ORDER A.R. Tiwari, J. 1. This revision petition, presented under Section 23-E of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short the 'Act') is directed against the order dated 14.7.92 rendered by the Rent Controlling Authority, Indore in Case No. A-90 (7) 405/84-85 thereby ordering the eviction of the applicant from the tenanted premises within a period of two months from the date of the order. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case arc that the original-applicant-landlady Smt. Seetabai widow of Nagulal Shukla filed the application before the Rent Controlling Authority under Section 23-A (b) of the Act for the requirement of starting of the business of her major son in ther suit-premises. After obtaining leave to defend in terms of Section 23-C of the Act, the applicant resisted the claim of eviction. The evidence was thus, recorded. On evaluation of the evidence, the Rent Controlling Authority found that the need was established in terms of law and passed the order of eviction as noted above. 3. Aggrieved by this order, the applicant has preferred this revision petition. During the pendency of this revision petition, the original landlady Smt, Seetabai (non - applicant in this revision petition) died and on leave of this Court, the legal representatives No. 1 to 3 were brought on record on 5.10.1993. 4. I have heard Shri R. S. Garg learned counsel for the applicant and Shri N. K. Patni, learned counsel for the legal representatives of the deceased non-applicant. I have also perused the record. 5. Shri Garg has directed scathing attack against the order of eviction impugned in this revision petition on the following grounds :- a) The Rent Controlling Authority did not possess jurisdiction to entertain the case and as such the order passed by it is liable to be vacated. b) One of the ingredients to attract Section 23 - A (b) of the Act is that the landlord should be proved to be the owner of the tenanted premises. But in this case, the landlord failed to prove this ingredient and the Rent Controlling Authority erred in law in placing the burden on the applicant-tenant. He thus, argued that the burden of proof is wrongly placed on the applicant-tenant and as such, the conclusion reached by it is totally vitiated and deserves to be dislodged. But in this case, the landlord failed to prove this ingredient and the Rent Controlling Authority erred in law in placing the burden on the applicant-tenant. He thus, argued that the burden of proof is wrongly placed on the applicant-tenant and as such, the conclusion reached by it is totally vitiated and deserves to be dislodged. c) The original landlady did not fall in the category of specified landlord as indicated in Sec. 23-J of the Act. d) The landlady did not plead in her application that the son, for whose need the application weas presented, did not possess suitable accommodation of his own for this purpose and as such, the second limb of the aforesaid provision was neither pleaded nor proved in the evidence. This being so, the counsel urged the eviction order was unsustainable in law. e) The applicant-tenant has rebuilt the structure on the land-belonging to the original landlady and as such, the application for eviction was not tenable in law, in these facts and circumstances. f) The order of eviction is not sustainable on facts and circumstances of this case and the Rent Controlling Authority has gone wrong in concluding about the establishment of the requirement, for business of the son. g) the landlady had died during the pendency of this revision petition and as such, the proceeding becomes incompetent after the death and as such, the order of eviction is not sustainable and executable thereafter in any case. h) The prayer made by I. A. No. 5592/93 for condonation of delay in depositing the rent deserves to be accepted on the basis of the reasons contained in the application. i) The prayer for amendment of the written statement as contained in I. A. No. 6403/93, presented under Or. 6 Rule 17 and Order 7 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure deserves to be allowed as the averments made therein have material bearing on the issue involved in this case. j) The affidavit of Azad Kumar filed by the non applicant is not worthy of being accepted unless the applicant was given an opportunity to test its veracity on the anvil of cross-examination. The Revision petition thus, deserves to be allowed and the order merits to be demolished. j) The affidavit of Azad Kumar filed by the non applicant is not worthy of being accepted unless the applicant was given an opportunity to test its veracity on the anvil of cross-examination. The Revision petition thus, deserves to be allowed and the order merits to be demolished. The counsel has placed reliance on AIR 1981 SC 1711 (Hasmatrai and Another vs. Raghunath Prasad) and AIR 1992 SC 1590 (Swadesh Ranjan Sinha v. Haradeb Benerjee). 6. Shri N. K. Patni, learned counsel for the legal representatives of the deceased non-applicant on the other had vehemently supported the order of eviction and urged that the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the applicant were devoid of merit and liable to be rejected. He further submitted that as far as the pleading is concerned, firstly, there is no deficiency in this behalf. Para 17-A of the application was complete answer to the objection raised by the applicant and secondly, this was not the stand taken in the application seeking leave to defend the main petition. Shri Patni has also submitted that the law granted presumption of correctness in terms of Section 23-D of the Act. In any case, no surprise was caused to the applicant. His reply in the written-statement did not specifically plead that the son was possessed of any alternative accommodation which could satisfy the need. Order 6 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure required only pleading of material facts. As an abuntdant caution the position of absence of alternative accommodation has also been tried to be placed on record through affidavit. Under Section 23-A (b) of the Act the applicant was not required to plead, anything about the son expect that the accommodation was required for his business. Shri Patni also submitted that the prayer for striking out of the defence deserves to be accepted and the attempt to seek condonation though the application is not backed bylaw. Shri Patni finally submitted that this revision petition was devoid of merit. The original landlady died and could not see the result of the litigation and her son is without job and is being harassed since 1985. He, therefore, made the fervent appeal in his argument that this revision petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. I proceed to examine the worth of rival contentions as urged before me by the learned counsel for the parties. 8. He, therefore, made the fervent appeal in his argument that this revision petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. I proceed to examine the worth of rival contentions as urged before me by the learned counsel for the parties. 8. Right at the there shold, three points, as chronicled below, merit mention- a) In (1988) 2 SCC 172 (Hiralal kapur v. Prabhu Choudhury), and 1985 JLJ 793 (D. B) (B Johnson v. C. S. Naidu), it is held that power, avilable to this Court under Section 23-E of the Act, is wider than the one conferred under Section 115 CPC but narrower than the power of appeal. Yet even this width does not entitle this Court to enter into the merits of the factual controversies between the parties and to reverse findings of fact in this regard. To make the law more luculent, it is apt to quote the conclusion of the Apex Court as contained in Hiralal's case (supra)- In the present case, the High Court should not have interfered with the findings of the Rent Controller on a mixed question of fact and law regarding the landlord's bonafide need of the premises. b) The contention of 'want of jurisdiction' was negatived by this Court right at the motion stage on 14.10.92 and this revision earned admission ONLY on twin point of (a) deficiency inpleading and (b) erroneous placement of burden of proof. As such, entire matter is not at large. Hence, the periphery as ordained, is that of some one on a long leash who has the right to move about as far as the leash permitted, but not beyond. The scrutiny can thus, be limited. c) Chapter III-A under which the application was moved came to be inserted in the Act vide Act No. 27/83 i.e. after about 22 years from the enforcement of the Act in 1961 to make specified categories of landlords (Section 23-J) beneficiaries of speedy decisions of cases and to make decisions immune from attack through any appeal. Contest depended on leave (Section 23-C). Procedure provided for day to day hearing and for disposal within six months (Section 23-D). In Nair's case, the Apex Court ( AIR 1987 SC 2117 ) Exhorted and enlightened as under- Tier of appeals should be curtailed. Laws must be simple, rational and clear. Tenants are in all cases not the weaker sections. Contest depended on leave (Section 23-C). Procedure provided for day to day hearing and for disposal within six months (Section 23-D). In Nair's case, the Apex Court ( AIR 1987 SC 2117 ) Exhorted and enlightened as under- Tier of appeals should be curtailed. Laws must be simple, rational and clear. Tenants are in all cases not the weaker sections. There are those who are weak both among the landlords as well as the tenants. Litigations must conic to end quickly. Such new Housing Policy must comprehend the present and anticipate the future. The idea of a National Rent Tribunal on an All India basis with quicker procedure should be examined. This has become and urgent imperative of today's revolution. A fast changing society cannot operate with unchanging law and preconceived judicial attitude. * * * Yet the lis commenced as back as in 1985 remained in search of finality and the landlady left this world on 4.9.93, and despite change in law, could not live long enough to hear final verdict. This is how procedural wrangle lends to erode faith in the system and makes justice cry in silence for long, far too long. The change in law has thus not altered the course. The situation, therefore, warrants change in attitude of the litigants. The scheme thus serves as a reminder of what THORE AV. once observed in classic terms- Things do not change, we change. 9. With this isagogic piece, I proceed further. Briefly few facts may be stated about jurisdiction, albeit it no longer is point to be determined as noted above. The case was initially instituted before Rent Controlling Authority which on 7.11.87 held that it was triable by Civil Court. The Civil Court, after some time, concluded that it was triable by the Rent Controlling Authority. It then referred the case to the District Judge who forwarded the case before the Rent Controlling Authority where the appellant participated and allowed the case to be concluded on merits. The oppugnation on the ground of want of jurisdiction is in these circumstances, even otherwise inutile and futile. It may thus, be observed that the landlady was pushed to rush from piller to post and consigned to nurse the feeling as to how illusory the system was and how in practice it turned out to be promise of unreality. 10. The oppugnation on the ground of want of jurisdiction is in these circumstances, even otherwise inutile and futile. It may thus, be observed that the landlady was pushed to rush from piller to post and consigned to nurse the feeling as to how illusory the system was and how in practice it turned out to be promise of unreality. 10. Now I take up the points of submission for consideration, one by one. As to the contention of ownership, it is noticed that in application for eviction, it was clearly pleaded in para 3(a) that original N.A., widow, was the owner. In written-statement there is admission of relationship of landlord and tenant but there is obscure denial of ownership in para 3 at page 9. There is however, no elaboration as to who men was the owner. Moreover, section 23-C of the Act roquires that the tenant shall state the grounds on which he seeks to contest. The aplication daled 9.10.85 did not contain any such ground for contest. Hence, three points emerge. One this ground is not available for dispute. Two relationship is admitted and rent was paid and as such the plea is barred by doctrine of estoppel. Three landlady deposed on oath that she was the owner of the tenanted premises (Para 1) and as such this point stands proved and is non-inierferable in this revision. Hence, the contention is non-meritorious and the conclusion about the ownership is on firm foundation and is evidently sustainable. AIR 1992 SC 1590 (Swadesh Ranjan Sinha vs. Haradeb Benerjee does not help applicant in the facts and features of the present case. 11. The landlady being widow fell in the category of the specified landlords. In fact this point is linked with the question of jurisdiction. In view of the discussion contained in para 9 above, this contention too must suffer the fate of rejection. 12. The question of alleged re-building or substantial improvements, after alleged damage or demolition, is said to be the subject matter of another suit pending between the applicant and the Corporation. In the instant case, the relationship is an undisputed fact. Hence, this contention in this revision petition is rather irrelevant, infirm and inutile. 12. The question of alleged re-building or substantial improvements, after alleged damage or demolition, is said to be the subject matter of another suit pending between the applicant and the Corporation. In the instant case, the relationship is an undisputed fact. Hence, this contention in this revision petition is rather irrelevant, infirm and inutile. 13 The only question, core and crucial, on which this revision was admitted is whether there is deficiency in pleading and whethert burden of proof was wrongly imposed and if so what is the effect. ? To appreciate this aspect, it is apt to reprodue the averments made in para 17 of the main application - It is thus, clear that the original non-applicant had pleaded that she did not own or possess any alternative accommodation to meet the need for her major son as urged. In reply, the applicant only came out with bare denial but did not aver that the major son owned or possessed any alternative accommodation for this purpose. The emphasis centred round unsuitability of tenanted accommodation on the basis of smallness of its size and not on the basis of avialability of any other reasonably suitable accommodation. Curiously enough, in application for leave this so-called omission was not put forward as a ground of contest Section 23- A (b), like Section 12 (1) (f) is restrictive in nature. Logically, the expression 'such person' should be understood as relating to that person for whose benefit the accommodation is held. Even otherwise, parties understood the case and received full opportunity of trial. The applicant has not urged that any 'prejudice' is caused to him. As if to meet the contention, the legal represent alive, for whose need the case was set up, filed an affidavit in this court to show and say that he did not own and possess any house in Indore or even in M. P. The applicant is right in his contention that this did not constitute evidence and verity needed to be tested by cross-examination. But then, there is no conter affidavit to rebut this assertion. AW-1 Azad Kumar is examined in the case but it is not even suggested to him that he owned or possessed any alternative accommodation of his own. There is no suggestion even to Seetabai. The applicant did not say so on oath. But then, there is no conter affidavit to rebut this assertion. AW-1 Azad Kumar is examined in the case but it is not even suggested to him that he owned or possessed any alternative accommodation of his own. There is no suggestion even to Seetabai. The applicant did not say so on oath. The decision reported in AIR 1981 SC 1711 Hasmat Rai and another v. RaghunathPrasad) is not helpful to the applicant. It is futile to slip under the umbrella of technicalities like pleading more so when no surprise, or prejudice is alleged or caused. The pleading and proof that landlord-owner did not possess any alternative accommodation to satisfy the need as it was shown to be existing was sufficient to suggest that even the son did not possess and that there was no alternative accommodation at all. Hence, firstly; the pleading is sufficient and secondly; no prejudice is caused and thirdly; no leave is obtained on this ground. The Authority thus did not commit any error in recording the finding that there was no alternative accommodation in existence. The contention to this extent appears to be correct that such a burden was not on the applicant tenant but this did not vitiate the eventual Conclusion as noted above. The affidavit is superfluity and is not required to annaesthetize the attack on this score. 14. Apart from this, it may be observed that burden of proof loses inportance when both parties led evidence and that it is of little significance after both parlies, aware of issues under contest, have produced evidence. Thereafter, it was only a question of apprisal of evidence. Relying on AIR 1963 SC 1150 (Abdul Shakoor vs. Arjit Papa Rao) and certain other decisions, this Court in case of Bhukhiya bai v. Phoolbai ( 1981(II) MPWN 36 ) held as under - This apart, the question of burden of proof loses its importance because parties have led evidence to prove this tact and the question of burden of proof is merely academic except in rare cases where consideration are evenly balanced it would be little signifficant (Abdul Shakoor v. Arjit Papa Rao AIR 1963 SC 1150 ). So I am of the opinion that there is no error committed by the Courts below in arriving at the finding that the defendant No. 1 is not the married wife of Gajadhar Prasad and there is no wrong placing of burden proof for such wrong placing has any effect on the finding. * * * And in Basant v. Thakur Balwant (1979 (1) MPWN 25), it is observed as under - "we are then left with the second question as to the burden. The perusal of the judgment will show that the contention of Shri Pandhye is without substance. The plaintiff has been able to prove that he had advanced a sum of Rs. 1,750. The appellate Court has given good reasons as to why the defendant ought not to be belived. The question of burden would be of little significance after both the parties have led evidence and were fully aware of the issues in the case. It was known to the defendant as to what he was required to refute. * * * * Luculently enough, the twin points on which this revision petition was admitted arc thus, on scrutiny found to be devoid of merit and are therefore, repelled and rejected accordingly. 15. Now is the stage to deal with other points as projected. The contention as regards death of landlady after passing the order of eviction is, in my view in consequential and LRs. particularly the one for whose need the claim of eviction was set up, can reap - the fruits of the order. The lis having been once validly constituted and instituted in not rendered invalid or teemless on the death of the suitor. In fact after death, the applicant moved an application on 25.9.93 and earlier proposed L. Rs. had also made an application on 8.9.93 (I. A. No 4864/93) for substitution of L. Rs. This exercise was demonstrably undertaken on the linchpin that "right to sue" had still survived. The applicant, before final arguments never contended or contested that "cause of action" for eviction perished on death. Delays in disposal of case cannot yield illogical consequences. There can be no lis like law versus justice. One has to vote harmony and veto antinomy. Hence, death can have no adverse impact on the order properly passed within jurisdictional competence. Thereafter it cannot be impeached as 'ultravires'. Delays in disposal of case cannot yield illogical consequences. There can be no lis like law versus justice. One has to vote harmony and veto antinomy. Hence, death can have no adverse impact on the order properly passed within jurisdictional competence. Thereafter it cannot be impeached as 'ultravires'. End of suitor is not to be end of the suit. It cannot operate as 'bolt from the blue' and cannnot be used as weapon to shatter the LRs. in quest of justice. Law has to be indulgent. The contention, thus, lacks substance and is rejected. 16. Apparently the finding about bonafide need for non-residential accommodation to start business of sweetmeats is unassailable and is not liable to be incinerated. The evidence offered in proof of bonafide need is satisfactory and sufficient and justifies the order of eviction. Tenant ought to be adherer of good tenent. The debility of the contest in the light of the undernoted statement of the applicant stares in the face - In sum, despite demarcated periphery, I have dealt with the points so as to do justice to the industry of the learned counsel but have found no merit in the contentions. The evidence clinched the issue and findings of fact are not liable to the dislodged, demolished and disturbed. There is no miscarrige of justice. The order of eviction is sensible and sustainable on facts and in law. 17. This brings me to the consideration of the application (I. A. No. 6403/93) dated 23.11.93 for amendment. This is opposed in writing as well branding it as malafide, meretricious and meritless. It is urged that case of termination from service MPSRTC is still pending. The contentions, sought to be incorporated arc emphatically denied. This application exfacie has two infirmities - a) It does not disclose source of information. b) It does not give particulars like date of order and employment etc. In any case, the arguments were concluded on 14.1.94 and as such, there was sufficient time to support the plea if true by documentary evidence i.e. order. This is not done. On the other hand, it is denied. The affidavit-is equally vague and undependable. In the circumstances, I deem it proper to reject the application. Moreover, Section 23-G (3) is also an answer to such imaginary apprehensions. Prima facie there is no subsequent event. The application is found to be obsure and malafide. This is not done. On the other hand, it is denied. The affidavit-is equally vague and undependable. In the circumstances, I deem it proper to reject the application. Moreover, Section 23-G (3) is also an answer to such imaginary apprehensions. Prima facie there is no subsequent event. The application is found to be obsure and malafide. A part from this even on success in case against MPSRTC the N. A. Azad Kumar may elect to do business only as pleaded and proved or may opt to do both. After bestowal of anxious consideration, I find that the application is acarpous. It is accordingly dismissed. 18. This then takes me to remaining applications. The rent is Rs. 150/- p.m. Despite this level, the applicant opted to remain a defaulter and non-observer of relevant provisions of the Act. Irked by this conduct the non-applicants tiled an application (I. A. No. 5502/93) seeking an order to strike out the defence. The applicant, in answer to such a prayer, presented an application (I. A. No. 5592/93) on 8.10.93 stating that rent upto 31.10.93 had been deposited and seeking condonation with regard to some delay and irregularity. This aspect was reserved for answer at the time of final hearing. Considering the fact that the rent has been deposited and revision petition is being decided finally. I find no justification in allowing either of these two applications at this stage. These applications are, thus, rejected as in consequential. 19. As noted above, it is not the affidavit that tilted the balance. The question of cross-examination thus, does not arise at all. 20. The conlentions coloured with no conundrum, are invertebrate but not irrecusable. The order, despite contention of prodigious number of attacks, is held to be sustainable and suffers no mortality. 21. In the ultimate analysis, I find that the afaresaid contenlions of the applicant are palpably non-meritorious and arc positively unworthy of being accepted. 22. Tied down with no tenebrosity, at botton this turned out to be a simple case of eviction and invloved no legal acrobats. 23. It seems that small level of rent in a place like Indore was perhaps prone to offer enough temptation to litigate and spurn rational thing. The mother-the suitor died and her son. evidently jobless and needy, waited for possession. Lord Keynes elegantly observed that "Men will do the rational things but only after exploring all other alternatives". 23. It seems that small level of rent in a place like Indore was perhaps prone to offer enough temptation to litigate and spurn rational thing. The mother-the suitor died and her son. evidently jobless and needy, waited for possession. Lord Keynes elegantly observed that "Men will do the rational things but only after exploring all other alternatives". Now that alternatives like urge to lapidate the lis, fail dismally, it may be assumed that the tenant may now relent to do the rational things of vacating the tenanted accommodation. However, if he still chooses to be undaunted, law will do the rest. The lis demonstrated no oblique motive 'or' malafides'. It was not inspired by any intent to seek more rent or harass the tenant in any way. After all. on proved need, a accommodation must return to the owner-landlord without forcing him or her to face the ordeal of long-drawn litigation or to suffer the torture of technicalities. It is well to remember that ends of justice are higher than ends of law. 24. Ex conscqucnti. I say monosyllabic 'no' to the prayer of demolition of the order of eviction, held-to be sound and sustainable and dismiss this revision petition with costs. The applicant is ordered to beer his own costs and also to pay the costs of the non-applicants. Counsel fee. subject to certificate, is fixed at Rs. 750/-. Let memo of costs be prepared accordingly. 25 The order is thus, upheld. Yet in view of dearth of accommodation, I find it just to allow time till 31.3.1994 to vacate the tenanted accommodation and deliver its vacant possession to not-applicants on the condition of filing an undertaking on affidavit before the Rent Controlling Authority, Indore by 27.1.1994 promising :- a) That the applicant shall vacate and deliver vacant possession to the non-applicants on or before 31.3.1994 subject to deposit before the Rent Controlling Authority xx double of the amount of annual rent (i.e. Rs. 3600/-) by the non-applicants as required under sec. 23-G (b) (i) of the Act and as directed in the impugned order by the Rent Controlling Authority. b) That the applicant shall not sublet, damage of destroy the accommodation in any manner and shall not otherwise part with its possession in favour of any person. 3600/-) by the non-applicants as required under sec. 23-G (b) (i) of the Act and as directed in the impugned order by the Rent Controlling Authority. b) That the applicant shall not sublet, damage of destroy the accommodation in any manner and shall not otherwise part with its possession in favour of any person. c) That the applicant shall deposit rent / mesne-profits up-to-date before Rent Controlling Authority, Indore by 31.1.1994 and shall continue to deposit at the rate of Rs. 150/ -per month till delivery of possession. 26. In the event of failure to file an undertaking as directed or infringement of any of these conditions, the order of eviction shall become executable atonce and may then be put into execution immediately. 27. The record of the Rent Controlling Authority Indore is now directed to be returned.