Sat Pal, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition filed on behalf of M/s. Mehta Teja Singh and Company (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner ) under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and in this petition it has been prayed that respondent No. 2. learned arbitrator, bedirected to file the award dated 7th April, 1989 along with proceedings and thereafter the award be made a rule of the Court. After the receipt of the award from the arbitrator, notice of filing of the award was issued to the petitioner and Delhi Development Authority (for short called dda ). Thereafter the DDA filed objectons against the award vide I. A. No. 3408/90. The following issues were framed on 23rd February, 1990:- 1) Whether the award is liable to be made a rule of the Court? 2) Relief. On the same date the parties were directed to adduce evidence in the form of affidavit. Affidavit by way of evidence on behalf of the petitioner was filed on 11th February, 1991 and counter affidavit on behalf of the DDA was filed on 4th March, 1991. ( 2 ) MR. Shailash Kapoor, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the DDA confined his submissions with regard to claim Nos. 1, 2,5,6,7, 12, 15 and 16. Learned cousnel submitted that the reasons given by the learned arbitrator with regard to the aforesaid claims were not valid. The learned cousnel, however, could not point out that the findings of the learned arbitrator with regard to any of these claims was perverse. ( 3 ) THE learned cousnel, however, vehemently argued that though the counterclaims were filed before the learned arbitrator but he failed to consider the counter claims filed on behalf of the DDA. The learned counsel drew my attention to the written statment filed on behalf of the DDA before the arbitrator on 8th April, 1987 and submitted that in the written statement it was clearly mentioned that counter claims were being submitted separately. He further submitted that on 25th March, 1989, the tentative counter claims were filed before the learned arbitrator and thereafter final counter claims were filed along with the letter dated 28th February, 1989 which is at page 268-69 of the proceedings. He further submitted that on 25th March, 1989, the tentative counter claims were filed before the learned arbitrator and thereafter final counter claims were filed along with the letter dated 28th February, 1989 which is at page 268-69 of the proceedings. The learned counsel further submtted that the balance work, at the risk and cost of the petitioner, was allotted to the new contractor on 3rd December, 1987 and the counter claims have been filed within three years from the said date on which the cause of action arose for filing of the counter claim. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that once the counter claims have been filed before the arbitrator, he ought to have considered the same and since he had failed to consider the same, the award was liable to be set aside. Insupport of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on ajudgment of the Supreme Court in Mahendra Kumar and another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, (1987) 3 SCC 265 and a judgment of this Court in M/s. Bombay Ammonia Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India. MR 1987 Delhi 148. ( 4 ) MR. Vijay Kishan, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that admittedly the hearing before the arbitrator was concluded on 27th March, 1989 and the counter claims duly approved by the competent ;authority were filed vide letter dated 28th February, 1989. He further drew my attention to the letter dated 27th March, 1989 addressed by Mr. O. P. Verma, Executive Engineer, South Eastern Divison No. ll and submitted that this letter clearly indicates that the letter dated 28th February, 1989 was sent along with the aforesaid letter dated 27th March, 1989 which was acknowledged by the learned arbitrator on 28th March, 1989. He, therefore, contended that since the counter claims were filed after the hearing was concluded, the said counter claims could not have been considered. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel further submitted that even in terms of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Mahendra Kumar (supra) the counterclaims, if any, are required to be filed within three years from the date of accrual of the right to sue under section 3 (2) (b) of the Limitation Act. He submitted that the cause of action accrued to DDA in Septerober 1985. He submitted that the cause of action accrued to DDA in Septerober 1985. when according to the DDA itself, the petitioner had abondened the work in violation of the contract but even the tentative counter claims were filed along with letter dated 25th February, 1989 which were beyond the period of three years from the date of accrual to DDA of the right to sue. He, therefore, submitted that the learned arbitrator was justified in not considering the counter claims filed on behalf of the DDA. The learned counsel also drew my attention to the award and submittethat it cannot be said that the findings of the learned arbitrator with regard to any of the claims was perverse. He, therefore, contended that the objections filed on behalf of the DDA being without any merit be dismissed and award be made a rule of the Court. ( 6 ) I have given my thoughful consideration to the submissions made on behalf of the learned counsel fur the parlies and have also perused the record. From the award I find that the arbitrator has given his findings with regard to the various claims of the petitioner on the basis of the material on record and submissions made before him. The award given in rcspect of all the claims is based on valid reasons and it cannot be said that the finding of the learned arbitrator with regard to any of the claim is perverse. Further as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Puri Construction Private Limited vs. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 777 . it is not open to the Court to examine the correctness of the award on a reappraisal of the evidence. In view of this I do not find any merit in the objections raised on behalf of the DDA with regard to claims mentioned hereinabove. ( 7 ) THE counter claims of the DDA were based mainly on the ground that the petitioner could not complete the work in time and delay was attributed on his part and as such the contractor was liable to pay compensation as the balance work left by the petitioner was got done from another contractor at higher rate. In para 3 of the counter claims it has been stated that the petitioner failed to complete the work and ultimately DDA had to rescind the work on 7th October. In para 3 of the counter claims it has been stated that the petitioner failed to complete the work and ultimately DDA had to rescind the work on 7th October. 1985. From this it is clear that the cause of action accrued on 7th October, 1985 when DDA rescinded the work. In terms of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Mahendra Kumar (supra), the counter claim which is treated as a suit under section 3 (2) (b) of the Limitation Act has to be filed within three years from the dale of accrual to the party concerned of the right to sue. In the present case the right to sue accrued on 7th October, 1985 and the counter claims ought to have been filed on nor before 6th October, 1988. Further the petitioner filed its statement of claim on 28th June, 1986, copy of which was given to the DDA. but the DDA has not filed the counter claims even within three years from the date of the receipt of thesaid statement of claim. Admittedly the counter claims which were duly approved by the competent authority were forwarded to the arbitrator along with the letter dated 28th February,1989 and the said letter cassent along with another letter dated 27th March, 1989 which was acknowledged by the arbitrator on 28th March, 1989. Besides, since the counter claims were filed after the hearing was concluded, the same were not considered by the learned arbitrator. ( 8 ) EVEN otherwise I do not find any substance in the counter claims. As stated earlier the counter claims are mainly based on the ground that the petitioner miserably failed to complete the work and ultimittely the depariment had to rescicnd the work on 7th October, 1985 and the balance work left by the petitioner was got done at higher rate. However, while dealing with claim No. 15 of the petitioner, the learned arbitrator has given the finding that, "the delay in execution of the work could not be attributed to the claimants since the work could not be completed within the stipulated contract period because of lapses on the part of the respondents. The respondents failed inmaking available the full site in the very beginning. The respondents failed inmaking available the full site in the very beginning. Required drawing/designs were not made available to the claimants in such a manner so as to enable the claimants to complete the work within stipulated contract period. " In view of the aforesaid findings of the learned arbitrator I do not find any merit in the counter claims of DDA. ( 9 ) IN view of the above discussion the objections raised on behalf of the DDA in IA No. 3408/90 against the award are dismissed. The objections against the award contained in IA No-3408/90 having been dismissed, the award is made a rule of the Court. Let a decree in terms of the award be drawn. The award shall form part of the decree. I further direct that in case the decretal amount is not paid within a period of two months from the date of this judgment, the petitioner will be entitled to interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum from the date of decree till realisation. The parlies are, however, left to bear their own costs.