Research › Browse › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

1994 DIGILAW 123 (GUJ)

MADAN MOHANLALJI NI HAVELI v. STATE

1994-04-13

A.P.RAVANI, N.N.MATHUR

body1994
RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner challenges the legality and validity of order dated may 14, 1992 passed by Special Land Acquisition Officer (Gujarat Housing Board), ahmedabad under Sec. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. By this order, it has been directed that the amount of compensation payable to the owner of the land pursuant to award dated February 19, 1991, in respect of land bearing Survey No. 292 of junagadh being Final Plot Nos. 4/1, 4/2 and 4/3 be deposited with the District court, Junagadh. The said order is passed mainly on account of the dispute as to who is the Trustee of the Trust named Shri Madan Mohanlalji ni Haveli alias Moti haveli Trust, Junagadh. In the cause title, the petitioner is described as follows :"shri Madan Mohanlalji ni Haveli, alias Moti Haveli Trust, Junagadh bearing registration No. 1614-A, Junagadh. Through : Acting Sole Trustee, Administrator and/or Manager Go. Shri Kishorchandraji purushottamlalji Maharaj, Adult, Hindu, Residing at Junagadh, Moti Haveli. "however, in paragraphs 1 and 2 of memo of petition, it is stated that the petitioner is citizen of India and is entitled to all fundamental rights. It is also stated that petitioner is duly adopted son of deceased Goswami Shri Purushottamlalji Maharaj. In view of this apparent discrepancy the learned Counsel for the petitioner stated that the description given in paragraphs Nos. 1 and 2 of the petition is inaccurate. He further stated that actually, the petitioner is a trust and the petition is filed through Go. Shri Kishorchandraji Purushottamlalji Maharaj. It is also stated that the description given in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the petition is in respect of said Shri kishorchandraji Purushottamlalji Maharaj and not in respect of the petitioner trust. ( 2 ) IT is an undisputed position that the land belonging to the trust has been acquired for the purposes of construction of residential houses by Gujarat Housing board. The acquisition has terminated into award dated February 19, 1991. Pursuant to this award, amount of compensation is required to be paid to the land owners. As stated in the impugned order dated May 14, 1992, there is no certainty as to who were the trustees and to whom the amount of compensation could be paid. The acquisition has terminated into award dated February 19, 1991. Pursuant to this award, amount of compensation is required to be paid to the land owners. As stated in the impugned order dated May 14, 1992, there is no certainty as to who were the trustees and to whom the amount of compensation could be paid. Therefore, the said Land Acquisition Officer passed order dated May 14, 1992 and the amount of compensation payable pursuant to the order has been ordered to be deposited in District Court, Junagadh. It is this order which is under challenge in this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 3 ) IT is also stated at the Bar that this very petitioner has sought reference under Sec. 18 of the Act. It is further stated that a reference has also been made by the appropriate officer under Sec. 18 of the Act to the appropriate Court, that is District Court, Junagadh. ( 4 ) IT is the contention of the petitioner that the reference under Sec. 30 as ordered by the Special Land Acquisition Officer as per has impugned order dated May 14, 1992 is not competent. In our opinion, this question can be raised before the District court, Junagadh, to which Reference is made under Sec. 30. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of mohammed Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1979 SC 404 . In that case the question arose as to whether reference made under Sec. 18 of the Act was valid or not. The validity of the reference was challenged on the ground that the application under Sec. 18 of the Act requesting the Collector to make reference was made beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The application itself was not maintainable before the Collector and, therefore, Collector had no jurisdiction to entertain the application and hence the reference made was not valid. In this connection, the Honble Supreme Court has inter alia observed that the power of the Collector to make a reference under Sec. 18 is circumscribed by the conditions laid down therein, and one condition is the condition regarding limitation to be found in the proviso to the section. In this connection, the Honble Supreme Court has inter alia observed that the power of the Collector to make a reference under Sec. 18 is circumscribed by the conditions laid down therein, and one condition is the condition regarding limitation to be found in the proviso to the section. The Supreme Court further observed that the fulfilment of the conditions, particularly the one regarding limitation, are the conditions, subject to which the power of the Collector to make the reference exists. Therefore, the supreme Court has held that the making of an application for reference within the time prescribed by proviso to Sec. 18 (2) is a sine qua non for a valid reference by the Collector. The Supreme Court further held that the Court functioning under the act being a tribunal of special jurisdiction, it is its duty to see that the reference made to it by the Collector under Sec. 18 complies with the conditions laid down therein so as to give the Court jurisdiction to hear the reference. The Supreme Court further observed that it is the duty of the Court to see that the statutory conditions laid down in Sec. 18 have been complied with, and it is not debarred from satisfying itself that the reference which it is called upon to hear is a valid reference. In para 29 of the decision, the Supreme Court has inter alia, observed as follows :"in deciding the question of jurisdiction in a case of reference under Sec. 18 by the collector to the Court, the Court is certainly not acting as a Court of appeal; it is only discharging the elementary duty of satisfying itself that a reference which it is called upon to decide is a valid and proper reference according to the provisions of the Act under which it is made. That is a basic and preliminary duty which no tribunal can possibly avoid. The Court has, therefore, jurisdiction to decide whether the reference was made beyond the period prescribed by the priviso to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 18 of the Act, and if it finds that it was so made, decline to answer reference". The aforesaid proposition of law has been laid down in relation to provisions of sec. 18 of the Act. However the same would be applicable to the provisions of sec. 30 also. (2) of Sec. 18 of the Act, and if it finds that it was so made, decline to answer reference". The aforesaid proposition of law has been laid down in relation to provisions of sec. 18 of the Act. However the same would be applicable to the provisions of sec. 30 also. Therefore, in our opinion, the contention that the reference is not competent can very well be raised before the District Court, Junagadh, to which the reference has been made by Special Land Acquisition Officer as per his impugned order dated May 14, 1992. If and when such contention is raised before the District court, Junagadh, the District Court shall hear and decide the same on merits in accordance with law. On this short point alone, the petition is required to be rejected. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has filed an application being Civil Application No. 144 of 1994 praying that the applicant be permitted to utilise the fund amount/interest income derived from the investment made with Unit Trust of India and also to meet with the revenue expenditure from the future income that may be derived from the said fund of the trust. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this application be referred to the District court, Junagadh, for deciding the same in accordance with law. In our opinion, it would not be proper to send the very application to the District Court, Junagadh. Instead, it would be proper to observe that if the petitioner files such an application before the District Court, Junagadh, the District Court, Junagadh, shall deal with the same in accordance with law. However, in facts of the case, we may observe and direct that if the petitioner files such application as stated above, on or before april 25, 1994, the District Court, Junagadh, shall hear and decide the same preferably on this side of Summer Vacation. No other contention is raised. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition is rejected. Rule is discharged. .