(1) LEAVE granted. We have heard both the counsel. (2) WE are satisfied on the facts that it is a fit case for interference. The first respondent - Rajendra Bahadur Srivastava was appointed as a lower division clerk on 15/1 1/1966. He was promoted as an upper division assistant in the year 1970. By proceedings dated 31/12/1971 his services were terminated with immediate effect on payment of one month salary in lieu of notice. Thereafter, on 7/9/1977 he submitted a representation to the authorities. On 20/9/1977 the Housing Commissioner and secretary had stipulated in his order that the respondent should give consent for his appointment afresh and subject to that his case would be considered. Accordingly, the first respondent has submitted a consent letter (Annexure V to the Special Leave Petition paper-book) which reads thus : "IN pursuance of the D.O. dated 7/9/1977 mentioned in the said letter I give my consent subject to the conditions contained therein, that my service tenure would start afresh and will not claim benefits of my past services. My joining w.e.f. 3/5/1986 may kindly be accepted." (3) PURSUANT to that, it was treated that he had joined on 3/5/1986. Thereafter, the first respondent has filed W.P. No. 6644 of 1991 in the High Court stating that his termination in 1971 was illegal and that he should be granted all consequential benefits. The High court, by its order dated 7/7/1993, allowed the writ petition and passed the following order : "IN view of the above facts and legal position the writ petition is liable to be, and is allowed to the extent and in the terms mentioned hereinafter. The impugned order of termination dated 31/12/1971 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) is quashed. The order dated 10/7/1992 (Annexure B to the counter-affidavit) is also quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to arrears of salary at the rate to which he would have been entitled, but for his termination, with effect from 28/9/1985. He shall also be entitled to and be given other benefits of his past services, including the benefit in regard to seniority, increments and promotion to which he would have been entitled, if his services had not been terminated. He shall also be entitled to and be given other benefits of his past services, including the benefit in regard to seniority, increments and promotion to which he would have been entitled, if his services had not been terminated. He shall be considered for promotion with effect from the date his next junior was promoted on the next higher post or posts and if necessary, the opposite parties shall create supernumerary post in order to give benefit of promotion to the petitioner in accordance with these directions. The conditions to the contrary in the order dated 6/5/1986 (Annexure 15 to the writ petition) is quashed. Appropriate orders in accordance with these directions shall be issued within four months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before the opposite parties." The Housing Board is now impugning the said judgment in this appeal. (4) IT is contended for the appellant that the first respondent having given his consent in an unequivocal terms in the letter, it is no longer open to him to claim all the benefits. For the respondent, it is contended that relying on the letters issued by the subordinate officers in the Accounts Department that the first respondent has got outstanding capacity to discharge duties and a capable officer and they themselves considered that in the event of his foregoing salary only all other benefits would be given, the High court therefore, would be justified in giving the directions in the impugned order as sought for. (5) WE have considered the respective contentions. On. the facts of this case the High court has clearly erred in allowing the writ petition in the terms stated above. In view of the unequivocal undertaking given by the first respondent, it is no longer open to him to contend that his dismissal (sic termination) order of 1971 was illegal. He approached the High court in 1991 seeking to quash his termination order of 1971 after securing conditional reinstatement. His challenge after his appointment on his representation and acceptance of conditions subject to which he was to be appointed is an attempt to overreach his goal in a circuitous route. It is hard to accept that within a short period of five months he has shown such a remarkable capabilities in discharging duties as appeared to be commendable to the officers recommended in the letters relied on by the respondent. It is hard to accept that within a short period of five months he has shown such a remarkable capabilities in discharging duties as appeared to be commendable to the officers recommended in the letters relied on by the respondent. Be it as it may, we need not go into that question in detail. Suffice to state that would not be a ground for the respondent to claim the reliefs granted by the High court. The order of the High court is illegal and the High court would (sic should) be circumspect in its exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is set aside. However, the first respondent is entitled to the computation of the period from the date of his initial appointment for the purpose of his pensionary benefits only and no further. He is entitled to the salary only from the date on which he started discharging duties, namely, 3/5/1986. It is stated that he has already been paid. Under these circumstances, no further directions for payment is necessary. (6) THE appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.