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1994 DIGILAW 114 (PAT)

Brihaspati Singh v. State of Bihar

1994-03-16

G.C.BHARUKA, G.S.SHARMA

body1994
JUDGMENT G. C. Bharuka, J. -In this case the petitioner is aggrieved by an order dated 8.11.92 (Annexure 3) passed by the District Superintendent of Education, Rohtas by which under the orders of the District Magistrate his two increments have been stopped by way of punishment. 2. At the material time the petitioner was working as headmaster of the Middle school, Gobardhanpur, P.S. Akauhigola in the district of Rohtas. It appears that on 18-3-91 the respondent District Superintendent of Education had visited the school in question and he found two assistant teachers, namely, Shri Ram Sakal Tiwary and Bijoy Pratap absent. Therefore, apart from suspending the petitioner, the respondent-District Superintendent of Education served charge-sheet (Annexure 6) containing various charges. The petitioner filed his show-cause. This was followed by order as contained in Annexures 1, 2, and 3. By Annexure-3 dated 8-11-92 two increments of the petitioners have been stopped as a measure of punishment. It has also been directed that during the period of suspension he will be entitled only to subsistence allowance. 3. I need not enter into all the questions which have been raised for assailing the impugned order since the present writ application has to be decided on the question of jurisdiction itself, as decided in a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Murari Pandey and others vs. State of Bihar and others reported in [ 1994 (1) BLJ 53 ] werein it has been held as under: "In absence of the Statutory Rules which are still to be framed by the State Government under the provisions of the Bihar Non-Government Elementary Schools (Taking Over of Control) Act, 1976, the power to take disciplinary actions and effect suspension as an interim measure has to be culled out from the aforesaid two notifications. Keeping in view the settled Rule of interpretation, the provisions of 1985 notification being later should be deemed to have impliedly repealed the provisions made under 1980 notification and in that view of the matter the only reasonable and permissible legal inference is that the disciplinary actions can be taken only by the Establishment Committees, and the District Superintendent of Education being its Member Secretary has to act in accordance with the decisions of the said committee. Earlier in some of the cases view had been taken that the said power has to be exercised by the District Susperintendent of Education under the orders of the District Magistrate, but that view was taken since 1985 notification was not brought to the notice of the court and as such view taken earlier in some of the cases should be deemed to be inoperative." 4. Keeping in view the law as stated above, since in the present case the impugned order has been passed under the orders of the District Magistrate, the same cannot be sustained in the eye of law and is accordingly, quashed. 5. Anyhow it will be open for the Establishment Committee to take appropriate steps for initiating disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner if it thinks fit and proper and to pass interim and consequential orders in accordance with law. It may be clarified that I have not applied myself to the merit of the charges. 6. The writ application is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Gurusharan Sharma, J. – I agree.