Judgment : The accused in C.C.No. 31 of 1990 on the file of Special Judge, Madurai, has filed this petition under Sec.482, Crl.P.C, praying to call for the records in the above case and quash the same. 2. Short facts arc: The respondent had earlier filed charge sheet against the petitioner for offence under Sec. 4(1)(a) read with 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act (which I shall hereafter refer to as ‘the Act’) before the Special Judge, Madurai, on the allegations that the petitioner was the Male Nurse in the hospital attached to Heavy Water Plant at Tuticorin between July, 1983 and May, 1984 that during that period, he told to certain persons that he can get employment for them in the Heavy Water Plant and had received amounts unlawfully, for his personal benefit that he is an employee of the Central Government that he had received those amounts which was not payable to him, by way of corruption. After trial, the learned Sessions Judge had found that no valid sanction was obtained for launching the prosecution and that the prosecution was not launched in accordance with Sec. 6(1) of the Act and had left the matter to the Government for obtaining valid sanction and launching prosecution against the petitioner. This judgment was rendered on 20.3.1989. Thereafter, after obtaining sanction, the respondent again filed chargesheet on 9. 1990 against the petitioner for offences punishable under Sec. 5(2) read with 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) of the Act. This chargesheet was taken on file in S.C.No. 31 of 1990 by the Special Judge, Madurai. The accused has now come forward with this petition to quash the same. 3. Thereafter, after obtaining sanction, the respondent again filed chargesheet on 9. 1990 against the petitioner for offences punishable under Sec. 5(2) read with 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) of the Act. This chargesheet was taken on file in S.C.No. 31 of 1990 by the Special Judge, Madurai. The accused has now come forward with this petition to quash the same. 3. Mr.R. Balasubramaniam, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit that for the very same offence, after elaborate trial, on the evidence let in, the learned Sessions Judge had observed in para 30 of the judgment that the fact that the accused had received amounts on promise of getting jobs would not bring the case within the purview of Sec. 161 of Indian Penal Code; but yet the accused was a public servant at the time when he received these amounts and that he had received it for his personal benefits and in these circumstances, even assuming that he had not committed offences under Sec.5(2) read with 5(1) of the Act, it is seen that he had committed offence under Sec. 161, I.P.C. and, that in view of this finding, the prosecution is estopped from filing another charge sheet on very same set of facts. He would further submit that after trial, the special Judge can only award conviction or acquittal, as provided under Sec. 248 Crl.P.C. and that he cannot give a finding that there was no valid sanction for the prosecution and leave the matter at that stage for the Government to get a valid sanction and launch the prosecution and in view of the above, the second prosecution in C.C.No. 31 of 1990 is liable to be quashed. 4.Per contra, Mr.P. Rajamanickam, the learned Special Public Prosecutor, would submit that in view of this definite finding that there was no valid sanction for the prosecution, the entire prosecution and all the proceedings in the case in C.C.No. 3 of 1985 are void ab initio and any observation or finding thereon cannot be relied upon by the petitioner. He would add that once the finding that there was no valid sanction is given, the respondent is within his right to obtain a valid sanction and file a fresh charge-sheet and the case in C.C.No. 31 of 1990 on the foot of the second change sheet is perfectly in order. 5. He would add that once the finding that there was no valid sanction is given, the respondent is within his right to obtain a valid sanction and file a fresh charge-sheet and the case in C.C.No. 31 of 1990 on the foot of the second change sheet is perfectly in order. 5. I have carefully considered the submissions made by rival counsels. In C.C.No. 3 of 1985. the learned special judge has observed in para 34 that the prosecution in that case has been launched against the accused, without obtaining a valid sanction order according to law. Then in para 36, the learned Special Judge had given a definite finding that sanction was not obtained as per Sec.6(1) of the Act. I shall presently consider as to what would be the position in the face of this finding. 6. In Baij Nath Prasad v. State of M.P., 1957 M.W.N. (Crl.) 17 (S.C.), the Apex Court had occasion to consider such as situation. In it, a Sub-Inspector of Police was prosecuted before the Special Judge and was convicted for offences under Sec.161, I.P.C. and Sec.5 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, He preferred an appeal to the Judicial Commissioner of Bhopal. The Judicial Commissioner held that no sanction according to law had been given for the prosecution of the petitioner and the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case: the trial was accordingly ab initio invalid and liable to be quashed. He accordingly set aside the conviction and quashed the entire proceedings before the Special Judge. He then observed that the parties would thus be relegated to the position as if no legal charge-sheet had been submitted against the appellant. Later, the Chief Commissioner of Bhopal passed an order under Sec. 7(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act that the petitioner shall be tried by the Special Judge for certain offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Sec. 161, I.P.C. The case of the petitioner was that he cannot be prosecuted and tried again for the same offences under the aforesaid order dated 4. 1956. Another Sub Inspector, who was also similarly tried, convicted and whose conviction was quashed for want of legal sanction and was again prosecuted, also came forward with another petition. Both these petitions were considered by the Apex Court. The Apex Court had dismissed both the petitions. 1956. Another Sub Inspector, who was also similarly tried, convicted and whose conviction was quashed for want of legal sanction and was again prosecuted, also came forward with another petition. Both these petitions were considered by the Apex Court. The Apex Court had dismissed both the petitions. The Apex Court had held that Clause (2) of Art.20 of the Constitution or Sec. 403(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure will not stand in the way of second prosecution and had observed as follows: "The whole fabric of the argument of learned counsel was founded on this dictinction. Assuming, however, that in certain cases one Magistrate may take cognizance and another Magistrate may try an accused person, it is difficult to appreciate how any court can try the petitioners of these cases in the absence of a sanction in view of the mandatory provisions of Sec. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. If no court can take cognizance of the offences in question without a legal sanction, it is obvious that no court can be said to be court of competent jurisdiction to try those offences and that any trial in the absence of such sanction must be null and void, and the sections of the Code on which learned counsel for the petitioners relied have really no bearing on the matter. Sec. 530 of the Code is really against the contention of learned counsel, for it states, inter alia, that if any Magistrate not being empowered by law to try an offender, tries him then the proceedings shall be void. Sec. 529(e) is merely an exception in the matter of taking cognizance of an offence under Sec. 190, Sub-sec.(1), Clauses (a) and (b); it has no bearing in a case where sanction is necessary and no sanction in accordance with law has been obtained. 7. In Manguesh v. Stale, 1969 Crl.L.J. 1384, in a similar situation, the Additional Judicial Commissioner of Goa, Daman and Diu had taken a similar view as has been taken by the learned special Judge in C.C.No. 3 of 1985. 7. In Manguesh v. Stale, 1969 Crl.L.J. 1384, in a similar situation, the Additional Judicial Commissioner of Goa, Daman and Diu had taken a similar view as has been taken by the learned special Judge in C.C.No. 3 of 1985. In the operative portion, the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner has stated as follows: "Since, however, there is no valid sanction in terms of Sec. 6(1) of the Corruption Act for prosecution of the accused on either of the two charges, I have no option but to hold the trial staged by the learned special Judge as invalid and without jurisdiction with the consequance that the conviction of the accused and the sentence imposed on him cannot be maintained. I would, therefore, accept the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused, 1 should not be taken to have expressed any opinion on the facts merits of the case. This order does not amount to acquittal of the accused on either of the two charges for which he was tried. It would be open to the State to prosecute him after obtaining proper sanction." 8. In the judgment in C.C.No. 3 of 1985, in para 36, the learned special Judge had given a definite finding that valid sanction order as enjoined under Sec.6(1) of Prevention of Corruption Act was not obtained prior to the filing of the case and on this ground the prosecution is infirm. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Baij Nath Prasad v. State of M.P., 1957 M.W.N. (Crl.) 17 (S.C.), that the trial in the absence of such sanction must be null and’ void, the submission of Mr.R.Balasubramaniam that issue estoppel will stand as a bar to C.C.No. 31 of 1990 has to be rejected. The further submission that in all cases, when trial of a case was over, the only course open to the court was to record a finding of the guilt and award conviction or award acquittal under Sec. 248, Crl.P.C. is not correct since in cases where valid sanction is a pre-requisite for launching a prosecution, as in the case of an offence under Prevention of Corruption Act, where no valid sanction was obtained, the entire proceedings arc void ab initio and so the court need not record a finding of guilty or not guilty. 9. 9. In Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana, 1975 Crl.L.J. 765, it was held that in order to invoke the rule of issue-estoppel not only the parties in the two trials must be the same but also the fact-in-issue proved or not in the earlier trial, must be identical with what is sought to be registrated in the subsequent trial. In Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, (1969) 3 S.C.R. 236 , the Apex Court had held that for the principle of issue-estoppel, to arise, that same issue must have been distinctly raised and inevitably decided in the earlier proceedings between the same parlies. In Mashd Khan v. Stale of Uttar Pradesh, (1974)1 S.C.R. 793 , it was held that issue-estoppel arises only if the earlier as well as subsequent proceedings were criminal prosecutions. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kokkiligada, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 771: (1970)1 S.C.A. 283: 1969 S.C.D. 596: (1969) 2 S.C.R. 1004 : (1970)1 S.C.J. 482:1970 Crl.L.J. 759: (1970)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 98: 1970 M.L.J. (Crl.)285: (1970)1 An.W.R. (S.C.) 98, it was held that where evidence with regard to a specific incident was rejected in proceeding under Sec.107, Crl.P.C. subsequent trial in respect of that incident is not barred. If in respect of an offence arising out of transaction a trial had taken place and the accused has been acquitted, another trial in respect of the offence alleged to arise out of that transaction or of a related transaction which requires the court to arrive at a conclusion inconsistent with the conclusion reached at the earlier trial is prohibited by the rule of issue estoppel. In A.R. Mehta v. State of Gujarat, (1980) 2 S.C.R. 72 , it was held that finding of fact finally determined at an earlier stage of case is binding if the facts required to be proved to establish the offences are basically the same. From the above, it would emerge that to operate issue-estoppel both the proceedings must be criminal proceedings and valid proceedings. In the instant case, the earlier proceedings in C.C.No. 3 of 1985, is void ab initio. Whileso, the principle of issue-estoppel cannot be applied to this case. 10. From the above, it would emerge that to operate issue-estoppel both the proceedings must be criminal proceedings and valid proceedings. In the instant case, the earlier proceedings in C.C.No. 3 of 1985, is void ab initio. Whileso, the principle of issue-estoppel cannot be applied to this case. 10. In Harihar v. The State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 266: 55 Crl.L.J. 724, it was held that once a charge is framed and the accused is found not guilty of that charge as acquittal must be recorded under Sec. 258(1) and there is no option in the matter. In Krishnamurthy v. State, A.I.R. 1957A.P. 874:58 Crl.L.J. 1216, it was held that Sec. 258 (1), Crl.P.C. (old) casts an obligation on the Magistrate to record an order of acquittal when there is no finding of guilt and that this being a mandatory provision, the noncompliance with it must be deemed to have the same result as that specified in that section. It was further held that the principle that emerges is that when there is no specific finding that the accused is guilty under any of the charges framed against him, it amounts to an acquittal of the offence involved in that case. Therefore, an appellate court cannot convict him of the offence, unless there is an appeal against that acquittal. The above rulings would apply only in a case instituted validly and not a case in which the entire proceedings are void ab initio. 11. For the reasons given above, I do not accept any one of the submissions made by Mr.R.Balasubramanian, consequently, this petition fails and shall stand dismissed.