JAYABEN JIVRAJBHAI v. KARSANBHAI K. RATHOD — 1994 DIGILAW 118 (GUJ)

SHAH, J. ( 1 ) LEAVE to add State of Gujarat as a party. Rule. Mr. S. T. Mahta, the learned A. G. P. waives service on behalf of the State which is the only vitally affected party in this revision petition. The Rule is finally heard and will stand disposed of by the following judgment : ( 2 ) THE petitioner filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, jamnagar, an application under Sec. 110a of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short the Old Act) for claiming compensation for personal injury sustained by her as a result of an automobile accident. Pending that application, she filed an interim application, Exh. 10, under Sec. 92a of the Old Act claiming interim compensation on the ground of no fault liability. In that application, she claimed compensation in the sum of Rs. 12,500. 00. The learned District judge, Jamnagar who acted as the Claims Tribunal under Old Act directed the opponents to the application to deposit Rs. 7,500/- in the office of the tribunal with 12% interest thereon from the date of that application, Exh. 10. Accordingly, the opponents to the main application deposited Rs. 7,782 in the office of the Tribunal. The petitioner applied for the withdrawal of that amount. The Tribunal on that application passed the following order : "to be paid only after deduction of Court-fees as Account payee cheque. " ( 3 ) IT is the aforesaid order by which the Tribunal has directed the deduction of the Court-fees which hits the petitioner and she, therefore, filed this revision application under Sec. 115 of the C. P. C. ( 4 ) ON the question of maintainability of revision application, Mr. M. S. Shah, the learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the Tribunal under the Old Act has all the trappings of a Civil Court and virtually for all purposes it is a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court, therefore, a revision under Sec. 115 of C. P. C. would be maintainable. To butress his argument, Mr. Shah relied upon the decision in the case of Shardaben wd/o. Sitaram Mohanlal v. M. I. Pandya and Am-, reported in (1971) XII GLR 97. To butress his argument, Mr. Shah relied upon the decision in the case of Shardaben wd/o. Sitaram Mohanlal v. M. I. Pandya and Am-, reported in (1971) XII GLR 97. Honble J. B. Mehta, J. as a learned single Judge of this High Court in that judgment has observed as follows :"it is obvious from the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is ousted and the Claims Tribunal is constituted under the Act to discharge the duties, which would have otherwise fallen on an ordinary Civil Court of the land. In view of Sec. 110 of the Act, the Tribunal possesses all the attributes of a Court and it has to decide the claim on the basis of legal evidence in accordance with law by a definitive final judgment. The Tribunal is for all intents and purposes a Civil Court discharging the same functions and duties in the same manner as a Civil court is expected to do. "relying upon the aforesaid observations made by the learned single Judge, mr. Shah submitted that though under the provisions of the Old Act, the Civil courts jurisdiction is ousted, none-the-less, the Tribunal has all the attributes of Civil Court and the District Judges who constitute the Tribunals in the state are, even as Tribunals, Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court and therefore, their judgments and orders would be amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 115 of the C. P. C. ( 5 ) MR. Shah in order further to support his argument, relied upon a full Bench Judgment of the Patna High Court in Anirudh Prasad ambasta and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. , reported in AIR 1990 Patna 49. The Full Bench of the Pataa High Court in that case has taken into consideration the decision in the cases of (1) State of Haryana v. Smt. Darshana Devi and Ors. , reported in AIR 1979 SC 855 and Bhagwati devi and Ors. v. M/s. I. S. Goel and Ors. , reported in 1983 0 ACJ 123. The Full Bench of the Pataa High Court in that case has taken into consideration the decision in the cases of (1) State of Haryana v. Smt. Darshana Devi and Ors. , reported in AIR 1979 SC 855 and Bhagwati devi and Ors. v. M/s. I. S. Goel and Ors. , reported in 1983 0 ACJ 123. In the latter of the aforesaid two judgments, which has followed the former one, it has clearly been posited by Their Lordships of the Supreme court that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under the motor Vehicles Act is a Civil Court for the purpose of Sec. 25 of the c. P. C. Following the aforesaid two judgments of the Supreme Court, the full Bench of the Patna High Court took the view that a Motor accidents Claims Tribunal is a Civil Court and that the District Judges who function as Claims Tribunal are not only within the administrative control of the High Court, but are also subordinate to it under Sec. 115 of the C. P. C. This proposition enunciated by the Full Bench of the Patna high Court on the basis of the two Supreme Court judgments referred to hereinabove as also the Judgement of the learned single Judge of this honourable High Court in Shardaben Case (supra) make it abundantly clear that a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court and the orders passed by such a Tribunal, if other conditions of Sec. 115 of the C. P. C. are satisfied, could be revised by this High Court under that section. ( 6 ) COMING to the merits of the revision application, I think the revision application should succeed. The learned District Judge acting as a Tribunal has ordered the deduction of the Court-fees from the amount of the interim compensation awarded in favour of the petitioner under Sec. 92a of the Old act (The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 ). That order directing the deduction of court-fees cannot be sustained for, in my opinion, it is an order without jurisdiction. ( 7 ) CHAPTER VIIA and therein Sec. 92a came to be inserted in the old Act by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1982 (47 of 1982) with effect from 1/10/1982. That order directing the deduction of court-fees cannot be sustained for, in my opinion, it is an order without jurisdiction. ( 7 ) CHAPTER VIIA and therein Sec. 92a came to be inserted in the old Act by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1982 (47 of 1982) with effect from 1/10/1982. Before that date, there was no provision corresponding 10 Sec. 92a enabling the claimant to claim compensation on the principle of no fault liability. Before this Sec. 92a came to be introduced in the Act, the Tribunal had to pass the award only in the final analysis of the claim application. The State Government, had framed rules known as the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959. As in this case, i am concerned with the question of Court-fees, the Rule in the Bombay motor Vehicles Rules, 1959 that would be relevant would be Rule 292. That Rule makes exhaustive provisions as to how in case of a claim application under Sec. 110a of the Old Act Court-fees would be charged. The Rule also makes provisions for the recovery of the deficit Court-fees. After Sec. 92a, came to be introduced in the Old Act, the Government of Gujarat amended the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959 by the bombay Motor Vehicles (Gujarat 12th Amendment) Rules, 1986 and introduced therein Rule 311 A which prescribes the procedure for an application for compensation in respect of liability without fault under chapter VII-A of the Old Act. That Rule 311a in so far as is relevant provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 291 to 310 (both inclusive) in the case of claim for compensation under Chapter VII-A of the Old Act, the procedure shall be as stated therein below. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 311a provides for making of an application for compensation under chapter VI-A of the Old Act. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 311a says that an application under sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by a fee of an amount of ten rupees. Rule 311a is a self-contained Rule which provides the entire machinery for making an application for compensation on the principle of no fault liability and passing of the orders on such application. In that rule, the provision as regards the charging of Court-fees is sub-rule (2) which says that an application under sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by a fee of an amount of ten rupees. In that rule, the provision as regards the charging of Court-fees is sub-rule (2) which says that an application under sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by a fee of an amount of ten rupees. The Rule nowhere makes any provision for charging Court-fees in excess often rupees irrespective of the amount claimed under that provision or the amount awarded under the provision. A bare comparison of Rule 311a with Rule 292 would show that the rule-making Authority clearly intended that the claimant in an application for an award on the ground, of no fault liability is not to pay anything in excess of ten rupees by way of Court-fees or fees. Whereas rule 292 provides for payment of Court-fees at the initial stage at different rates depending upon the amount claimed in the main application and whereas that Rule also provides for recovery of the deficit in the payment of Court-fees, if in the final award, the amount awarded is that high as would attract payment of Court-fees in excess of the amount by way of Court-fees already paid. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 311a simplicitor says that an application under Sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by a fee of an amount of ten rupees and Rule 311a which is otherwise exhaustive, makes no provision for recovery of Court-fees or fees in excess of ten rupees whatever be the amount under that provision claimed or whatever be the amount under that provision awarded. If the Rule-making Authority intended that the claimant in such a case shall have to pay additional Courtfees in the event of the award in a higher sum being passed in his favour, he would certainly have made a provision on the line as contained in Rule 292, but, the Rule-making Authority has not made any such provision. ( 8 ) THIS Rule 311a excludes the operation of Rules 291 to 310 (both inclusive) and that would mean that the operation of Rule 292 is also excluded. The Rule applies notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 291 to 310 (both inclusive ). Rule 310 says that in so far as the Rules make no provision or make insufficient provision, the Claims Tribunal shall follow the procedure laid down in the C. P. C. for the trial of suits. The Rule applies notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 291 to 310 (both inclusive ). Rule 310 says that in so far as the Rules make no provision or make insufficient provision, the Claims Tribunal shall follow the procedure laid down in the C. P. C. for the trial of suits. Now the said rule 311a excludes the operation of Rules 291 to 310 (both inclusive.) the operation of Rule 310 which permits the Tribunal to follow the provisions of C. P. C. would also be excluded in so far as an application under Sec. 92a of the Act is concerned and even by resorting to the provisions of C. P. C. , the claimant cannot be asked to pay anything in excess of Rs. 10. 00 by way of Court-fees in the matter of his claim under Sec. 92a of the Old Act. ( 9 ) THE Old Act came to be repealed by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (The New Act, for short ). In the New Act, we have Sec. 140 which corresponds to Sec. 92a of the Old Act. Under the New Act, the government has framed Rules which are known as Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (New Rules, for short ). They, in so far as are relevant for the purpose of determination of the question before me, are almost identical with the bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959 as they stood amended by the Bombay motor Vehicles (Gujarat Twelfth Amendment) Rules, 1986 (Old Rules, for short ). Rule 212 of the New Rules is in pan materia with Rule 292 of the Old Rules. Rule 229 of the New Rules is in part materia with Rule 310 of the Old Rules. Rule 231 of the New Rules is in pari materia with Rule 311a of the Old Rules. By Rule 231 of the New Rules, it is provided that the application for compensation on the ground of no fault liability shall be accompanied by a fee of rupees ten in the form of Courtfees stamp. Rule 231 of the New Rules also makes no provision for recovery of anything in excess of rupees ten by way of Court-fees in the matter of an application under Sec. 140 of the New Act. ( 10 ) OF course, the case before me is governed by the Old Act and the Rules thereunder. Rule 231 of the New Rules also makes no provision for recovery of anything in excess of rupees ten by way of Court-fees in the matter of an application under Sec. 140 of the New Act. ( 10 ) OF course, the case before me is governed by the Old Act and the Rules thereunder. However, I have referred to the New Act and the rules thereunder only for the purpose of showing that the Rule-making authority, both under the New Act as also under the Old Act has expressed its intention in a very clear manner. The intention is that an applicant who applies for compensation on the principle of no fault liability is not required to pay anything in excess of Rs. 10. 00 by way of Court-fees. Therefore, merely because in the present case, the learned district Judge who acted as a Tribunal has passed an award in the sum of Rs. 7,500. 00 under Sec. 92a of the Old Act and the concerned party has deposited that sum with interest, that would not confer jurisdiction on the learned District Judge, acting as a Tribunal to direct the applicant to pay the Court-fees in excess of Rs. 10. 00. To put it differently, the learned Judge of the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to direct the deduction of the Court-fees from the amount deposited. The order of the learned judge of the Tribunal was, therefore, patently without jurisdiction and is required to be set aside in a revision application under Sec. 115 of the c. P. C. Hence, the revision application is allowed. The direction about the deduction of Court-fees from the sum of Rs. 7,782. 00 is hereby set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly. The learned Judge of the Tribunal is requested to pay up the amount to the claimant at the earliest. .