Judgment : The appellant was the defendant while the respondents were the plaintiffs in the suit. 2. The plaintiffs are brothers and the defendant is their sister. Plaintiffs filed the suit in O.S.No.80 of 1990 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Ramanathapuram for partition and separate possession of 3/4th share in the suit properties. It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the suit properties were their ancestral properties and therefore, they are entitled to 15/16lh share therein. Even otherwise, they would further contend that in case the suit properties are held to have belonged exclusively to their mother Kuppammal, even then, they are entitled to 3/4th share therein. 3. Defendants, on the other hand, would deny the ancestral character of the suit properties, besides taking specific stand that they belonged exclusively to their mother Kuppammal, that there was a custom in the Idaya community, to which the parties belong that the male members of the family did not at all inherit and the moment they got married, they would go and settle in the families of their wives, inheriting the properties of their wives and that even otherwise, the suit properties had been in her exclusive possession continuously for well over thirty or thirty-five years openly and thereby she prescribed title to the same by ouster and therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. The trial court framed the requisite issues, reflecting the respective pleadings and on consideration of the materials placed on record, however, dismissed the suit with costs. The aggrieved plaintiffs preferred appeal in A.S.No.85 of 1992 on the file of District Court, Ramanathapuram, which was allowed granting preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of their 3/ 4th share, directing the parties to bear their own costs. Aggrieved defendant resorted to the present action, besides filing C.M.P.No.611 of 1994 for stay of operation of the decree of the lower appellate court. 5. A perusal of the reversing judgment of the lower appellate Court reveals, in a clinching fashion, that a proper approach had been made to the points involved for consideration, in appreciating, in the best of fashion possible, the evidence available on record and in such process, no trace had been left to make it appear that such consideration suffers from any vice or infirmity of such a serious nature, either on facts or on law, calling for interference. 6. 6. The discussion therein further reveals that the custom pleaded and set up had not been proved, in the manner allowed by law and that even otherwise, subsequent to the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short ‘the Act’), even if there was any custom existing, as regards the devolution of the estate left by Hindu female, such a custom ceased to operate, by reason of the salient and salutary provisions, adumberated under Sec.4, coupled with Secs. 15 and 16 thereof. Secs. 15 and 16 provide succession to the estate of the Hindu female dying intestate. The effect of such specific provisions made therein is that by operation of Sec.4, such a custom ceases to operate on and from the day of the commencement of the said Act. In that view of the matter, the granting of a preliminary decree to the extent of 3/4th share in favour of plaintiffs by the lower appellate courts cannot at all be stated to be not in conformity with the provisions of Secs.15 and 16 of the Act. 7. Even as respects ouster, as revealed by the discussion therein, their mother Kuppammal, even according to the defendant, died only in the year 1980. On such basis, the plea of ouster faced dismal failure, inasmuch as succession to the properties will open only therefrom.