ORDER Civil Appeals Nos. 4823-28 of 1984 1. These six appeals arise out of the judgment rendered in Regular Second Appeal No. 251 of 1981 by learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court on 25-7-1984 which came to be followed in Second Appeals Nos. 252-56 of 1981. As the issue involved in these appeals is identical, we propose to dispose of all the appeals by this common order. 2. The factual matrix is that the appellants purchased different parcels of land situate in the city of Ambala under separate registered sale deeds. The respondent, who was tenant in respect of the said lands, instituted suits to enforce the right of pre-emption conferred by Section 15 of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1913 as adopted in the State of Haryana under the Haryana Adaptation of Laws Order, 1968. The suits were decreed by separate judgments rendered on 30-9-1980. By the said judgment and decree the respondents right of pre-emption was recognised and he was granted time to deposit the court fee within one month and the remaining 4/5th sale price by 27 -11-1980. Admittedly, the respondent complied with these conditions within the time allowed by the decree. 3. It appears that in the meantime on 29-7-1980 the appellant landowners had instituted proceedings for eviction of the respondent from the lands in question under Section 9(1) read with Section 9-A of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. The application for eviction was accepted by an order dated 3-10-1980. This was subsequent to the pre-emption decree passed on 30-9-1980. The appellant landowners took possession of the land by evicting the respondent on 11-10-1980. Notwithstanding his eviction the respondent deposited the 4/5th amount pursuant to the decree of 30-9-1980 on 26-11-1980. The first appeal preferred by the appellants against the preemption decree was dismissed on 6-1-1981. On 28-7-1983 notification under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act was issued but the same came to be quashed on 2-2-1984. The regular second appeals which have given rise to these appeals were dismissed on 25-7-1984. Hence, the present appeals by special leave. It appears that in the meantime the State of Haryana issued another notification dated 8-10-1985 under the very same provision declaring that no right of pre-emption shall exist in respect of sales of land falling in the areas of any municipality in the State of Haryana. Hence, the present appeals by special leave. It appears that in the meantime the State of Haryana issued another notification dated 8-10-1985 under the very same provision declaring that no right of pre-emption shall exist in respect of sales of land falling in the areas of any municipality in the State of Haryana. There is no dispute that the suit lands were before the issuance of the notifications dated 28-7-1983 and 8-10-1985. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants made two submissions before us. Firstly he contended that since the decree for eviction had been executed on 11-10-1980 before the deposit of the 4/5th amount on 26-11-1980 the right to enforce the decree stood defeated and, therefore, the decree ought to be set aside as unenforceable. In this connection, the High Court observed that the relevant date was the date of the passing of the decree i.e. 30-9-1980 and not the date on which 4/5th of the amount was deposited. The High Court took the view and, in our opinion, rightly, that once decree for enforcement of the pre-emption right was passed the subsequent deposit of the court fee and purchase money within the time allowed by the decree cannot change the date of the decree because the decree is not preliminary decree so to say. Therefore, on the date of the passing of the decree since the respondent continued to be in possession of the lands in question his subsequent dispossession w.e.f. 11-10-1980 will not set the decree at naught. The term "decree" is defined by Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by the amending Act of 1976 to mean the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. So what the decree conveys is formal expression of an adjudication which so far as regards the court expressing it conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to matters in controversy in the suit. In the instant case, the respondent was seeking to enforce right of pre-emption which he claimed was conferred on him by Section 15 of the Pre-emption Act applicable in the State. In the instant case, the respondent was seeking to enforce right of pre-emption which he claimed was conferred on him by Section 15 of the Pre-emption Act applicable in the State. The question which the court had to consider was whether such right existed and, if yes, whether the plaintiff was entitled to have it enforced. It is this point which was in controversy and which was adjudicated by the trial court. The decree carried the formal expression of that adjudication in regard to matters put in issue in the suit. Order 20 Rule 14( 1) is special provision in relation to decree in pre-emption suit. It says that where the court decrees claim to pre-emption in respect of particular sale of property and the purchase money has not been paid into the court, the decree shall specify day on or before which the purchase money shall be so paid and direct that on such payment into court together with the costs (if any) decreed against the plaintiff, on or before the specified date, the defendant shall deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff, whose title thereto shall be deemed to have accrued from the date of such payment. If however, the plaintiff fails to pay the purchase money and the costs within the time allowed, the suit shall stand dismissed with costs. In the instant case, the Court had granted one months time for deposit of court fee and time up to 27-11-1980 for depositing the remaining 4/5th purchase money. Indisputably, the court fee was deposited within the time allowed and the balance purchase money was deposited one day before the time ran out. Therefore, by virtue of sub-rule (1) of Rule 14 of Order 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure the title to the property passed to the respondent (original plaintiff) on the deposit of the money on 26-11-1980. Counsel for the appellants submitted that the date of decree would be the date on which the deposit was actually made and since before that date the respondent was evicted from the land in question, his right to seek and enforce pre-emption stood lawfully defeated. We fmd it difficult to hold that the date of decree is not the date on which it was made i.e. 30-9-1980, but the date on which the payment was completed i.e. 26-11-1980. We fmd it difficult to hold that the date of decree is not the date on which it was made i.e. 30-9-1980, but the date on which the payment was completed i.e. 26-11-1980. We have already pointed out the definition of the term "decree". Reference may be made to Rule 7 of Order 20 which enjoins that the decree shall bear the date as the day on which the judgment was pronounced. In the instant case, the judgment w pronounced on 30-9-1980, and, therefore, that was the date of the decree. Rikhi Ram v. Ram Kumar1 three-Judge Bench of this Court held that und the general law of pre-emption it was firmly established that the decisive as regards the pre-emptors right to pre-empt the sale was the date of the decree. The pre-emptor who claims the right to pre-empt the sale on the sale must continue to possess that right till the date of the decree. If loses that right before the passing of the decree, the decree for pre-empti cannot be granted even though he may have had such right on the date the suit. The same rule applies to person who claims to pre-empt the s under Section 15(1)(a) of the Pre-emption Act. It is clear from the observations that the right to pre-empt the sale must be shown to have defeated before the decree is actually passed to successfully non-suit plaintiff. In the instant case, that right was not defeated till the date of on 30-9-1980. Counsel for the appellant was quite conscious of this difficulty and, therefore, he vehemently contended that the decree could not be said have been passed on 30-9-1980 because 4/5th purchase money had not deposited till 26-11-1980. We find it difficult to subscribe to this view. first contention, therefore, fails. 5. Counsel for the appellant then tried to contend that the decree had been drawn up on 30-9-1980 since the learned Judge had signed the decree at later date. He, therefore, contended that the decree could not be said to dated 30-9-1980. No such contention was raised earlier. However, Vasdev very fairly showed us copy of the decree, which shows that it drawn up on 30-9-1980 but the learned Judge had put his signature on 29- 10- 980 on payment of the additional court fee of Rs 1617. He, therefore, contended that the decree could not be said to dated 30-9-1980. No such contention was raised earlier. However, Vasdev very fairly showed us copy of the decree, which shows that it drawn up on 30-9-1980 but the learned Judge had put his signature on 29- 10- 980 on payment of the additional court fee of Rs 1617. Therefore, even otherwise the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant in this behalf is untenable. It runs in the teeth of Order 20 Rule 7. 6. The second contention is based on the language of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act read with notifications issued by the State Government on 28-7-1983 and 8-10-1985. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 reads as under: "8. (2) The State Government may declare by notification that in any local area or with respect to any land or property or class of land or property or with respect to any sale or class of sales, no right of pre-emption or only such limited right as the State Government may specify, shall exist." 7. By the notification of 28-7-1983 the Governor of Haryana declared that no right of pre-emption shall exist in respect of the sales of land included in the boundary of Ambala City Municipal Committee as notified by the Government of Haryana, Local Department notification dated 21-2-1974. It was, therefore, contended that since the appeal in the High Court was pending when the aforesaid notification came to be issued the right of preemption became non est as admittedly the lands in question were situate within the area of Ambala City Municipal Committee. But that notification was later quashed. By the subsequent notification of 8-10-1985 the Governor declared that no right of pre-emption shall exist in respect of sales of land falling in the areas of any municipality in Haryana. Counsel, therefore, submitted that the right of pre-emption stood extinguished by the issuance of these notifications and the appeal being continuation of the suit the High Court was not justified in affirming the decree of the trial court. Counsel, therefore, submitted that the right of pre-emption stood extinguished by the issuance of these notifications and the appeal being continuation of the suit the High Court was not justified in affirming the decree of the trial court. This precise question was considered by the Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab in Ramji Lal v. State of Punjab2• Question 1 was formulated on the basis of similar contention urged before the Full Bench which held that in suit for pre-emption the claimant must prove that his right to pre-empt subsisted till the date of the decree of the first court and that loss of the right after the date of the decree by an act beyond his control did not affect his claim in the suit. Accordingly, the notification under Section 8(2) extinguishing the right of pre-emption in the property issued during the pendency of the appeal against the decree of the trial court did not disentitle the plaintiffs to maintain their claim of pre-emption already exercised and decreed. This is the law which is holding the field since 1965. The view taken by the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court is not shown. to be erroneous. Besides, having regard to the language of Order 20 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure, title passes on payment of the money and we see no reason why we should disturb that view. We, therefore, do not find any substance in the second contention also. 8. These being the only points urged before us in these appeals, we find no merit in them. The appeals fail and are dismissed with no order as to costs. 9. In the view which we have taken in the batch of appeals, this appeal also fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. 10. This appeal was preferred mainly because the High Court had quashed the notification dated 28-7-1983 issued under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. This notification was quashed qua the respondents in the proceedings on the ground that it was the result of mala fide exercise of power qua the respondents. Insofar as his application is concerned, we have already held in the batch of appeals just disposed of that by the said notification the decree for pre-emption, if passed prior to the issuance of the notification, will not be affected. Insofar as his application is concerned, we have already held in the batch of appeals just disposed of that by the said notification the decree for pre-emption, if passed prior to the issuance of the notification, will not be affected. Therefore, we do not see any reason to entertain this appeal but if the judgment of the High Court is sought to be relied upon in any other matter where the notification is put in issue, that will have to be decided on its own merit. The appeal is disposed of with no order as to costs.