JUDGMENT T. L. VISWANATHA IYER, J. - The petitioner who is dealing in X-ray films amongst others was assessed to tax for the year 1984-85 under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (the Act) assessing X-ray film multi-point at 5 per cent overruling the petitioner's contention that it was taxable only single point at the point of first sale. Petitioner's contention was that they had purchased the X-ray films from M/s. Hindustan Photo Films Manufacturing Co., within the State and therefore as a second seller they were not liable for payment of tax. The specific case put forward by them before the assessing authority was that X-ray films were electrical goods falling under entry 130 of the First Schedule to the Act. This contention was not accepted by the assessing authority who passed the order exhibit P1 assessing the petitioner to tax at 5 per cent on their sales of X-ray films. Petitioner's appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner having failed by the order exhibit P2, they approached the Tribunal by filing appeal T.A. No. 878/86 which was disposed of by the order exhibit P3 dated January 2, 1987. There the petitioner reiterated the contention that X-ray films were electrical goods and therefore taxable single point, and not general goods taxable multi-point. The Tribunal had earlier dealt with the same question in another appeal T.A. No. 218/86 filed by the Hindustan Photo Films itself where they had also put forward the same plea that X-ray films were electrical goods falling under entry 130 of the First Schedule to the Act. The Tribunal had negatived that contention and upheld the levy of multi-point tax. The Tribunal followed this order of theirs and dismissed the appeal T.A. No. 878/86 by the order exhibit P3. 2. Similar orders of assessment for the years 1985-86 and 1986-87 were dealt with by the Tribunal in T.A. Nos. 758 and 759 of 1988 dated December 27, 1988. After all the appeals were disposed of the petitioner filed an application for rectification of the order exhibit P3 relating to the year 1984-85 and petitions for review of the order passed on T.A. Nos. 758 and 759 of 1988. All these applications were dealt with together by the Tribunal and disposed of by the proceedings exhibit P5. The matter was heard in the first instance by the Chairman and the Departmental Member who wrote two separate orders. 758 and 759 of 1988. All these applications were dealt with together by the Tribunal and disposed of by the proceedings exhibit P5. The matter was heard in the first instance by the Chairman and the Departmental Member who wrote two separate orders. In these applications the case which the petitioner put forward was that X-ray films fell under entry 151 of the First Schedule, namely, photographic and other cameras and enlargers, lenses, films and plates, paper and cloth and other parts and accessories required for use therewith. The petitioner relied on the meaning of the word "photographic" as given in dictionaries and various Law Lexicons to contend that X-ray films fell under entry 151. The Chairman in his order held that X-ray films came within the scope of photographic films in entry 151 and accordingly allowed the rectification application as also the review petitions. He did not specifically deal with the maintainability of any of these applications, but simply allowed them on the finding that X-ray films were photographic films falling under entry 151. The Departmental Member in an elaborately considered separate order came to a contrary conclusion. He held in the first instance that the application for rectification filed under section 43 of the Act was not maintainable inasmuch as there was no error apparent on the face of the record. He also held that the petitions for review filed for the succeeding two years were not maintainable under section 39(7) of the Act. He also held on the merits that X-ray films did not fall under entry 151 as photographic films, in the view that X-ray films will not in common parlance be understood as hotograhic films. 3. In view of this conflict of view between the two members, the matter was referred to a third member, namely, Member (Accounts), who in his separate order, concurred with the Departmental Member that X-ray films did not fall within the purview of entry 151 as photographic films. So far as maintainability of the applications was concerned, he mentioned the point, and observed that the "iron door of review" can be opened only on the basis of discovery of new and important facts which after the exercise of due diligence were not within the knowledge of the party or could not be produced by the party when the order was made. 4. 4. In the light of this opinion, the applications for rectification and for review were dismissed. A copy of the order is exhibit P5. 5. This order in so far as it related to the assessment years 1985-86 and 1986-87 was challenged in T.R.C. Nos. 73 and 74 of 1992, in which this Court called for a finding from the Tribunal about the maintainability of the petitions for review to enable this Court to render a satisfactory decision, as neither the Chairman nor the Accounts Member had decided on the question of maintainability of those petitions. The finding was received with the Chairman holding that the review petitions were maintainable, and the Accounts Member holding to the contrary. This Court accepted the opinion of the Departmental Member with which the Accounts Member had concurred, that there was no discovery of new and important facts, which after the exercise of due diligence were not within the knowledge of the assessee when the original order of the Tribunal was made, and therefore the petitions for review were not maintainable. The tax revision cases were accordingly dismissed on June 16, 1993. (See Arts and Cini House v. State of Kerala [1994] 92 STC 354 (Ker).) 6. That ended the controversy so far as the years 1985-86 and 1986-87 are concerned. The order exhibit P5 in so far as it related to the year 1984-85 in which the application concerned was one for rectification, is in challenge in this original petition. I have already mentioned that the Chairman did not expressly decide on the question of maintainability. He just went on the merits of the case, held that X-ray films fell under entry 151 and allowed the application without anything more. The Departmental Member held against the petitioner on both the points, namely, maintainability as well as the scope of entry 151. The Member (Accounts) did not specifically deal with the question of maintainability but agreed with the Departmental Member on the scope of entry 151 and held against the assessee. 7. The main question to be tackled is whether the application for rectification filed by the petitioner was maintainable. The other question as to whether X-ray films fell under entry 151 will arise for consideration only if the prayer for rectification is held maintainable. 7. The main question to be tackled is whether the application for rectification filed by the petitioner was maintainable. The other question as to whether X-ray films fell under entry 151 will arise for consideration only if the prayer for rectification is held maintainable. I have already mentioned that the petitioner's contention all through the assessment proceedings right up to the Tribunal, was that X-ray films were electrical goods falling under entry 130 and therefore assessable single point. He had nowhere a contention that they were photographic films falling under entry 151. All the authorities therefore dealt with the question from this angle and found against him. It was only long thereafter that the petitioner had a rethinking and he filed the application under section 43 to rectify what he alleged as a mistake in the order of the Tribunal. In support of his application, petitioner relied on various dictionaries and Law Lexicons as to what exactly photographic films were. Section 43 enables the assessing authority or an appellate or revising authority to rectify any error apparent on the face of the record at any time within three years from the date of any order passed by it. The power is to rectify only an error apparent on the face of the record, and not any other. The power is a very limited one; the very jurisdiction to exercise the power depends on the existence of such an error. The power is analogous to that under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In the oft quoted decision, T. S. Balaram v. Volkart Brothers [1971] 82 ITR 50, the Supreme Court has delineated the scope of the expression "mistake apparent on the record". It was held that a mistake apparent on the record is an obvious and patent mistake, and not something which can be established only by a long-drawn out process of reasoning, of points on which there may conceivably be two opinions, - a decision on a debatable point of law is not a mistake apparent on the record. This dictum, quoted and reiterated in subsequent decisions continues to be the authoritative statement of the law relating to mistake apparent. A mistake rectifiable under section 43 should be apparent on the face of the record and is not one which could be discovered by arguments. This dictum, quoted and reiterated in subsequent decisions continues to be the authoritative statement of the law relating to mistake apparent. A mistake rectifiable under section 43 should be apparent on the face of the record and is not one which could be discovered by arguments. It should be an obvious error which does not require any serious or lengthy debate to establish it. 8. The question posed by the petitioner as to whether X-ray films were photographic films is not one of first impression. It is not one to be stated and accepted without anything more. It is not a question which is not capable of two or more interpretations. In fact, the very difference of opinion in the Tribunal - the Chairman speaking in one voice and the other two members speaking in a different voice - is indicative of the possible controversy on the point; that the question is not one free from any doubt, and that it is a debatable point on which there can possibly be two opinions. That the proposition propounded by the petitioner that X-ray films are photographic films falling under entry 151, is not self-evident is apparent from another circumstance, namely, the conduct and understanding of the petitioner himself. All along, in the assessment proceedings, right up to the Tribunal's order in T.A. No. 878 of 1986, and even thereafter when the next two appeals were disposed of, the petitioner had canvassed only for the position that X-ray films were electrical goods. He had no contention that they fell under entry 151. It is therefore clear that the error which is now set forth as apparent, was far from being apparent or obvious. In fact it was a point on which much could be stated on both sides, as could be seen from the difference of opinion in the Tribunal itself, and the conduct of the petitioner throughout the assessment proceedings. There was therefore no error in the order of the Tribunal, which was liable to be rectified under section 43, and the Departmental Member was right in his view that the very application for rectification was not maintainable. The Chairman did not deal with this matter specifically, though I should think that was a point on which he should have addressed himself before allowing the application. The Accounts Member of course went on the merits and held against the assessee. The Chairman did not deal with this matter specifically, though I should think that was a point on which he should have addressed himself before allowing the application. The Accounts Member of course went on the merits and held against the assessee. But when it is apparent from the fats that the application was not at all maintainable as it did not satisfy the requirements of section 43, nothing further requires to be done, except to affirm the decision of the Tribunal. 9. Counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision in T. Manickavasagam Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1983] 143 ITR 269 (Mad.) to contend that the application of a wrong provision of law will itself amount to a mistake apparent on the record. The said decision was not dealing with a case like, the present where the alleged mistake is one which requires elaborate arguments and application of principles of interpretation to establish the existence of the mistake. I do not find any applicability for that decision to the facts of this case. 10. Acceptance of the petitioner's contention will lead to very curious nay, calamitous results with repeated bouts in the litigative process. An assessee who has put forward a case all through before the authorities could, after a round of fights, come forward with a second round with a contention that he should have been assessed under a different entry and not under the one for which he canvassed earlier. In other words, he will be enabled to go on contending for the applicability of one entry after another without any finality to the proceedings. The position will be otherwise if the matter in controversy is subsequently settled by an authoritative pronouncement which leaves no room for doubt or arguments. But when the interpretation is nebulous, an assessee cannot be allowed to reserve his points for a second round of challenge after he has lost in the first round. He is bound to put forward all his claims in relation to non-liability or rate of tax, in the proceedings. It is not up to him to reserve and keep some of the points up his sleeve to be utilised in a second round of proceedings. That will result in endless litigation which cannot be encouraged by any process of law. Section 43 does not permit such a procedure. It is not up to him to reserve and keep some of the points up his sleeve to be utilised in a second round of proceedings. That will result in endless litigation which cannot be encouraged by any process of law. Section 43 does not permit such a procedure. As mentioned earlier, the position will be otherwise if a binding decision is rendered throwing light on a particular question in which case questions may arise whether the assessee is not entitled to relief in the light of that decision. But when no such binding decision has intervened and all that the assessee wants is a consideration of his case de novo under another entry, which according to his present thinking is the one applicable, the case is not one for rectification under section 43. The original petition is without merit. It is dismissed. Petition dismissed.