JUDGMENT U. L. BHAT, C.J. - These writ petitions which have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common order since common questions of law arise therein, have been filed by dealers in sugar, tobacco or iron and steel. 2. The Sales Tax Officers concerned have been levying entry tax under provisions of the Entry Tax Act, 1976, on the turnover of the petitioners in regard to the above goods. According to the petitioners, this is illegal and, therefore, they seek the following reliefs : (a) Declaration that levy of entry tax is violative of the provisions of the Constitution and beyond the legislative competence of the State; (b) declaration that the provisions of the Entry Tax Act, 1976, are ultra vires the provisions of article 286(3) and entries 92-A and 92-B of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution as also articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution; (c) declaration that levy of entry tax on the above goods is ultra vires the charging section; and (d) consequential reliefs such as quashing notices requiring them to deposit tax, prohibiting the Sales Tax Officers from proceeding with the pending assessment; restraining them from levying tax on the petitioners and directing them to refund tax illegally collected. 3. Respondents have filed returns as well as additional submissions. Additional submissions have been filed on behalf of the petitioners in some other cases. Shri M. S. Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioners in some of the petitions who led the arguments and counsel in other petitions, made the following submissions in the course of their arguments : (i) Dealers in the aforesaid goods are not covered by section 3 of the Entry Tax Act which is the charging section. (ii) In view of the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, levy of tax on first purchase outside the State is hit by article 286(3) of the Constitution. (iii) Levy on the aforesaid goods amounts to levy of consignment tax in the guise of entry tax and offends entry 92-A of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. (iv) The scheme of levy of entry tax under the Entry Tax Act discriminates between goods manufactured inside the State and goods imported from outside the State, thereby offending articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution, the conditions laid down in which have not been satisfied. 4. (iv) The scheme of levy of entry tax under the Entry Tax Act discriminates between goods manufactured inside the State and goods imported from outside the State, thereby offending articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution, the conditions laid down in which have not been satisfied. 4. The first submission made on behalf of the petitioners is that liability under the Entry Tax Act arises only in the case of a dealer liable to pay tax under the Sales Tax Act; that in regard to goods covered by these cases, no dealer is liable to pay tax under the Sales Tax Act and hence no dealer is liable to pay entry tax in relation to such goods. 5. Section 3 of the Entry Tax Act deals with incidence of taxation. Sub-section (1) deals with the entry of two kinds of goods, viz., all goods specified in Schedule II on one hand and all goods specified in Schedule III on the other. In case of goods specified in Schedule II, entry in the course of business of a dealer into each local area for consumption, use or sale therein is the taxable event. We do not propose to refer to the provisions regarding goods specified in Schedule III, as it is not necessary for the purposes of these cases. According to sub-section (1), entry tax is to be paid by every dealer liable to tax under the Sales Tax Act who has effected entry of such goods. Item 3 of Schedule II refers to iron and steel; item 8 refers to cotton fabrics, item 11 refers to sugar and item 12(ii) refers to tobacco. Thus on the entry in the course of business of a dealer of these goods into each local area for consumption, use or sale, entry tax becomes leviable and every dealer liable to tax under the Sales Tax Act who has effected entry of the goods, shall pay the tax. 6. In this connection, we may also refer to sub-section (4) of section 3 which states that no entry tax shall be payable on the goods specified in Schedule I. Schedule I deals with goods specified in Schedule I of the Sales Tax Act excepting the goods specified in entries 6, 41 and 42 of that Schedule. 6. In this connection, we may also refer to sub-section (4) of section 3 which states that no entry tax shall be payable on the goods specified in Schedule I. Schedule I deals with goods specified in Schedule I of the Sales Tax Act excepting the goods specified in entries 6, 41 and 42 of that Schedule. Goods specified in Schedule I of the Sales Tax Act are exempt from sales tax under section 10(1) of the Sales Tax Act. Items 6, 41 and 42 relate to cloth, sugar and tobacco respectively. Iron and steel are not included in Schedule I of the General Sales Tax Act. In other words, though these three types of goods are exempt from sales tax under the Sales Tax Act, they are not exempt from entry tax. 7. Since the liability to tax under the Sales Tax Act is in issue, the scheme of the provisions of that Act has to be considered. Section 2(d) of the Sales Tax Act defines "dealer" as any person who carries on the business of buying, selling, supplying or distributing goods directly or otherwise. "Turnover" is defined in section 2(t) as the aggregate of the amount of sale price received and receivable by a dealer in respect of any sale or supply or distribution of goods made during a particular period, whether or not the whole or any portion of such turnover is liable to tax, but after deducting the amount, if any, refunded by the dealer to the purchaser in respect of any goods purchased and returned by the purchaser within the prescribed period. "Tax-paid goods" is defined in section 2(rr) as meaning any goods specified in Parts II to VI of Schedule II which have been purchased by such dealer from a registered dealer inside the State, except the goods the sale whereof by such registered dealer is exempted in whole from payment of tax. "Taxable turnover" is defined in section 2(r) as meaning that part of a dealer's turnover for such period which remains after deducting therefrom the sale price of goods mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (vi). Sale price of goods declared tax-free under sections 10 and 12, of goods mentioned in Part II of Schedule II which are in the nature of tax-paid goods in the hands of such dealer, etc., have to be deducted. 8. Sale price of goods declared tax-free under sections 10 and 12, of goods mentioned in Part II of Schedule II which are in the nature of tax-paid goods in the hands of such dealer, etc., have to be deducted. 8. Since sugar, tobacco and cloth are declared tax-free under section 10 of the Sales Tax Act, the taxable turnover for the purposes of that Act cannot include the sale price of such goods. Section 4 of the Sales Tax Act deals with incidence of taxation. Sub-section (5) prescribes a limit of turnover beyond which alone the incidence of taxation falls. According to sub-section (1), every dealer whose turnover during the period exceeds the limit, shall be liable to pay tax under the Act on his taxable turnover in respect of sales or supplies effected in the State. While sub-section (1) relates to dealers having the requisite turnover before the commencement of the Act, sub-section (2) deals with those dealers who have such turnover subsequent to the Act. Under sub-section (3), once a dealer becomes liable, he shall continue to be so liable until after the expiry of two consecutive years during which his turnover does not exceed the limit and on the expiry of the period, his liability shall cease. Explanation to sub-section (5) prescribing the limit, states that for the purpose of calculating the limit of turnover, the turnover shall include the aggregate amount for which all goods are sold or supplied, irrespective of the fact whether any such goods are imported or manufactured or otherwise obtained by the dealer concerned or whether or not they are exempt from payment of tax. The effect of these provisions is that every dealer whose total turnover exceeds the limit, is liable to pay sales tax on his taxable turnover. While total turnover includes the price of exempted goods irrespective of liability to tax, the taxable turnover excludes the price of tax-free goods and of goods referred to in section 2(r). 9. The contention is that in so far as the three types of goods are concerned, it is a case of "non-liability to sales tax" and not merely a case of exemption and, therefore, entry tax is not required to be paid under section 3(1) of the Entry Tax Act. 9. The contention is that in so far as the three types of goods are concerned, it is a case of "non-liability to sales tax" and not merely a case of exemption and, therefore, entry tax is not required to be paid under section 3(1) of the Entry Tax Act. For this purpose, learned counsel placed reliance on several decisions, viz., State of Kerala v. Attesee (Agro Industrial Trading Corporation) [1989] 72 STC 1 (SC); AIR 1989 SC 222 , Vrajlal Manilal and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1972] 30 STC 291 (MP), affirmed by the Supreme Court in [1986] 63 STC 1 (SC); AIR 1986 SC 1085 (Vrajlal Manilal Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh), Fernandez v. State of Kerala [1957] 8 STC 561 (SC); AIR 1957 SC 657 , Mohanlal Hargovind Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1955] 6 STC 687 (SC); AIR 1955 SC 786 , Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1971] 28 STC 627 (SC); [1971] 82 ITR 353 (SC); AIR 1971 SC 2145 and Bhawani Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of Punjab [1967] 20 STC 290 (SC); AIR 1967 SC 1616 . We do not think these decisions really help the petitioners. These decisions have been relied on to bring out the distinction between "non-liability to pay tax" and "exemption from sales tax". We will assume for the purpose of this discussion that in so far as the three types of goods are concerned, it is a case of non-liability and not exemption. These decisions have been relied on to bring out the distinction between "non-liability to pay tax" and "exemption from sales tax". We will assume for the purpose of this discussion that in so far as the three types of goods are concerned, it is a case of non-liability and not exemption. We will quote the relevant portion of section 3(1)(a) of the Entry Tax Act : "There shall be levied an entry tax - (a) on the entry in the course of business of a dealer of goods specified in Schedule II, into each local area for consumption, use or sale therein; and such tax shall be paid by every dealer liable to tax under the Sales Tax Act who has effected entry of such goods." An analysis of the above provision shows - (a) entry in the course of business of a dealer of goods into each local area for consumption, use or sale therein; (b) entry of goods must be those specified in Schedule II; (c) entry must be in the course of business of the dealer; and (d) tax shall be paid by the dealer who has effected entry of such goods, provided he is liable to pay tax under the Sales Tax Act. The words "liable to tax under the Sales Tax Act" qualify the expression "dealer" and do not qualify the expression "goods". The attempt in section 3 is to identify the dealer who is liable to pay entry tax. He is the dealer who has effected entry of the goods provided he is liable to tax under the Sales Tax Act. Every dealer who has taxable turnover under the Sales Tax Act, is liable to pay tax under the Sales Tax Act. Of course in computing the taxable turnover, deductions of the sale price of specified goods is to be made. A dealer's liability to pay tax under the Sales Tax Act arises if he has a taxable turnover which is not affected by the fact that his turnover includes the sale price of goods not liable to tax. "Dealer liable to tax under the Sales Tax Act" means only the dealer who has taxable turnover and is, therefore, liable to pay tax under the Sales Tax Act and not "dealer liable to tax under the Sales Tax Act in respect of goods whose entry has been effected into the local area". "Dealer liable to tax under the Sales Tax Act" means only the dealer who has taxable turnover and is, therefore, liable to pay tax under the Sales Tax Act and not "dealer liable to tax under the Sales Tax Act in respect of goods whose entry has been effected into the local area". The plain meaning of section 3 of the Entry Tax Act is contrary to the above contention raised on behalf of the petitioners. We hold that the aforesaid goods are covered by section 3 of the Entry Tax Act and dealers in such goods are liable to pay entry tax, provided they are liable to pay tax under the Sales Tax Act. The point is answered accordingly. 10. It is next contended that levy of entry tax on first purchase outside the State of the aforesaid goods is hit by article 286(3) of the Constitution. The relevant part of article 286(3) states, inter alia, that any State legislation, in so far as it imposes or authorises the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of goods declared by Parliament by law to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce, will be subject to such restrictions and conditions in regard to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of tax as the Parliament may, by law, specify. Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, declares the goods enumerated therein to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. Items (ii), (iv), (viii) and (ix) relate to cotton fabrics, iron and steel, sugar and tobacco respectively. Section 15 provides for restrictions and conditions in regard to tax on sale or purchase of declared goods under any State legislation. There are limitations with regard to limit of taxation and single point taxation, and reimbursement of tax paid. 11. Petitioners contend that they are bringing these goods from outside the State, paying tax under the Central Sales Tax Act and once the goods enter a local area, it is in the local area that entry tax is required to be paid. 11. Petitioners contend that they are bringing these goods from outside the State, paying tax under the Central Sales Tax Act and once the goods enter a local area, it is in the local area that entry tax is required to be paid. It is pointed out that though entry tax is payable only on entry of goods into a local area in the course of business of a dealer of specified goods for consumption, use or sale therein, yet the Act does not contain any machinery for verification of the purpose of entry and there is no procedure for assessment or refund and, therefore, the entry tax is really in the nature of purchase tax and hence hit by article 286(3) of the Constitution and section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Learned counsel relied on the decision of Municipal Council v. Parekh Automobiles Ltd. (1990) SCC 367, where it was held that since the Municipalities Act provided for octroi on goods brought within the limits of the municipality for consumption, use or sale therein, even if the sale took place within the octroi limits, octroi could not be levied on re-export to retail outlets of the dealers located outside the municipal limits for use of the ultimate consumers outside the municipal limits. Learned counsel also referred to the decision in Hotel Balaji v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1993] 88 STC 98 (SC); AIR 1993 SC 1948, where history of sales tax legislation has been traced. This decision overruled the earlier decision in Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana [1990] 76 STC 71 (SC); AIR 1990 SC 781 . It was argued before the Supreme Court that provisions of the Sales Tax Act of some other States really levied consignment tax and not tax upon the purchase of raw material. Jeevan Reddy, J., observed : "It is well-settled that taxing power can be utilised to encourage commerce and industry. It can also be used to serve the interests of economy and promote social and economic planning. Section 9 of the Haryana Act and section 13-AA of the Bombay Act are intended to encourage the industry and at the same time, derive revenue. It is also not right to concentrate only on one situation, viz., consignment of goods to manufacturer's own depots (or to the depots of his agents) outside the State. Section 9 of the Haryana Act and section 13-AA of the Bombay Act are intended to encourage the industry and at the same time, derive revenue. It is also not right to concentrate only on one situation, viz., consignment of goods to manufacturer's own depots (or to the depots of his agents) outside the State. Disposal of goods within the State without effecting a sale also stands on the same footing, an instance of which may be captive consumption of manufactured products in the manufacture of yet other products. Once the scheme and policy of the provision is appreciated, there is no room, in our respectful opinion, for showing that the tax is on the consignment of manufactured goods." 12. Item 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution relates to tax on sale or purchase of goods subject to the provisions of entry 92-A of List I. Item 52 of List II relates to tax on entry of goods into local area for consumption, use or sale therein. Item 92-A of List I relates to sale of goods other than newspapers, where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Item 92-B relates to tax on consignment of goods. Tax on sale or purchase, tax on entry of goods into local area for consumption, use or sale therein and tax on consignment of goods are different in nature and character and are imposed by local authorities under separate laws. Octroi is in the nature of a multi-point imposition. Various State Legislatures, with the intention of reducing harassment of dealers, abolished octroi which is a multi-point imposition and at the same time, legislated on single point entry tax for the purpose of compensating the local authorities who suffered loss of revenue on account of abolition of octroi. 13. Single point entry tax is a substitute for multi-point octroi and falls within the ambit of entry 52 of List II. It is a tax on entry and does not restrict freedom of trade or commerce, as is made clear in Transport Corporation of India v. Chairman, Municipal Council, Municipal Corporation, Indore AIR 1963 MP 253 and City Municipality v. Mahado Seetha Ram AIR 1967 AP 363 . It is a tax on entry and does not restrict freedom of trade or commerce, as is made clear in Transport Corporation of India v. Chairman, Municipal Council, Municipal Corporation, Indore AIR 1963 MP 253 and City Municipality v. Mahado Seetha Ram AIR 1967 AP 363 . It is true that State Legislature is competent to levy entry tax only in respect of goods brought into a local area for the purposes of consumption, use or sale. Even where words of wide and general import are used, it has to be presumed that the Legislature was using the words in regard to activity in respect of its competence to legislate and to no other. (See Jothi Timber Mart v. Corporation of Calicut AIR 1970 SC 264 ). 14. We have adverted to the scheme of the provisions of the Entry Tax Act. The Act is intended to levy entry tax on entry of specified goods into local area for consumption, use or sale. It is not possible to accept that in pith and substance, the Act levies entry tax on entry of all goods, irrespective of the purpose of entry. That the purpose of the entry is fundamental to the levy is made clear by the presumption laid down in section 6 as if goods are consumed, used or sold in local area by the dealer or other person, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved by him, that such goods are entered into local area for consumption, use or sale therein. Where the dealer purchases specified goods in a local area from a person or dealer who is not a registered dealer, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved by him, that the entry of goods had been effected by him into the local area. Section Il deals with burden of proof of certain aspects and makes the matter clearer. The burden of proving that a dealer or a notified person has not effected entry of specified goods in the local area for consumption, use or sale therein, lies on him. The Rules framed under the Act provide among other things, for furnishing of returns, payment of tax or penalty imposed on him, order of assessment and form thereof, authority and manner for assessment of tax and appeal or revision against the order of assessment. The Rules framed under the Act provide among other things, for furnishing of returns, payment of tax or penalty imposed on him, order of assessment and form thereof, authority and manner for assessment of tax and appeal or revision against the order of assessment. These provisions completely negative the contention of the petitioners that in pith and substance, entry tax contemplated under the Act is a tax on entry, irrespective of the purpose of entry and amounts to purchase tax. Therefore, article 286(3) of the Constitution and section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, are not attracted to this legislation. The point is answered against the petitioners. 15. For the same reasons as aforesaid, it has to be held that levy of entry tax does not amount to levy of consignment tax and the contention that it offends article 92-A of List I of the Constitution is not tenable. 16. The petitioners contend that where specified goods are imported from outside the State, they must necessarily enter a local area and entry tax becomes leviable, while goods manufactured inside the State may not be entering a local area and, therefore, entry tax is not leviable and thus there is a restriction imposed on inter-State trade and commerce and, therefore, the Act offends articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution. 17. Article 301 requires that trade, commerce and intercourse through-out the territory of India should be free subject to other provisions of Part XIII. Imposition of a tax on entry or movement as long as it is not otherwise arbitrary or unreasonable, cannot be regarded as adversely affecting the system of trade, commerce or intercourse. 18. Article 304 reads as follows : "304. Notwithstanding anything in article 301 or article 303, the Legislature of a State may, by law. Imposition of a tax on entry or movement as long as it is not otherwise arbitrary or unreasonable, cannot be regarded as adversely affecting the system of trade, commerce or intercourse. 18. Article 304 reads as follows : "304. Notwithstanding anything in article 301 or article 303, the Legislature of a State may, by law. - (a) impose on goods imported from other States or the Union territories any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject, so, however, as not to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced; and (b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest : Provided that no bill or amendment for the purposes of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President." This is a provision enabling the State Legislatures to introduce certain restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse amongst States. There may be State tax imposed on goods imported from other States or Union territories to which similar goods manufactured in that State are subject so as not to discriminate between the goods so imported and goods manufactured. What is contemplated is a tax imposed on goods imported from outside the State. Entry tax is not a tax on goods, but a tax on entry of goods into a local area for particular purposes. Entry tax would be levied on specified goods either manufactured or produced within the State or imported from outside on their entry into a local area. The tax does not discriminate between the specified goods manufactured or produced within the State or those imported from outside. The differential treatment accorded to goods produced within the area and those imported from outside the area is microscopic and irrelevant for the purpose of article 304(a). (See State of Karnataka v. Hansa Corporation AIR 1981 SC 463 ). Therefore, article 304(a) of the Constitution is not attracted. 19. The differential treatment accorded to goods produced within the area and those imported from outside the area is microscopic and irrelevant for the purpose of article 304(a). (See State of Karnataka v. Hansa Corporation AIR 1981 SC 463 ). Therefore, article 304(a) of the Constitution is not attracted. 19. It is contended that article 304(b) enables the State Legislature to impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse with or within the State as may be required in public interest, provided no bill or amendment for the said purpose shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature without the previous sanction of the President. According to the petitioners, there is no public interest involved in this restriction and the bill did not have the previous sanction of the President. Both sides have referred in this connection to the decision in State of Karnataka v. Hansa Corporation. AIR 1981 SC 463 . 20. The above decision dealt with the challenge against the validity of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale therein Act (27 of 1979). Reference has been made to the majority view in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam AIR 1961 SC 232 and Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1962 SC 1406 . The decision clarifies the position in para 25 as follows : ".......... If a measure is shown to be regulatory or the tax imposed is compensatory in character meaning the tax instead of hampering trade or commerce would facilitate the same, it would be immune from a challenge under article 301. In other words, if the tax is shown to be compensatory in character, irrespective of the fact whether it is saved by article 304 or not, it does not come within the inhibition of article 301. In other words, if the tax is shown to be compensatory in character, irrespective of the fact whether it is saved by article 304 or not, it does not come within the inhibition of article 301. Accordingly, if validity of a tax law is challenged on the ground that it violates freedom of inter-State commerce, trade and intercourse guaranteed by article 301, the contention may be repelled by showing (i) that the tax is compensatory in character as explained in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd.'s case AIR 1962 SC 1406 or (ii) it satisfies the requirements of article 304." The court further held as follows : "On a conspectus of these decisions, it appears well-settled that if a tax is compensatory in character, it would be immune from the challenge under article 301. If on the other hand, the tax is not shown to be compensatory in character, it would be necessary for the party seeking to sustain the validity of the tax liability, to show that the requirements of article 304 have been satisfied." In that case, the State did not attempt in the High Court to sustain the validity of the law on the ground that it is compensatory in character. 21. In the present case, the State has taken the stand that the levy of entry tax is compensatory in character, i.e., to compensate the municipalities for loss of income by way of octroi which has been abolished in the State. This contention is met by learned counsel for the petitioners by pointing out that the legislative provisions indicative of the compensatory nature of the levy, have been deleted and, therefore, it is no longer open to the State to contend that the levy is compensatory in character. 22. Section 17 of the Act, as it originally stood, required that the tax collected shall be credited to the consolidated fund of the State and that net tax collection be placed to the credit of M.P. Octroi Compensation Fund under section 7-B of the Sales Tax Act. By Act No. 24 of 1978, this provision was omitted with effect from April 1, 1978. Section 7-B was introduced in the Sales Tax Act with effect from October 1, 1978, specifically providing for grant-in-aid for loss of octroi to the municipality. This provision was deleted in 1990. By Act No. 24 of 1978, this provision was omitted with effect from April 1, 1978. Section 7-B was introduced in the Sales Tax Act with effect from October 1, 1978, specifically providing for grant-in-aid for loss of octroi to the municipality. This provision was deleted in 1990. This is the foundation for the contention that the entry tax is not compensatory in character. 23. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act states that it is enacted to levy a tax on entry of goods in lieu of octroi tax collected by the municipalities and municipal corporations and to make transportation of goods trouble-free by abolishing octroi check-posts. A copy of the Statement of Objects and Reasons is found in annexure A. R-1 appended to the additional submissions made on behalf of the respondents in M.P. No. 2289 of 1989. It indicates that the statute had the view of raising financial resources to compensate local bodies consequent upon abolition of octroi with a view to simplifying the taxation structure. Annexure A. R-3 gives summary in respect of levy and details of allotment made to local bodies. The document shows that during the period 1976-77 till 1988-89, provision was made in the budget to compensate the municipalities and the amount budgeted was made over. It also shows that with effect from the year 1983-84, there has been a regular annual increase of 10 per cent in total compensation amount. Considering the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the particulars given in annexure A. R-3, the statutory changes referred to above have no significance. Entry tax remains compensatory in nature and, therefore, it is immune from challenge. 24. For the aforesaid reasons, we repel the challenge against the vires of the Entry Tax Act. We may mention in passing that learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that certain aspects of interpretation and application of the Entry Tax Act were canvassed in a batch of writ petitions and the Indore Bench has heard the same and judgment is awaited. For this reason, we do not advert to those aspects which will be decided in that batch of writ petitions. 25. In the result, the writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocates' fee Rs. 1,000 in each of the writ petitions. Writ petitions dismissed.