JUDGMENT 1. Third defendant is the appellant. Plaintiff (first respondent) filed the suit for realisation of money from defendants 1 to 3. Loan of Rs. 15,000 was availed by John Manjooran, the principal debtor, he having executed Ext. A-1 promissory note dated 23rd September 1981. John. Manjooran died on 23rd January 1984. First, defendant voluntarily undertook responsibility to repay the loan amount to the plaintiff-bank. This is evidenced by Ext. A-4 dated 13th April 1985. Ext. A-2 bearing the same date as Ext. A-l is the letter of guarantees given by defendants 2 and 3 to the plaintiff. Plaintiff-bank filed the suit against defendants 1 to 3 asserting that they are liable to pay the amount due to it. 2. Third defendant filed written statement contending that the suit is barred by limitation, that 1 he suit against sureties alone is not maintainable as legal representatives of John Manjooran were not impleaded and that in view of Ext. A-4 executed by the first defendant he (the surety) can no longer be held liable. 3. Though Ext. A-1. promissory note was executed on 23rd September 1981, it cannot be held that the suit is barred by limitation as there is evidence of part payment of the money due to the plaintiff-bank by the principal debtor. Last payment by the principal debtor was on 19th January 1984. Principal debtor had confirmed the debit balance confirmation letter (Ext. A-3) on 11th January 1983. It shows that the outstanding balance amount due to the plaintiff was Rs. 13,762.85. As the suit was filed on 5th November 1986, it cannot be said that it is barred by limitation. 4. Next contention of the appellant is that as the legal representatives of the deceased principal debtor were not impleaded the sureties cannot be saddled with the responsibility of the payment of the amount to the bank. Counsel relied on Nur Din v. Allah Ditta AIR 1928 Lahore 246 for the above proposition. In the above decision while interpreting S.134 of the Contract Act it is held that where the principal debtor is discharged due to failure to bring his representatives on record the surety for the debtor is also discharged. Learned counsel for the plaintiff (1st respondent) submitted that the principal debtor died as a bachelor and as he left no estate the above contention is not tenable. 5. Learned counsel for the plaintiff (1st respondent) submitted that the principal debtor died as a bachelor and as he left no estate the above contention is not tenable. 5. Failure to implead the legal representatives of the principal debtor cannot be taken as a ground to dismiss the suit filed against the sureties in a case where the former has not left any estate. S.2(ii) of the C.P.C. defines legal representative as a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate - devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. As the appellant has no case that the principal debtor died leaving any estate, his contention that the suit is not maintainable as the principal debtor's legal representatives were not impleaded is untenable. As the surety's liability is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor they cannot be absolved of their liability merely on the ground that the principal debtor's legal representatives were not impleaded in the suit. The position would be different if the deceased principal debtor left no estate and his legal representatives were not Impleaded in the suit and only against the sureties action is pursued. In a case where the creditor failed to bring the legal representatives of the principal debtor on record, the consequence of the omission is that the creditor would-be left without any remedy against them. The resultant position is that they stand discharged. In that case, it can certainly be held that on account of the omission of the creditor the legal consequence is the discharge of the principal debtor. If that be so, die surety also stands discharged. S.134 of the Contract Act makes the position clear. So far as the case in hand is concerned, as Manjooran, the principal debtor did not leave any assets on his death, failure to bring on record his legal representatives in the suit cannot be held sufficient to discharge the sureties. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that in view of the plaintiff obtaining Ext. So far as the case in hand is concerned, as Manjooran, the principal debtor did not leave any assets on his death, failure to bring on record his legal representatives in the suit cannot be held sufficient to discharge the sureties. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that in view of the plaintiff obtaining Ext. A-4 from the first defendant and as she undertook the liability to pay the amount due to the plaintiff the sureties cannot be held liable as provided under S.134 of the Contract Act. In para 5 of the plaint it is stated that the first defendant approached the plaintiff and undertook the liability of paying the loan amount of the principal debtor by March 1986 and a fresh promissory note was executed on 13th April 1985 for Rs. 13,961-75 which was the outstanding amount due from the principal debtor. Appellant maintained that in view of Ext. A-4 and the positive averments in the plaint that the 1st respondent (first defendant) had undertaken the liability to discharge Manjooran's debt, the sureties can no longer be held liable for the same. 7. S.134 of the Contract Act stipulates that surety is discharged by any contract between the creditor and the principal debtor by which the principal debtor is released, or by any act or omission of the creditor, the legal consequence of which is the discharge of the principal debtor. Defence contention is that plaintiff having obtained Ext. A-4 from the first defendant who had undertaken to discharge the liability of the principal debtor is amounts to a specific act on the part of the plaintiff and as the legal consequence of it would tantamount to the discharge of the principal debtor S.134 is attracted. In view of Ext. A-4 whereby first defendant had undertaken the liability of the principal debtor to discharge the debt, the sureties can no longer be held liable for the debt. In view of Ext. A-4 whereby first defendant had undertaken the liability of the principal debtor to discharge the debt, the sureties can no longer be held liable for the debt. In Lakshminarasayya v. Venkatakrishnyya AIR 1922 Madras 119 a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held: "Where a surety executed a subsequent note in discharge of the first note, the principal debtor is discharged, and under S.134 of the Contract Act, the co-sureties are also discharged from liability , The debt under the subsequent promissory note is quite a new transaction and a co-surety who is ignorant of it, cannot be made liable without his consent to make contribution." . Canara Bank v. Gokuldas Shenoy 1989 (1) KLT 281 relied on by plaintiff's counsel has no application to the facts of the case in hand. 8. The sureties had no role to play in the execution of Ext. A-4. As Ext. A-4 promissory note takes in the outstanding amount due from John Manjooran the principal debtor and as it creates liability on the first defendant it has to be held that by this action the sureties (defendants 2 and 3) are discharged as envisaged under S.134. As the debt due to the plaintiff can be realised from the 1st defendant as per Ext. A-4 there is no need to proceed against the sureties. Contention of the plaintiff that Ext. A-4 is intended only as additional security and that it cannot have the effect of discharging . the sureties is without merit. In view of Ext. A-4 and positive averments in para 5 of the plaint it is apparent that the plaintiff has accepted the undertaking of the Ist defendant to pay the debt of principal debtor. Acceptance of a new debtor instead of the old one has extinguished the liabilities of the sureties for the old debt. In that view of the matter there cannot be a decree against the sureties (defendants 2 and 3). 9. For the foregoing reasons the judgment and decree of the first appellate court confirming that of the Trial Court are set aside in so far as the sureties (defendants 2 and 3) are concerned. Decree against the 1st defendant stands confirmed. Second appeal stands allowed as stated above with no order as to costs.