AJIT KUMAR SENGUPTA, J. ( 1 ) IN this application under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has challenged the determination of annual value in respect of the premises No. 1 Shakespeare Sarani, Calcutta for the period commencing 4th Quarter 1984-85. The main ground of challenge is that in determining the annual value no reasons have been disclosed by the Authorities as to how the valuation was arrived at. ( 2 ) AT the hearing Mr. Jayanta, Mitra, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that there is no basis for determining the annual value at Rupees 29,16,000/- and unless the reasons are disclosed as to why and how the quantum has been arrived at, the petitioner is not in a position to challenge such determination before the Appellate Authority. ( 3 ) IT has been contended by Mr. A. K. Dasadhikari, learned counsel appearing for the Calcutta Municipal Corporation that the Corporation is at liberty to adopt any of the two methods for valuation. In this particular case, the rental method was adopted and according to the particulars furnished the rent including service charge annually came to Rs. 2,70,000. 00 and on that basis the calculation was made and the annual valuation was determined. This has been seriously disputed by Mr. Mitra that no such submission was made before the Municipal Authorities because the rent which was being realised is not rs. 2,70,000/- and all the particulars regarding the rent and the service charge have been furnished and earlier the Corporation proceeded to make the assessment on that basis. ( 4 ) IT is now well settled that when an order passed by an appropriate authority ensues civil consequences it is absolutely essential that the reasons shall be disclosed, particularly when the order is an appellate order. If one has to prefer an appeal against the impugned order, which I have already set out above, it will not be possible to decipher any reason as to why and how the valuation was adopted in the manner as stated in the said impugned order. Even if there be a dispute as to whether service charges should be included in the computation of annual value or not if such a contention is raised it is necessary for the respondents to decide that question about the inclusion of service charges in the computation of the annual value. Even if there be a dispute as to whether service charges should be included in the computation of annual value or not if such a contention is raised it is necessary for the respondents to decide that question about the inclusion of service charges in the computation of the annual value. ( 5 ) MY attention has been drawn to a decision of House of Lords in the case of Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, reported in 1968 AC 997 where Lord Pearce at pages 1052 and 1053 quoted the following observations of Lord Cairns L. C. , Lord Penzance and Lord Selborne from the decision in the case of Julius v. Bishon of Oxford reported in 5 App Cas 214:"lord Cairns L. C. ". . . the cases to which I have referred appear to decide nothing more than this: that where a power is deposited with a public officer for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons who are specifically pointed out, and with regard to whom a definition is supplied by the legislature of the conditions upon which they are entitled to call for its exercise, that power ought to be exercised, and the Court will require it to be exercised. ""lord Penance : "the words 'it shall be lawful' are distinctly words of permission only they are enabling and empowering words. They confer a legislative right and power on the individual named to do a particular thing, and the true question is not whether they mean something different, but whether, regard being had to the person so enabled - to the subject-matter, to the general objects of the statute, and to the person or class of persons for whose benefit the power may be intended to have been conferred - they do, or do not, create a duty in the person on whom it is conferred, to exercise it. ""lord Selborne; the question whether a Judge, or a public officer, to whom a power is given by such words, is bound to use it upon any particular occasion, or in any particular manner, must be solved aliunde, and, in general, it is to be solved from the contact, from the particular provisions, or from the general scope and objects, of the enactment conferring the power. "then Lord Pearce observed as follows:"it is quite clear from the Act in question that the Minister is intended to have some duty in the matter. It is conceded that he must properly consider the complaint. He cannot throw it unread into the waste paper basket. He cannot Simply say (albeit honestly) "i think that in general the investigation of complaints has a disruptive effect on the scheme and leads to more trouble than (on balance) it is worth; I shall therefore never refer anything to the committee of investigation. " To allow him to do so would be to give him power to set aside for his period as Minister the obvious intention of Parliaments, namely, that an independent committee set up for the purpose should investigate grievances and that their report should be available to Parliament. This was clearly never intended by the Act. Nor was it intended that he could silently thwart its intention by failing to carry out its purposes. I do not regard a Minister's failure or refusal to give any reasons as a sufficient exclusion of the Court's surveillance. If all the prima facie reasons seem to point in favour of his taking a certain course to carry out the intentions of Parliament in respect of a power which it has given him in that regard, and he gives no reason whatever for taking a contrary course, the Court may infer that he has no good reason and that he is not using the power given by Parliament to carry out its intentions. In the present case, however, the Minister has given reasons which show that he was not exercising his discretion in accordance with the intentions of the Act. " ( 6 ) MY attention has also been drawn to the observation of Lord Upjohn which is as follows:-". . . . In the present case, however, the Minister has given reasons which show that he was not exercising his discretion in accordance with the intentions of the Act. " ( 6 ) MY attention has also been drawn to the observation of Lord Upjohn which is as follows:-". . . . My Lords, I would only add this: that without throwing any doubt upon what are well known as the club expulsion cases, where the absence of reasons has not proved fatal to the decision of expulsion by a club committee, a decision of the Minister stands on quite a different basis; he is a public officer charged by Parliament with the discharge of a public discretion affecting Her Majesty's subjects; if he does not give any reason for his decision it may be, if circumstances warrant it, that a Court may be at liberty to come to the conclusion that he had no good reason for reaching that conclusion and order a prerogative writ to issue accordingly. The Minister in my opinion has not given a single valid reason for refusing to order an inquiry into the legitimate complaint (be it well founded or not) of the South-Eastern Region; all his disclosed reasons for refusing to do so are bad in law, I would allow this appeal in the terms proposed by my noble and learned friend, Lord Reid. " ( 7 ) MY attention has also been drawn to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U. P. reported in AIR 1970 SC 1302 where the Supreme Court observed as follows at page 1303:"paragraph 5; the case discloses a disturbing state of affairs. The authorities have disclosed by their conduct a reckless disregard of the rights of the appellants. The order passed by the District Magistrate cancelling the licences was quasi judicial; it could be made only on a consideration of the charges and the explanation given by the appellants. That necessarily implied that the District Magistrate had to give some reasons why he held the charges proved, and the explanation unacceptable. When the matter was carried in appeal, the State Government could at least have acted with some awareness that citizens have rights which must be protected against possible arbitrary action by subordinate officials. The District Magistrate is not made the final authority in cancelling the licence. When the matter was carried in appeal, the State Government could at least have acted with some awareness that citizens have rights which must be protected against possible arbitrary action by subordinate officials. The District Magistrate is not made the final authority in cancelling the licence. The appellants had a right to carry on their business, and as they held a licence to carry on their business they could be deprived of their right by an executive order supported by good and adequate reasons. The relevant rules granted a right of appeal to the State Government against that order, and that implied that the aggrieved party must have an opportunity to convince the State Government that the order passed by the District Magistrate was erroneous. That right could be effectively exercised if reasons be recorded by the District Magistrate and supplied to the aggrieved party. If the aggrieved party is not supplied the reasons, the right to appeal is an empty formality. ""paragraph 7. Opportunity to a party interested in the dispute to present his case on queston of law as well as fact, ascertainment of facts from materials before the Tribunal after disclosing the materials to the party against whom it is intended to use them, and adjudication by a reasoned judgment upon a finding of the facts in controversy and application of the law to the facts found are attributes of even a quasi judicial determination. It must appear not merely that the authority entrusted with quasi judicial authority has reached a conclusion on the problem before him; it mist appear that he has reached a conclusion which is according to law and just, and for ensuring that end he must record the ultimate mental process leading from the dispute to its solution. Satisfactory decision of a disputed claim may be reached only if it be supported by the most cogent reasons that appeal to the authority. Recording of reasons in support of a decision on a disputed claim by a quasi judicial authority ensures that the decision is reached according to law and is not the result of caprice, whim or fancy or reached on grounds of policy or expediency. A party to the dispute is ordinarily entitled to know the grounds on which the authority has rejected his claim. A party to the dispute is ordinarily entitled to know the grounds on which the authority has rejected his claim. If the order is subject to appeal, the necessity to record reasons is greater, for without recorded reason the appellate authority has no material on which it may determine whether the facts were properly ascertained, the relevant law was correctly applied and the decision was just. " ( 8 ) IN my view it was absolutely essential for the Municipal Authorities to decide the question after giving the petitioners an opportunity of being heard and also after disclosing the reasons for the determination made. If there is a duty to make as assessment in accordance with law it implies that such duty shall be carried out following the principles of natural justice as well as by giving the reasons. It is not merely an administrative order whereby the assessment is made. It is a quasi judicial order inasmuch as the effect of such order may adversely affect the right of a citizen regarding the enjoyment of a property and accordingly, it is incumbent upon the respondents to decide the question by giving the reasons so that the petitioners could have challenged the decision before the Appellate Authority or before this Court as the case may be, on this ground alone the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 8a. Mr. Das Adhikary has, however, contended that this writ application is not maintainable inasmuch as the petitioners have taken recourse to the remedy provided under the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act and has preferred an appeal. It is well settled that when there is an alternative remedy and the aggrieved party has taken recourse to such a remedy he cannot be permitted to initiate a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which provides for a discretionary remedy. He has submitted that the appeal is pending and accordingly, this Court should not interfere in this matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This contention has to be considered in the light of the relevant provisions of the Act. He has submitted that the appeal is pending and accordingly, this Court should not interfere in this matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This contention has to be considered in the light of the relevant provisions of the Act. Sections 189 (3) and 189 (6) of the Act provide as follows:-"189 (5) : any owner or person liable to payment of consolidated rate may, if dissatisfied with the determination of objection under Section 188 appeal to the Tribunal: provided that such appeal shall be presented to the Tribunal within forty-five days from the date of service of a copy of the order under Section 188 and shall be accompanied by a copy of the said order. "189 (6) :"no appeal under this section shall be entertained unless the consolidation rate in respect of any land or building for the period ending on the date of presentation of the appeal on the valuation determined under Section 188 has been deposited in the office of the Corporation and the appeal shall abate unless such consolidated rate is continued to be deposited still the appeal is finally disposed of. " ( 9 ) IT appears that the aforesaid provisions require deposit of consolidated rates on the enhanced rates on the pre-condition of filing of an appeal and so long as the appeal is not disposed, the appellant has to go on depositing the consolidated rates and taxes as determined by the authorities. In this case admittedly the pre-deposit has not been made and accordingly, there is no appeal in the eye of law because the appeal cannot be entertained by the Tribunal on the ground that pre-condition for filing of the appeal has not been fulfilled. Therefore, the contention that the petitioner has alternative remedy cannot be entertained on the facts of this particular case. ( 10 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and having regard to the fact that the impugned order dots not contain any reason and it cannot be said to be a speaking order, it is to be set aside. Even where an authority can exercise the power to make an ex parte assessment, the authority cannot proceed merely on guess work without there being any material for such determination. In this case also the authorities proceeded without there being any materials in quantifying the valuation. Even where an authority can exercise the power to make an ex parte assessment, the authority cannot proceed merely on guess work without there being any material for such determination. In this case also the authorities proceeded without there being any materials in quantifying the valuation. ( 11 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, this application is allowed. The impugned order determining annual valuation in respect of the premises No. 1, Shakespeare Sarani, Calcutta for the period commencing 4th Quarter 1984-85 is set aside. The respondents are directed to make a fresh assessment in accordance with law after giving the petitioners a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The respondents shall determine the question as raised by the petitioners regarding the inclusion of service charges in the computation of annual valuation for the purpose of imposition of consolidated rates and taxes. They shall disclose the basis on which the assessment is made in the order that will be passed. Let the assessment be made and order be passed within 2 months from the date of the communication of the operative part of the judgment and order. ( 12 ) ALL parties concerned to act on a signed copy of the operative part of this judgment and order on the usual undertaking, order accordingly.