JUDGMENT - MOHTA V.A., J.:—The common referred point for consideration by this Full Bench in this batch of petitions is :— “Whether regulations framed under section 157 of he Customs Act can be termed as 'statute' and whether doctrine of promissory estoppel can be evoked against such regulations?” 2. All the petitioners are dealers in photographic and other processes. They entered into contracts with manufacturers of mini colour lab in Japan for import of sets of N.QSS. 603 With accessories and spare parts, and opened irrevocable letters of credit for the price in Japanese currency Yen. All this was complete much before 3rd April, 1986. Indeed the sets even left Japan shore before that date. The sets, however, actually reached India subsequent to that date. The significance of the date 3rd April, 1986 is that the Project Import Regulations, 1986 made under section 157 of the Customs Act (the Act) were brought in force with effect from that date by Notification No. 230 of 1986 in supersession of the Project Imports (Registration of Contract) Regulations, 1965 made under section 157 read with proviso to the entry in Column No. 2 against Item 72-A(i) of the First Schedule to the Indian Tariff Act, 1934. Prior to 28th February, 1986, customs duty was charged as per the rates mentioned against the heading No. 86 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act – 'Boilers, Machinery, Mechanical Appliances, Parts thereof'. Sub-item No. 84.66 dealt with all items of machinery popularly known as 'Project Imports'. As per Regulations of 1965, it was necessary for every importer who wanted to claim the benefit thereunder, to apply in writing for the registration of the contract before clearance of the goods and to give certain information as prescribed. 3. With effect from 28th February, 1986, the Tariff Entry No. 84.66 was recast by dropping the proviso and an independent Heading No. 98.01 attracting the same rate of duty, viz. 40% was made. The 1986 Regulations applied for assessment and clearance of goods falling under heading 98.01. Under those Regulations, the term 'Industrial Plant' has been specially defined as a result thereof the scope of entry relating to the project entry has been curtailed and it excluded from its scope the photographic film processing laboratories, film studios and certain other establishments. The 1986 Regulations applied for assessment and clearance of goods falling under heading 98.01. Under those Regulations, the term 'Industrial Plant' has been specially defined as a result thereof the scope of entry relating to the project entry has been curtailed and it excluded from its scope the photographic film processing laboratories, film studios and certain other establishments. The benefit of Heading No. 98.01 was thus not applicable to the photographic machinery imported by the photographic processing laboratories, photographic studios and photocopying studios and the goods became assessable at higher rate under Heading No. 90.10. Chapter Note (2) of Chapter 98 says that the expression used in heading 98.01 shall have the meaning assigned to them by the 1986 regulations. It may be mentioned that the expression “Industrial Plant” is not defined either under the Customs Act or the Customs Tariffs Act which together form a near composite scheme. 4. Upon coming into force of the 1986 regulations, the Customs Authorities to treat the photographic equipments imported thereafter as “Industrial Plant” falling under Heading No. 98.01 and sought to levy duty thereon under Heading No. 90.01. These actions/orders of the Customs Authorities and so also the validity of the 1986 regulations were challenged in this Court by several importers on several grounds. One ground was that the 1986 regulations could not cut down the normal meaning of the expression “Industrial Plant” specially when the photographic machinery was included in the expression under the old tariff and 1965 Regulations and this position was affirmed by the Government by a letter dated 4th November, 1983. According to the importers, the normal connotation could be curtained only by the Act and not by a subordinate legislation like regulations and hence the regulations were outside the purview of section 157 and were incompetent. In the case of (Subhash Photographics v. Union of India)1, 1992(3) Bom.C.R. 49 , this Court repelled the challenge. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners therein filed appeals in the Supreme Court which came to be dismissed by a common judgment which is reported in 1993(66) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.) (Subhash Photographics v Union of India)2. 5. Some importers had also raised a contention, invoking the principles of promissory estoppel, that they had acted on the notification in force prior to 3rd April, 1986 and consequently could not be burdened with higher duty only because the goods arrived and were imported thereafter. 5. Some importers had also raised a contention, invoking the principles of promissory estoppel, that they had acted on the notification in force prior to 3rd April, 1986 and consequently could not be burdened with higher duty only because the goods arrived and were imported thereafter. Those petitions also failed and the said decision is (Lazor Colour Prints Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India)3, 1992(62) E.L.T. 703(Bom.). Substance of the view taken is that the doctrine could not be applied to the regulations which are a statute. These present writ petitions were also companion matters but were heard separately by another Division Bench which expressed doubt about the correctness of the view that the regulations were a statute taken in Subhash Photographic and Lazor Colour Prints (supra) and referred the question reproduced in the opening part of the judgment to a larger Bench by an order dated 5th November, 1992 (Popular Colour Lab. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India)4, 1993(68) E.L.T. 544. 6. Two grounds are common before us. One is that the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not operate against a statute and the other is that the Rules framed under section 156 of the Customs Act are statute. Our task has become easy in view of the following pronouncements of Supreme Court in appeal in the case of Subhash Photographics (supra). “The Parliament has appointed two authorities i.e. central Government and the Board to make Rules/Regulations to carry out the purposes of the Act generally. The character of Rules and of the Regulations made under sections 156 and 157 respectively is the same—both constitute delegated legislation. The Regulations are subject to an additional limitation viz., they should not be contrary to the Rules made under section 156. The purpose of sub-section (2) in both the sections is inter alia to allocate certain matters to each of them exclusively; subject to these sub-sections, both the delegatees can exercise the power vested in them for carrying out the purposes of the Act. No established legislative practice of any considerable duration has been brought to our notice to read any further limitation into the regulation-making power under section 157, assuming that a legislative practice can be read as a limitation. No established legislative practice of any considerable duration has been brought to our notice to read any further limitation into the regulation-making power under section 157, assuming that a legislative practice can be read as a limitation. We cannot, therefore, accept the contention that regulation-making power under section 157 should be confined only to peripheral and/or procedural matters.” “It makes little difference in principle that while an exemption notification made under section 157 are not so required. Absence of such requirement does not mean absence of control by the Parliament over the acts of the delegate.” In this connection, provisions of section 158 are most relevant. Not only are rules and regulations required to be published in the Official Gazette but they can also provide for levy of fees and for imposing a penalty for their contravention or for failure to comply with them. No doubt, the maximum outer limit of the penalty under the rule is Rs. 500/- and in the case of regulations it is Rs. 200/-, but that is besides the point. Under Article 20 of our Constitution, no one can be punished without authority of law. All these factors are clear indications that the regulations have a status of statute. It is not and cannot be the case of anyone that the sub-ordinate legislation is not a statute. 7. As observed by the Supreme Court, character of the rules as well as regulations both is not different, both being delegated legislation and hence if rule is a statute, regulation is also a statute. Their purpose and ambit are no doubt different since they operate within the specified areas. But that is hardly relevant. Only additional limitation put on the regulations by sub-section (1) of section 157 is that they shall not be inconsistent not only with the Act but also with the Rules. Source of power is contained in sub-section (1) and not in sub-section (2) which only provides illustrations of the general powers conferred by sub-section (1) without exhausting the subject in relation to which such powers can be exercised. The opening words “in particular and without prejudice to the generality of power” used in sub-section (2) are a pointer. This sub-section does not provide an exhaustive list of topics to be covered by the Regulations and they are not confined merely to procedural or peripheral matters. They are a statute in their respective sphere. The opening words “in particular and without prejudice to the generality of power” used in sub-section (2) are a pointer. This sub-section does not provide an exhaustive list of topics to be covered by the Regulations and they are not confined merely to procedural or peripheral matters. They are a statute in their respective sphere. It is pertinent to notice that the regulations are framed by the “Board” which under section 2(6) of the Customs Act means the Central Board of Excise and Customs constituted under the Central Board of Revenue Act, 1963. As observed by the Supreme Court in (Sukdeo Singh v. Oil and Natural Gas Commission)5, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1331,—Rules and Regulations framed even by statutory Corporations have the force of law “there being no substantial difference between a rule and a regulation in as much as both are subordinate legislation under powers conferred by the statute.” Requirement of laying the rules before the Parliament under section 159 would make no difference for the purposes of judging their respective character. After all it is not a condition precedent for making them effective. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the word “statute” is not defined any where, not even under the General Clauses Act and hence its common and dictionary meaning will have to be resorted to. Contention is correct. To put it shortly, statute means the will of the legislature. But this does not mean the will can be expressed only through the substantive Act and not through a sub-ordinate legislation. 9. It was submitted that the regulations are “instruments” and not the statute and there is a well recognised distinction between the statute and the instrument. In this context, our attention was drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (V.P. Sugar Works v. C.I. of Stamps, U.P.)6, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 102. The question in that case was whether the Court-fees Act as applied to U. P. was an “instrument” as contemplated under section 7(iv)(a) of the said Act. The Supreme Court held that it was not. The ratio of that decision does not advance the case of the petitioners any further. 10. The question in that case was whether the Court-fees Act as applied to U. P. was an “instrument” as contemplated under section 7(iv)(a) of the said Act. The Supreme Court held that it was not. The ratio of that decision does not advance the case of the petitioners any further. 10. It was also contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that doctrine of promissory estoppel can be applied against exercise of executive power conferred upon the Government by a statute as held by Rajasthan High Court in the case of (Union of India v. J.K. Industries Ltd)7, 1990(49) E.L.T. 511. The principle is unquestionable but has no application. We are concerned with the provision in a regulation and not a Government decision. Reliance on decision of Madras High Court in the case of (Union of India v. Chakra Tyres Ltd.)8, 1991(32) E.L.T. 6 is equally misplaced. It was a case of withdrawal of exemption notification (even before its specified period) issued under the Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and in that background the doctrine of promissory estoppel was held to be applicable to the said notification issued under a subordinate legislation. 11. One of the submissions made before us by learned Counsel for the respondents was that promissory estoppel is not applicable to any change in the policy decision of the Government. We find it difficult to accept a proposition as wide as this. All will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the policy decision. 12. In our view therefore the view taken by the Division Bench in Lazor Colour Prints Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has correctly laid down the law that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot apply to the regulations in question. We may mention that to the same effect is the decision of Madras High Court in the case of (Suresh Colour Labs v. Union of India)9, 1993(64) E.L.T. 399 . Even on merits it is pertinent to notice that the 1963 Regulations were not for a stated period and hence it is not a case of premature withdrawal or supersession of those Rules. 13. To conclude, we hold that the Regulations are statute and doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be evoked against them. In the result, the petitions are dismissed and Rules discharged. No order as to costs. 14. 13. To conclude, we hold that the Regulations are statute and doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be evoked against them. In the result, the petitions are dismissed and Rules discharged. No order as to costs. 14. At the request of Shri Kantawala, learned Counsel for the petitioners, interim order continued for a further period of eight weeks. Petitions dismissed. -----