D. J. KARIA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who is the original plaintiff of Special Civil Suit no. 242 of 1988 on the file of the Civil Judge, S. D. , Mahesana has challenged the legality and validity of the order dated December 19, 1988 passed by the learned trial Judge dismissing the suit on the ground of not paying the Court fees, though the plaintiff was allowed to sue as an indigent person. ( 2 ) RELEVANT facts giving rising to the petition may be briefly stated as under :the petitioner, class IV employee working as a peon in Mahesana is a tenant of the premises situated at Tarachand Jadavs Khadki in Mahesana on monthly rent of Rs. 150. 00. Opponent No. 2, the original defendant is the landlord of the said premises. It transpires from the pleadings of the said suit that the petitioner as a tenant, has been paying regular rent to the defendent No. 2. However, the defendant No. 2 tried to evict the petitioner by adopting unfair and illegal means. The defendant No. 2 disconnected electric power supply in the demised premises of the petitioner. The petitioner and his family personnel were harassed by not allowing them to use latrine and by providing irregular water supply. The defendant no. 2 filed Civil Suit No. 153 of 1977 for recovery of the possession of the suit premises against the petitioner. The petitioner also filed a civil proceeding being civil Case No. 2149 of 1987 against the defendants for obstructing and withholding essential services such as water, electric power, etc. Thus, the relationship between the parties was quite strained. ( 3 ) IT is the pleadings of the aforesaid Special Civil Suit No. 242 of 1988 that on June 26, 1987, the defendant attacked on the petitioner with lethal weapon, while he was passing in front of the shop of the defendants and caused serious injuries to the petitioner. The petitioner had undergone treatment as an indoor patient for about 12 days. A criminal complaint being Criminal Case No. 2502 of 1987 was lodged by the petitioner against the defendants. The petitioner also filed the aforesaid Special Civil Suit in the Court of Civil Judge (S. D.), Mahesana and claimed compensation of Rs. 25,000. The petitioner had undergone treatment as an indoor patient for about 12 days. A criminal complaint being Criminal Case No. 2502 of 1987 was lodged by the petitioner against the defendants. The petitioner also filed the aforesaid Special Civil Suit in the Court of Civil Judge (S. D.), Mahesana and claimed compensation of Rs. 25,000. 00 as general damages of pain, shock and suffering and medical expenses that were required to be incurred by the petitioner on account of aforesaid incident of June 26, 1987. The petitioner filed a Civil miscellaneous Application No. 112 of 1987 for allowing him to institute suit appeal as an indigent person as the petitioner did not possess of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fees prescribed by law for the plaint in the said suit. The said application was under Order XXXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By the order of Novermber 29, 1987, the learned trial Judge ordered to issue notice to the District Government Pleader and the opponents and thereafter, held necessary inquiries into the means of the petitioner as an indigent person. The learned Judge by his order dated August 5, 1988, on conclusion of the said inquiry, permitted the petitioner to contest the suit in forma pauperies and ordered to register the said suit as a special suit. Accordingly, the suit was registered as special Civil Suit No. 242 of 1988. The Court thereafter, ordered to issue summons to the defendants for settlement of issues making it returnable on September 5, 1988. ( 4 ) THE defendants on being served with the summons of the suit appeared before the Court and the suit was adjourned to September 17, 1988 for further proceedings. ( 5 ) IT is averred in the petition that on September 17, 1988 the petitioner was directed to call his Advocate. The petitioner, however, could not find his Advocate and he informed the Court accordingly. The petitioner was thereupon informed that the presence of his Advocate was not necessary and was directed to compromise the suit for Rs. 5,000. 00 by withdrawing the suit. The petitioner expresed his inability to settle the suit in that way. According to the petitioner, he was threatened. ( 6 ) IT appears that the learned trial Judge thereafter issued notice at Exh. 4 in civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 112 of 1987. 5,000. 00 by withdrawing the suit. The petitioner expresed his inability to settle the suit in that way. According to the petitioner, he was threatened. ( 6 ) IT appears that the learned trial Judge thereafter issued notice at Exh. 4 in civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 112 of 1987. By the said notice, the peittioner was called upon to show cause as to why his aforesaid Special Civil Suit No. 242 of 1988 should not be dismissed as he was serving as a peon. It appears that an endorsement of the plaintiff is taken on the said notice Exh. 4 that the plaintiff was prepared to pay requisite Court fees. The learned trial Judge has thereafter, passed the order directing the petitioner plaintiff to pay the requisite Court fees within 10 days failing which his suit would automatically stand dismissed. ( 7 ) THE plaintiff filed written reply at Exh. 6 to the aforesaid notice at exh. 4. The petitioner inter alia contended in his reply in writing that the notice is illegal and improper, illegal and against principles of natural justice and was served with a view to pressurise the petitioner. The petitioner denied the allegation that he made any false affidavit inasmuch he had disclosed before the Court that he was serving as a peon in the college at Mahesana. He also contended that he had four children and it was very difficult for him to maintain family of six persons with a meagre salary that he was earning as a peon and was unable to pay the requisite court fees for the suit. The petitioner submitted that after necessary inquiry about financial condition of the petitioner, the petitioner was permitted to sue as an indigent person and accordingly, his suit was ordered to be registered as Special Civil Suit no. 242 of 1988. The petitioner also submitted he did not possess any movable or immovable property and had only the property as specified in Schedule to Civil miscellaneous Application No. 112 of 1987. He did not have any ornaments or any other movable property so that he could sell and pay the requisite Court fees for the suit. He denied having made a false affidavit. He contended that the notice Exh. He did not have any ornaments or any other movable property so that he could sell and pay the requisite Court fees for the suit. He denied having made a false affidavit. He contended that the notice Exh. 4 was issued by mala fides and prejudice as he had made an application to the District judge, Mahesana on September 19, 1988 and also to the Honble the Chief Justice of High Court of Gujarat with regard to harassment by compelling him to settle the suit with the defendants. He, thus, requested the Court to quash the notice. ( 8 ) THE learned Judge by his impugned order ordered to dismiss the suit holding that the plaintiff had not paid the Court fees as per his undertaking given below notice Exh. 4. The order recites that the plaintiff was told to pay the Court fees within 10 days, but instead of that, he has chosen to reply and in the reply, he has tried to make allegations. The suit of the plaintiff was, thus, ordered to be dismissed. It is this order against which the present petition is preferred by the original plaintiff. ( 9 ) THE learned Advocate for the petitioner submits that once the Civil application for allowing the petitioner to institute the suit as an indigent person is granted, it was not open for the learned Judge to issue the notice and obtain his endorsement about payment of Court fees and to pass order of dismising the suit on that count; the learned Judge has exercised the jurisdiction not vested in him. Mr. Poojari also submitted that the learned Judge has committed an error in dismissing the suit in the facts of the case. ( 10 ) ). Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates suit by indigent persons. A person is an indigent person if he is not possessed fo sufficient means (other than property exempt from attachment in execution of a decree and the subject-matter of the suit) to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit. Rule 1a of Order XXXIII contemplates about the inquiry into the means of the indigent person. Rule 1a of Order XXXIII contemplates about the inquiry into the means of the indigent person. Every inquiry into the question whether or not a person is an indigent person shall be made, in the first instance, by the chief ministerial officer of the Court, unless the Court otherwise directs, and the Court may adopt the report of such officer as its own finding or may itself make an inquiry into the question. In the present case, the Court having issued notice to the district Government Pleader and to the opponents made inquiry itself and satisfied that the petitioner was an indigent person who was not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fees prescribed by law on his suit. On conclusion of the inquiry, the learned Judge permitted the petitioner to issue as an indigent person as aforesaid. Order XXXIII dows not provide any further inquiry after the permission to issue as an indigent person is granted. Rule 10 of Order XXXIII contemplates that where the plaintiff succeeds in the suit, the Court shall calculate the amount of Court-fees which would have been paid by the plaintiff as if he had not been permitted to sue as (an indigent person); such amount shall be recoverable by the State Government from any party ordered by the decree to pay the same, and shall be a first charge on the subject-matter of the suit. As per Rule 11, where the plaintiff fails in the suit or the permission granted to him to sue as an indigent person has been withdrawn, or where the suit is withdrawn or dismissed, the Court shall order the plaintiff, or any person added as a co-plaintiff to the suit, to pay the Court-fees which would have been paid by the plaintiff if he had not been permitted to sue as an indigent person. Rule 9 of Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as under :"9. Rule 9 of Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as under :"9. The Court may, on the application of the defendant, or of the Government pleader, of which seven days clear notice in writting has been given to the plaintiff, order that the permission granted to the plaintiff to sue as an indigent person be withdrawn- (a) if he is guitly of vexatious or improper conduct in the course of the suit; (b) if it appears that his means are such that he ought not to continue to sue as (an indigent person); or (c) if he has entered into any agreement with reference to the subject-matter of the suit under which any other person has obtained an interest in such subject-matter. "thus, it is clear on construing the above rule that the Court has no power suo motu to dispauper the plaintiff. There is no material on record to show that any application either by the defendant or Government Pleader is made. In order the exercise jurisdiction under Rule 9, there must be an application or allegation of the situation as set out in the aforesaid clauses (a) to (c) of the Rule 9; and the plaintiff should be found to be guitly of vexatious or improper conduct in the course of the suit or that his means are such that he ought not to continue to sue as an indigent person or he has entered into any agreement with reference to the subject-matter of the suit under which any other person has obtained an interest in such subjectmatter. No such thing is proved or even alleged against the petitioner in the present case. Notice Exh. 4 is to show cause why the plaintiff shoud not be treated as dispauper, as the petitioner is an employee having earning. Order XXXIII, and particularly Rule 9 thereof does not prescribe that the person suing as an indigent person should not possess any income at all nor should serve anywhere to maintain his family. What is contemplated is that the person who may be permitted to sue as an indigent person, is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fees prescribed by law on his suit. What is contemplated is that the person who may be permitted to sue as an indigent person, is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fees prescribed by law on his suit. The petitioner has categorically mentioned in his application that he was serving as a class IV employee in a private college at Mahesana and he had to maintain a family of six persons and he was unable to pay prescribed court fees from his meagre salary. Inquiries were also made on these averment. After due inquiry, the learned Judge granted the said application allowing the petitioner to sue as an indigent person. None of the conditions provided in the aforesaid Rule 9 was available so as to exercise the powers to withdraw the permission to sue as an indigent person. There is no material or even allegation on record against the plaintiff with regard to any of the situations, as set out in any of the clauses (a) to (c) of Rule 9 of Order 33. In any event, by the impugned order, the learned Judge has not withdrawn the permission granted to the plaintiff to sue as an indigent person. The learned Judge has dismissed the suit on account of non-payment of court-fees. He has not passed order dispaupering the plaintiff. And such an order can only be passed on the grounds mentioned in rule 9. In my opinion, the learned Judge acted with material irregularity in isuing notice Exh. 4 and demanding Court-fees. The plaintiff was permitted to sue as an indigent person. Therefore, in absence of any situation as set out in Rule 9, demand of Court-fees could only be made after the close of proceedings of the suit. Rule 9 of the Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure does not empower the Court to dismiss the suit. ( 11 ) WHILE passing the impugned order of dismissing the suit, the learned trial judge did not appreciate or consider any of the contentions of reply in writing at exh. 6. It is evident that by that reply, he felt offended and he ordered to dismiss the suit without having regard to the relevant provisions of law, relating to dispaupering of plaintiff. Therefore, even an order dismissing the suit is per se without jurisdiction. The impugned order dismissing the suit is, therefore, liable to be quashed. 6. It is evident that by that reply, he felt offended and he ordered to dismiss the suit without having regard to the relevant provisions of law, relating to dispaupering of plaintiff. Therefore, even an order dismissing the suit is per se without jurisdiction. The impugned order dismissing the suit is, therefore, liable to be quashed. ( 12 ) ON persual of the pleadings and material on record, I am of the view that the learned Judge has acted with spite and ill-will towards the plaintiff. He states in his order "the plaintiff was told to pay Court-fees within 10 days, but instead paying Court-fees he has elected to file reply Exh. 6". The learned Judge does not deal with any of the contention of the reply Exh. 6, details of which are in para 7 above. The learned Judge has not cared to see, it appears, the relevant provisions of law in regard to grant of leave to sue as an indigent person and withdrawal thereof. It is unfair and illegal to pass judicial orders in anguish and prejudice and in brushing aside the relevant provisions of law. Such an attitude and approach would not only render the order vulnerable but would also tarnish the image of independent and impartial judiciary. ( 13 ) IN the result, the Civil Revision Application succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated December 19, 1988 passed by the learned Civil Judge (S. D.), ,mahesana dismissing the suit is quashed and set aside. The learned Civil judge (S. D.), Mehsana is directed to take the Special Civil Suit No. 242 of 1988 on file and dispose it of on merits and in accordance with law. The suit is of the year 1988 and therefore, he is directed to dispose of the suit as aforesaid, as expeditiously as possible and not later than December 31, 1994. Rule made absolute with costs. .