JUDGMENT A.L. Vaidya, J.—Jagdish Ram respondent filed a suit for declaration to the effect that he and Tirath Ram deceased, proforma defendant, were owners in possession of the suit land as a co-sharers since the time of their fore-fathers. The suit was filed for permanent injunction against Sadhu defendant, since deceased, praying to restrain him perpetually from interfering with the possession of the suit land of the plaintiff and defendant No.2. The plaintiff also sought declaration that the entries in Khasra Girdawari in favour of Sadhu pertaining to the suit land as a tenant under the plaintiff and proforma defendant were wrong. 2. The suit was contested by defendant No.1, late Sadhu Ram, who pleaded that he has been in occupation of the suit land for the last 40 years and he has constructed a shed over the same. It was also pleaded that with the permission of the plaintiff, the defendant has occupied the suit land and was residing thereon. The entries in favour of defendant No.1 describing him as tenant have been alleged to be correct. However, in the alternative the defendant pleaded that he has become owner in possession of the suit land by way of adverse possession. The defendant also took the plea of estoppel. Defendant No.1 amended his written statement and, after amendment, he further pleaded that on the coming into force the Himachal Pradesh Village Common Land (Vesting and Utilization) Act, 1947, (hereinafter to be referred as "the Act") the State Government has become owner of the suit land. Earlier to it, Gram Panchayat Tiuri was its owner. As such, both Gram Panchayat Tiuri and the State of Himachal Pradesh were necessary parties. 3. The trial Court, on the pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues on 24-10-1972 : 1. Whether the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 are the owners in possession of the suit land ? OPP 2. Whether defendant No. I is the tenant of the suit land ? OPD 3. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction ? OPD 4. Relief. The following additional Issues were framed on 12-4-1979 on the basis of the amended written statement : 3-A. Whether the H.P. State is a necessary party, as alleged ? OPD 3-B. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct from bringing the present suit ? OPD 4. OPD 4. Relief. The following additional Issues were framed on 12-4-1979 on the basis of the amended written statement : 3-A. Whether the H.P. State is a necessary party, as alleged ? OPD 3-B. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct from bringing the present suit ? OPD 4. Under Issue No.1 it was decided that the plaintiff and defendant No.2 were owners in possession of the suit land while Issue No.2 was decided in the negative. Issues No.3 and 3-B were decided against the defendant, being not pressed. Under Issue No.3-A it was held that the State of H.P. was not a necessary party. The trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff by granting a declaratory decree that he was in Hissedari possession of the suit land as owner alongwith defendant No.2 and defendant No.1 had no concern with the land in suit. The trial Court further directed defendant No.1 to remove his Jhugi from the suit land within two months failing which the plaintiff shall get it removed at the cost of defendant No. 1. 5. The aforesaid judgment and decree were assailed before the lower appellate Court. The learned District Judge, Hamirpur and Una Districts, after hearing the parties, came to the conclusion that the relief that the plaintiff was owner in possession could not have been granted and was, as such, declined as the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and the Collector was to decide the matter, in accordance with law, in regard to the vesting of the land in the State of H.P. in case the aggrieved party wished to pursue the remedy. The lower appellate Court, however, maintained the decree of the trial Court to the extent that the defendant would remove the Jhugi, within two months from the date of the judgment and decree, and mandatory injunction to that effect was confirmed. 6. The aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court have been assailed in the present appeal on various grounds. 7. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also minutely gone through their pleadings and the entire record. 8. The lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the present suit but inspite of that a decree for mandatory injunction had been granted against defendant No.1. 7. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also minutely gone through their pleadings and the entire record. 8. The lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the present suit but inspite of that a decree for mandatory injunction had been granted against defendant No.1. It is being contended that the decree for mandatory injunction was passed on the basis of the possessory title of the plaintiff and proforma defendant No. 2 which could be so done by the civil court. There is no doubt that such a decree for mandatory injunction could be granted by demolition of the Jhugi in favour of the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 but that has not been the case of the plaintiff, either pleaded or submitted at any time. The plaintiffs simple case had been that he alongwith defendant No.2 was owner in possession of the suit land and he had asked for possession against defendant No.1, on the basis of their title. The lower appellate Court held that the civil court lacked inherent jurisdiction to pass a decree on the basis of the title, prayed for by the plaintiff, and if it was so, the decree for mandatory injunction by way of demolition of the Jhugi could not have been granted by the civil court. 9. It is well established principle of law that objection of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings in case it pertains to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Court trying the suit. This objection of jurisdiction in the present case has not been taken by the defendant in his written statement. It was taken in the lower appellate Court. 10. The present suit is a simple suit for declaration that the plaintiff and proforma defendant No. 2 were owners in possession of the suit land and as a consequential relief permanent injunction had been prayed for against defendant No.1 and in the alternative suit for possession on the basis of title, was based. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Therefore, as per allegations made in the plaint, the initial jurisdiction lies with the civil courts. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Therefore, as per allegations made in the plaint, the initial jurisdiction lies with the civil courts. The suit, as framed, shall be tried by the civil court as there is no law which could expressly of impliedly bar the jurisdiction of the civil court in a suit of the present nature, as pleaded in the plaint. 11. The objection of jurisdiction can be raised by the opposite party that is, the defendant. In the present case the defendant has not raised the objection of civil courts jurisdiction. The preliminary objection, taken in the written statement by defendant No. 1, had been that property in dispute had been vested in Gram Panchayat Tiuri and, now under the Act, the State of Himachal Pradesh has become owner of this property. It was further pleaded that, therefore, the Gram Panchayat Tiuri and the State of Himachal Pradesh were necessary parties and the suit cannot proceed without impleading them. Thus, the objection pertained to the plea that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties but nowhere the objection in regard to jurisdiction had been raised by the defendant. 12. As referred to above, the objection pertaining to jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings by the parties or by the Court suo moto and such an objection should be decided, if raised at any stage of the proceedings, in case the record of the suit established or some admitted facts established that the Court lacked inherent jurisdiction or that the jurisdiction of the civil courts has been, expressly or impliedly, barred by any other statute. In the present case the point of jurisdiction raised at the lower appellate stage was not a simple and pure question of law but a mixed question of law and fact. In the present case the point of jurisdiction raised at the lower appellate stage was not a simple and pure question of law but a mixed question of law and fact. The lower appellate Court while coming to the conclusion that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit for declaration and possession, based on title, referred to section 10 of the Act which provided that save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no order made by the Collector or the State Government or any officer authorised by it, as the case may be, shall be called in question by any court or before any officer or authority. Admittedly, there is no order passed, under the aforesaid Act, which is being assailed in the present suit. Otherwise also in order to apply the aforesaid provision of law, as envisaged under section 10 of the Act, first of all it has to be admitted or proved factually that the suit land, at the first instance, legally vested in the Gram Panchayat and later on in the State of Himachal Pradesh on account of the provisions of the Act. These are the factual positions which have to be established before section 10 of the Act was made applicable. In the present case the evidence has not been examined in this particular behalf, and rightly so, as there was no Issue in regard thereto. Here the objection of jurisdiction being raised by the party before the lower appellate Court, was not a pure question of law but a mixed question of law and fact. In this view of the matter, without there being any objection taken by the party and Issue framed to that effect, the point of jurisdiction could not have been disposed of, as was done by the lower appellate Court. 13. The point of jurisdiction initially has to be disposed of on the basis of the allegations made in the plaint, if those are presumed to be correct. In the present case, as discussed earlier, the pleadings referred to in the plaint do not debar the civil court to try the present suit. 13. The point of jurisdiction initially has to be disposed of on the basis of the allegations made in the plaint, if those are presumed to be correct. In the present case, as discussed earlier, the pleadings referred to in the plaint do not debar the civil court to try the present suit. In case an objection is raised that the jurisdiction of the civil court has been expressly barred by section 10 of the Act, in that event Issue has to be framed and facts have to be established that initially there was legal vesting of the suit land in the Gram Panchayat and later on in the State of H. P. under the provisions of Act, and then alone the jurisdiction of the civil court can be said to have been barred. But in the present case no such evidence is there in the absence of there being any Issue. That being so, the point of jurisdiction, which has not been specifically pleaded by the defendant and regarding which no evidence during the trial had been examined, the same could not be disposed of in the manner it has been done by the lower appellate Court. Thus, the finding of the District Judge below that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the present suit is liable to be set-aside, being not based on proved or admitted facts in the present case. 14. The defendants plea, raised in the written statement, had been that the suit suffered from non-joinder of necessary parties. It is well settled proposition of law that necessary parties are parties who ought to have been joined, that is, parties necessary to the constitution of the suit, without whom no decree at all can be passed. In order that a party may be considered a necessary party, two conditions must be satisfied. First, that there must be a right to some relief against that party in respect of the matter involved in the suit and, Second, that the presence of that pasty should be necessary in order to enable the Court, effectively and completely, to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit Again, there is no dispute to the proposition that for failure to implead a necessary party, as a party to the proceedings, was fatal. 15. 15. The plaintiff sought declaration that he along with defendant No.2 was owner in possession of the suit land. The plaintiff has brought on record Jamabandi for the year 1968-69 wherein Panchayat Deh has been recorded to be the owner of the suit land. This entry continued till 1973-74, as is evident from Ex. DB, Jamabandi for the year 1973-74, wherein Panchayat Deh Tiuri has been recorded to be owner of the suit land. In this copy there is a note that, as per mutation No. 1099, the ownership has been changed from Panchayat Deh in favour of the State Government. That means, in the record of right, the copies of which have been filed by the parties before the trial Court, earlier Gram Panchayat Tiuri was recorded owner and later on the State of H.P. was recorded as owner in place of the Panchayat, probably on the basis of the provisions of the Act: 16 At the cost of repetition, it may again be referred that the plaintiff has nowhere been recorded as owner of the suit land in the revenue record, as per entries reflected in various copies of the record of right relied upon by the parties during the trial of the suit. The plaintiff and defendant No. 2 have been recorded in occupation in the latest record of right Ex. DB, referred to above, and defendant : has been recorded in actual occupation under the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 as non-occupancy tenant. Any way, the fact remains that the plaintiff/defendant No.2 have nowhere been recorded as owners of this suit land. They are claiming ownership of the suit land, meaning thereby that they are assailing the right of the Panchayat and thereafter of the State Government which have been recorded owners of the suit land. In this view of the matter the suit for declaration sought by the plaintiff that he along with defendant No. 2 was the owner of the suit land cannot proceed behind the back of the Panchayat/State of Himachal Pradesh. It has been the case of the plaintiff that he has been in occupation of the suit land alongwith defendant No. 2 since long, that is, since their fore-fathers, meaning thereby that they were assailing the entries of ownership in the name of the Panchayat Diehl and later entries of ownership in favour of the State of Himachal Pradesh also. It has been the case of the plaintiff that he has been in occupation of the suit land alongwith defendant No. 2 since long, that is, since their fore-fathers, meaning thereby that they were assailing the entries of ownership in the name of the Panchayat Diehl and later entries of ownership in favour of the State of Himachal Pradesh also. This declaration sought for by the plaintiff cannot be enquired into effectively behind the back of the recorded owner. That being so, the Gram Panchayat Tiuri as well as the State of Himachal Pradesh were necessary parties to the present suit. 17. It has been contended on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent that he has not sought any relief against the Panchayat or the State of Himachal Pradesh and, as such, they were not necessary parties. This plea cannot be favourably considered at all. It is not essential that a party would be necessary only in case some relief has been asked for against that party. On the other hand it has to be seen, if, in the absence of such a party the relief prayed for can be granted or not which fact, has already been discussed above whereby it had been concluded that in the present case in the absence of the Gram Panchayat/State of Himachal Pradesh the relief that the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 were owners of the suit land cannot be granted. It has further been contended by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent that as there was no legal vesting of the ownership right initially in favour of the Panchayat and later on in favour of the State of Himachal Pradesh, therefore, they were not necessary parties. Again, this argument, at this stage is not available to the plaintiff. At present it is an admitted fact that initially the Gram Panchayat and later on the State of Himachal Pradesh have been recorded as owners in the record of right. Whether that entry was correct or wrong, legal or illegal can be gone into only in the presence of those parties in whose favour those entries had been made. Therefore, taking into consideration this aspect of the matter also the Panchayat as well as the State of Himachal Pradesh were necessary parties to the present suit for its effective and proper adjudication. 18. Therefore, taking into consideration this aspect of the matter also the Panchayat as well as the State of Himachal Pradesh were necessary parties to the present suit for its effective and proper adjudication. 18. In view of the foregoing reasons, the present appeal is accepted and the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are set aside and the suit is remanded back to the trial Court with the direction that Gram Panchayat Tiuri and State of Himachal Pradesh are the necessary parties to the present suit and the plaintiff is directed to make them as defendants in the present suit and thereafter the suit be disposed of in accordance with law. 19. The original suit was filed in the year 1972 and it is being sent back to the trial Court after 22 years of its institution for being disposed of after adding some necessary parties, as referred to above. The delay has been most unfortunate, the reasons were obvious and need not be elaborated. With this background the trial Court is directed to finally dispose of the matter without causing any undue delay. 20 The parties, through their counsel, are directed to appear before the trial Court on 22nd August, 1994. The Registry is directed to send back the record of the suit with utmost expedition so that it reaches in the trial Court before the aforementioned date, to enable the trial Court to proceed with the matter. Appeal allowed.