S. D. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiff Dayahabhai Ranabhai vaghela claiming to be resident of Anand park has filed this suit under Order 11 rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure for declaration and permanent injunction. He has prayed for following reliefs in the suit. (A) to hold and declare that the public issue of the deft. No. 1-Company, namely, Bloom Dekor Limited dt. 9-9- 1993 for equity shares 23,65,000/- of Rs. 10/- each is void as it is contrary to the provisions of Section 73 (1) of the companies Act, 1956; (B) to hold and declare that the company is liable to refund the amount of each subscribers to the companies shares with interest 15%; (C) to pass an order of permanent injunction or in nature of permanent injunction that the trading of the shares of the deft. No. 1-Company with the deft. Nos. 3 and 4 cannot be allowed: (D) be pleased to pass an order of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from using the money subscribed by the plaintiff and other subscribers who have subscribed for the public issue of the deft. No. 1-Company dated 9-9-1993. The suit is filed on 5th of March 1991. Along with the suit, he has tendered an application at Exh. 6 for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules-1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and has prayed for following reliefs: (A) be pleased to pass an order of injunction directing the defendant Nos. 3 and 4, namely, the Ahmedabad Stock exchange and the Bombay Stock exchnge not to allow the trading of the shares of the Bloom Dekor Limited, i. e. defendant No. 1 herein; (B) be pleased to pass an order of injunction restraining the deft. No. 1- company as tousing of the monies (sic.) of the subscribers in the public issue of bloom Dekor Limited dated 9-9-1993. ( 2 ) THE trial Court passed ex parte order of temporary injunction, the operative portion of which reads as under:"plaintiff is successful in establishing his prima facie case. Prayers 9a and B as prayed for in plaintiffs Application of exh. 6 are hereby granted and temporary injunction in the said terms is granted against the defendants upto 15th of march 1991. It is also directed to issue urgent show-cause notice to the defendants. Prayers 9a and B as prayed for in plaintiffs Application of exh. 6 are hereby granted and temporary injunction in the said terms is granted against the defendants upto 15th of march 1991. It is also directed to issue urgent show-cause notice to the defendants. It is also directed that plaintiff should follow the rules of Order 39 of Civil Procedure Code strictly. Moreover, by 15th of March 1994, it is directed that plaintiffs shall produce reliable documentary evidence to establish that he is shareholder or debenture-holder of the company, thus, irreparable loss and balance of convenience are also in favour of the plaintiff and therefore temporary injunction upto 15th of March 1994, is granted. Accordingly, it is directed that immediately urgent show-cause notice should be issued to the defendants. Today dated 5-3-1994, aforesaid order is declared in open court (Civil Judge, J. D. , Chotila.)" ( 3 ) ON 15th of March 1994, defendant no. 1-Bloom Dekor Limited has appeared and has filed application at Exh. 14 objecting against extension of ex parte order of injunction and also stating in such application that six of the suits of similar nature have been preferred in the name of different persons in different courts of Gujarat and that defendant No. 1 has approached the Supreme Court and that Honourable the Supreme Court has stayed the orders of the trial Court and therefore ex parte order granted by the trial Court should not be extended. ( 4 ) DESPITE aforesaid application at Exh. 14 given by the defendant No. 1- company, the trial Court proceeded to pass order below Exh. 14 and Exh. 17 (an application given by the plaintiff for extension of temporary injunction ). By the said order, the trial Court noted that though defendant No. 1 has objected to extension of temporary injunction, it has not filed its reply to the application for temporary injunction and it has prayed for some time. It also noted that though advocate of plaintiff has shown readiness and willingness of hearing of the application at Exh. 6, he has also applied for adjournment to produce documents evidence by application at Exh. 21. The trial Court also noted that against defendant No. 1-Company six different suits are filed by different parties, in different courts, and the Supreme Court of India has stayed various orders of the trial Court by passing appropriate order in Spl. 6, he has also applied for adjournment to produce documents evidence by application at Exh. 21. The trial Court also noted that against defendant No. 1-Company six different suits are filed by different parties, in different courts, and the Supreme Court of India has stayed various orders of the trial Court by passing appropriate order in Spl. Leave Petition Nos. 878 and 874 of 1994. The trial Court also recorded that copies of all orders of the Supreme court were produced before it, the trial court also recorded the submission of the learned Advocate appearing for the defendant No. 1-Company that since in all other suits injunction granted by the trial Court is stayed by the Honourable supreme Court, of India, the learned trial judge at Chotila should not extend the injunction as such successive litigations were being filed solely with a view to harass the defendant No. 1-Company. The trial Court however noted that from the documents produced by the defendant no. 1-Company, namely, the Xerox copies of the order of the Honourable the supreme Court of India, it was clear that no direction was issued to the trial Judge of Chotila court and therefore in his opinion it was appropriate to extend injunction upto 21st of March 1994, and accordingly he extended the injunction upto 21st of March 1994. The trial Judge thus exhibited scant regard for the order of the Supreme Court. Having noticed that the Apex Court has stayed all orders of injunction granted by six different trial courts against defendant No. 1 and having noticed that in all suits similar type of injunction was granted and stayed by the Supreme Court. The learned trial judge dubiously and unintelligently and perhaps deliberately failed to notice implied inherent warning against grant of such injunction. He quite curiously and brazen facedly gathered courage to extend identical order of injunction, stay of such orders of injunction by the supreme Court notwithstanding. This act of judicial bravado on the part of the trial judge undermines the binding effect of precedents of the Apex Court and also exhibits unpardonable judicial impropriety on the part of the subordinate judicial officers. ( 5 ) IT appears that meanwhile, defendant no. This act of judicial bravado on the part of the trial judge undermines the binding effect of precedents of the Apex Court and also exhibits unpardonable judicial impropriety on the part of the subordinate judicial officers. ( 5 ) IT appears that meanwhile, defendant no. 1-Bloom Dekor Limited has already moved the Supreme Court of India and the Supreme Court has by order dated 18th of March 1994, transferred to the high Court of Gujarat this suit along with other five suits and has directed that the suit be placed before the Company Judge for disposal. The Supreme Court also directed that the Company Judge will consider the prayer of the defendant No. 1 for vacating the interlocutory order made in the present suit (original Civil suit No. 3 of 1994 in Chotila Court ). All the parties in the aforesaid six suits were directed to appear before this Court on 28th of March 1994, and the Supreme court has also directed that the Court should proceed with the hearing without the need of service of fresh notice on the parties. ( 6 ) ON 23rd of March 1991. Civil application No. 18 of 1991 was filed in this Court and B. C. Patel, J. was approached for interim relief and B. C. Patel, J. passed following order:"the learned Advocate has approached the Court at 4. 50 p. m. for an interim order. He seeks immediate relief which cannot be granted, more particularly, in view of the order passed by the honourable Supreme Court, wherein direction is given to the effect that the matter shall be placed before the learned company Judge on 28th March 1994 for further proceedings in the matter without the need of service of fresh notice on them. Therefore, obviously as per the order passed by the Honourable Supreme court the parties will appear on the specified date before this Court. The court will consider the application for vacating the interlocutory order passed in regular Civil Suit No. 3/94 by the learned Civil Judge (J. D.), Chotila, on that day as per the direction given by the honourable Supreme Court. ( 7 ) IT appears that pursuant to direction issued by the Supreme Court of India, the registry of this Court has directed the district Judge. ( 7 ) IT appears that pursuant to direction issued by the Supreme Court of India, the registry of this Court has directed the district Judge. Surendranagar to transfer the proceeding of the present suit to this court and in fact sealed envelop (sic.) addressed to Chotila Court was received from High Court of Gujarat containing papers for transfer of the suit personally by the learned trial Judge at 11. 30 a. m. on 21st of March 1991. The Advocate of the defendant No. 1-Company also filed application before Civil Judge, J. D. , chotila that the suit having been transferred under the order of the supreme Court from Chotila Court, it has no jurisdiction to extend ex parte order of injunction. On 22nd of March 1994, an application at Exh. 82 was made before civil Judge, J. D. , Chotila by plaintiff through his Advocate Mr. R. M. Roparel for extending the order of injunction. It appears that the trial Court ordered notice to issue to the other side though it was conscious of the fact that suit had already been transferred to High Court. It appears that the papers of the suit were already transferred to the District Court at surendranagar and on plaintiffs adovcate approaching the District Court, surendranangar, it returned the paper to the Civil Judge, J. D. , Chotila at 2. 00 a. m. at midnight with direction to return the same on the next day by 9. 00 a. m. so that papers can be transferred to the High court. Once the papers were withdrawn from the trial Court as the suit is ordered to be transferred from the trial Court to the High Court and when such order was already implemented by transferring the suit by withdrawing the suit from the trial court. It is not understood as to why the district Court, Surendranagar returned the papers of the suit to the trial Court. It appears that on 22nd of March 1994, on exh. 82, Civil Judge, J. D. , Chotila proceeded to pass an order whereby he extended the ad interim injunction till 23rd of March 1994, in such extension of order of injunction, the trial Court has emboldened itself to record following reasons for grant of extension of temporary injunction. It appears that on 22nd of March 1994, on exh. 82, Civil Judge, J. D. , Chotila proceeded to pass an order whereby he extended the ad interim injunction till 23rd of March 1994, in such extension of order of injunction, the trial Court has emboldened itself to record following reasons for grant of extension of temporary injunction. (A) In accordance with the order of the high Court of Gujarat, the District Court had by telephonic Message called for the suit for the purpose of transfer from chotila Court and accordingly on 21st of march 1994, though application for extension of temporary injunction was made, trial Court has not granted the application as suit was transferred from trial Court. (B) Application for temporary injunction was forwarded by the trial court to the District Court, surendranangar and that the District court has sent back the file to the trial court with the object of making appropriate order. (C) While granting ex parte temporary injunction on 5th of March 1994, orders were passed requiring the plaintiff to produce reliable evidence to show that plaintiff is shareholder or debenture- holder of the defendant-Company. However, the plaintiff was anable to produce such documentary evidence even on 15th of March 1994 and therefore in the interest of justice application for extension of injunction was granted by fixing 21st of March 1994 as the last date for producing such evidence. Even on 22nd of March 1994, the plaintiff has not complied with the order of trial Court commanding it to produce documentary evidence to show that he was the shareholder or debenture-holder of the company and to that extent case of the plaintiff has technically become defective. (D) The trial Court is not in complete agreement with the argument of Mr. R. M. Roparel (Advocate for the plaintiff) that the trial Court still has jurisdiction to pass any order after file is transferred. Despite, sufficient time having been granted to the plaintiff he has failed to produce any evidence to show that he is the shareholder or debenture-holder of the company upto the last date given by the Court and therefore no jurisdiction remains with the Court as the matter is already transferred to the Gujarat High court in accordance with the order of the honble the Supreme Court of India. (E) Notwithstanding, the aforesaid objection, since the matter is going to reach the High Court, the order of status quo is granted upto 23rd of March 1994. ( 8 ) AFORESAID exercise undertaken by the trial Court of entertaining an application for extension of injunction after this suit is transferred from its jurisdiction to High Court and absolutely untenable and lame reason given for extension of injunction has invited serious and aggressive submissions and comments from Mr. S. B. Vakil, learned counsel for the defendant No. 1- company. Mr. Vakil has very strenuously urged before this Court that conduct of the trial Court not only deserves to be denounced and deprecated but serious view is required to be taken as he has emboldened himself to pass order which he knew he could not pass judicially despite full knowledge that the suit is transferred from his jurisdiction by the supreme Court and secondly despite full knowledge that the plaintiff has failed to prove prima facie case by producing documents which he was required to produce. Mr. Vakil has further submitted that the conduct of the District Judge, surendranagar in sending the suit back to the trial Court, for appropriate action was also in total disregard of the order of the transfer of suit passed by the Supreme court of India and having received writ and having already received the papers of the suit from the trial Court he should not have sent back the papers to the trial court as that conduct itself would amount to disobeying and disregarding the direction of the Honourable Supreme court of India. He submitted that in fact the Supreme Court has fixed the date for hearing before the High Court, i. e. , 28th of March 1994 and therefore the trial court as well as the District Court, surendranagar were acting beyond their powers and jurisdiction in entertaining any application or passing any order in the said proceeding as from the moment the order was passed by the Supreme court, the proceedings stood transferred to the High Court of Gujarat and the trial judge was functus officio. In my opinion, the submission of learned Counsel appearing for the defendant No. 1- company has merit and force and it shall have to be observed that once the order of transfer of proceedings from the trial court to the High Court is passed by the honble the Supreme Court of India, and once such order is communicated to the trial Court by High Court through District court, the trial Court was left with no power of jurisdiction and has no control whatsoever over the suit. In fact, the suit was transferred to the District Court. The district Judge, Surendranagar also did not act properly in sending back the papers to the trial Court at the request of the advocate of the plaintiff. Once the suit is transferred to the High Court under the order of the Supreme Court, this Court fails to understand the purpose for which the District Judge, Surendranangar sent back the papers to the trial Court at midnight 2. 00 a. m. with direction to return the papers to the District Court at 9. 00 a. m. in the morning (the hours which were not the court hours ). If the suit is already transferred, it is not understood as to how any order could be legitimately passed in such suit by the trial Court. Unfortunately, sending back the papers to the trial Court by District court created an impression in the mind of the trial Court that it has jurisdiction and power to pass appropriate order. In the opinion of this Court the District court should have noticed that the order of the Supreme Court of India was final and as per such order, the suit was ordered to be transferred to the High court of Gujarat and therefore from the moment order was communicated to it, the trial Court could not have passed any order whatsoever in the suit and it acted improperly in sending back the papers of the suit to the trial Court thereby leaving a scope of passing order in favour of the plaintiff. In the opinion of this Court, once the Supreme Court of India was transferred the suit from the file of the trial Court to the High Court of Gujarat, the trial Court is left with no jurisdiction to pass any order in the proceeding pending before it and the suit as such shall have to be transferred to the High court. The action of the District Judge, surendranangar, in sending the papers back to the trial Court and the action of the trial Court in passing an order of extension of injunction upto 23rd of march 1994, are alearly contrary to the order of the Supreme Court and are highly improper. Facts of the Case ( 9 ) IT is the case of the plaintiff that he is a small investor and is carrying on business of buying and selling of shares of companies. According to him, he has applied for shares of several companies. He has not stated that he has applied for shares of the defendant No. 1-Company. It is his case that he has come to learn that defendant No. 1-Bloom Dekor limited has adopted malpractices and was trying to defraud the public at large and that defendant No. 3-Ahmedabad stock Exchange and defendant No. 4- bombay Stock Exchange were acting in collusion with defendant No. 1-Company. ( 10 ) THE defendant No. 1-Company had announced the opening of its public issue with effect from 9th of September 1993. The said issue closed on 14th of september 1993, being the earliest date of closer as per the prospectus of the company. It is the further case of the plaintiff that even before the public issue was announced by the defendant No. 1- company, shares of defendant No. 1- company were quoted in the market at the price of Rs. 40 to 50 though the value of the share was Rs. 10 only. It is the case of the plaintiff that the company attracted every investors like the plaintiff to subscribe for such share and after the subscription was closed on 14th of september 1993, the price of the share of the company has gone down to Rs. 8 only. 40 to 50 though the value of the share was Rs. 10 only. It is the case of the plaintiff that the company attracted every investors like the plaintiff to subscribe for such share and after the subscription was closed on 14th of september 1993, the price of the share of the company has gone down to Rs. 8 only. It is the case of the plaintiff that he therefore made necessary enquiries and came to learn that the action of issuance of public issue-by the defendant No. 1- company was void as it was contrary to the provisions of Section 73 (1) of the companies Act, 1956 and that therefore, the company was liable to refund the amount of each subscriber with interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum. The plaintiff also prayed for order of temporary injunction restraining the defendant No. 1-Company from trading its shares and plaintiff also prayed for injunction against defendant Nos. 3 and 4 from permitting trading of the shares of defendant No. 1-Company. The plaintiff prayed for further injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from using the money subscribed by the plaintiff and other subscribers who have subscribed for the public issue of the defendant No. 1- company. ( 11 ) THE plaintiff has along with the suit fikd an application for temporary injunction at Exh. 6 and has inter alia, prayed for injunction in terms of para 9a and 9b set out hereinabove. ( 12 ) THE trial Court has granted ex parfie temporary injunction as stated hereinabove upto 15th of March 1994, and the same was extended upto 21st of march 1994. ( 13 ) IN the meanwhile Spl. Leave petition Nos. 878 and 874 were filed in the Supreme Court of India along with a transfer petition. On 18th of January 1994, the Supreme Court passed following order:"upon motion, the matters are taken on board. Issue notice on the Transfer Petition. In the meanwhile, the interlocutory orders made by the Civil Judge (Sr. Dvn.), vadodara in Spl. Civil Suit No. 25/84, civil Judge, Sr. Dvn. at Morvi in Civil suit No. 90/93, City Civil Court at ahmedabad in Civil Suit Nos. 6630 and 6683/93 and by the Civil Judge, Jr. Dvn. at Prantij in Civil Suit No. 85/93, are stayed and further proceedings in those suits are also stayed, until further orders. Dvn.), vadodara in Spl. Civil Suit No. 25/84, civil Judge, Sr. Dvn. at Morvi in Civil suit No. 90/93, City Civil Court at ahmedabad in Civil Suit Nos. 6630 and 6683/93 and by the Civil Judge, Jr. Dvn. at Prantij in Civil Suit No. 85/93, are stayed and further proceedings in those suits are also stayed, until further orders. List all the matters on February 4, 1994. " ( 14 ) FROM the aforesaid order of the supreme Court of India, it becomes clear that interlocutors orders of injunctions were also granted in favour of the respective plaintiffs in various suits by various courts and the Supreme Court has stayed such interlocutory orders. The apex Court also stayed further proceedings in the suit until further orders. The aforesaid suits now stand transferred to this Court and all orders of injunction passed in such suits are stayed by the Supreme Court of India. 15. to 16. xxx xxx xxx ( 15 ) THE most vital and relevant facts referable to the conduct of plaintiffs and various suits is required to be noted and the same are as under: (A) Civil Suit No. 90 of 1993 which is renumbered as Suit No. 90 of 1994 in this court is filed in the Court of Civil Judge, s. D. at Morvi by Mr. Bharat Kherajbhai chanda Rana. In the said suit, Advocate of the plaintiff is Tarunbhai V. Shah. In the said suit which is filed on 30th of november 1993, by Exh. 5 injunction is sought against the Bloom Dekor Limited restraining it from finalising the allotment of the equity shares of defendant No. 1- company and if allotment is finalised, restraining the company from acting upon such allotment from in any manner including issuance and despatching share certificates in connection to the public issue of the defendant No. 1-Company that such suit was filed at Morvi as Viren thakkars sisters husband Ramaniklal at morvi and he is a Court Bird. This order of injunction was challenged by the defendant No. 1 by preferring Appeal from Order No. 522 of 1993 in the High court of Gujarat. By order dated 8th of december 1993, the Gujarat High Court stayed the order passed by Morvi court was already stayed by this Court and the defendant No. 1-Company was not restrained from allotting, issuing and dispatching the share certificates. By order dated 8th of december 1993, the Gujarat High Court stayed the order passed by Morvi court was already stayed by this Court and the defendant No. 1-Company was not restrained from allotting, issuing and dispatching the share certificates. (B) In immediate succession on the next day, i. e. on 9th of December 1993, virens wifes brother filed another suit in the City Civil Court being Civil Suit no. 6630 of 1993 through Advocate girish R. Pathak. In such suit, the plaintiff has also applied for ex pane interim injunction in terms similar to the order of injunction issued by Morvi court. It is not disputed before this Court that Advocate Mr. T. V. Shah also appeared in the City Civil Court along with Advocate Mr. G. R. Pathak and obtained the ex parte order of injunction around 6. 30 p. m. on 9th of December 1993. The defendant No. 1-Company was once again constrained to file an appeal being Appeal from Order No. 527 of 1993 in the High Court of Gujarat in 10th of December 1993, Mr. R. M. Ruparel learned Advocate represented the plaintiff before the High Court. The appeal was circulated and heard on 13th of december 1993, and on 14th of december 1993, which was admitted and ex parte ad interim order passed by the city Civil Court was stayed on 14th of december 1993. It is thus clear that in the second suit also plaintiff did not succeed in getting any effective order of injunction. (C) Once again in close succession on that very day, i. e. 14th of December 1993, Arvind Sheth and K. T. Gadhia two other persons who are branded as close associates of Viren Thakkar and associates filed another suit being Civil suit No. 6683 of 1993 in the City Civil court and obtained ex parte ad interim injunction around 7. 45 p. m. The City civil Court issued injunction directing defendant Nos. 5 to 13 to maintain status quo as existing on 14th of December 1993, with regard to issuing and transferring shares and utilising the funds which they have received by virtue of public issue, otherwise than in the manner provided in Section 73 (3) of the companies Act till 20th of December 1993. It is alleged that in this suit also advocate T. V. Shah has appeared for the plaintiff and Mr. It is alleged that in this suit also advocate T. V. Shah has appeared for the plaintiff and Mr. T. V. Shah has not disputed this fact though it is true that advocate R. A. Patel has filed his vakalatnama. It may be noted here that since the City Civil Court was careful enough, the plaintiffs were not successful in getting desired ex parte injunction and therefore on 13th of December 1993, Spl. Civil Application No. 13891 of 1993 was filed in this Court by Grakhsuraksh samiti through its Advocate Mr. T. V. Shah. In such writ petition order of injunction was sought against ahmedabad and Bombay Stock exchange from granting any permission for trading or dealing in the equity shares of the company and injunction was sought against the company and its directors restraining them from transferring or dealing in any manner the equity shares of the company. K. R. Vyas, j. on 15th of December 1993, ordered notice to issue to the respondents but did not grant any at interim relief and it is stated that K. R. Vyas, J. has positively put a question to Mr. T. V. Shah, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner as to whether any suit had been filed in the subject-matter and Advocate Mr. T. V. Shah replied in the negative. (D) Since no favourable order could be obtained from the High Court, yet another attempt in close succession was made by filing a Civil Suit in the Court of civil Judge, J. D. at Prantij. The suit was filed by late night being Suit No. 85\93 (numbered as suit No. 5/94) in this Court. In such suit the plaintiff is represented once again by Advocate T. V. Shah. In this suit also he applied for temporary injunction restraining the Company from issuing, transferring, selling or dealing in any manner with the equity shares of the company and further restraining the company from unitilizing (sic.) the funds till the disposal of the suit. The trial Court however did not give any interim order and dismissed the application. (E) On the next day, i. e. on 18th of december 1993, the hearing of injunction was fixed before the trial Court at Morvi and since Mr. T. V. Shah could not remain present at Mor\i Court, application for interim relief was dismissed for default. The trial Court however did not give any interim order and dismissed the application. (E) On the next day, i. e. on 18th of december 1993, the hearing of injunction was fixed before the trial Court at Morvi and since Mr. T. V. Shah could not remain present at Mor\i Court, application for interim relief was dismissed for default. However, said order of dismissal for default was set aside and submissions of advocate Mr. T. V. Shah were heard till 6. 30 p. m. (F) Having thus failed to obtain any temporary injunction in the Morvi Court as well as in the City Civil Court and prantij Court and since the order obtained from the City Civil Court and the Morvi court was stayed by the High Court, it is alleged that Viren Thakkar and Associates got instituted another suit at Baroda being spl. Civil Suit No. 25 of 1994 (numbered as Civil Suit No. 6/94 before this Court) and he obtained ex parte order of injunction from Baroda Court. (G) From the aforesaid chain of litigation successfully instituted it becomes clear that defendant No. 1- company was facing series of litigations with respect to its public issue one after another in close succession and since there was no end to such successive litigation, on 17th of January 1994, the defendant-Company filed Spl. Leave petition Nos. 874 and 878 of 1994 in the supreme Court of India against ex parte ad interim order dated 14th of December 1993 passed by City Civil Court in Civil suit No. 6683 of 1993 and against order dated 11th of January 1994, passed by civil Judge, S. D. , Vadodara in Special civil Suit No. 26 of 1994. The defendant- company has also filed transfer petition nos. 28 to 30 of 1994 in the Supreme court of India for transfer of Morvi Suit; two suits in the City Civil Court at ahmedabad, Prantij Suit and Baroda Suit to the High Court and Supreme Court on 18th of January 1994, stayed various interlocutory orders made in the suits at morvi, Baroda, Ahmedabad and Prantij and also stayed further proceedings in those suits. All the matters were thereafter ordered to be posted before the Supreme court on 4th of February 1991, when the details of successive litigation filed against defendant No. 1-Company were brought to the notice of the Supreme court, the Supreme Court directed the plaintiff of Baroda suits and of ahmedabad suits to remain present before it and even they were cross- examined before the Supreme Court. (H) On 3rd of February 1991, the supreme Court granted Special Leave petition in Special Leave Petition Nos. 874 and 878 of 1994 and continued the order of stay. (I) It appears that once again in the close succession to the aforesaid litigation, on 5th March 1994, Regular civil Suit No. 3 of 1994 (Special Suit No. 1 of 1994 before this Court) was filed in the Court of Civil Judge, S. D. , Chotila and in such suit ad interim injuction was obtained operative upto 15th March 1994, in terms of para 9 (A and B) of the plaint. Such injunction was extended by the trial Court. ( 16 ) IMMEDIATELY on llth of March 1991, the defendant-Company applied to the Supreme Court by making I. A. No. 3 of 94 in Special Leave Petition, challenging the ad interim ex parte order dated 5th of March 1994, granted by chotila Court. The Supreme Court by its order dated 18th of March 1991, ordered issue of notice on I. A. No. 3 of 94 and further ordered that various suits pending in various courts shall stand transferred to the High Court of Gujarat to be placed before the Company Judge. ( 17 ) FROM the aforesaid history of litigation, it becomes clear that successive suits were filed against the defendant No. 1-Company in various courts in the State of Gujarat. The purpose of filing such suits was to restrain the defendant No. 1- company from issuing and dispatching share certificates to the subscribers and further restraining the Company from utilising the funds received towards subscription and thus to see to it that the public issue of the Company does not materialize. It is pertinent to note that in almost all suits as well as in Special Civil application in the High Court, Advocate mr. T. V. Shah has appeared for the plaintiffs excepting the suit which is lastly filed in Chotila Court. In such suit advocate Mr. It is pertinent to note that in almost all suits as well as in Special Civil application in the High Court, Advocate mr. T. V. Shah has appeared for the plaintiffs excepting the suit which is lastly filed in Chotila Court. In such suit advocate Mr. R. M. Ruparel has appeared for the plaintiff. When such successive suits are filed by different parties in different courts through the same Advocate, it becomes clear that there was one common party behind this litigation which wanted to obtain order against the defendant No. 1-Company. It is the case of the defendant No. 1- company that Mr. Viren Thakkar and associates were working behind this litigation and were interested in obtaining order against defendant No. 1-Company as they had indulged into speculatives transactions and were not in a position to discharge their liabilities. They were therefore interested in obtaining order against issuance of share certificates. This allegation made by the defendant No. 1- company is not denied by any of the plaintiffs by filing the affidavit-in- rejoinder. In my opinion, it is reasonable to infer that all such successive suits were master minded by one party and every attempt was made to obtain injunction from any available court in the State of gujarat so as to see that the shares of the defendant No. 1-Company are not issued or forwarded to the subscribers and defendant No. 1 is restrained from utilising the funds received. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that one and the same Advocate Mr. T. V. Shah has appeared in all the proceedings excepting last suit at Chotila. It is also pertinent to note that pleadings of almost all suits are closely parallel and if plaint of the civil suit filed in the ahmedabad City Civil Court is compared with Memo of Special Civil Application filed in the High Court of Gujarat, it would become at once clear that one party or person has master minded this chain of litigations. Since ex parte order passed by Morvi Court and Ahmedabad city Civil Court were stayed by the High court of Gujarat, an attempt was made to obtain an ex parte order from this Court, which miserably failed and therefore this very petition was copied as a Civil Suit and on the next day a civil suit is filed once again in the city Civil Court. Even thereafter also if the pleadings of the suits and Special Civil Application are compared, there is no manner of doubt that they are closely identical and verbatim same and every endeavour is made by the plaintiffs through their advocate T. V. Shah who was common all throughout to obtain ex parte ad interim injunction against the defendant no. 1-Company. It is pertinent to note that such suits are filed in different courts. It is also pertinent to note that suits are filed at places where prima facie the trial Court has no territorial jurisdiction. However, this diabolical device of successive suits in different courts for same relief was adopted with the sole object of anyhow obtaining order of injunction against the defendant No. 1- company so as to restrain it from issuing transferring and dispatching share certificates to the subscribers and from utilizing the fund received by way of subscription from the subscribers. There is also lot of substance in the allegation made by the defendant No. 1-Company that it was apprehended by Viren Thakkar and Association that if the said shares are listed and permitted to be dealt with at stock exchanges, he would be answerable for his speculative dealings and since he has indulged into large-scale speculation, he realized that it was not possible for him to shoulder the responsibilities. It was therefore that he through his stooges manoeuvered the entire show of successive litigation with the sole objective of anyhow seeing that public issue of the defendant No. 1-Company is not listed or dealt with at the Stock exchange. ( 18 ) THUS, from the aforesaid history of successibe litigation, it becomes clear that one and the same party or group was acting at the instance of Viren Thakkar arid Associates and such conclusion is reinforced by the fact that plaints of successive suits are closely identical and parallel and secondly all suits are filed either by Advocate T. V. Shah or by some other Advocate with whom T. V. Shah has appeared before the trial Courts. The device of filing successive suits in each courts irrespective of the fact as to whether trial Court has territorial jurisdiction or not, solely with a view to obtaining ex pane temporary injunction against the same defendant deserves denounciation and condemnation from this Court. The device of filing successive suits in each courts irrespective of the fact as to whether trial Court has territorial jurisdiction or not, solely with a view to obtaining ex pane temporary injunction against the same defendant deserves denounciation and condemnation from this Court. This Court has no manner of doubt that one and the same party was behind the entire chain of litigation and it is unfortunate that an Advocate has knowingly extended his helping hand in such nefarious device. It is true that there is no express prohibition flowing from the provisions of the Code of Civil procedure prohibiting a party from filing successive suits is to obtain ex parte interim injunction against the defendant who is same in all suits and when such injunction is either refused and/or stayed by the High Court, such device of instituting successive suit becomes highly vulnerable to serious criticism as it lacks bona fide and as it results into oppression and harassment to the defending defendant. The object of such litigation is not of getting any relief to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, but it is to oppress, harass and handicap the defendant thereby compelling the defendant to agree the terms which the plaintiff or a group of person dictates. Such a misuse of legal process, in my opinion, would amount to abuse of the process of the court and though no express prohibition exists under the provisions of the Code of Civil procedure against adopting such device it shall have to be condemned and deprecated and plaintiff of such suits shall have to be subjected to some serious action both for contempt of court by abusing the process of the court and also for paying exemplary damages to the defendants who has been subjected to untold hardship because of the diabolic dubious devise adopted by the plaintiffs. This Court would while passing final order, issue appropriate direction in this behalf both against the plaintiffs as well as the common advocate who has extended his helping hand. This Court would while passing final order, issue appropriate direction in this behalf both against the plaintiffs as well as the common advocate who has extended his helping hand. He has unfortunately rendered himself to the position of a purchasable commodity in the hands of the client so as to institute successive litigation by concealing facts of earlier adverse orders passed against his client by the High Court of Gujarat and has thus made himself guilty of suppression of material facts from the courts of law solely with a view to obtaining favourable order for his client, who, he knew to be the same person, who was master minding the entire chain of litigation. The conduct of the learned advocate Mr. T. V. Shah, to say the least, all throughout the proceedings, was highly improper and deserves utmost denounciation and condemnation at the hands of this Court. In fact, he has not only over-identified himself with the cause of his client but he has gone to the extent of abusing the process of the court thereby oppressing the defendant- company to a chain of litigations. He has thus rendered himself liable both for abuse, of the process of the court as well as for not observing the high standard of ethics and behaviour expected from a member of this noble profession. Date: 26-4-1994 ( 19 ) AT this stage it would be appropriate to make reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of All India State Bank Officers federation v. Union of India reported in 1990 (2) Judgment Today, p. 243. before the Supreme Court, it was noticed by the court that petitioner-Federation has resorted to tactics which can be described as abuse of process of the court. The petitioner-Federation filed number of writ petitions in various High courts on the same issue on behalf of different associations of officers of the same bank. The submission that every association was required to file a separate petition to represent its members was not countenanced by the Supreme Court. The supreme Court noted its disapproval of such a practice of filing number of proceedings in different courts for the same relief and it noted that such a practice has to be discouraged. The court also noticed that where there is no diversity but only a commonness of interest, there is no need of filing separate petition. The supreme Court noted its disapproval of such a practice of filing number of proceedings in different courts for the same relief and it noted that such a practice has to be discouraged. The court also noticed that where there is no diversity but only a commonness of interest, there is no need of filing separate petition. The reason why separate simultaneous petitions were filed in different High Courts in India were well know (sic.) and in that context the supreme Court observed as under:11. Apart from mis-statements in the affidavits filed before this Court, the petitioner-Federation has clearly resorted to tactics which can only be described as abuse of the process of court. The simultaneous filing writ petitions in various High Courts on the same issue though purportedly on behalf of the different associations of the officers of the bank, is a practice which has to be discouraged. Sri Sachar and Sri ramamurthy wished to pinpoint the necessity and importance of petitions being filed by different associations in order to discharge satisfactorily their responsibilities towards their respective members. We are not quite able to appreciate such necessity where there is no diversity but only a commonness of interest. All that they had to do was to join forces and demonstrate their unity by filing a petition in a Single Court. It seems the object here in filing different petitions in different Courts was totally different and not very laudable one. Again an attempt was made to obtain a stay in the Andhra Pradesh High Court and when that attempt failed the writ petition here was filed. In this the petitioners were able to obtain only an order that any promotions made during the pendency of the petition would be subject to the decision in the writ petition. But, having obtained this order on 26-4- 1989, it is curious and inexplicable that an affiliated association should have made an application on 27-4-1989 in the karnataka High Court praying for a stay of the promotions. These are only tactics that it will be indulged in by a chronic and compulsive litigant and not by a federation like the petitioner. But, having obtained this order on 26-4- 1989, it is curious and inexplicable that an affiliated association should have made an application on 27-4-1989 in the karnataka High Court praying for a stay of the promotions. These are only tactics that it will be indulged in by a chronic and compulsive litigant and not by a federation like the petitioner. ( 20 ) IN similar situation having failed upto the Supreme Court in obtaining injunction against enforcement of Bank guarantee, a plaintiff filed another suit on the same cause of action in the trial Court solely with a view to getting temporary injunction. This Court had an opportunity of dealing with the practice of filing successive suits solely with a view to obtaining temporary injunction. In the case of Hindustan Zinc Limited v. Vijaysinh and Company reported in 1994 (i) G. L. R. p. 161, while dealing with an appeal from Order arising from Order of temporary injunction granted by the trial court in a subsequently instituted suit in disregard of order of the trial Court, High court and Supreme Court in earlier suit between the same parties against the plaintiff refusing injunction, this Court made following observations:"the action of bringing the second suit for same relief without impleading the most vitally interested party was designed to circumvent, defeat or nullify the effect of the orders, of the trial Court, single judge of the High Court as well as the supreme Court. The institution of the second suit and filing an application for temporary injunction and deliberately omitting to implead Hindustan Zinc limited as party was nothing but daring raid on the Court and each act was an abuse of the process of the Court, calculated to obstruct the due course of judicial proceeding and the administration of Justice. The law should not be seen to sit by simply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope. . ( 21 ) IT would not out of place to make reference to yet another decision of the supreme Court in the case of T. Arwndonom v. T. V. Satyapal 1978 (i) R. C. J. p. 33 where Justice V. R. Krishna iyer described this practice of successive litigation as "horrendous enterprise". . ( 21 ) IT would not out of place to make reference to yet another decision of the supreme Court in the case of T. Arwndonom v. T. V. Satyapal 1978 (i) R. C. J. p. 33 where Justice V. R. Krishna iyer described this practice of successive litigation as "horrendous enterprise". In the case before the Supreme Court, the petitioner whose father contested an eviction proceeding, lost it, appealed against it, lost again, moved a revision, which too was rejected, but the tenant was successful in getting time of six months to vacate the premises. After availing of this indulgence, the petitioner and his father instituted a suit for a declaration that the order of eviction, which was confirmed upto the High court and resisted by the father of the petitioner throughout, was one obtained fay "fraud and collusion". An injunction was also sought. When this fact was brought to the notice of the High Court, during the hearing of the prayer for further time to vacate instead of frowning upon the fraudulent stroke, the learned judge took pity upon the tenant and persuaded the landlord to give more time for vacating the premises on the basis that the suit newly and sinistrally instituted would be withdrawn. However, hope of the landlord and the learned Judge was belied and the extension of time by five months for vacating the premises was proved to be a ploy. The subsequent developments are described by Justice krishna Iyer in the following words:"the next chapter in litigative acrobatics of the petitioner and father soon followed since they were determined to dupe and defy the process of the court to cling on to the shop. The trick they adopted was to institute another suit before another Munsif making a carbon copy as it were of the old paint and playing upon the likely gullibility of the new respondent entered appearance and exposed the hoax played upon the court by the petitioner and the second respondent. Thereupon the Munsif vacated the order of injunction he had already granted. An appeal without success. Undaunted by all these defeats the petitioner came to the High Court in revision and managed to get an injunction over again. The second respondent promptly applied for vacating the temporary injunction and when the petition came up for hearing before Mr. Thereupon the Munsif vacated the order of injunction he had already granted. An appeal without success. Undaunted by all these defeats the petitioner came to the High Court in revision and managed to get an injunction over again. The second respondent promptly applied for vacating the temporary injunction and when the petition came up for hearing before Mr. Justice Venkataramayya, Counsel for the petitioner submitted that he should not hear the case, the pretext put forward being that the petitioner had cutely mentioned the name of the Judge in the affidavit while describing the prior proceedings. The unhappy Judge, who had done all he could to help the tenant by persuading the landlord found himself badly betrayed. He adjourned the case to the next day. The torment he underwent is obvious from his own order where he stated: "i spent a sleepless night yeasterday. "luckily be established himself the next day and heard arguments without yielding to bullying tactics of the petitioner and impropriety of his advocate. He went into the merits and dismissed the revision. Of course, these fruitless proceedings in the High Court did not deter the petitioner from faring to move this Court for special leave to appeal. The subsequent observations of the Supreme Court are still more relevant and are reproduced in extenso:we have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court statements of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court. It is perfectly plain that the suit now pending before the first Munsifs Court, bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order vii, Rule 11 Civil Procedure Code taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled, And if clear (sic. clever) drafting has created the illusion of cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searching under Order X, Civil Procedure code. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. clever) drafting has created the illusion of cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searching under Order X, Civil Procedure code. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial Courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men (Ch. XI) and must be triggered against them. " ( 22 ) IN the aforesaid context, Justice krishna Iyer also adversely commented upon the conduct of the Advocate in instituting successive suits on the same cause of action in different courts with a view to anyhow getting order of temporary injunction. The observations of Justice Krishna Iyer in this behalf are worth noting. His Lordship observed as under:we regret the infliction of the ordeal upon the learned Judge of the High Court by a callous party. We more than regret the circumstances that the party concerned had been able to prevail upon one lawyer or the other to present to the court a case which was disingenous (sic.) or worse. It may be a valuable contribution to the cause of Justice if counsel screen wholly fraudulent and frivolous litigation refusing to be beguiled by dubious clients. And remembering that an Advocate is an officer of justice he owes it to society not to collaborate in shady actions. The Bar council of India, we hope, will activate this obligation. We are constrained to make these observations and hope that the co-operation of the Bar will be readily forthcoming to the bench for spending judicial time on worthwhile disputes and avoiding the distraction of sham litigation such as the one we are disposing of. Another moral of this unrighteous chain litigation is the gullible grant of ex parte orders tempts gamblers in litigation into easy courts. A Judge who succumbs to ex parte pressure in unmerited cases helps devalue the judicial process. Another moral of this unrighteous chain litigation is the gullible grant of ex parte orders tempts gamblers in litigation into easy courts. A Judge who succumbs to ex parte pressure in unmerited cases helps devalue the judicial process. ( 23 ) IT is thus clear that institution of successive suits or litigations in same or different courts, based on same or similar averments for same or similar reliefs coupled with further attempts to obtain ex parte temporary injunction with full knowledge of the fact that on the same facts and set of pleadings, injunction is either refused or vacated in earlier proceeding by another court, is in the opinion of this Court, nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. The abuse of the process of the Court becomes more blatant and shameful to the entire profession if one and the same advocate undertakes the exercise of instituting successive suits on the same cause of action, more and less on the same pleadings forgetting that he is an officer of system dispensing justice and he owes it to the society not to collaborate in shady actions. Another moral of this unrighteous chain of litigation is that the gullible grant of ex parte temporary orders tempts gamblers in litigation into easy courts and a Judge who succumbs to granting such ex parte temporary injunction does enormous damage to the rival partly as well as to the judicial system. In my opinion, the action of bringing successive litigation on the same or more or less similar pleading and on the same cause of action in different courts with a view to anyhow getting an order of temporary injunction is nothing but most brazen faced outrageous raid on the judicial process. Those involved in it, the litigants and the advocates shall have to be ruthlessly dealt with because so long as such unscrupulous litigants are determined to dupe and defy the process of the Court with the help of co-conspirators and collaborators, the practising (sharp practice?) advocates, those who simply look to the strength of the purse of their clients and are totally unmindful and oblivious of their duty to this noble profession, to the Court and the litigants, the faith from the judicial system shall be irreparably shaken. With this observation in mind this Court shall have to decide as to how the plaintiffs of the various suits and the Advocate Mr. Tarun V. Shah should be dealt with while passing the final order. 26. to 45. xxx xxx xxx ( 24 ) IN the facts of the case, in view of the fact that successive litigation is resorted to and in view of the fact that it is found by this Court that successive suits are instituted at the instance of the partly solely with a view to seeing that the public issue of the Defendant No. 1- company is voided and Defendant No. 1-Company is not permitted to utilise the moneys received by way of subscription of the public issue. It is a fit case where the plaintiff shall have to be directed to pay cost of the defendant No. 1 which is quantified at Rs. 10,000/- and the plaintiff is directed to pay the cost in this Court within a month. ( 25 ) NEXT question is as to whether any action should be taken against Advocate tarun V. Shah, who has as stated hereinabove filed successive litigation and secondly as to whether action should be taken against the plaintiff of this Suit for abuse of the process of the court. In view of the findings positively reached by me in my judgment, I am inclined to take action against Tarun V. Shah, advocate for the plaintiff. He has, however, submitted that even Supreme court of India has not taken any action against him in view of unconditional apology tendered by him before the supreme Court. In the order dated 3rd of febrauary 1994, the Supreme Court of india has noted as under:"shri Tarun Shah, Advocate, expresses regret and tenders an unconditional apology for the way he has come to handle the cases in the Courts below. He assures that in future he will abstain from repetition of any such conduct. In view of his candour and readiness to realise the possible implication of the way he had come to handle the cases, we think we should drop any further enquiry in the matter. He assures that in future he will abstain from repetition of any such conduct. In view of his candour and readiness to realise the possible implication of the way he had come to handle the cases, we think we should drop any further enquiry in the matter. At the same time, in view of the fact that such litigative resouecefulness in obtaining ex parte orders might in conceivable cases serious and indeed, irreparable injury to corporate business and that there is imminent need to lay down guidelines to prevent indiscriminate ex parte orders, we propose to lay down some general guidelines which will minimize, if not altogether eliminate, such harmful propensities of ex parte orders and their adverse effects on the capital market. While legal remedies for protection from exploitation of the gullible investors to unscrupulous promoters are appropriate and permissible, however, ex parte orders on bona fide capital venture could cause serious and irremediable mischief. ( 26 ) IT is true that the Supreme Court of india has decided not to take any serious view of the matter as of 3rd of February 1992. It has also accepted unconditional apology of Advocate Tarun V. Shah. However, the matter does not rest there. It is thereafter that the present suit is filed in the Court of Civil Judge, J. D. , Chotila. It is also pertinent to note that the averments contained in the plaint and application for temporary injunction are closely parallel to the earlier suits preferred. It is submitted by Mr. S. B. Vakil, learned Counsel appearing for the defendant No. 1 that subsquently also the successive litigation has. continued against the defendant No. 1-Company and it has reason to believe that it is at the instance of one and one party and that the last suit is also filed under the advise (sic.) of Advocate Mr. Tarun V. Shah. He has further submitted that case of this nature, a serious view must be taken and action should also be taken against the advocate as well as against the plaintiff. In my opinion, it may not be permissible for me in absence of any direct involvement of Advocate Tarun V. Shah in institution of this suit to hold that he was instrument in filing the suit at Chotila court. In my opinion, it may not be permissible for me in absence of any direct involvement of Advocate Tarun V. Shah in institution of this suit to hold that he was instrument in filing the suit at Chotila court. Since his unconditional apology is accepted by the Apex Court of the country, I also would desist from taking any action except observing that his action deserves severe condemnation and denounciation. The plaintiff undoubtedly is guilty of the abuse of the process of the court and since 1 have already imposed the liability to pay cost of Rs. 10,000/- to the defendant No. 1 on plaintiff, I do not intend to take any other action against the plaintiff. Suit dismissed. .