Judgment : Plaintiff is the appellant. .2. The averments in the plaint are briefly as follows: The suit properties originally belonged to one Pichumani Iyer and he was in possession and enjoyment of the same till his death. The plaintiff purchased the properties from the heirs of the said Pichumani viz., defendants 6 to 9 on 1. 1961. The plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the same since then. It is alleged that Pichumani Iyer had executed an agreement of sale in favour of one Mallaiah Chettiar in respect of the suit properties. Mallaiah Chettiar obtained a decree in O.S.No.214 of 1968 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Manamadurai, for specific performance of the agreement against Pichumani Iyer. Subsequently he died. The defendants 3 to 5 are his legal representatives. Defendants 1 and 2 filed O.S.No.5 of 1963 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Sivagangai against the heirs of Pichumani Iyer, plaintiff and Mallaiah Chettiar for declaration and possession claiming that the suit properties are the trust properties belonging to the defendants 1 and 2 temple. It was decreed. But, in the appeal the decree of the trial court was set aside and the suit was dismissed. The second appeal preferred by the defendants 1 and 2 was also dismissed. In the said suit, defendants 1 and 2 contended that the properties were the separate properties of Ranga Iyer, paternal uncle of Pichumani Iyer and he dedicated the property in favour of the defendants 1 and 2 temple. It was also contended that Pichumani Iyer later ratified the dedication. The allegation that the properties were the separate properties of Ranga Iyer and they were dedicated in favour of the defendants 1 and 2 are all false. The dedication if any has never been acted upon. Pichumani never admitted the rights of defendants 1 and 2. Defendants 12 to 14 are the heirs of one Narayanasami in whose favour Pichumani Iyer had mortgaged the suit property. The plaintiff filed O.S.No.l80 of 1964 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Manamadurai against defendants 10 to 14 for redemption, and for recovery of arrears of rent or damages for use and occupation. The appeal arising out of the said decree is pending. Defendants 1 and 2 who filed O.S.No.24 of 1975 for declaration that the suit properties belonged to them later on withdrew the same. The appeal arising out of the said decree is pending. Defendants 1 and 2 who filed O.S.No.24 of 1975 for declaration that the suit properties belonged to them later on withdrew the same. But, they filed a petition before the Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board against the plaintiff and the deceased Mallaiah Chettiar claiming that the suit properties are trust properties belonging to them. It was ordered in favour of defendants 1 and 2. The appeal preferred by the plaintiff to the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board failed. Hence the suit. .3. The defendants 1 and 2 in their counter written statement contend as follows: The suit properties were the separate properties of Ranga Iyer who dedicated the same for pooja and neivedhyam expenses of defendants 1 and 2 temple. In the partition deed effected between Ranga Iyer and Pichumani Iyer on 111. 1913, the properties have been described as endowed to the temple. The endowment made by the Manager of the joint family is therefore binding on Pichumani and he had ratified the same subsequently. The income from the properties were utilised towards the expenses of performing pooja and neivedhyam in the temple of defendants 1 and 2. The temple has acquired prescriptive title to the suit properties. Pichumani Iyer and his heirs are therefore estopped from claiming the suit properties as their properties. The vendors of the plaintiff have no right over the suit properties. The earlier proceedings in which defendants 1 and 2 are not parties are not binding on them. The High Court has held in the second appeal that the properties have been dedicated in favour of the temple of defendants 1 and 2 are trust properties. The High Court has also directed the defendants 1 and 2 to approach the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board for relief. It is only thereafter, defendants 1 and 2 filed a petition before the Deputy Commissioner. The appeal preferred by the plaintiff to the Commissioner against the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner was dismissed. The suit is therefore liable to be dismissed. 4. The defendants 10 and 11 adopted the statement of defendants 1 and 2. 5. The 15th defendant filed a separate written statement reiterating the case of the defendants 1 and 2. 6. The appeal preferred by the plaintiff to the Commissioner against the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner was dismissed. The suit is therefore liable to be dismissed. 4. The defendants 10 and 11 adopted the statement of defendants 1 and 2. 5. The 15th defendant filed a separate written statement reiterating the case of the defendants 1 and 2. 6. On the above pleadings, the trial court has held an enquiry and gave a finding that the order of the Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board is not liable to be set aside and dismissed the suit. 7. Aggrieved over the same, the plaintiff has come forward with this appeal. .8. The subject matter of the suit viz., the properties are shops. The fact that they originally belonged to Ranga Iyer and Pichumani are not in dispute. The defendants 1 and 2 contend that they were dedicated in their favour by Ranga Iyer, while the contention of the appellant herein is that they belonged to Pichumani and it is his absolute property and Ranga Iyer had only created a charge over the income of the properties for service to be done in the defendants 1 and 2 temples and there is no absolute dedication. The principles of Hindu Law applicable to questions relating to charitable trust are well settled. Whether or not a dedication to charity is complete must depend on the intention of the donor, which has to be gathered from the terms of the document in any particular case read as a whole. If the dedication is complete, a trust is created if not a charge follows. The question that arises for consideration is, whether the suit properties have been dedicated by Ranga Iyer, whose brother’s son is Pichumani Iyer in favour of the two temples viz., defendants 1 and 2 or whether the suit properties continue to be the joint family properties of Ranga Iyer and Pichumani and whether Pichumani had absolute title over the same after the death of Ranga Iyer in order to enable him to alienate the same as the owner of the property. 9. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that there is no document of dedication of the properties in favour of defendants 1 and 2 and Ranga Iyer had created only a charge over the income from the properties as seen from Ex.B-7 the partition deed between Ranga Iyer and one Sankarasubbu Iyer. Therefore, we have to see whether the document under Ex.B-7 under which the defendants 1 and 2 claim that the properties have been dedicated establishes an absolute dedication of the property in favour of the defendants 1 and 2 or whether it only indicates a charge being created. According to the learned counsel Ranga Iyer had expressed a desire to utilise the income from the property to do seva pooja in favour of defendants 1 and 2 and therefore a charge only has been created over the income of the properties and Ex.B-7 does not establish an absolute dedication. Before proceeding further, it is desirable to recollect the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Ramkishorelal v. KamaIanarayan,A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 890, regarding ascertainment of the intention of parties to a document. In the above decision, it is held as follows: “The golden rule of construction, it has been said, is to ascertain the intention of the parties to the instrument after considering all the words, in their ordinary, natural sense. To ascertain this intention the court has to consider the relevant portion of the document as a whole and also to take into account the circumstances under which the particular words were used.” Before ascertaining the intention of Ranga Iyer which he had expressed in Ex.B-7, it is also necessary to bear in mind the principles of Hindu Law applicable to the construction of question of dedication of property to charity. It has been held in the decision reported in M.Dasaratharami Reddy v. D.Subba Rao, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 797: (1957) 2 M.L.J. (S.C.) 175: 1957 S.C.J. 835: 1957 S.C.R. 1122: (1957) 2 An W.R. (S.C.) 175: (1959) 1 S.C.A. 91, as follows: “It can be established by cogent and satisfactory evidence of conduct of parties and user of the property which show the extinction of the private secular character of the property and its complete dedication to charity.” In the law of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments by V.K. Varadachari, (III Edition) at page 96, it is stated as follows: “A Hindu, who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution may, according to his law, express his purpose and endow it. A trust is not required for that purpose. All that is necessary is that the religious or charitable purposes should be clearly specified, and that the property intended for the endowment should be set apart for or dedicated to those purposes. A dedication of property for a religious or charitable purpose, can, according to the Hindu Law, be validly made orally, and no writing is necessary to create an endowment except where it is created by a Will.” In the decision reported in Sappani Mohd. Mohideen v. R.V.Sethusubramania Pillai, (1975)1 S.C.J. 246, it has been held as follows: “Whether an endowment is absolute or partial, primarily depends on the terms of the grant. If there is an express endowment, the intention has to be gathered on the construction of the document as a whole. If the words of the document are clear and unambiguous, the question of interpretation would not arise. If there be ambiguity, the intention of the founder has to be carefully gathered from the scheme and language of the grant. Even surrounding circumstances, subsequent dealings with the property, the conduct of the parties to the document and long usage of the property and other relevant factors may have to be considered in appropriate cases.” 10. Now. let us consider the terms of Ex.B-7 to ascertain whether the intention of Ranga Iyer was to create an absolute dedication or he has created only charge over the income of the properties. Ex.B-7 is dated 111. 1913. Now. let us consider the terms of Ex.B-7 to ascertain whether the intention of Ranga Iyer was to create an absolute dedication or he has created only charge over the income of the properties. Ex.B-7 is dated 111. 1913. It is specifically stated in that document that since the properties worth Rs.200 in D Schedule has been dedicated in favour of Agraharam Perumal Temple and Navaneetha Balakrishnaswamy Temple in Kohalingapuram for performance of Pooja and neivedhyam by the first party viz., G.Ranga Iyer already, from out of the income from the said property. Ranga Iyer and his heirs have to perform the Trust and Ranga Iyer and Pichumani Iyer have no right whatsoever toalienate the properties described in ‘C’ and ‘D’ schedules. The words in the document would show that the properties described in ‘D’ schedule have already been dedicated for the performance of pooja and neivedhyam and it shows that Ranga Iyer had not created a charge on the date of the execution of Ex.B-7 since he had no right over the same on account of the dedication of the property even before. The dedication is an absolute one, will also be seen from the other recitals in the document that neither Ranga Iyernor Pichumani have a right to alienate the property mentioned in it. The recitals in Ex.B-7 thus makes it absolutely clear that the property had been dedicated for the performance of pooja and neivedhyam in the defendants 1 and 2 temples and the parties to the document viz., Ranga Iyer and Pichumani have confirmed the said dedication. Pichumani was said to be 17 years old on the date of Ex.B-7 and there is no evidence that after attaining majority within the period allowed in law, Pichumani repudiated this dedication as not binding on him. In the decision reported in S.S.Pillai v. K.S.Pillai, (1973)1 S.C.R. 570 , it has been held as follows: “A minor cannot be compelled to take the benefit of a transaction which will have the effect of depriving him of his legal rights when the succession opens. But a minor can, after attaining majority, ratify the transaction entered into on his behalf by his guardian. If he so ratifies the transaction entered into by his guardian and accepts the benefit thereunder, there cannot be any difference in the application of the principle of election. But a minor can, after attaining majority, ratify the transaction entered into on his behalf by his guardian. If he so ratifies the transaction entered into by his guardian and accepts the benefit thereunder, there cannot be any difference in the application of the principle of election. If the original transaction conferring the benefit was in favour of the minor his enjoyment of the benefit after attaining the majority may in itself be a sufficient act of ratification. If a person having full knowledge of his right as a possible reversioner enters into a transaction which settles his claim as well as the claim of the opponents at the relevant time, he cannot be permitted to go back on that agreement when reversion actually falls open.” From this decision, we can infer that when a minor fails to ratify a transaction which was entered into by his guardian, while he was a minor, he is bound by the transaction entered into by the guardian. There is absolutely no evidence that Pichumani Iyer has challenged the recitals in Ex.B-7 within three years after attaining majority. There is no evidence that Pichumani repudiated this dedication as not binding on him immediately after attaining majority. On the other hand, it is in evidence that Pichumani has issued receipts to the tenants who were in occupation of the shops in the suit property. When they made payment as evidenced by Ex.B-9. Chellam Iyer who has taken over the management of the properties, had executed a rent deed in favour of one Karuppan Chettiar under Ex.B-8 in 1914. This deed has not been challenged by Pichumani Iyer after attaining majority. It is only when he was not appointed as a trustee. Pichumani had executed a sale agreement of the suit property in favour of Mallayya Chettiar. It is long after Pichumani Iyer attained majority, Pichumani Iyer appears to have executed a mortgage deed in favour of Narayanasami in respect of the suit properties and other properties and he had also executed a sale agreement in favour of Mallayya Chettiar. Mallayya Chettiar obtained a decree for specific performance by filing a suit in O.S.No.214 of 1968. It is long after Pichumani Iyer attained majority, Pichumani Iyer appears to have executed a mortgage deed in favour of Narayanasami in respect of the suit properties and other properties and he had also executed a sale agreement in favour of Mallayya Chettiar. Mallayya Chettiar obtained a decree for specific performance by filing a suit in O.S.No.214 of 1968. Defendants 1 and 2 have therefore filed a suit in O.S.No.5 of 1963 against the plaintiff and the heirs of Pichumani Iyer and Mallayya Chettiar for declaration and for possession of the suit properties contending that the suit properties are trust properties belonging to them. The suit was decreed in the trial court. But, in the appeal, the judgment of the trial court was set aside and the suit was dismissed. Defendants 1 and 2 preferred a Second Appeal to the High Court. In the second appeal viz., S.A.No.1451 of 1967, the High Court has held that the suit properties have been dedicated to the temple and are trust properties and directed the defendants 1 and 2 to file a petition before the Deputy Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment. It is only in pursuance of this direction, the defendants 1 and 2 have preferred a petition before the Deputy Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment, in O.A.No.45 of 1971. The Deputy Commissioner has passed an order to the effect that the suit property was validly dedicated in favour of the petitioner temple somewhere in the year 1991, and it has been in possession and enjoyment of the defendants 1 and 2 herein through the trustees and allowed that petition. The appeal preferred by the plaintiff to the Commissioner has been dismissed and therefore, the plaintiff has come forward with this suit. The prior dispute between the parties would reveal that even the High Court has held in the Second Appeal No.1451 of 1967, that the suit properties have been dedicated in favour of the temple. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would argue that there is no application of the principle of res judicata to estop the plaintiff from filing the suit on account of the observation made in the judgment in S.A.No.1451 of 1967. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would argue that there is no application of the principle of res judicata to estop the plaintiff from filing the suit on account of the observation made in the judgment in S.A.No.1451 of 1967. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent would on the other hand argue that even though the plaintiff is not estopped from filing the suit on the principle of res judicata, we cannot ignore the fact that the High Court has also considered the character of the property and the treatment of the same by Pichumani Iyer and his ancestors regarding the suit property and they would go to show that the property has been enjoyed by the temple and in pursuance of an absolute dedication, and it is not a mere creation of a charge. D.W.1 the archakar performing the pooja and neivedhyam in the said temples would show that originally, Karuppan Chettiar was enjoying the property as a lessee and that he was running a rice mill and at that time the rent paid by him was spent by the temple. He has also stated that Karuppan Chettiar had sold the shed to the temple and Velappa Naicker and Perumal Naicker were having a car shed in the property and Velappa Naicker was paying rent to the temple. This evidence of D.W.1 indicates that the temple was enjoying the suit property as an absolute owner and has even acquired a shed and rented out the same to Velappa Naicker and was collecting the rent from the said Velappa Naicker also. The treatment of the property by Karuppan Chettiar and Velappa Naicker also indicates that the property was enjoyed by the temple and not the income alone from the property. 12. D.W.1 would say that the assessment in respect of the property was in the name of temple and the receipts for payment of tax to the Aruppukottai Municipality have been issued in the name of Pichumani Iyer. This evidence of D.W.1 would show that Pichumani Iyer was paying the tax to the Municipality and collecting the receipts in his name as a trustee of the temple and it is not as if the income from the property alone has been utilised for performing the neivedhyam service. This evidence of D.W.1 would show that Pichumani Iyer was paying the tax to the Municipality and collecting the receipts in his name as a trustee of the temple and it is not as if the income from the property alone has been utilised for performing the neivedhyam service. D.W.1 would depose that he is running a cycle shop in the suit property for the past 25 years after taking of lease from Pichumani Iyer and Narayanasami Iyer and was paying the rent to the temple. He would also say that the trustees of the temple are paying tax to the Municipality. He would categorically say that the Claim of the plaintiff that the suit property belongs to Pichumani Iyer absolutely and not the temple property is false. D.W.2 is another tenant of the property and he is the 10th defendant. He has also stated that he has been paying the rent for the past 40 years to Pichumani Iyer, who utilised the collected rent on behalf of the temple, and thereafter he used to pay the rent to Ponnusami Iyengar and that the trustees are now collecting the rent. During cross-examination, he would say that when he took the property on lease for the first time, Pichumani Iyer was the trustee of the temple and he negotiated the transaction with Pichumani Iyer and he had seen Pichumani Iyer paying the rent collected to the temple. D.Ws.1 and 2 who are tenants of the property for the past more than 35 years, have deposed to the effect that the property was the absolute property of the temple and Pichumani Iyer was collecting the rent from them and paying the same to the temple. The subsequent dealings of the property and the conduct of the parties would thus indicate that there is only an absolute dedication of the property in favour of defendants 1 and 2 and not as if a mere charge is created. We have already seen that dedication to charity need not necessarily be by instrument or grantand it can be established by cogent and satisfactory evidence of conduct of the parties and user of the property which show the extinction of the private secular character of the property and its complete dedication to charity. We have already seen that dedication to charity need not necessarily be by instrument or grantand it can be established by cogent and satisfactory evidence of conduct of the parties and user of the property which show the extinction of the private secular character of the property and its complete dedication to charity. The evidence placed before the trial court would show that the user of the property by-Pichumani Iyer after attaining majority and his conduct in treating the property would only indicate that he was aware of the dedication of the property in favour of defendants 1 and 2 and his subsequent repudiation of the nature of the dedication long after attaining the majority cannot be sufficient to hold that the property has not been dedicated in favour of defendants 1 and 2. The execution of the mortgage and the execution of the sale agreement by Pichumani are all long after he had lost the interest if any in the suit property and therefore the plaintiff cannot claim to have acquired a title to the suit property by purchasing the same from the heirs of Pichumani Iyer. In that view. I am of opinion that the judgment and decree of the trial court are well-founded and does not call for any interference by this Court. 13. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.