JUDGMENT R.R.K. Trivedi 1. In this petition Shri S. P. Mehrotra has accepted notice for respondents. As only a short question of law is involved in this f)efition and there is no controversy with regard to the facts of the case, earned counsel for parties have agreed that the petition may be decided finally at this stage. 2. Petitioner has challenged the order - dated 28-12-93 passed by General Manager of Kanpur Electricity Supply Administration (hereinafter referred to as KESA), approving retirement of 38 employees on various dates on account of their attaining the age of superannuation. This list includes name of petitioner also at Serial no. 4 and 31-1-1994 is mentioned as the date on which he shall retire from service from the post of Technical Staff Grade I. The supply of electricity in Kanpur city was being done up to 15-9-1947 by Cawnpore Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. which was owned and managed by M/s, Eegg Sutherland and Company Ltd. on termination of its licence on the aforesaid date, the State Government took over the Company with effect from 16-9-1947 and it was given the present name Kanpur Electricity Supply Administration. It was run and managed by the State Government as one of its department until 1-4-1959 when the U. P. State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) was constituted under Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Petitioner was appointed on 12-11-1956 in KESA, It is stated that the terms and conditions of service were governed by the Certified Standing Orders and at the time when petitioner was appointed, there was no provision for retirement and this position was continuing from the time of erstwhile licensee from whom the Company was taken over by the State Government. The employees of KESA were entitled to serve on their posts so long as they were physically fit and capable of discharging their duties. This position was reiterated from time to time by the authorities and in this connection the petitioner has placed reliance on various letters and notifications which have been filed as Annexures 2 to 6 to the writ petition. After the constitution of Board on 1-4-1959, services of the petitioner and all the employees of KESA were transferred to the Board on deputation on existing terms and conditions of service. This service of depution continued till 1-7-1971 when the same was absorbed by the Board. After the constitution of Board on 1-4-1959, services of the petitioner and all the employees of KESA were transferred to the Board on deputation on existing terms and conditions of service. This service of depution continued till 1-7-1971 when the same was absorbed by the Board. The State Government Notification no. 367-E/71-23- P.B. by which the services were absorbed has been filed as Annexure 5 to the writ petition. This notification prescribes the modalities for absorbing those government servants who were serving the Board on deputation including the employees serving in KESA. Para. 2 of this Notification provides as under ; 'Ukt sanvilion ki aek anivarya purti yeh hogi ki parishad ke adhin inki sewa sharte kisi bhi dasha me sharton se heya nahi hogi jo inhen sanvilion fee thik purv sarkar ke adhin uplabdh ho tatha inka sarkari sewa kal paiishad ke adhin inki variyata, pronnati, vetan nirdharan, avakash sambandhi hak tatha nivrittik labhoon ke liye usi prakar vicharya hoga jaisa ki wah sarkari sewa me hi unke rahane par hota." 3. Relying on the aforesaid condition, petitioner's case is that as there was no date of retirement for petitioner and other employees similarly situated, at the time of absorption and it was a necessary condition, the Board cannot how retire the petitioner at the age of 58 years. The contention on behalf of petitioner is that the U. P State Electricity Board (Employees' Retirement) Regulations, 1975 fixing the age of superannuation of the Board's employees will not be applicable to the petitioner and he is entitled to continue in service until he is physically fit and capable of discharging his duties. Thus the sole legal question for determination in this writ petition is as to whether Regulation 2 of the aforesaid Regulations of 1975 shall be applicable to the petitioner or not. The relevant Regulation is being reproduced below : "2. Date of Compulsory Retirement : (a) Notwithstanding any rule or order or practice hitherto followed and except as provided otherwise in other clauses of this Regulation, the date of compulsory retirement of a Board's employee other than a Board's employee in inferior service, is the date on which he attains the age of years. Date of Compulsory Retirement : (a) Notwithstanding any rule or order or practice hitherto followed and except as provided otherwise in other clauses of this Regulation, the date of compulsory retirement of a Board's employee other than a Board's employee in inferior service, is the date on which he attains the age of years. He may be retained in service after the age of compulsory retirement with the previous sanction of the Board in writing, but he must not be retained after the age of 60 years except in very special circumstances." 4. I have heard learned counsel for parties. Learned counsel for petitioner has submitted that in view of the irrevocable conditions mentioned in para. 2 of the Notification dated 1-7-1971, the petitioner was absorbed in service of the Board under the same terms and conditions which were applicable while he was serving as government servant in KESA and the terms and conditions of the service cannot be changed which may be disadvantageous to him. As there was no date of retirement now under the aforesaid Regulation, petitioner cannot be retired at the age of 58 years about which there is no doubt that it prescribes a condition which is disadvantageous as it reduces the tenure of service. Learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on the various letters in this regard as already mentioned above and has submitted that the respondents are estopped and they cannot be allowed to change the assurance which was given to the petitioner and other employees by various letters. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for petitioner in cases of S. P. Dubey v. M.P.S.R.T.C., AIR 1991 SC 276 , Life Insurance Corporation of India v. S. S. Srivastava, AIR 1987 SC 1527, B. S. Yadav v. General Manager, Central Bank of India, AIR 1987 SC 1706 . Learned counsel for petitioner has also submitted that judgments of this Court and Honourable Supreme Court dealing with identical controversy cannot be used against the petitioner under the doctrine of sub- silention. Reliance has been placed in case of Municipal Corporation, Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, AIR 1989 SC 38 . Learned counsel for petitioner has also submitted that judgments of this Court and Honourable Supreme Court dealing with identical controversy cannot be used against the petitioner under the doctrine of sub- silention. Reliance has been placed in case of Municipal Corporation, Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, AIR 1989 SC 38 . Learned counsel for respondents, on the other hand, has submitted that the controversy with regard to retirement of such employees of KESA who were earlier Government servants and were subsequently absorbed as employees of the Board under the notification of 1-7-1971 has already been decided by Division Bench of this Court in case of Bhai Lal v. Superintending Engineer, Allahabad, 1978 (37) FLR 421 (DB) and by Honourable Supreme Court in cases of U. P. State Electricity Board v. Hari Shankar Jain, AIR 1979 SC 65 and U. P. State Electricity Board v. Labour Court I, U. P. Kanpur, AIR 1984 SC 1450 . 5. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for parties and have also perused the authorities relied on by them. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhai Lal (supra) after considering all the relevant facts and the position of law held as under : "Once the Regulations framed under section 79 (c) of Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 have been notified by State Government under section 13-B of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, the Standing Orders framed by the earst-while licensee to the extent they concern the subject dealt with by the Regulation became ineffective and inoperative and that in respect of such matter, the right of the parties would be governed only by the Regulation so notified. In the circumstances, even if it be a fact that the Standing Orders framed by the erst-while licensee contained a clause specifying a higher age than 58 years as age of superannuation for its employees, the employee would nontheless. In the circumstances, even if it be a fact that the Standing Orders framed by the erst-while licensee contained a clause specifying a higher age than 58 years as age of superannuation for its employees, the employee would nontheless. as provided under the notified regulation, be superannuated at the age of 58 years." Honourable Supreme Court quoted the aforesaid view of the Division Bench with approval in its judgment repotted in AIR 1984 SC 1450 and further relying on the case reported in AIR 1979 SC 65 , held as under : "In view of the admitted fact that the Regulations framed by the Board under section 79 (c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 have been notified by the Government under section 13-B of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, we hold that the second respondent is bound by those regulations in which the age of retirement has been admittedly fixed at 58 years and that he has no reason to complain against his retirement on that basis with effect from 31-3-1979. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the appellant retiring the second respondeat with effect from 31-3-1979 is upheld." 6. In both the aforesaid cases the employees were earlier in service of KESA as government employees and were absorbed by the Board under the Notification of 1-7-1971 like the present petitioner. They had challenged their retirement at the age of 58 years on identical grounds as raised by the petitioner in the present writ petition. The controversy has been decided by Division Bench of this Court as well as by the Appex Court after examining in detail the legal position and it has been held that Regulation no. 2 of U. P. State Electricity Board (Employees' Retirement) Rules, 1975 shall be applicable uniformly to all the employees. In view of the fact that the legal position in this regard has already been settled long back, the petitioner has no case and the order dated 28-12-1992, Annexure 8 to the writ petition, challenged by the petitioner does not suffer from any error of law. In view of the fact that the legal position in this regard has already been settled long back, the petitioner has no case and the order dated 28-12-1992, Annexure 8 to the writ petition, challenged by the petitioner does not suffer from any error of law. Learned counsel for petitioner, however, made an attempt to distinguish the aforesaid authorities on the basis of doctrine of sub-silientio and has placed reliance in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, mentioned supra, and it has been submitted that the view expressed by the Honourable Supreme Court in case of S. P. Dubey v. M.P.S R. T.C. and another may be followed. 7. I have considered the submission of the learned counsel for petitioner and, in my opinion, the submissions are wholly based on misconception. The doctrine of sub-silentio can be pressed in service only where the matter has been fully argued and decided and some legal provision has escaped consideration of the Court which delivered the judgment which, if taken notice of, the view of the Court would have been different. However, learned counsel for petitioner has not been able to point out any such legal position on which basis it may be said that the views expressed by the Division Bench and the Honourable Supreme Court could have been different. The learned counsel has placed reliance in case reported in AIR 1987 SC 1527 and another case in the same volume at page 1706 and then the case of S. P. Dubey mentioned above and it appears that on the basis of those judgments he wanted to ignore the view expressed by the Division Bench and Honourable Supreme Court directly deciding the controversy. In my opinion, the submission is wholly based on misconception. In the case reported in AIR 1987 SC 1527 Honourable Supreme Court even approved the age of retirement in cases where the employees of the erst-while ensurers had no date of retirement like in the present case. The views expressed in the cases relied on by the learned counsel for petitioner are in peculiar facts and circumstances and the law applicable to them and they cannot be applicable in the present case. The reliance by the petitioner is solely based on the standing orders which did not provide any age of superanuation. The views expressed in the cases relied on by the learned counsel for petitioner are in peculiar facts and circumstances and the law applicable to them and they cannot be applicable in the present case. The reliance by the petitioner is solely based on the standing orders which did not provide any age of superanuation. However, the standing orders have to give way to the statutory regulations framed by the Board which have been notified under section 13-B of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders), Act, 1946. The petitioner is bound by the Regulations framed which have statutory force. The learned counsel placed much reliance on certain letters and notifications prior to his absorption in service of the Board wherein it was mentioned that terms and conditions of employment will not be altered to his disadvantage. However, this position was stated in the letter sand notifications on the basis of the Standing Orders governing the terms and conditions of service then applicable which have been rendered inoperative according to the procedure provided in law and thus the' petitioner cannot claim any advantage on the basis of the aforesaid letters and notifications. It is well known that there cannot be any estoppel against law. 8. For the reasons recorded above, this petition has no force and is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.