ORDER K.T. Thomas, J. 1. In a suit for partition, one of the defendants contended, inter alia, that he has tenancy right over the suit property as it was orally leased to him in 1960. On the strength of the said contention fee moved the trial court to refer the question (whether he has such tenancy right) to a Land Tribunal under S.125(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (for short 'the Act'). Learned Munsiff rejected the application as per the Impugned order. Hence the said defendant has filed this revision. 2. Parties to the suit are the children of one Kunhamma who died in 1990, Plaintiff is one of the daughters of the said Kunhamma. She contended that Kunhamma obtained the suit property on Kuzhikanam lease and had effected improvements and put up a building thereon and that as per suo motu proceedings initiated by the Land Tribunal, Kanhangad, a certificate of purchase was granted to Kunhamma on 20-12-1976 and that till her death in 1990 she continued to be in possession of the property as per the certificate. In the written statement filed by the petitioner, it was contended that the lease was granted to him in the year 1960 (Petitioner's age then would have been 15 or 16 if the present age shown in the plaint is correct) and that it was he who cultivated the land and put up the house building. He further contended that the certificate of purchase relied on by the plaintiff was obtained by fraud behind his back. 3. Learned Munsiff was not inclined to refer the question (whether petitioner got independent tenancy right) to the Land Tribunal on the premise that the dispute between the patties in one of tile and hence is not liable to be referred under S.125(3) of the Act. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the question raised by the petitioner is a question which could only be decided by the Land Tribunal particularly in the light of the larger bench decision of this court in Kesav Bhat v. Subraya Bhat ( 1979 KLT 766 ). Counsel relied on the observations contained in another decision by k Division Bench in Balakrishnan Nair v. Radha Amma (1981 (1) KLT 195). In that case one of the defendants raised a contention that tenancy right was granted to him personally and not to the thavazhi. Counsel relied on the observations contained in another decision by k Division Bench in Balakrishnan Nair v. Radha Amma (1981 (1) KLT 195). In that case one of the defendants raised a contention that tenancy right was granted to him personally and not to the thavazhi. The Division Bench observed that "this is a question which arises for consideration in this case and the question is, who is the tenant of the items ......... whether the tenant is the second defendant personally or thavazhi/tharwad; therefore, there can be no doubt that the dispute is a matter which attracts the application of S.125(3) of the Act". 5. The factual position in this is different. Petitioner claims tenancy right under the same person whose right, title and interest have been assigned to his mother. Kunhamma in the suo motu proceedings of the land tribunal by granting the certificate of purchase. Under S.72(K)(2) of the Act "the certificate of purchase issued under sub-s.(1) shall be conclusive proof of the assignment to the tenant of the right, title and interest of the landlord and intermediaries. If any" over the land concerned. Under S.4 of the Evidence Act, when a fact is declared to be conclusive proof of another the court shall regard the other as proved and the court shall not allow evidence to be given to disprove the same. As held by this court in Lakshmi Bai v. Taluk Land Board ( 1986 KLT 332 ) (by Dr. Kochu Thommen, J. as he then was) "evidentiary value of a certificate of purchase cannot be disregarded except where it was inaccurate or obtained by fraud". 6. Here the petitioner does not dispute that the certificate of purchases relied on by the plaintiff was issued by the Land Tribunal. When he attacks the certificate as vitiated by fraud, the burden is on him to establish that fact. Until he succeeds in establishing it the probative value of the certificate of purchase would remain strong and its conclusiveness stable. Civil court has undoubtedly jurisdictions to consider whether the certificate of purchase was obtained by fraud, in the event of petitioner succeeding to establish that certificate of purchase was obtained by fraud the suit is liable to be dismissed without going to the further contention of the petitioner that he got tenancy right over the property. Civil court has undoubtedly jurisdictions to consider whether the certificate of purchase was obtained by fraud, in the event of petitioner succeeding to establish that certificate of purchase was obtained by fraud the suit is liable to be dismissed without going to the further contention of the petitioner that he got tenancy right over the property. Hence the question of tenancy claimed by the petitioner does not really arise in this suit. 7. At a time when the functioning of Land Tribunals is in dormant stage without adequate suo infrastructure provided, Courts should consider whether a reference to the Land Tribunal is inevitable on the facts. Only if reference is found to be indispensable that the court need to resort to that course. Very often such reference, in these days (as the experience shows) amounts to consignment of suit records to cold storage, if not to unreclaimable range. Unfortunately the system of reference under S.12(3) of the Act has now become a haven for contumacious litigants and indulgers in dilatory tactics. Many a times the High Court has sounded to the Government to consider the desirability of retaining the system further. I do not see any reason to interfere with the order of the learned munsiff who has adopted the correct and practical angle in this matter. Hence, I dismiss this Civil Revision Petition.