Judgment :- 1. The challenge in these actions, by one R.M. Salam, stated to be a social worker and Joint Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Congress Committee (I) is relatable to the Constitutional vires and validity of the two Bills, namely, the Madras University and the Annamalai University Bill, 1994 (Legislative Assembly Bill No. 4 of 1994) and the Tamil Nadu Universities Bill, 1994 (Legislative Assembly Bill No. 5 of 1994), to amend and consolidate the laws relating to Madras, Annamalai and certain other Universities in the State of Tamil Nadu and for matters, connected therewith and incidental thereto, recently passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, replacing the Governor by the Chief Minister, as Chancellor of all the Universities in the State and more particularly, Cls. 1O (1) and 24(1) of both the Bills and Cle. 2(11) of the earlier Bill. 2. The emergence of such a challenge is founded on manifold grounds thus: (1) After the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, ‘education’ had been brought under Concurrent List (Entry 25 of List III of the Seventh Schedule) and the State had no competence to pass legislation, pertaining to Universities and Institutes of/Higher Education, in including technical education, medical education and Universities. (2) Non-compliance of obtaining proper instructions or permission or sanction from the President of India, for the introduction of the Bills in the Assembly, as per Art. 213 of the Constitution renders the Bills invalid. (3) The Bills would destroy the vital link between the Centre and the State maintained by the institution of the Governor. (4) The Bills would destroy the autonomy of the Universities and jeopardise independent educational system, free from political influence. (5) The Bills would suffer from serious vice or infirmity, as they do not provide for a situation, when the State comes under the Presidents rule, when there would be no Chief Minister and in such an eventuality, there would be a vacuum and all the Universities would have to function, without a Chancellor. (6) The Bills suffer from the vice of excessive delegation, by conferment of Legislative power on the Syndicate-an executive body, to make Statutes and amend or repeal the same. (7) Cl. 2(11) of the Legislative Assembly Bill No. 4 of 1994, defining ‘Founder’, in relation to Annamalai University, to mean only male descendants, excluding female descendants, regarding the post of Pro-Chancellorship, is discriminatory, as violative of Arts. (7) Cl. 2(11) of the Legislative Assembly Bill No. 4 of 1994, defining ‘Founder’, in relation to Annamalai University, to mean only male descendants, excluding female descendants, regarding the post of Pro-Chancellorship, is discriminatory, as violative of Arts. 15(1) and 16(1) of the Constitution, besides being a Legislative judgment amounting to a Bill of Attainder, and hence unconstitutional as violative of rule of law. (8) The invalidity is writ large, on the face of the Bills, in as much as the provisions therein relating to the constitution and composition of authorities in the Universities are totally at variance with their Objects and Reasons. 3. The parties as impleaded in these actions are Government of Tamil Nadu represented by its Secretary, Education Department, Fort St. George, Madras-600009 (first respondent); and the Secretary to the Governor, Raj Bhavan, Guindy, Madras-600032 (second respondent), besides Secretary to the President, President of India, Rashtrapathi Bhavan, New Delhi-110001 (third respondent). 4. The petitioner also filed WMP Nos. 1113 and 1114 of 1994 seeking interim directions to respondents 2 and 3, not to give assent to those Bills, pending disposal of these actions, on the ground that the assent, if given, would result in opening floodgates of political interference, in the governance of the Universities, resulting in irreparable damage to the higher education system in the State. 5. When these Writ Petitions, along with WMPs, came up for admission, Dr. K.P. Krishna Shetty, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, would resort to make his submissions, in a flamboyant style, on the merits of the contentions taken in the respective affidavits filed in support of the Writ Petitions, in an elaborate fashion and the Court, in such a situation, intervened and said that it was rather premature to revel in such submission and what is required now is to demonstrate about the maintainability of these actions on the following points: (1) When Legislative process commenced, by the introduction and passing of the Bills in question is yet to get terminated with the assent of the Governor or the President, as the case may be, those Bills cannot at all be consider to be ‘Laws’ as per Art. 13(3)(a) of the Constitution. (2) Giving of assent or no assent or sending of the Bills for reconsideration by the Assembly or reservation for consideration of the President is a power inhering in favour of the Governor (Arts. (2) Giving of assent or no assent or sending of the Bills for reconsideration by the Assembly or reservation for consideration of the President is a power inhering in favour of the Governor (Arts. 200) and for any act done or purporting to be done in the exercise and performance of such a power, either by the Governor or the President, as the case may be, either of them, shall not be answerable to any Court (Art. 361) and in such an eventuality, the prayer for issuance of an interim direction sought for against respondents 2 and 3, who are, after all, members of the Staff of the Secretariat attached to the Governor or the President, as the case may be, not to give assent to the Bills in question is nothing but one camouflaged in such a way that what could not be done directly, is required to be done in an indirect way, which is not legally permissible, in the sense of affording of such relief would come within the interdict or inhibition of the salutary provisions of Art. 361. 6. For solving the tangle on maintainability, this Court sought the assistance of Mr. P. Shanmugham, learned Special Government Pleader (Education). 7. Dr. K.P. Krishna Shetty, learned Counsel, took the position that the declared will of the Legislative Assembly got reflected by the passing of the same and once such a process got fructified, those Bills attain the status of ‘law’, rendering their Constitutional Vires challengeable, in a bid to prevent incalculable harm or damage likely to be caused or perpetrated upon the members of the society, going by the adage ‘prevention is better than cure’. 8. This apart, he would further submit that the immunity provided under Article 361 of the Constitution is not available to respondents 2 and 3. 9. Mr. P. Shanmugham, learned Special Government Pleader (Education) would submit that a Bill, pending assent, is in the legislative process of becoming law and the question of its voidness could arise only in relation to a ‘law’ and not to a ‘Bill’ that the sovereignty of the Legislature vouchsafed under Arts. 9. Mr. P. Shanmugham, learned Special Government Pleader (Education) would submit that a Bill, pending assent, is in the legislative process of becoming law and the question of its voidness could arise only in relation to a ‘law’ and not to a ‘Bill’ that the sovereignty of the Legislature vouchsafed under Arts. 194, 208 and 212 of the Constitution, not to speak of the general scheme and structure of our Constitution, is a potent factor and a decisive answer against an attempt to persuade this Court to in terfere with the proceedings of the Legislature, in the formative stages of an enactment and that the issuance of a direction sought for, not to give assent to the Bills in question, as against respondents 2 and 3, cannot at all be said to avoid the inhibition of Art. 361 of the Constitution. 10. The submissions, as above, may now fall for consideration in the arena of discussion, in the light of the relevant Constitutional provisions, as interpreted by the superior Courts of this Country — Apex Court and other High Courts of Judicature. 11. The Supreme Court in the case of In re Special Courts Bill, 1978 ( AIR 1979 S.C. 478 ), in the process of considering the scheme of the Constitution, expressed thus: “Our federal or quasi-federal Constitution provides by a copious written instrument for the setting up of a Judiciary at the Union and State levels. Art. 124, which occurs in Chapter IV of the Constitution called “The Union Judiciary”, provides for the establishment of the Supreme Court of India. Its powers and functions are defined in Art. 32(2), Art. 129, Articles 131 to 140 and in Art. 143 of the Constitution. Likewise, Article 214 provides, subject to Art. 231, for the establishment of a High Court for each State. Article 226 confers powers on the High Courts to issue certain writs while Art. 227 confers upon them the power of superintendence over all courts subordinate to their appellate jurisdiction. Those provisions show that the power of reviewing the constitutional validity of legislations is vested in the Supreme Court and the High Courts and in no other body. The British Parliament, being supreme, no question can arise in England as regards the validity of laws passed by it. Those provisions show that the power of reviewing the constitutional validity of legislations is vested in the Supreme Court and the High Courts and in no other body. The British Parliament, being supreme, no question can arise in England as regards the validity of laws passed by it. The position under our Constitution is fundamentally different because, the validity of laws passed by the Indian Legislatures has to be tested having regard to the scheme of distribution of legislative powers and on the anvil of other constitutional limitations like those contained in Art. 13 of our Constitution. The right of the Indian Judiciary to pronounce a legislation void if it conflicts with the Constitution is not merely a tacit assumption but is an express avowal of our Constitution. The principle is firmly and wisely in our Constitution that the policy of law and the expediency of passing it are matters for the Legislature to decide while, interpretation of laws and questions regarding their validity fall within the exclusive advisory or adjudicatory functions of Courts.” 12. It is thus clear that the right to Indian Judiciary to pronounce a Legislation void is with the Supreme Court and the High Courts. The moot question, however, that arises for consideration, is as to whether a ‘Bill’, which is yet to receive the assent of the Governor or the President, as the case may be, can be challenged on the ground of it being unconstitutional in a High Court, under Art. 226 of the Constitution, that is to say, in other words, whether a ‘Bill’ is a ‘Legislation’ within the meaning of the provisions of the Constitution. 13. The answer to such a question is provided for in the judgment of the Apex Court (by Untwalia, J.) in the case of the Special Courts Bill, 1978 (Supra), wherein, it was held as follows: “But if, in some, it becomes expedient to do so, as in my opinion in the instant one it was so, I think, it saves a lot of public time and money to remove any technical lacuna from the Bill if the Government thinks that it can agree to do so. Of course, the Bill by itself is not a law. It would be a law when passed by the Parliament. Of course, the Bill by itself is not a law. It would be a law when passed by the Parliament. But even at the stage of the Bill when opinion of this Court is asked for, it seems to me quite appropriate in a given case to make some suggestions and then to answer the Reference on the footing of acceptance by the Government of such of the suggestions as have been accepted.” 14. Patent thus it is that but for Art. 143 of the Constitution, even the Apex Court could not have considered the question as to whether a ‘Bill’, which is yet to become an ‘Act’, satisfied the requirement of the Constitution or would otherwise be constitutionally valid or not. 15. The Supreme Court further in Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1983 S.C. 1019 ), after taking into consideration the effect of Arts. 199, 200 and 201 of the Constitution, said in paragraphs 88 and 89 thus; “Paragraph 88 :— The constitutional position of a Governor is clearly defined. The Governor is made a component part of the Legislature of a State under Art. 168 because every Bill passed by the State Legislature has to be reserved for the assent of the Governor under Art. 200. Under that Article, the Governor can adopt one of the three courses, namely,: (1) he may give his assent to it, in which case the Bill becomes a law; or (2) He may, except in the case of a ‘Money Bill’, withhold his assent therefrom, in which case the Bill falls through, unless the procedure indicated in the first Proviso is followed i.e., return the Bill to the Assembly for consideration with a message; or (3) He may ‘on the advice of the Council of Minister’ reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President, in which case the President will adopt the procedure laid down in Art. 201. The first Proviso to Art. 200 deals with a situation where the Governor is bound to give his assent and the Bill is reconsidered and passed by the Assembly. The second Proviso to that Article makes the reservation for the consideration of the President obligatory where the Bill would, ‘if it becomes law, derogate from the powers of the High Court’. The second Proviso to that Article makes the reservation for the consideration of the President obligatory where the Bill would, ‘if it becomes law, derogate from the powers of the High Court’. Under Art. 201, when a Bill is reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President, the President can adopt two courses, namely, (1) He may give his assent to it, in which case again the Bill becomes a law; or (2) He may, except where the Bill is not a ‘Money-Bill’, direct the Governor to return t he bill to the Houses of the Legislature of the State, together with such message as is mentioned in the first Proviso to Art. 200. When a Bill is so reserved by the President, the House or Houses shall reconsider it accordingly within a period of six months from the date of receipt of such message and if it is again passed by the House or Houses with or without amendment, it shall be presented again to the President for his consideration. Thus, it is clear that a Bill passed by the State Assembly may become law if the Governor gives his assent to it or having been reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President, it is assented to by the President. Paragraph 89 :— There is no provision in the Constitution which lays down that a Bill which has been assented to by the President would be ineffective as an Act if there was no compelling necessity for the Governor to reserve it for the assent of the President. A Bill which attracts Art. 254 (2) or Art. 304(b) where it is introduced or moved in the Legislative Assembly of a State without the previous sanction of the President or which attracted Art. 31(3) as it was then in force, or falling under the second Proviso t o Art. 200 has necessarily to be reserved for the consideration of the President. There may also be a Bill passed by the State Legislature where there may be a genuine doubt about the applicability of any of the provisions of the Constitution which require the assent of the President to be given to it in order that it may be effective as an Act. There may also be a Bill passed by the State Legislature where there may be a genuine doubt about the applicability of any of the provisions of the Constitution which require the assent of the President to be given to it in order that it may be effective as an Act. In such a case, it is for the Governor to exercise his discretion and to decide whether he should assent to the Bill or should reserve it for consideration of the President to avoid any future complication. Even if it ultimately turns out that there was no necessity for the Governor to have reserved a Bill for the consideration of the President, still he having done so and obtained the assent of the President, the Act so passed cannot be held to be unconstitutional on the ground of want of proper assent, is not open to scrutiny by the Courts. In the instant case, Financial Bill which ultimately became the Act in question was a consolidating Act relating to different subjects and perhaps the Governor felt that it was necessary to reserve it for the assent of the President. We have no hesitation in holding that the assent of the President is not justiciable, and we cannot spell out any infirmity arising out of his decision to give such assent. 16. Evidently therefore, even the question as to whether Governor should give his assent to the Bills in question or not or to take recourse to one or the other procedures laid down under Art. 200 of the Constitution is beyond the judicial review/of this Court. 17. An useful reference, in this connection, may now be made to the case of Indra Kumar v. State of Bihar (AIR 1988 Patna 309), which is exactly on all fours with the present one on hand. (a) In that case, the Bill known as ‘Criminal Procedure (Bihar Amendment) Bill, 1982 was introduced in Bihar Legislative Assembly on 27-7-1982, which was passed on the same day and transmitted to the Bihar Legislative Council. The said Bill was also passed by the Bihar Legislative Council on 30th July, 1982. (b) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to criminal procedure. The said Bill was also passed by the Bihar Legislative Council on 30th July, 1982. (b) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to criminal procedure. Criminal Procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure at the commencement of the Constitution finds place in Item No. 2 of List III (Concurrent List) of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. Evidently, therefore, the State Legislature has the requisite power to make law amending the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, subject to the other provisions of the Constitution. (c) After the passing of the said Bill and before the assent of the Governor is obtained, the petitioner therein questioned the Constitutional vires of the said Bill contending that its provisions are contrary to the salient and salutary provisions adumbrated under Art. 37 (Embargo put on the State Legislature to make law, contrary to the provisions contained in Part IV of the Constitution): Art. 50 (Separation of Judiciary from the Executive) and Art. 51-A (Fundamental duties such as to cherish and follow the/noble ideals which inspired National Struggle for Freedom etc.,) and consequently, the same is beyond the Legislative Competence of the State Legislature. (d) S.B. Sinha, J., of Patna High Court, after placing implicit reliance, upon the decisions of the Supreme Court, namely (1) In Re The Special Courts Bill , 1978 and Horchst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. , v. State of Bihar (supra), ultimately upheld the contention that the power under Art. 226 of the Constitution cannot at all be invoked to decide the vires or validity of a Bill, which is yet to become an Act and consequently, dismissed the Writ Petition, by observing in paragraph 12 thus: “Taking into consideration all these aspects of the matter, I am of the view that this court has no jurisdiction to declare a ‘Bill’ which is yet to be received the assent of the Governor as ultra vires and unconstitutional in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Art. 226 of the Constitution as ‘bill’ is not law.” 18. Pertinent it is to mention here, that the proposition that the legislative process is a continuous one, beginning with the introduction of a Bill in a House of Legislature and ending with the submission to the Governor of the Bill passed by both the Houses of the Legislature and the Governor giving his assent to it and the writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 cannot at all be resorted to, to interfere with the proceedings of the Legislature in the formative stages of enactment had been laid down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the process of consideration of Arts. 194, 208 and 212 of the Constitution, in the case of Ramachandra Rao v. The Andhra Pradesh Regional Committee (AIR 1965 Andhra Pradesh 306). I respectfully agree with such a view unreservedly and without any hesitation what ever. 19. Clause (1) of Art. 361 of the Constitution prescribes. “The President or the Governor or Rajpramukh of a State, shall not be answerable to any court for the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of his office or for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance of those powers and duties. 20. This Clause Art. 361(1) means that no Court can compel the President or the Governor to exercise any power or to perform any duty; nor can a Court compel him to forbear from exercising his power or perform his duties. He is, therefore, not amenable to the writs or directions issued by any Court. Giving of assent to the Bills in question by the Governor or by the President, in case those Bills are reserved for consideration, is a Constitutional function and in the exercise of such a function, no writ or direction is capable of being issued by any Court. Such being the position, I am at a loss to understand as to how a direction, as is now sought for, namely, ‘not to give assent to the Bills in question’ as against respondents 2 and 3, who, as already referred to, are after all the members of the staff of the Secretariat attached to the Governor or the President, as the case may be, may be issued. They, if at all, may have the power to communicate the decision of the Governor or the President, as the c ase may be, on the question of assent and nothing more, in accordance with the directions, if any, issued to them. The prayer for issuance of any such direction, as I have already indicated, is nothing but one camouflaged in such a way that what could not be done directly is sought to be done in an indirect way, which is not legally permissible, in the sense of affording of such a relief would come within the inhibition of the sanguine and salutary provisions of Art. 361 of the Constitution. 21. Of the eight grounds raised in the respective affidavits, filed in support of the Writ Petitions, which had been catalogued as above, Ground No. 2 revolving on the question of non-compliance of obtaining of prior instructions or permission or sanction from the President of India for the introduction of the Bills in question in the Legislative/Assembly may appear to fringe on the question of maintainability and therefore the same deserves consideration. 22. The two Bills in question are admittedly relatable to a subject matter in the Concurrent List (List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution). The sweep and amplitude of this ground is so wide that any Bill relatable to a subject matter, included in such a Concurrent List must have to be introduced in the Legislative Assembly or Council, as the case maybe, with the prior sanction or approval of the President of India or otherwise such introduction is not legitimately permissible. To such a submission, I am unable to affix my seal of approval, in as much as Dr. K.P. Krishna Shetty, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in these actions was unable to refer to any provisions in the Constitution, except Art. 213 (Power of the Governor to promulgate Ordinances during the recess of the Legislature), which, on a cursory reading, even without any elaboration further, would point out that the said Article does not at all govern the situation. “213.(1) If at any time, exception when the Legislative Assembly of a State is in session, or where there is a Legislative Council in a State, except when both Houses of Legislature are in session, the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require: Provided that the Governor shall not withdraw without instructions from the President, promulgate any such Ordinance if— (a) a Bill containing the same provisions would under this Constitution have required the previous sanction of the President for the introduction thereof into the Legislature: or (b) he would have deemed it necessary to reserve a Bill containing the same provisions for the consideration of the President; or (c) an Act of the Legislature of the State containing the same provision would under this Constitution have been invalid unless, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, it had received the assent of the President.” 23. I may point out, at this juncture, that the sole and lone provision requiring previous sanction of the President for introducing or bringing in Billing the Legislature of a State is traceable to Art. 304(b) of the Constitution, which reads as under: “304. Notwithstanding anything in Art. 301 or Art. 303, the Legislature of a State by law — (a) .. .. .. (b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest: Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purpose of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President.” 24. Thus, there are three conditions, which must be satisfied in passing an Act under Art. 304 (b) (1) Previous sanction of the President must be obtained; (2) The Legislation must be in public interest; and (3) It must impose restrictions, which are reasonable. 25. It is not as if the defect of not obtaining the previous sanction of the President, in such cases, is not curable and the sordid fact, however, is that such a defect gets cured, if the assent of the President to the Act, has been obtained, after it had been enacted by virtue of the provisions of Article 255, which reads as under: “255. No Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State, and no provision in any such Act, shall be invalid by reason only that some recommendation or previous sanction required by this Constitution was not given, if assent in that Act was given. (a) where the recommendation required was that of the Governor, either by the Governor or by the President: (b) where the recommendation required was that of the Rajpramukh, either by the Rajpramukh or by the President; (c) where the recommendation of previous sanction required was that of the President, by the President.” If any authority is needed for the proposition, as above, the decision of the Apex Court in the case of A.B. Abdul Kader v. State of Kerala ( AIR 1976 S.C. 1182 ) may be usefully referred to. 26. As the other grounds delved on the merits of the issue, they need not at all be considered at this preliminary stage and are therefore, left out of consideration. 27. Before parting with the case, I wish to place on record a word of appreciation as to the able assistance rendered by Mr. P. Shamugham, learned Special Government Pleader (Education). 28. For the reasons as above, both these Writ Petitions deserve to be dismissed, even at the admission stage and accordingly, they are dismissed. Consequently, both WMPs are also dismissed.