event, the validity of the section is not affected as it does not by itself violate any provision of the Constitution. That will be so with regard to Secs.l6(l)(b) and 20(1)(b) also and we hold that Secs.l0(l)(b), 16(l)(b) and 20(1) (b) are valid and enforceable. 18. An argument was faintly advanced that members who belong to political parties are being appointed as non-judicial members of the Forum and the provisions of the section are easily susceptible to misuse and abuse, and they should, therefore, be struck down. There is no merit in this contention. If a person satisfies the requirements of the section he cannot be disqualified merely because he is a member of a political party. It cannot be contended that honesty and sincerity to duty will be alien to a member of a political party. If in a particular case an appointment is made mala fide with ulterior motives, that can certainly be questioned by appropriate proceedings. But, the remote possibility of such an appointment cannot be a ground to invalidate the sections. 19. One other argument advanced is that under Sec.2(jj) a ‘member’ includes the ‘President and a member of the National Commission or a State Commission or a District Forum, as the case may be’ and that under Sec.29-A no act or proceeding of the Forum at any level shall be invalid by reason only of the existence of any vacancy amongst its members or any defect in the Constitution thereof. Learned counsel argues that even if the post of President of the District Forum or State Commission or the National Commission is vacant, the proceedings can go on without the presence of a Judicial member and such proceedings cannot be invalidated by reason of the said vacancy. There is no merit in this contention. Sec. 14(2) ensures that no proceeding is conducted in the District Forum without its President. Sec.18 makes the provision applicable to the State Forum with such modification as may be necessary. There is no merit in this contention. Sec. 14(2) ensures that no proceeding is conducted in the District Forum without its President. Sec.18 makes the provision applicable to the State Forum with such modification as may be necessary. Further, under Sec.l8-A, when the office of the President of the District Forum or of the State Commission, as the case may be, is vacant or when any such President is, by reason of absence or otherwise,unable to perform the duties of his office, the duties of the office shall be performed by such person who is qualified to be appointed President of the District Forum or, as the case may be, of the State Commission, as the State Government may appoint for the purpose. Thus, the State Government is empowered to fill up the vacancy by appointing a person who is qualified to be appointed President of the District Forum or State Commission. No doubt, there is no similar provision for filling up the vacancy in the National Commission, but that does not mean that the vacancy need not be or will not be filled up as soon as it arises. Sec.29-A is only a precautionary measure to see that the acts or proceedings before the Forum or Commission are not challenged on a mere technical ground. It cannot be contended that the absence of the Judicial Member will by itself cause the adoption of unfair procedure or the violation of the principles of natural justice. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner invites our attention to the judgment in V.Balachandran v. Union of India, (1992)1 L W. 396. A Division Bench of this Court found that the provisions in the Company Law Board Members (Qualifications and Experience) Rules, (1989) were weighted more in favour of Administrative Members and instead it should be weighted in favour of Judicial Members. The Bench held that the Chairman should be none but one who is qualified to be a Judge of a High Court or had been a Judge, of a High Court. The Bench issued certain directions to reframe the Rules within a time schedule. The ruling has no relevance here as the Legislature has taken care to provide that the President of the Forum or Commission at all levels is a Judicial Member. The Bench issued certain directions to reframe the Rules within a time schedule. The ruling has no relevance here as the Legislature has taken care to provide that the President of the Forum or Commission at all levels is a Judicial Member. The respondents have rightly drawn our attention to Sec.23 of the Act under which any person aggrieved by the order made by the National Commission may prefer an appeal against the same to the Supreme Court. Thus, judicial review by the highest court in the country is provided for by the Act. 21. Much of the attack was directed against Sec.13(3). That sub-section reads thus: “No proceedings complying with the procedure laid down in Sub-secs.(l) and (2) shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been complied with”. On a superficial reading, the sub-section appears to encourage disposals in an arbitrary manner, by the District Forum. But, a second reading will show that the sub-section is carefully worded. The sub-section refers to Sub-secs.(l) and (2). A perusal of Sub-secs. (1) and (2) shows that the procedure prescribed therein enshrines the principles of natural justice and if that procedure is adopted, the principles of natural justice are automatically satisfied. Sub-sec.(3) is introduced by the Legislature only to exclude such principles of natural justice which may fall outside Sub-secs.(l) and (2). The expression “natural justice” is capable of covering a wider field than what is necessary for a fair trial. It is only to eschew the larger connotations and confine the expression to its essential ingredients, the Legislature has thought fit to introduce Sub-sec.(3). There is no merit in the contention that Sub-sec.(3) has thrown overboard all the principles of natural justice and enabled the District Forum to function arbitrarily while disposing of the complaints. We do not find anything unreasonable in, Sec.13(3) of the Act. 22. Reference is made to Sec. 13(5) and a contention is advanced that the District Forum will misuse the said provision while adopting the summary procedure. There is no warrant for such a contention. Sub-secs.(4) and (5) of Sec. 13 should be read together, as Sub-sec.(4) vests the District Forum with the powers of the civil court in respect of the specified matters. There is no warrant for such a contention. Sub-secs.(4) and (5) of Sec. 13 should be read together, as Sub-sec.(4) vests the District Forum with the powers of the civil court in respect of the specified matters. Sub-sec.(5) has to necessarily empower the Forum to act under Secs.193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code for the purpose of Sec. 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-sec.(5) is more or less consequential to Sub-sec.(4). 23. It is contended that the provisions in Sec.14(1 )(d) enabling the district forum to pass an order to pay such amount as may be awarded by it as compensation to the consumer for any loss or injury suffered by the consumer due to the negligence of the opposite party is invalid as there are no guidelines for fixing the compensation. There is no merit in this contention. Each case has to be decided on the facts thereof and the forum should necessarily have the discretion to award such amount as may be found just and proper. If the District Forum commits any error in fixing the amount, the aggrieved party can always file an appeal to the State Commission and a further appeal is provided to the National Commission. The matter can also be taken to the Supreme Court ultimately, if the party is not satisfied with any of the orders of the Forum or Commission. 24. There is also no merit in the contention that the provisions in Sec.27 enabling the District Forum or the Commission to award imprisonment besides fine are unreasonable. Obviously, the provision is made with a view to enable the Forum or the Commission to enforce its orders as quickly as possible. The very purpose of the Act to protect the interests of the consumers will be defeated if the consumers find it difficult or impossible to execute the orders of the Forum or the Commission for a long time just as in Civil courts. The provision is only similar to Sec.51(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the dicta of the Supreme Court in Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 470, relating to arrest and execution proceedings in cases arising under the Code of Civil Procedure will certainly be borne in mind by the District Forum or the Commission when its powers under Sec.27 are exercised. The section by itself is not unconstitutional. 25. Learned counsel for the respondents referred to several rulings in support of their arguments that the provisions of the Act are valid and enforceable. In the view we have taken, there is no necessity for us to refer to them all. It is enough if we make a reference to the decision in Rama Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 538, in which the case law was elaborately discussed and certain principles were culled out. The following are relevant in this case; “.... .... .... .(b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality, of an enactment, and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles: .(c) that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws, are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds: .(d) that the Legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; .(e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation.” The second respondent in W.P. No.15743 of 1993 who argued his case in person, referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Asgarali Nazarali v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 503. In that case, the same principle was laid down. It is unnecessary for us to refer to it in detail here. The presumption of constitutionality has not been rebutted in this case. 26. Though the prayer in the writ petition uses the expression “other provisions of the Consumer Protection Act.” No argument has been advanced before us with reference to any other section in the Act. We do not find any infirmity whatever in any of the sections so as to invalidate the same. In the result, we hold that the sections in the Act impugned by the petitioner are not unconstitutional ultra vires or unenforceable. On the other hand, they are valid and enforceable. Applicability of the Act: 27. We do not find any infirmity whatever in any of the sections so as to invalidate the same. In the result, we hold that the sections in the Act impugned by the petitioner are not unconstitutional ultra vires or unenforceable. On the other hand, they are valid and enforceable. Applicability of the Act: 27. The petitioners contend that they are engaged in imparting education which is not a commercial or business activity. Hence, the service rendered by them is no ‘service’ defined by the Act and the students are not consumers within the meaning of the Act. In support of their contention, reliance is placed on the debates held in the Parliament when the Bill was considered before passing the Act and the Statement of Objects and Reasons. They have also drawn out attention to the recent decisions of the Supreme Court on education. Besides referring to the rulings of the National Forum in some cases, they have placed reliance on the decision of the Calcutta High Court holding that educational institutions are outside the scope of the Act. On the other hand, the respondents contend that the definition of ‘service’ in the Act is very wide and education falls well within its ambit. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A.Rajappa, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 548, that educational institution is ‘industry’. It is argued that the provisions of the Act should be liberally construed with a purpose having regard to the mushroom growth of educational institutions and the conduct of the same as a business activity. Reference is made to the decision of the Forums in different States in which it has been held that educational institutions fall within the purview of the Act. InW.P.No.20165 of 1993, it is argued that a distinction must be made between academic institutions and the Department of Education which is carrying on administrative functions only. According to counsel for the respondent therein, the Director of Government Examinations cannot escape the provisions of the Act as the Directorate is not imparting education but only rendering other service for charges falling within the scope of the Act. 28. According to counsel for the respondent therein, the Director of Government Examinations cannot escape the provisions of the Act as the Directorate is not imparting education but only rendering other service for charges falling within the scope of the Act. 28. In this country, education has never been a commercial commodity, Saint Thiruvalluvar in his immortal work Thirukkural said that "Numbers" and "Letters" are the two eyes of mankind) and that the learned alone can be said to possess eyes while the unlettered have but two sores in their head) In another stanza he said that the’learning that a man acquireth in this birth will exalt him even unto his seventh rebirth. In his Niti Satakam, the Sanskrit poet Bhartruri said that the hidden treasure, namely learning does not fall within the reach of the thief: always confers indefinable joy: increases phenominally when endowed on those seek for it and does not perish even at times of deluge. (Sloka 13) In chapter II, Vidwat Paddathi). The term "educate" has been defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Volume I at page 723 to mean: "to develop (as a person) by fostering to varying degrees the growth or expansion of knowledge, wisdom, desirable qualities of mind or character, or physical health, or general competence especially by a course of formal study or instruction." It takes its origin in the Latin tern ‘educate’ meaning to rear, bring up and educate. The function of a teacher is not merely to deliver lectures in a class room, but to bring out the talents of the students, build up his character and develop him into a full person. That is why it said that a person blossoms into a full man only by the blessings of a teacher Guroranugrahanaiva puman poornah prajayathe.) Educational institutions should be interested in developing the personality of the students. The relationship of ‘alma mater’ and the ‘alumni’ can never be equated or even compared to that of a trader and a consumer. The expression ‘alma mater’ means foster mother while ‘alumni’ means foster child. It may be that unscrupulous men might have attempted to make a business out of education and convert the institutions into teaching shops. But the Indian Legislature has never attempted to do so: nor has the judiciary ever allowed it. The expression ‘alma mater’ means foster mother while ‘alumni’ means foster child. It may be that unscrupulous men might have attempted to make a business out of education and convert the institutions into teaching shops. But the Indian Legislature has never attempted to do so: nor has the judiciary ever allowed it. Courts in this country have always been vigilant in weeding out the ‘masked phantoms" established as business ventures from the field of education. 29. In University of Delhi v. Ram Nath, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1873, Ganjendragadkar, J. rejected the contention that a teacher is a ‘workman’ and the University in an ‘industry’ within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Judge pointed out that the distinctive purpose and object of education would make it very difficult to assimilate it to the position of any trade, business or calling or service within the meaning of Sec.2 (j) of the said Act. The learned Judge said: "Education seeks to build up the personality of the pupil by assisting him in physical, intellectual, moral and emotional development. The speak of this educational process in terms of industry soulds so completely incongruous that one is not surprised that the Act has deliberately so defined workmen under Sec.2(s) as to exclude teachers from its scope. Under the sense of values recognised both by the traditional and conservative as well as the modern and progressive social outlook, teaching and teachers are, no doubt, assigned a high place of honour and it is obviously necessary and desirable that teaching and teachers should receive the respect that is due to them. A proper sense of values would naturally hold teaching and teachers in high esteem, though power or wealth may not be associated with them." 30. Though in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A.Rajappa, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 548, a seven Judge Bench overruled the aforesaid judgment and held that definition of ‘industry’ in the Industrial Disputes Act would take within its fold Universities and educational institutions, the question whether a teacher was a ‘workman’ vis-a-vis his employer was not decided. Referring to the judgment in University of Delhi case, A.I.R. 1963 S. C. 1873, it was observed: "The first ground relied on by the court is based upon the preliminary conclusion that teachers are not "workmen’ by definition. Perhaps, they are not, because teachers do not do manual work or technical work. Referring to the judgment in University of Delhi case, A.I.R. 1963 S. C. 1873, it was observed: "The first ground relied on by the court is based upon the preliminary conclusion that teachers are not "workmen’ by definition. Perhaps, they are not, because teachers do not do manual work or technical work. We are not too sure whether it is proper to disregard, with contempt, manual work and separate it from education, nor are we too sure whether in our technological universe, education has to be excluded. However, that may be a battle to be waged on a later occasion by litigation and we do not propose to pronounce on it at present. The Court, in the University of Delhi, proceeded on that assumption viz-, that teachers are not workmen, which we will adopt to test the validity of the argument." 31. This aspect of the matter was highlighted by the Supreme Court in A.Sundarambal v. Government of Goa, Daman & Diu, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1700, in which it was held categorically that though a school is ‘industry’, the teacher employed in a school is not a ‘workman’. The court observed: "We are of the view that the teachers employed by educational institutions whether the said institutions are imparting primary, secondary, graduate or post-graduate education cannot be called as "workmen" within the meaning of Sec.2(s) of the Act. Imparting of education which is the main function of teachers cannot be considered as skilled or unskilled manual work or supervisory work or technical work or clerical work. Imparting of education is in the nature of a mission or a noble vocation. A teacher educates children, he moulds their character, builds up their personality and makes them fit to become responsible citizens. Children grow under the care of teachers. The clerical work, if any they may do, is only incidental to their principal work of teaching." 32. In Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1858, delivering the judgment of the Bench, Kuldip Singh, J., held that without making "right to education" under Art.41 of the Constitution a reality, the fundamental rights under Part III shall remain beyond the reach of large majority which is illiterate and thus, the "right to education" is concomitant to the fundamental rights. The learned Judge referred to the importance of education in Indian civilisatioon and pointed out that education has never been a commodity for sale. The learned Judge said. "Indian civilization recognises education as one of the pious obligation of the human society. To establish and administer educational institutions is considered a religious and charitable object. Education in India has never been a commodity for sale." 33. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court reiterated the position in Unnikrishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178. The following passage in the Judgment of Jeevan Reddy, J. can be quoted with advantage: "142. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802: 1984 Lab I.C. 560: (1984)3 S.C.C. 161 : (1984)2 Lab.L.N. 80, this Court held that the right of life guaranteed by Art.21 does take in educational facilities." [The relevant portion has been quoted hereinbefore]". Having regard to the fundamental significance of education to the life of an individual and the nation, and adopting the reasoning and logic adopted in the earlier decisions of this Court referred to hereinbefore we hold, agreeing with the statement in Bandhua Mukti Morcha, that right to education is implicit in and flows from the right to life guaranteed by Art.21. That the right to education has been treated as one of transcendental importance in the life of an individual has been recognised not only in this country since thousands of years, but all over the world. In Mohini Jai, A.I.R. 1992 S.C.W. 2100, the importance of education has been duly and rightly stressed. The relevant observations have already been set out in para 7 hereinbefore. In particular, we agree with the observation that without education being provided to the citizens of this country, ‘the objectives set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution cannot be achieved. The Constitution would fail. We do not think that the importance of education could have been better emphasized than in the above words. The importance of education was emphasised in the ‘Neethi Satakam’ by Bhartruhari (First Centrury B.C.) in the following words: "Translation: Education is the Special manifestation of man: Education is the treasure which can be preserved without the fear of loss: Education secures material pleasure, happiness and fame: Education is the teacher of the teacher: Education is God incarnate: Education secures honour at the hands of the State, not money. A man without education is equal to animal." The fact that right to education occurs in as many as three Articles in Part IV viz.,Arts.41,45 and 46 "Shows the importance attached to it by the founding fathers. Even some of the Articles in Part III viz., Arts.29 and 30 speak of education. 143. In Brown v.Board of Education. (1953)98 Law Ed. 873, Earl Warren, C. J„ speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court emphasised the right to education in the following words: "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of State and local Government.....It is required in the performance of our most basic responsibilities, even service in the armed forces, it is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is the Principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education." In Wisconsin v. Yoder, (1972)32 Law Ed 2d 15, the court recognised that: "Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State". "The said fact has also been affirmed by eminent educationists of modern India lie Dr. Radhakrishnan, J.P. Naik, Dr. Kothari and others." 34. The question in this case is whether the exalted position given to education and educational institutions from the ancient times has been changed in any manner by the provisions of the Act or are the educational institutions and the students reduced to the status of trader and consumer. The answers to the questions have to be found in the provisions of the Act. Before considering the relevant sections themselves, it is worthwhile referring to the history of the legislation and the object thereof. The Consumer Protection Bill, 1986 was moved in the Lok Sabha along with seven other Bills viz., (1) Standards of Weights and Measures (Amendment) Bill, 1986, (2) Standards of Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Amendment Bill, 1986, (3) Essential Commodities (Second Amendment) Bill, 1986 (4) Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Bill, 1986, (5) Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Bill, 1986 (6) Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Amendment) Bill, 1986 and (7) Agricultural Produce (Grading and Marking) Amendment Bill, 1986. All the eight Bills were taken up for consideration together. All the eight Bills were taken up for consideration together. The Minister of Parliamentary Affairs and the Minister of Food and Civil Supplies, while introducing the Bills said: "In the Present Economic and Social Scenario, the Subject of Consumer Protection is of vital concern and importance for all of us because we are all consumers in one form or the other. Al- though various Scientific and technological developments have brought about perceptible socioeconomic changes, the consumer’s control over the market mechanism has gradually diminished. His suzerainty in choice of goods and services has been greatly eroded by various forms of unfair, monopolistic and deceptive trade practices. Although there are a number of consumer protection laws such as the Essential Commodities Act, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, Standards of Weights and Measures Act, MRTP Act, etc., the existing arrangements have not led to the growth of an effective consumer protection movement. These laws are either preventive or punitive in approach and they do not provide for speedy relief and compensation to the aggrieved consumers. The procedures are long-drawn and cumbersome. Besides, at present, there is no statutory machinery which could function as a common platform for officials and non-officials to discuss the consumer protection and advise the After careful consideration of various ideas, this Consumer Protection Bill, 1986, now the designation given to this Bill is slightly different for redressal of grievances etc., has been introduced for kind consideration of the House. This Bill is a landmark in the field of Socio-economic legislation of the country. This comprehensive bill is in addition to and not in replacement of any other law on the subject of Consumer Protection. The Bill enshrines the rights of the Consumers to be promoted and protected by the Consumer Protection Councils in the Centre and the States and the redressal machinery at the national, State and District levels. The Legislation intends to provide prompt and meaningful remedy for consumer grievances, but its success will depend on effective implementation of its provisions by the Central and State Governments. More than that, I have no hesitation in saying that the success of the legislation would depend on the development of a strong bread-based voluntary consumer movement at the grass-root level. The Legislation intends to provide prompt and meaningful remedy for consumer grievances, but its success will depend on effective implementation of its provisions by the Central and State Governments. More than that, I have no hesitation in saying that the success of the legislation would depend on the development of a strong bread-based voluntary consumer movement at the grass-root level. I also take this opportunity to request my brethren in the trade and industry to rise to the occasion and set up consumer redressal cells within their organisations which would minimise consumer complaints and improve their image. Trade and industry should not only evolve a Code of Ethics for fair business practices but also implement them in letter and spirit “ [Italics ours] 35. A perusal of the entire debate which followed shows that no Member of the Parliament including the Minister had any idea of bringing educational institutions and Universities within the sweep of the Bill or the Act. One of the Honourable Members said the course of his speech: ”Similarly, my suggestion is that when we have formed the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums at the district level, State level and national level, the composition of these show that it includes the interests of commerce and trade. My suggestion will be that in these forums also, the representative of consumers should be included along with commerce and trade because they are going to decide the disputes between traders and consumers. Therefore, when we include the representatives of the commerce and trade and education, then we should have representatives of the Consumers themselves on these Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums-on all these levels. My submission is that a person of eminence in the field of education need not be there at all. Instead of that, a representative of the consumers should be there so that it will be protecting more and more interests of the consumers.“ In the Rajya Sabha, one of the Members raised a doubt whether services like transport, railways, telephones, Communication etc., would come within the definition in Subclause 2(1)(c) (iii) of the Bill and demanded that those also should come within the purview of definition. We do not think that it is necessary to refer to all the passages in the debates read out by learned counsel for the petitioners, which he did in order to emphasise that educational institution was not in the contemplation of the legislators while passing the Bill. The contention that the fact that the Bill was grouped along with seven other Bills related to trade and commerce is a pointer to the scope of the Act is well founded. 36. The Supreme Court had occasion to refer to the object of and need for the legislation in the following words in Common Cause (A registered society) v. Union of India, (1993)1 C.P.R. 211 (S.C.): ”The object of the legislation, as the preamble of the Act proclaims, is for better protection of the interests of consumers. During the last few years preceding the enactment there was in this country a marked awareness among the consumers of goods that they were not getting their money’s worth and were being exploited by both traders and manufacturers of Consumer goods. The need for consumer redressal fora was, therefore, increasingly felt. Understandably, therefore, legislation was introduced and enacted with considerable enthusiasm and fanfare as a pathbreaking benevolent legislation intended to protect the consumer from exploitation by unscrupulous manufacturers and traders of consumers goods. A three-tier fora comprising the District Forum, the State Commission and the National Commission came to be envisaged under the Act for redressal of grievances of consumers“. 37. The relevant part of the Statement of Objects and Reasons is thus: ”The Consumer Protection Bill, 1986 seeks to provide for better protection of the interests of consumers and for that purpose, to make provision for the establishment of consumer councils and other authorities for the settlement of consumer disputes and for matters connected therewith. 2. It seeks, inter alia, to promote and protect the rights of consumers such as — .(a) the right to be protected against marketing of goods which are hazardous to life and property: .(b) the right to be informed about the quality, quantity, potency, purity, standard and price of goods to protect the consumer against unfair trade practices: .(c) the right to be assured, wherever possible, access to an authority of goods at competitive prices: .(d) the right to be heard and to be assured that Consumers interests. Will receive due consideration at appropriate forums: .(e) the right to seek redressal against unfair trade practices of unscrupulous exploitation of consumers: and .(f) right to consumer education. 3. These objects are sought to be promoted and protected by the Consumer Protection Council to be established at the Central and State Level. 4. To provide speedy and simple redressal to consumer disputes, a quasi-Judicial machinery is sought to be set up at the district, State and Central levels. These quasi-Judicial bodies will observe the principles of natural Justice and have been empowered to give reliefs of a specific nature and to award, wherever appropriate, compensation to consumers. Penalties for non-compliance of the orders given by the quasi-judicial bodies have also been provided." 38. The Act was amended by Ordinance No.24 of 1993 dated 18th June, 1993 which became Act No.50 of 1993 dated 27th August, 1993. The Statement of Objects and Reasons is thus: "The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 was enacted to protect the interests of the consumers. But the administration of the Act has brought some major deficiencies in the Act. For example it is not applicable to the services rendered by Government Hospitals to the poor patients who are generally treated, free of cost, but many of such hapless patients have to suffer the apathy, neglect and carelessness of the hospital staff while availing of the services there. Similarly postal and telecommunication services are out of its ambit. This Act also does not cover the sale of hazardous substances which are harmful particularly for the children. All these shortcomings in the Act need to be rectified. Of course the consumer awareness is picking momentum in our country which is a good sign for the consumer movement but when we are educating our consumers it is also our duty to discourage frivolous and false complaints which are lodged either to harass the traders or to blackmail them. Hence, a provision for deterrent penalty in the form of fine is necessary to be provided in the Act. This Bill provides to remove some of the shortcomings in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986." It will not be out of place to mention that the said amendment was motivated by a decision of the National Forum in Consumer Unity and Trust Society, Jaipur v. State of Rajasthan and others, (1991)1 C.P.R. 241. This Bill provides to remove some of the shortcomings in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986." It will not be out of place to mention that the said amendment was motivated by a decision of the National Forum in Consumer Unity and Trust Society, Jaipur v. State of Rajasthan and others, (1991)1 C.P.R. 241. It was held in that case that a claim against doctors working in a Government Hospital and the authorities of a Government Hospital under the provisions of the Act, was not sustainable, as the patients could not be held to be ‘consumers’ and the facility offered in Government Hospitals cannot be regarded as service "hired" for "consideration". The Commission suggested that it was for the Parliament to review the matter and amend the Act suitably so that there is no ambiguity between the intent of the law and its interpretation. In that context, the amendment was brought about changing certain definitions, including those of "consumer" and "complaint". 39. A Division Bench of this Court has held that the said amendment has not changed the position regarding hospitals and services rendered by them Vide Dr.C.S. Subramanian v. Kumarasamy and another, (1994)1 L. W. 347. The Division Bench held in that case that the services rendered by a Medical Practitioner or a hospital to a patient by way of diagnosis and treatment would not come within the meaning of ‘service’ as defined in the Act and a patient who undergoes treatment under a medical practitioner or a hospital by way of diagnosis and treatment, cannot be considered to be a ‘consumer’ as defined by the Act. However, the Division Bench held that the Act would apply to para-medical services rendered by medical practitioners or hospitals to the extent of which they would fall within the definition and a person availing such service would be a ‘consumer’ under the Act. The main plank of the arguments of the petitioners’ in these cases is the said Judgment of the Division Bench. We will refer to the same in detail a little later. 40. After the amendment of 1993, the Supreme Court had to decide a case relating to a statutory housebuilding construction authority in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K.Gupta, (1994)1 L.W. 10 (S.C.). While holding that statutory authorities are not exempted from the provisions of the Act, the Court considered the objects and scope of the Act. 40. After the amendment of 1993, the Supreme Court had to decide a case relating to a statutory housebuilding construction authority in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K.Gupta, (1994)1 L.W. 10 (S.C.). While holding that statutory authorities are not exempted from the provisions of the Act, the Court considered the objects and scope of the Act. Reliance is placed on the Judgment by both sides. It is, therefore, necessary to extract the relevant passages in extenso. 41. Referring to the purpose of the Act and the object it seeks to achieve, the Bench said at pp.13 to 15: "to begin with the Preamble of the Act which can afford useful assistance to as certain the legislative intention, it was enacted to provide for the protection of the interest of consumers. Use of the word "protection’ furnishes key to the minds of makers of the Act. Various definitions and provisions which elaborately attempt to achieve this objective have to be construed in this light without departing from the settled view that a prearable cannot control otherwise plain meaning of a provision. In fact the law meets long felt necessity of protecting the common man from such wrongs for which the remedy under ordinary law for various reasons has become illusory. Various legislation and regulation permitting the State to intervene and protect interest of the consumers have become a haven for unscrupulous ones as the enforcement machinery either does not move or it moves ineffectively, inefficiently and for reasons which are not necessary to be stated. The importance of the Act lies in promoting welfare of the society by enabling the consumer to participate directly in the market economy. It attempts to remove the helplessness of a consumer which he races against powerful business, described as, a network of rackets or a society in which, “producers have secured power” to rob the rest, and the might of public bodies which are degenerating into store house of inaction where papers do not move from one desk to another as a matter of duty and responsibility but for extraneous consideration leaving the common man helpless, bewildered and shocked. The malady is becoming so rampant, widespread and deep that the society instead of bothering, complaining and righting for it, is accepting it as part of life. The malady is becoming so rampant, widespread and deep that the society instead of bothering, complaining and righting for it, is accepting it as part of life. The enactment in these unbelievable, yet, harsh realities appears to be silver lining, which may, in course of time, succeed in checking the rot. A scrutiny of various definitions such as ‘con-sumer’, “service: ‘trader,” unfair trade practice’ indicates that Legislatures has attempted to widen the reach of the Act. Each of these definitions are in two parts, one explanatory and the other expandatory. The explanatory or the main part itself uses expressions of wise amplitude indicating clearly its wide sweep when its ambit is widened to such things which otherwise would have been beyond its natural import. Manner of construing an inclusive Clause and its widening effect has “been explained in Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps, 1899 A.C. 99, as under:” Includes “ is very generally used interpretation Clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute, and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the definition clause declares that they shall include.” It has been approved by this Court in Regional Director, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation v. Highland Coffee Works of P.F.X. Saldanha and Sons and another, (1991 )3 S.C.C. 617, C.I.T.,Andhra Pradesh v. M/s.Taj Mahal Hotel, Secunderabad, (1971)3 S.C.C. 550 and The State of Bombay and others v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and others, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 610. The provisions of the Act thus have to be construed in favour of the consumer to achieve the purpose of enactment as it is a social benefit- oriented legislation. The primary duty of the Court while construing the provisions of such an Act is to adopt a constructive approach subject to that it should not ‘do violence to the language of the provisions and is not contrary to attempted objective of the enactment. 3. The primary duty of the Court while construing the provisions of such an Act is to adopt a constructive approach subject to that it should not ‘do violence to the language of the provisions and is not contrary to attempted objective of the enactment. 3. Although the legislation is a milestone in history of socio- economic legislation and is directed towards achieving public benefit we shall first examine if, on a plain reading of the provisions unaided by any external aid of interpretation, it applies to building or construction activity carried on by the statutory authority or private builder or contractor and extends even to such bodies whose ancillary function is to allot a plot or construct a flat. In other words could the authorities constituted under the Act entertain a complaint by a consumer for any defect or deficiency in relation to construction activity against a private builder or statutory authority ? That shall depend on ascertaining the jurisdiction of the commission. How extensive it is? A National or a State Commission under Secs.21 and 16 and a consumer forum under Sec.11 of the Act is entitled to entertain a complaint depending on valuation of goods or services and compensation claimed. The nature of complaint which can be filed, according to clause (c) of Sec.2 of the Act is for unfair trade practice or restrictive trade practice adopted by any trader or for the defects suffered for the goods bought or agreed to be bought and for deficiency in the service hired or availed of or agreed to be hired or availed of, by a complainant who under clause (b) of the definition Clause means a consumer or any voluntary consumer association registered under the Companies Act, 1956 or under any law for the time being in force or the Central Government or any State Government or where there are one or more consumers having the same interest then a complaint by such consumers. The right thus to approach the Commission or the forum rests in consumer for unfair trade practice or defect in supply of goods or deficiency in service. The word ‘consumer’ is a comprehensive expression. It extends from a person who buys any commodity to consume either as eatable or otherwise from a shop, business house, corporation, store, fair price shop to use of private of public services. The word ‘consumer’ is a comprehensive expression. It extends from a person who buys any commodity to consume either as eatable or otherwise from a shop, business house, corporation, store, fair price shop to use of private of public services. In Oxford Dictionary a consumer is defined as a ‘purchaser of goods or services’, In Black’s Law Dictionary it is explained to mean, one who consumes. “Individuals who purchase use, maintain, and dispose of products and services. A member of that broad class of people who are affected by pricing policies, financing practices, quality of goods and services, credit reporting debt collection, and other trade practice for which State and Federal Consumer Protection laws are enacted. The Act opts for no less wider definition. It reads as under: ”Consumer “ means any person who, .(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and party promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval of such person but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or .(ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which” has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system or deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of within the approval of the first mentioned person: (Explanation: For the purposes of sub -clause (i) “commercial purpose” does not include use by a consumer of goods bought and used by him exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood, by means of self- employment“. It is in two parts. The first deals with goods and other with services. Both parts first declare the meaning of goods and services by use of wide expressions, their ambit is further enlarged by use of inclusive clause. For instance, it is not only . It is in two parts. The first deals with goods and other with services. Both parts first declare the meaning of goods and services by use of wide expressions, their ambit is further enlarged by use of inclusive clause. For instance, it is not only . purchaser of goods or hirer of services but even those who use the goods or who are beneficiaries of services with” approval of the person who purchased the goods or who hired services are included in it. The Legislature has taken precaution not only to define ‘complaint’, complainant’, “consumer’, but even to mention, in detail, what would amount to unfair trade practice by giving an elaborate definition in Clause (r) and even to”define’defect and “deficiency’ by Clauses (f) and (g) for which a consumer can approach the Commission. The Act thus aims to protect the economic interest of a consumer as understood in commercial sense as a purchase of goods and in the larger sense of user of services. The common ^ characteristics of goods and services are that they are supplied at a price to cover the costs and generate profits or income for the seller of goods or provided of services. But the defect in one and deficiency in other may have to be removed and compensated differently. The former is, normally, capable of being replaced and repaired whereas the other may be required to be compensated by award of the just equivalent of the value or damages for loss.” Goods’ have been defined by Cl.(l) and have been assigned “the same meaning as in sale of Goods Act, 1930 which reads as under: ”Goods “ means every kind of movable property other than actionable claims and money, and includes stock and shares, growing crops, grass, and things attached to or forming part of the land ‘which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale.” It was, therefore, urged that the applicability of the Act having been confined to movable goods only a complaint filed for any defect in relation to immovable goods such as a house or building or allotment of site could not have been entertained by the commission. The submission does not appear to be well founded. The submission does not appear to be well founded. The respondents were aggrieved either by delay in delivery of possession of house or use of substandard material etc., and therefore, they claimed deficiency in service rendered by the appellants. Whether they were -^ justified in their complaint and if such act or omission could be held to be denial of service in the Act shall be examined presently but the jurisdiction of the Commission could not be ousted because even though it was service it related to immovable property. "4. What is the meaning of the word "service"? Does it extend to deficiency in the building of a house or flat? Can a complaint be filed under the Act against the statutory authority or a builder or contractor for any deficiency in respect of such property. The answer to all this shall depend on understanding of the word "service’. The term has variety of meanings. It may mean any benefit or any act resulting in promoting interest or happiness. It may be contractual, professional, public, domestic, legal, statutory, etc., The concept of service thus is very wide. How it should be understood and what is meant depends in the context in which it has been used in an enactment. Clause (c) of the definition Section defines it as under: "Service means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes the provisions of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or loading or both (housing construction) entertainment, amusement or the surveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service." "It is in three parts. The main part is followed by inclusive clause and ends by exclusionary clause. The main clause itself is very wide. It applies to any service made available to potential users. The words "any’ and "potential’ are significant. Both are of wide amplitude. The word "any’ dictionarily means one or same or also. In Black’s Law Dictionary it is explained thus, word ‘any’ has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate "all" or "every" as well as depends upon the context and subject 2. 1. 2. 1. 2. 1. 2. . . 3. . . 4. 1. 2. 1. 2. 3. . . . . In Black’s Law Dictionary it is explained thus, word ‘any’ has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate "all" or "every" as well as depends upon the context and subject 2. 1. 2. 1. 2. 1. 2. . . 3. . . 4. 1. 2. 1. 2. 3. . . . . 2. 1. 2. 3. 4.