A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE common decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue tribunal at Ahmedabad (the Tribunal for convenience) on 7th April 1980 in revision Application Nos. TEN. B. A. 888 and 902 both of 1979 is under challenge in this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Thereby the Tribunal upset the order passed by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal (No. 2) at Kalol (the First Authority for convenience) on 16th August 1977 in Tenancy case No. Nardipur-75 of 1975 as affirmed in appeal by the order passed by the deputy Collector (Land Reforms) at Mehsana (the Appellate Authority for convenience) on 30th June 1979 in Tenancy Appeal No. 220. By his aforesaid order, the First Authority accepted the application made by the present petitioner for restoration of possession of two parcels of land bearing survey Nos. 111 and 115 admeasuring 1 acre 5 gunthas and 2 acres 13 gunthas respectively situated at village Nardipur, taluka Kalol, district Mehsana (the disputed lands for convenience) on the ground that the disputed lands were not used for the purpose for which the possession thereof was taken by the landlord under Sec. 32t of the Bombay tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (the Tenancy Act for brief ). ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this petition move in a narrow compass. The petitioner is the son of the Vithalbhai Harjivanbhai who was the original tenant of the disputed lands. I shall refer to the deceased father of the petitioner as the original tenant for the sake of convenience. The husband of original respondent No. 1 was the owner of the disputed lands. I shall refer to him as the landlord for convenience. It appears that the landlord was a certified landlord. He obtained possession of the disputed lands in accordance with Sec. 32t of the Tenancy Act. It is obvious that the landlord obtained possession of the disputed lands for his personal cultivation. It appears that during his lifetime he agreed to sell the disputed lands to respondent No. 2 herein. A copy of the agreement executed between the parties on 8th January 1967 is at annexure-D to this petition. It appears that the landlord thereafter breathed his last leaving behind him original respondent No. 1 as his heir and legal representative. It appears that during his lifetime he agreed to sell the disputed lands to respondent No. 2 herein. A copy of the agreement executed between the parties on 8th January 1967 is at annexure-D to this petition. It appears that the landlord thereafter breathed his last leaving behind him original respondent No. 1 as his heir and legal representative. I shall refer to original respondent No. 1 as the widow for the sake of convenience. As the heir and legal representative of the deceased landlord, she agreed to abide by the transaction between her deceased husband and respondent No. 2. She executed the necessary agreement on 20th April 1968. Its copy is at Annexure-E to this petition. It appears that the present petitioner thereupon moved the First Authority with an application under Sec. 37 of the Tenancy Act some time in 1972. It came to be registered as Tenancy Case No. 251 of 1972. It came to be rejected for default of appearance on the part of the present petitioner on 28th September 1972. That aggrieved the present petitioner and he, therefore, carried the matter in appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority dismissed the aforesaid appeal as time-barred by his order passed on 8th January 1974. The present petitioner thereupon invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal by means of Revision application No. TEN. B. A. 141 of 1974. By its decision rendered on 30th April 1974 in the aforesaid revisional application, the Tribunal rejected it. The Tribunal, however, observed in its decision that the present petitioner could make a fresh application under Sec. 37 read with Sec. 39 of the Tenancy Act and the First authority should decide the same on merits if it was in time and according to law. It appears that, pursuant to the aforesaid direction issued by the Tribunal in its decision rendered on 30th April 1974 in Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 141 of 1974, the present petitioner made a fresh application on 20th May 1974 before the First Authority under Sec. 37 of the Tenancy Act. It came to be registered as tenancy Case No. Nardipur-75 of 1975. Since the disputed lands were in possession of respondent No. 2 herein, he was also made a party to the aforesaid proceeding under Sec. 37 of the Tenancy Act. It came to be registered as tenancy Case No. Nardipur-75 of 1975. Since the disputed lands were in possession of respondent No. 2 herein, he was also made a party to the aforesaid proceeding under Sec. 37 of the Tenancy Act. After hearing the parties, by his order passed on 16th August 1977 in the aforesaid proceeding, the First Authority came to the conclusion that the landlord, after obtaining possession of the disputed lands under sec. 32t of the Tenancy Act, did not use the lands for the purpose for which the possession thereof was taken from the original tenant after terminating his tenancy. Its copy is at Annexure-A to this petition. That aggreived both the widow and respondent No. 2 herein. Both of them carried the matter in appeal before the appellate Authority. The appeal of respondent No. 2 came to be registered as tenancy Appeal No. 220 and that of the widow as Tenancy Appeal No. 220a. After hearing the parties, by his common order passed on 30th June 1979 in the aforesaid appeals, the Appellate Authority dismissed both the appeals. Its copy is at Annexure- b to this petition. That again aggrieved both the appellants. Both of them, therefore, invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal by means of their Revision application Nos. TEN. B. A. 902 and 888 respectively both of 1979. By its common decision rendered on 7th April 1980 in the aforesaid two revisional applications, the Tribunal accepted them and set aside the order passed convenience. It appears at Annexure-A to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the appellate order at annexure-B to this petition. Its copy is at Annexure-C to this petition. That obviously aggrieved the present petitioner. He has, therefore, moved this Court by means of this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the decision at Annexure-C to this petition. ( 3 ) THE Tribunal has interfered with the order at Annexure-A to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the appellate order at Annexure-B to this petition on two grounds. In the first place, the Tribunal found that the present petitioners application was not maintainable as the right of the deceased tenant was not inheritable. The other ground was that the landlord or in any case the widow had not transferred the disputed lands in favour of respondent No. 2 herein. In the first place, the Tribunal found that the present petitioners application was not maintainable as the right of the deceased tenant was not inheritable. The other ground was that the landlord or in any case the widow had not transferred the disputed lands in favour of respondent No. 2 herein. ( 4 ) SO far as the first ground is concerned, with respect, the Tribunal has not examined the case from its proper perspective. Since the disputed lands were in possession of respondent No. 2 herein whether by way of transfer or otherwise and since he was made a party to the proceeding, the application could be said to be under Sec. 37 (1a) of the Tenancy Act and not under Sec. 37 read with Sec. 39 thereof. Under Sec. 37 (1a) of the Tenancy Act, the First Authority has been empowered to take action suo motu or on an application made by any interested person. The petitioner as the son of the original tenant was certainly an interested person. In that view of the matter, it was not necessary to examine the case in the light of Sec. 40 of the Tenancy Act. The impugned decision at Annexure-C to this petition, qua the first ground, cannot be sustained in law. ( 5 ) THE Tribunal has proceeded on the footing that the Banakhat would create no interest in favour of the Banakhat-holder in view of the relevant provisions contained in Sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (the T. P. Act for brief ). The question is whether or not the word "transfer" as used in Sec. 37 (1a) of the Tenancy Act has its connotation with reference to the T. P. Act. ( 6 ) IN order to decide the controversies between the parties in that regard, it would be quite proper to look at the relevant provisions contained in Sec. 37 of the Tenancy Act. They read :"37. ( 6 ) IN order to decide the controversies between the parties in that regard, it would be quite proper to look at the relevant provisions contained in Sec. 37 of the Tenancy Act. They read :"37. (1) If after the landlord takes possession of the land after the termination of the tenancy under Sec. 31 or 32t he fails to use it for any of the purposes specified in the notice given under Sec. 31 or 32t within one year from the date on which he took possession or ceases to use it at any time for any of the aforesaid purposes within twelve years from the date on which he took such possession, the landlord shall forthwith restore possession of the land to the tenant whose tenancy was terminated by him, unless he has obtained from the tenant his refusal in writing to accept the tenancy on the same terms and conditions or has offered in writing to give possession of the land to the tenant on the same terms and conditions and the tenant has failed to accept the offer within three months of the receipt thereof. (1a) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1a) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1), where in respect of any land the possession of which has been taken by the landlord after the termination of the tenancy under Sec. 31 or 32t, the Mamlatdar suo motu or on an application from any person interested in such land has reason to believe that the landlord has failed to use the land for any of the purposes specified in the notice given to the tenant under Sec. 31 or 32t, within one year from the date on which he took possession of the land or ceases or has ceased to use it for the purpose specified in the notice, at any time within twelve years from the date on which he took possession, or has transferred the land to any other person and such transfer is inconsistent with the ground on which the tenancy of the land was terminated, the Mamlatdar shall, after issuing a notice to the landlord or as the case may be, to the landlord and the transferee both, in the prescribed form to show cause why the landlord should not be disentitled to retain possession of the land, or, as the case may be, why the transfer should not be declared invalid and after holding such inquiry as he deems fit, declare that the landlord shall not be entitled to retain possession of the land or, as the case may be, that the transfer of the land shall be invalid and that the transferee shall be deemed to be unauthorisedly occupying the land. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 7 ) A bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions would go to show that the legislature intended action against the landlord who failed to use the land for the purpose for which the possession was taken by him from that tenant under Sec. 31 or 32t of the Tenancy Act after terminating the tenancy. Under Sec. 37 (1) thereof, the tenant has been enabled to move the concerned authority for restoration of possession if the landlord has not used the land for the purpose for which he has taken its possession from the tenant under Sec. 31 or 32t thereof after terminating the tenancy. The tenant will be able to do so provided possession of the land in question is with the landlord. The tenant will be able to do so provided possession of the land in question is with the landlord. If he has parted with its possession, the tenant will not be able to avail of the remedy under Sec. 37 (1) of the Act. In order to ameliorate the lot of the tenant in such circumstances, the Legislature in its wisdom has enacted sub-sec. (1a) of Sec. 37. That statutory provision has come to be brought on the statute book by means of Gujarat Act No. 5 of 1973. The dominant consideration was to ameliorate the lot of the tenant and to see that the object of the Tenancy act is not frustrated. It cannot be gainsaid that Sec. 31 or 32t thereof empowers the landlord to obtain possession of the tenanted land for certain specific purpose. If he does not put into practice that purpose for which he obtains possession thereunder, the legislature in its wisdom has thought that he has no right to retain possession of the land which he has taken under Sec. 31 or 32t thereof after terminating the tenancy. As pointed out hereinabove, after obtaining possession of the land under Sec. 31 or 32t thereof, a scheming and shrewd landlord might transfer it in favour of a third party so as to deprive the tenant of his right to obtain its possession back from the landlord under Sec. 37 (1) of the Tenancy Act. To prevent such scheming and shrewd landlord to take advantage of his own wrong and thereby escaping the clutches of the law, the legislature in its wisdom has brought on the statute book sub-sec. (1a) of Sec. 37 by Gujarat Act No. 5 of 1973. The word "transfer" occurring therein has to be construed in the light of this avowed object behind introducing the aforesaid statutory provision by Gujarat Act No. 5 of 1973. ( 8 ) ). It is true "transfer" strictly speaking will have to be in accordance with the relevant provisions contained in the T. P. Act. However, since the legislature in its wisdom has thought of frustrating the possible design on the part of a scheming and shrewd landlord, the word "transfer" occurring in Sec. 32 (1a) cannot be interpreted in that restricted sense. It is true "transfer" strictly speaking will have to be in accordance with the relevant provisions contained in the T. P. Act. However, since the legislature in its wisdom has thought of frustrating the possible design on the part of a scheming and shrewd landlord, the word "transfer" occurring in Sec. 32 (1a) cannot be interpreted in that restricted sense. It will have to be interpreted in a broader sense including all possible ways of transferring possession of the land in question by the landlord in favour of any other person after obtaining its possession from the tenant under Sec. 31 or 32t of the Tenancy Act after terminating the tenancy. A parcel of land given by way of an irrevocable licence might not be a transfer within the meaning of the T. P. Act. It will have, however, to be treated as a transfer for the purposes of Sec. 37 (1a) of the Tenancy Act. Similarly, handing over possession of the land under a Banakhat will not be a transfer within the meaning of the T. P. Act but it will have to be treated as such for the purposes of Sec. 37 (1a) of the Tenancy Act. The emphasised portion in the aforesaid statutory provision reproduced earlier to the effect ". . . . . has transferred the land to any other person and such transfer is inconsistent with the ground on which the tenancy of the land was terminated. . . . " would also go to show that the word "transfer" has to be interpreted in the sense broader than its accepted meaning under the T. P. Act. Parting with possession by the landlord after obtaining possession under Sec. 31 or 32t of the Tenancy Act after terminating the tenancy would certainly be inconsistent with the ground on which the tenancy could be said to have been terminated. In that view of the matter, there is no escape from the conclusion that the handing over of possession of the disputed lands under the agreement at Annexures-D and E to this petition would amount to transfer for the purposes of the aforesaid statutory provision. Any other interpretation of the word "transfer" occurring in the aforesaid statutory provision contained in Sec. 37 (1a) of the Tenancy Act would run counter to the avowed object behind its introduction in the statute book by Gujarat Act No. 5 of 1973. Any other interpretation of the word "transfer" occurring in the aforesaid statutory provision contained in Sec. 37 (1a) of the Tenancy Act would run counter to the avowed object behind its introduction in the statute book by Gujarat Act No. 5 of 1973. ( 9 ) IT may be mentioned that the execution of the documents at Annexures-D and E to this petition by the concerned parties is not in dispute. Though these transactions may be styled as an agreement to sell the disputed lands, these transactions would be covered by Sec. 37 (1a) of the Tenancy Act. The contrary view expressed by the Tribunal in its decision at Annexure-C to this petition cannot, therefore, be sustained in law. ( 10 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion, the decision at Annexure-C to this petition cannot be sustained in law and it has to be quashed and set aside. ( 11 ) THE question might arise as to what would be the consequences of setting aside the decision at Annexure-C to this petition. It is difficult to agree with Shri r. A. Patel for the petitioners that the order at Annexure-A to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the appellate order at Annexure-B to this petition should be restored for the simple reason that the case is not governed by Sec. 37 (1) of the act but is found governed by Sec. 37 (1a) thereof. Section 39 of the Tenancy Act will be applicable if the case is governed by Sec. 37 (1) of the Tenancy Act. So far as the action under Sec. 37 (1a) is concerned, consequences are provided in sub-secs. (5aa), (5ab), (5b), (5c) and (5d) of Sec. 37 thereof. In that view of the matter, the disputed lands would stand vested in the State Government free from all emcumbrances and the same should be disposed of in accordance with sub-sec. (5ab) thereof. The matter will have, therefore, to be remanded to respondent no. 3 for disposal of the disputed lands according to law as provided in Sec. 37 (5ab) of the Tenancy Act. ( 12 ) IN the result, this petition is accepted to the aforesaid extent. The impugned common decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad on 7th april 1980 in Revision Application Nos. TEN. B. A. 888 and 902 both of 1979 is quashed and set aside. ( 12 ) IN the result, this petition is accepted to the aforesaid extent. The impugned common decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad on 7th april 1980 in Revision Application Nos. TEN. B. A. 888 and 902 both of 1979 is quashed and set aside. The order passed by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands tribunal at Annexure-A to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the order passed by the Deputy Collector at Annexure-B to this petition is, however, not restored. The matter is remanded to the State Government (respondent No. 3 herein) for disposal of the disputed lands according to law as expeditiously as possible preferably before 30th June 1994 in the light of this judgment of mine. Rule is accordingly made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs. .