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1994 DIGILAW 128 (MAD)

K. R. Santhanam. v. State

1994-01-27

BELLIE

body1994
Judgment : The appellant is the accused-a government servant who has been convicted under Sec. 161 of the Indian Penal Code and Sec. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year under each of the sections, and in addition he has also been fined a sum of Rs.1,000 under the latter section. 2. The only point raised in the appeal is that there is no valid sanction for prosecution as required under Sec.6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sec. 197, Crl.P.C. and therefore the entire proceedings is illegal and liable to be set aside. 3. The prosecution has filed Ex.P-12 as the sanction order. It is contended for the appellant accused that there is nothing to show that the sanctioning authority has applied his mind, and Ex.P-12 sanction order is only mechanically signed by him and as such it is not a valid sanction order. In support Of this contention the learned counsel appearing for the appellant cited a decision of the Supreme Court and two decisions of this Court. 4. Against this the learned Government Advocate relied on a Supreme Court decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Damodaran 1992 Crl.L.J. 522 and contended that the facts of that case regarding the sanction order are clearly similar to the instant case and in that case it was held that there was valid sanction order and there is no reason to hold that in the instant case there is no valid sanction order. In the Supreme Court decision, on perusal of the letter seeking for sanction for prosecution it was found by the Supreme Court that the letter contained all the particulars of the facts of the case and oral and documentary evidence relied upon by the prosecution and statements recorded under Sec.162, Crl.P.C. and therefore there was no justification in the submission that the sanctioning authority sanctioned it mechanically and without application of mind, and hence the sanction order was valid. 5. In the instant case, a perusal of the sanction order Ex.P-12 shows that it contains the necessary particulars of the case to constitute of offence and the grounds of satisfaction. 5. In the instant case, a perusal of the sanction order Ex.P-12 shows that it contains the necessary particulars of the case to constitute of offence and the grounds of satisfaction. The learned Government advocate also produced the letter of the prosecuting agency to the sanctioning authority seeking sanction for prosecution and that letter runs to 23 pages containing all the facts of the case and reproduction of the Sec. 162, Crl.P.C. Statements of witnesses etc., as in the letter produced in the Supreme Court case. Therefore there is no substance in the contention that there is no valid sanction order. 6. In Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 677: 1979 Crl.L.J. 633 relied on by the appellant it is stated thus: "It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out constituting the offence. This would be done in two ways, either (1) by producing the original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction, and (2) by adducing evidence aliunde to show the facts placed before the sanctioning Authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. In the instant case of sanction order Ex.P-12 has been filed and as stated above, it contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction it is stated therein thus: “Whereas I, Thiru W.S. Manickavasagam the authority competent to remove the said K.R. Shantharam from office, after fully and carefully examining the materials’ placed before me in regard to the said allegations and circumstances of the case, am satisfied that Thiru K.R. Shantharam should be prosecuted for the aforesaid offences”. Hence by producing the original sanction order which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction the prosecution has proved that valid sanction has been granted. 7. Hence by producing the original sanction order which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction the prosecution has proved that valid sanction has been granted. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant then would rely on two decisions of this Court viz., Charles Waker Devadass v. State, by Inspector of Police, 1993 M.L.J.(Crl.) 681:1993 L.W.(Crl.) 346 arid S. Narayana Pillai v. The State of Tamil Nadu represented by Inspector of Police Vigilance and Anti-corruption, Nagercoil, 1993 L.W. (Crl.) 107 and argue that in these two cases the sanction orders were similar to the sanction order filed in this case and therein it has been held that the sanction order was not valid sanction order. 8. On going through both the judgments I find that in the first judgment in Charles Waker Devadass v. State, by Inspector of Police, 1993 M.L.J. (Crl.) 681: 1993 L.W. (Crl.) 346 the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Damodaran 1992 Crl.L.J. 522 has been referred to but no letter for sanction has been produced for perusal of the Judge there as in the instant case. In the second judgment in S. Narayana Pillai v. The State of Tamil Nadu represented by Inspector of Police Vigilance and Anti-corruption, Nagercoil, 1993 L.W. (Crl.) 107, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohd.Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 677:1979 Crl.L.J. 633 was relied on, and referring to the said later judgment of the Supreme Court which was reported subsequently in 1992 Crl.L.J. 522, it is stated that the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 677 has not been brought to the notice of the Supreme Court at the time of its judgment in 7992 Crl.L.J. 522 and nothing further has been stated. Referring to A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 677, I have already said above that Ex.P-12 filed as sanction order by the prosecution contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction and therefore it is a valid sanction order. However, it may be whatever is laid down in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 677, it appears to me that the judgment in 1992 Crl.L.J. 522 reflects the correct position of law and that can be followed. 9. However, it may be whatever is laid down in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 677, it appears to me that the judgment in 1992 Crl.L.J. 522 reflects the correct position of law and that can be followed. 9. This being the case it is clear that there is a valid sanction order in this case and therefore the point raised by the learned counsel has no merit. I may also mention here that the purpose for sanction is to prevent frivolous prosecution against officers. Therefore, the question as to the validity of the sanction order would arise at the time any point regarding the sanction order can be raised. If then is no sanction order. Obviously the prosecution files a document as a sanction order and it contains averments as to the material particulars of the case constituting an offence and the reasons for satisfaction of commission of an offence, prima facie it has to be taken as the valid sanction order. 10. If the accused wants to raise any point regarding the validity of the sanction order he may do so at the earliest point of time i.e., at the beginning of the prosecution. This will be in keeping with the above said purpose of the sanction order. Raising such point after the trial of the case is over or at the appeal stage, shall be deprecated even though it may be legal. To raise a point at a later stage of the case i.e., after the trial is over or during the appeal there must be strong reasons for the court to believe that it is quite possible that the document and it requires probe, and in the absence of that, the document filed as the sanction order has to be taken as valid sanction order. 11. In the result therefore, the criminal appeal is dismissed. 12. At this stage, the learned, counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is entitled to remission of the sentence of imprisonment for one year under G.O.Ms.No. 2795 dated 22. 1992 and G.O.Ms.No. 296, dated 20.2.1993. This is not disputed. In view of the said Government orders the appellant need not surrender to custody to serve the said sentence of imprisonment for one year.