Research › Browse › Judgment

Orissa High Court · body

1994 DIGILAW 122 (ORI)

PUSPA RANJAN PATEL v. STATE OF ORISSA

1994-05-03

G.T.NANAVATI, K.L.ISSRANI

body1994
JUDGMENT : G.T. Nanavati, C.J. - In view of the contrary decisions of this Court on the question as to whether the Orissa Kerosene Control Order, 1962 applies to a consumer or not, the learned single Judge hearing this criminal revision application thought it proper to refer the following question to a larger Bench ; "Whether the Orissa Kerosene Control Order, 1962 applies to a consumer or not ?" 2. On 25-1-1988, the accused-petitioner was found carrying kerosene oil measuring 35 litres in two tins. He was prosecuted on the ground that he did not possess any licence, as required by the Orissa Kerosene Control Order, 1962 read with the Government Notification bearing S.R.O. No. 264/82 dated 18-4-1982 issued in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause 8 of the Control Order. The learned Special Judge convicted the accused u/s 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. 3. Before the learned single Judge, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner relied upon the decision of this Court in Radheshyam Pradhan v. State ( 1993)6 OCR 309 and contended that a consumer is not covered by the Kerosena Control Order and, therefore, the notification made under Clause 8 of that Control Order obviously cannot cover a consumer. He submitted that if the said notification issued under Clause 8 is interpreted to cover a consumer also, then that part of the notification will have to be regarded as bad as going beyond the scope of the main Control Order. In the case of Radheshyam, this Court has held that the Control Order regulates or controls business in kerosene and, therefore, it covers only those dealers in kerosene who are specified in the said order. This Court also held that there is no provision in the Control Order for any permission, certificate or licence for a person other than a dealer. In the term 'storage, distribution and 'sale' used in Clause 8(b), storage and distribution are to be read ejusdiem generis to have connection with sale and will have to be applicable to dealers. The word 'storage' cannot be read bereft of context of the entire scheme of the Control Order. 4. In the term 'storage, distribution and 'sale' used in Clause 8(b), storage and distribution are to be read ejusdiem generis to have connection with sale and will have to be applicable to dealers. The word 'storage' cannot be read bereft of context of the entire scheme of the Control Order. 4. On the other hand, the learned Government Advocate, relying upon the decision of this Court in Pravash Chandra Bachar v. State [(1992) 5 OCR 158], contended that the Control Order specifically fixes the maximum retention limit either for storage or for possession of kerosene in quantity exceeding ten litres at a time. A regulation fixing the maximum retention limit even by an individual is a necessary concomitant of the Power of regulation for storage in the context of the provisions of the Act and the Control Order. Hence the Control Order includes within its purview a consumer also. 5. That we have to decide is which of the two views is correct. Clause 3 of the Control Order prohibits carrying on business as a whole- sale or a sub-wholesale dealer except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence to be granted under Control Order. Clause 7 prohibits carrying on business of kerosene as a retail dealer unless such a dealer obtains a certificate from the competent registering authority. Clause 8, which is material for our purpose reads as follows ; "8. The licensing authorities shall have the power by order notified in the Gazette in respect of their respective jurisdictions- (a) to fix the price of rate at which kerosene may be sold by dealers; and (b) to regulate the storage, distribution and sale of kerosene : Provided that where the licensing authrity is the Collector no such order shall be made without the previous consent of the State Government." Clause 8 opens with the words, "the licensing authorities shall have the power". From the aforesaid provision, it becomes clear that what is controlled or regulated by the Control Order is doing business in kerosene either as a wholesale or sub-wholesale dealer or a retail dealer. It is in respect of such persons or dealers that Clause 8 of the Control Order permits the licensing authorities to fix the price of rate at which kerosene may be sold by dealers and to regulate the storage, distribution and sale of kerosene. It is in respect of such persons or dealers that Clause 8 of the Control Order permits the licensing authorities to fix the price of rate at which kerosene may be sold by dealers and to regulate the storage, distribution and sale of kerosene. Thus, the word 'storage' used in Sub-clause(b) of Clause 8 will have to be interpreted to mean storage by a dealer who is required to obtain a license or certificate and not by others who are under no obligation to obtain either a license or a certificate in that behalf. Obviously, a consumer cannot be said to be doing business in kerosene and, therefore, storage by a consumer does not require any licence, So, the word 'person' used in the notification issued under Clause 8 cannot be interpreted to mean "any person" but it will have to be interpreted to mean that person who does business in kerosene and who would thus be covered by the provisions of the Control Order. The word 'person' as used in the said notification cannot be interpreted to mean or cover a consumer also. If it is interpreted otherwise, the said notification will have to be regarded as bad and offending the Control Order as going beyond the scope of the Control Order and, therefore, without any authority of law. In our opinion, the view taken by our learned brother S. C. Mohapatra, J. in the case of Radheshyam is quite correct and the contrary view taken by our learned brother L. Rath, J. is not correct. 6. We, therefore, answer the question by stating that the Orissa Kerosene Control Order, 1962 does not apply to a consumer. We, however, make it clear that a person who poses to be a consumer but is really found to be doing business in kerosene would be covered by the Contol Order, and that would depend upon the facts of each case. The matter will now go back to the learned single Judge for disposal of the revision application on its own merits. K.L. Issrani, J. I agree.