AJIT KUMAR SENGUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THE subject matter of challenge in this writ petition filed by the Shipping Corporation of India is a notice of demand No. S-146/30/ KPD/85/s60/ (VII)-204/85a, dated 14th January 1986 issued by the Assistant Collector of Customs for Appraisement Group VII and as confirmed by order dated 11th August 1986. The relevant facts are as under : ( 2 ) THE Motor Vessel "vishwa Jyoti" (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as "the said Vessel") was imported by the Shipping Corporation of India, the writ petitioner, from Poland in or about April 1959. Under item No. 76 (i) of the Schedule-I of the Indian Tariff Act, 1934 as amended in 1949, customs duty was leviable on all ships, boats and vessels imported into India either for the purpose of navigation or for breaking up. On October 1,1958, the Central Government issued the following notification :-"g. S. R. 930 - In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 23 of the Sea Customs Act, 1978 (8 of 1978), as in force in India and as applied to the State of Pondichery, The Central Government hereby exempts ocean-going vessels imported into India or the State of Pondichery, other than vessels imported to be broken up, from the whole of the duty of customs leviable thereon : provided that any such vessel if subsequently broken up shall be chargeable with the duty which would be payable on her if she were imported to be broken up. " ( 3 ) IN view of the said Exemption Notification dated 11th October, 1958, no customs duty was levied on the importation into India of the said vessel in the year 1959, since the same was an ocean-going vessel. ( 4 ) AFTER importation into India, the said vessel was engaged in foreign run as a registered Indian flag vessel. In May 1985, the writ petitioner sold the said vessel for scrapping purpose after advertising and inviting tenders in prominent newspapers and acknowledged shipping journals of the country. The writ petitioner obtained the requisite permit from the Director General of Shipping and Metal Scrap Trading Corporation Ltd. for the purpose of such sale and end-use of the said vessel by the purchaser. The writ petitioner obtained the requisite permit from the Director General of Shipping and Metal Scrap Trading Corporation Ltd. for the purpose of such sale and end-use of the said vessel by the purchaser. Thereupon, the writ petitioner filed a statement of particulars (Bill of Entry) with the Customs Authority for the purpose of assessment of customs duty leviable thereon and the Customs Authority assessed the customs duty in the aggregate sum of Rs. 17,35,902. 52 P. Such duty was assessed on the value of the said vessel as certified by Metal State Trade Corporation and at the rate of duty prevalent at the time of first importation of the said vessel in the month of April, 1959. In accordance with the judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Ramniwas Chaudhury, 1983 (1) Calcutta High Court Notes, page-6, the duty was assessed under the Customs Tariff Item 76 (i) of the Indian Tariff Act, 1934, which was applicable on the date of importation of the said vessel into India in the year 1959. Such duty was duly paid and upon payment thereof, the said vessel was cleared out of the Customs Control on August 12, 1985 and made over to the purchaser of the said vessel for scrapping. ( 5 ) ON or about 14th January 1986, the respondent No. 3 issued a notice of demand alleging that the customs duty amounting to Rs. 54,97,265. 40 was short levied in respect of the vessel "vishva Jyoti" and that the said amount was the differential amount that has been short levied as the vessel appears to be classifiable under Section 12 of the Customs Act and Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act under Heading No. 89. 01 /03 of Customs Tariff read with Notification No. 184-Cus. , dated 23rd June, 1984. The duty was claimed at the rate of 30% plus 50% additional duty plus 12% countervailing duty, as per Item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff for the year 1986. The writ petitioner was asked to show cause why it should not be liable to pay the short-levied customs duty of Rs. 54,97,265. 40. , dated 23rd June, 1984. The duty was claimed at the rate of 30% plus 50% additional duty plus 12% countervailing duty, as per Item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff for the year 1986. The writ petitioner was asked to show cause why it should not be liable to pay the short-levied customs duty of Rs. 54,97,265. 40. The writ petitioner gave a reply on 21st January, 1986 pointing out that it had already paid the customs duty in respect of the said vessel in accordance with the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Ram Niwas Chaudhury (supra ). The respondents, however, by an order dated 11th August, 1986 confirmed the said notice of demand under Section 22 of the Customs Act, 1962 and directed for payment of the said sum of Rs. 54,97,265. 40 by the writ petitioner forthwith. ( 6 ) SRI P. K. Malik, learned Counsel, appearing for the writ petitioner has contended that in view of the said judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Ram Niivas Chaudhury's case (supra), the respondents have no authority or jurisdiction to issue the demand notice and/or confirm the said demand. Sri Mullick has particularly drawn my attention to paragraphs 5 (b) and 5 (c) of the Affidavit-in-Opposition filed by the respondent which read as under : (b) In terms of the decision by the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Ram Niwas Chaudhury v. Union of India, rate of duty prevailing at the time of original Importation of the vessel would be applicable in terms of Notification 262-Cus. , dated 11-10-1958. The subject vessel was, therefore, assessed at the rate as prevalent in 1977-78 when the vessel as imported and registered to Indian Flag. Importers paid duty vide B/e1-1105 dated 27-3-1985. (c) Subsequently it was considered that goods should have been assessed @ 30% plus 50% plus 12%. As such there was short levy to the extent of Rs. 38,54,778. 61. However, it is evident from the documents that letter dated 15-1-1986 was issued to the Mogul Line Ltd. requesting them to pay the differential duty. Therefore, letter for voluntary payment was issued possibly due to the fact that the demand was time-barred. As such there was short levy to the extent of Rs. 38,54,778. 61. However, it is evident from the documents that letter dated 15-1-1986 was issued to the Mogul Line Ltd. requesting them to pay the differential duty. Therefore, letter for voluntary payment was issued possibly due to the fact that the demand was time-barred. ( 7 ) IN Union of India v. Ramniwas Chaudhury, 1983 (1) Calcutta High Court Notes, page-6, the Division Bench of this Court considered an almost identical question. There the ocean-going vessel was purchased and imported into India in 1963 by Ratnakar Shipping Co. Ltd. After her importation into India, the vessel changed hands and was ultimately purchased by Poompahar Shipping Corporation as an Ocean-Going vessel. Since its importation into India in 1963, the vessel had been used as an oceangoing vessel for about 18 years. The owner of the said vessel proposed to sell the same in or about December, 1980. Metal Scrap Trade Corporation invited tenders for sale of the said vessel and the highest tender of one Ram Niwas Chaudhury, was accepted. Ram Niwas Chaudhury, the writ petitioner in that case filed a Bill of Entry on February 5, 1981. Another Bill of Entry was submitted by Ram Niwas Chaudhury to the proper officer Under Section 46 (1) of the Customs Act, 1962 on April 25,1981. A dispute arose between the parties as to the date of noting of the Bill of Entry as the rate of customs duty to be levied depended on the date of such noting. One of the questions that was raised for consideration of this Court was whether the Customs duty could be levied at the rate that was in force on the date of importation of the vessel in 1963. The Division Bench of this Court held that the statement of particulars that was filed by Ram Niwas Chaudhury has been wrongly characterised as "bill of Entry". A Bill of Entry was required to be filed under the Customs Act at the time of importation of goods into India. Indeed a Bill of Entry was filed in that case when the vessel was imported into India in 1963. Therefore, the statement of particulars filed by Ram Niwas Chaudhury could not be considered to be Bill of Entry. A Bill of Entry was required to be filed under the Customs Act at the time of importation of goods into India. Indeed a Bill of Entry was filed in that case when the vessel was imported into India in 1963. Therefore, the statement of particulars filed by Ram Niwas Chaudhury could not be considered to be Bill of Entry. The Division Bench further observed that if the vessel was imported into India in 1963 for the purpose of breaking up, she would have been chargeable with duty that was prevalent on that date. The proviso refers to the payment of such duty that was in force on the date of importation of the vessel. Since the vessel was undoubtedly imported in 1963, the duty that was payable on the vessel, as if she was imported for breaking up in 1963, would be levied. ( 8 ) MY attention has been invited to the decision of the Supreme Court in Chowgule and Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. This decision, in my view, has no application in the facts and circumstances of this case. There, the appellants, who were carrying on business of exporting iron ore to various countries from India acquired a second-hand tanker and had it converted in Japan as a transphipper. It was stated by the appellants that the said ship was to serve as a sea-barge. It would take cargo coming by barge with the help of her own equipment and thereafter she would go alongside bulk carriers and transfer the iron ore from her holds into the bulk carriers. The transhipper was registered as a "home Trade Vessel". In another appeal in the case of the same appellant, which appeal was also heard by the Supreme Court simultaneously, the appellants acquired another vessel from its previous owner. The ship was fitted with added holds on both sides, cranes, conveyors and ship loading equipment, designed for transfer operations. It was contended on behalf of the appellant before the Supreme Court that the two vessels in question were not "goods" within the meaning of Section 46 (1) of the Customs Act and therefore, it was not necessary to file a Bill of Entry. It was further submitted that even according to the Govt. It was contended on behalf of the appellant before the Supreme Court that the two vessels in question were not "goods" within the meaning of Section 46 (1) of the Customs Act and therefore, it was not necessary to file a Bill of Entry. It was further submitted that even according to the Govt. of India, an ocean-going vessel was not required to file a Bill of Entry and that the vessel in question was an ocean-going vessel notwithstanding that its main purpose was topping up bulk carriers of iron ore. Supreme Court held that the two vessels in question were "goods for home consumption" and could not be treated as going vessel for the purposes of the Customs Act. Since they were brought to India primarily for the purpose of topping up operations. I do not understand as to how this decision is of any assistance in deciding an altogether different controversy involved in the present case of the writ petitioner. ( 9 ) I find that the aforesaid decision is applicable on all fours in the present case. Admittedly the Motor Vessel "visva Jyoti" was imported into India by the writ-petitioner, Shipping Corporation of India, from Poland in April, 1959. This very vessel was sold by the writ petitioner in May, 1985. The respondents already charged customs duty in the aggregate sum of Rs. 17,35,902. 52 in respect of the said vessel at the rate of duty prevalent in the month of April, 1959 when the said vessel was imported into India from Poland. This assessment was made following the principles laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Ramniwas Chaudhury's case (supra ). The Special Leave Petition filed by the Union of India against the said judgment of the Division Bench of this Court was also dismissed by the Supreme Court. In this view of the matter, I find no justification for the respondents in revising the said assessment to customs duty by the impugned notice of demand dated 14th January, 1986 which was further confirmed by the impugned order dated 11th August, 1986. In the result this application is allowed. In this view of the matter, I find no justification for the respondents in revising the said assessment to customs duty by the impugned notice of demand dated 14th January, 1986 which was further confirmed by the impugned order dated 11th August, 1986. In the result this application is allowed. The impugned notice of demand dated 14th January, 1986 and the subsequent confirmatory order dated 11th August, 1986 are set aside and quashed being without jurisdiction, illegal and invalid in view of the principles laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Ramniwas Chaudhury's case (supra ). The petitioners will be entitled to refund of the excess amount paid. The respondents are directed to pay the excess amount, if any, realised by them to the petitioner within 6 weeks from the date of the communication of this order. There will be no order as to costs.