Judgment : The present respondent Jayaraman in his capacity as the President of local Panchayat Board filed a suit in O.S.No. 390 of 1990 in the Court of the District Munsif, Chidamabaram against one Kaliyan, his mother and brother and in I.A.No.1069 of 1990 obtained an order of temporary injunction restraining them from interfering with the rights of the Panchayat over a tank, well and property in their village. The injunction order was served on them. According to him, thereafter in violation of the injunction order, Kaliyan, his mother and brother fenced the property with “Karuvai Veli”. On the public reporting against that fencing, he had the veli removed with the help of police. However, petitioner herein and the said Kaliyan preferred a complaint to the local Assistant Superintendent of Police stating that respondent Jayaraman and another felled and taken away neem and karuvai trees to the value of Rs.36,000 in the aforesaid property. It was registered as Crime No. 183 of 1990 of Porto Novo Police Station under Secs. 447 and 379, I.P.C. against them. 2. Thereupon respondent Jayaraman filed a private complaint in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Porto Novo against the present petitioner Gopalaswami and the said Kaliyan, stating that he had been put to considerable mental agony, torture and his esteem in the eyes of the general public had been lowered and he had to suffer incalculable damage to his reputation on account of the police complaint. In view of this the present petitioner and the said Kaliyam are liable to be punished under Sec. 500, I.P.C. Learned Judicial Magistrate, Porto Novo took the complaint on file in C.C.No. 153 of 1990 and examined the witnesses produced by the said Jayaraman. In his evidence Jayaraman as P.W.1. has stated that the present petitioner Gopalaswami without properly ascertaining the truth of the allegations mentioned by Kaliyan in his complaint against him forwarded the same to the police for investigation. In his evidence Jayaraman as P.W.1. has stated that the present petitioner Gopalaswami without properly ascertaining the truth of the allegations mentioned by Kaliyan in his complaint against him forwarded the same to the police for investigation. On this the local police registered a case and that his reputation was lowered because he was called by the police for investigation and that he had written to the Superintendent of Police to take action against the petitioner for the offence under Sec. 211, I.P.C. Now Gopalaswami the first accused in C.C.No. 153 of 1990 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Porto Novo has come forward with this application under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to call for the records in that case and quash the proceedings. 3. Ms.N.S. Nappinai, learned counsel for the quash petitioner submits that the complaint preferred by respondent Jayaraman in C.C.No. 153 of 1990 for an offence under Sec. 500, I.P.C. against him is not maintainable as he is not the author of the complaint in Crime No. 183 of 1990. That complaint was preferred only by Kaliyan and what the present petitioner did was to forward it to police for investigation. Any citizen is entitled to complain before the police about any offence which he bona fide thinks has been committed by the offender and his intention was not to injure the reputation of Jayaraman. In case, the petitioner and Kaliyan had desired the police to use their lawful power to injure the reputation of Jayaraman with allegations in the complaint, or if any false charge of offence with intent to injure had been filed, the respondent should have moved the police to proceed under Sec.182 or 211 of the Indian Penal Code. Instead of doing so, he has chosen to prefer the complaint himself for the offence under Sec. 500, I.P.C. In any event under Eighth Exception to Sec. 499, I.P.C, it is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject of accusation. As the illustration to section indicates, if in good faith accuses before a Magistrate, ‘A’ is within this exception. 4. As the illustration to section indicates, if in good faith accuses before a Magistrate, ‘A’ is within this exception. 4. Learned counsel for the quash petitioner further submits that a complaint under Sec. 500, I.P.C., cannot be made to circumvent legal hurdles in prosecuting a petition under Sec.182 or 211, I.P.C. He substantiates his argument by placing reliance on the decision in Mohammed Ali v. N.A.S. Ansari, 1988 L.W. (Crl.) 491. There a complaint was filed before the police alleging that the respondent broke open the petitioner’s premises. It was enquired into and was reported that the matter was of a civil nature and no prosecution could be launched. The respondent thereupon filed a private complaint against petitioners for an offence under Sec. 500, I.P.C. It was taken on file by the Magistrate and sworn statement was recorded, and thereafter, though a formal charge was not framed, the accused was examined and were asked whether they pleaded guilty or not. At this stage, the petitioners moved this Court for calling for the records of the case and quashing the proceedings contending that the fact of filing a report to the police against the respondent will not constitute prima facie an offence under Sec.499 of the Indian Penal Code, since any citizen is entitled to complain before police about any offence which he bona fide thinks has been committed by the other party. Davoid Annousamy, J., has held that when a person goes to the police station to file a complaint against another person, he assumes a big responsibility and takes a risk. His intention is not then to injure the reputation of the person against whom the complaint is filed. His intention is to see that the other person is prosecuted. If any complaint is filed with intent to cause the public servant to use his lawful power to injure another person or if any false charge of offence with intent to injure is filed, the concerned person can complain of offence under Sec.182 or 211, Indian Penal Code respectively. In that case, the complainant has not chosen to do so. The complainant knowing well that hurdles are existing in prosecuting the party under the above sections has attempted to circumvent the legal hurdles by filing a petition under Sec.500, Indian Penal Code. Therefore, on the face of it there is no intention to harm the reputation. In that case, the complainant has not chosen to do so. The complainant knowing well that hurdles are existing in prosecuting the party under the above sections has attempted to circumvent the legal hurdles by filing a petition under Sec.500, Indian Penal Code. Therefore, on the face of it there is no intention to harm the reputation. When the law has made provision for any false complaint to lawful authority, this complaint before the Magistrate for an offence under Sec.500 will not lie. 5. In Ponnuchamy, Inspector of Police, Trichy Air Port v. Suyambanandam, 1989 L.W. (Crl.) 411, the petitioner was the Inspector of Police at Thisayan-vilai and one A.M.Subbaraj was the Sub-Inspector of Police at the Uvari Police Station, which was under the jurisdiction of the petitioner. In respect of the suspicious death of one Ramasamy Nadar, his brother Chidambaranathan, preferred a complaint before the Uvari Police Station, which was registered as Crime No. 145 of 1985 by the Sub-Inspector of Police, under Sec.174, Crl.P.C. The petitioner on completion of investigation filed the charge sheet against the son, son-in-law of the deceased and seven others. When the trial in the Sessions Court was coming to a close, the first accused herein preferred a private complaint against the petitioner and four others, which has resulted in P.R.C.No. 8 of 1986. The petitioners sought to quash the proceedings in P.R.C.No. 8 of 1986 contending that the averments made in the complaint disclose certain offences, alleged to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in court, which the trial court cannot take cognizance of on a private complaint by the respondent, since the complaint, if any, must be in writing by the court, or some other superior court. Circumvention of the provisions of Sec.195, Crl.P.C. cannot be permitted. Arunachalam, J. has held that as far as the offences under Secs.194, 195 and 211, I.P.C. are concerned, there is a legal bar of the Magistrate to take cognizance except on a complaint in writing by the court or some other court to which that court is subordinate. It is clear that the charge-sheet had been filed before the committal court and the proceedings are now pending before the Court of Sessions in relation to Crime No. 145 of 1985. The complaint for these offences may gave to be made either by the Committal Magistrate or by the Court of Sessions. It is clear that the charge-sheet had been filed before the committal court and the proceedings are now pending before the Court of Sessions in relation to Crime No. 145 of 1985. The complaint for these offences may gave to be made either by the Committal Magistrate or by the Court of Sessions. This may also be possible, after the trial in S.C.No. 237 of 1987 is concluded. At this stage, it is apparent that to circumvent the provision of Sec.195, Crl.P.C., this private complaint has been filed, implicating the petitioner for an offence under Sec.506(II), I.P.C. alone. The attitude of the prosecution to circumvent Sec.195, Crl.P.C by resorting to prosecute for other offences, without attempting to move the court or the officer concerned for taking action under Sec.195, Crl.P.C, cannot be allowed to stand. Learned counsel for the respondent would only submit that the prosecution for an offence under Sec. 506(2), I.P.C. will still be maintainable, irrespective of the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Once it is patent that circumvention of the provision of Sec.195, Crl.P.C, has been attempted by the respondent, the proceedings will have to be quashed against the petitioner. 6. In the case on hand also had the complaint in Crime No. 183 of 1990 been instituted to cause harm to the reputation of Jayaraman, that would have attracted only the provisions of Sec.182 or 211 of the Indian Penal Code. Sec.182 deals with giving a false information with intention to cause public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another person. Whoever, with intent to cause injury to any person, institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding against that person, or falsely charges any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge against that person, is liable to be punished under Sec. 211, I.P.C. However, both the offences of giving false "formation to a public officer under Sec.182, I.P.C, or making a false accusation under Sec. 211, I.P.C. cannot be taken cognizance of by a Magistrate as per Sec.195, Crl.P.C. in the absence of a complaint by a public servant concerned or of some authority to whom the public servant is subordinate. So the contention of learned counsel for the quash petitioner is well founded. So the contention of learned counsel for the quash petitioner is well founded. Where it is clear that the publication was to a person in authority and was really intended to give information about some offences with a view to get redress or protection, the offence, if any, must be only the furnishing of false information or the making of a false accusation. It cannot be said that the offence of defamation is also committed simply because some part of the information or the accusation maybe found to be defamatory and false. So on the ratio laid down in the two decisions referred to above the complaint laid under Sec.500, I.P.C, instead of Sec. 182 or 211, I.P.C, to circumvent the provisions of Sec.195, Crl.P.C, cannot be allowed to stand. 7. The next submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that no offence under Sec. 500, I.P.C. can be made out, since allegations are covered by Exception 8 to Sec. 499, I.P.C. is also well founded. In Ponpandian v. Chinnasamy, 1984 T.L.N.J. 435, the respondent preferred a complaint against the petitioners under Sec. 500, I.P.C, on the allegations that the petitioners prepared a complaint and obtained signatures thereto from the natives of Koozha Eral and presented the same to the Sub-Inspector of Police, Ettayapuram, containing false allegations which are defamatory. According to the petitioners, the very complaint itself was an abuse of the process of court, as on the material there was nocase for trial. The main contention of the quash petitioners was that the impugned complaint given to the police was an absolutely privileged one and as such no action could be taken under Sec. 500, I.P.C. It was contended by the respondent that under Exception 8 to Sec. 499, I.P.C. the petitioners must prove good faith and this question can be considered only at the appropriate stage in the trial and the complaint cannot be quashed. Natarajan, J. has held that on the face of the allegation stated in the complaint there was no malice or ill-will attributed to the accused. So the necessity to undergo ordeal of the trial by the petitioners/accused was nothing but harassment and abuse of the process of court. And hence, the complaint was liable to be quashed. Natarajan, J. has held that on the face of the allegation stated in the complaint there was no malice or ill-will attributed to the accused. So the necessity to undergo ordeal of the trial by the petitioners/accused was nothing but harassment and abuse of the process of court. And hence, the complaint was liable to be quashed. In the present case also, even as per the allegations in the complaint the overt-act attributed to the quash petitioner was that he had forwarded to the police for investigation the complaint preferred by Kaliyan. In the absence of any malice or ill-will attributed to him no offence under Sec.500, I.P.C. is made out. 8. In Ayyavu Konar v. Chelliah, 1984 L.W. (Crl.) 115, the allegations against the respondent was that he gave a complaint to the Sub-Inspector alleging that the appellant was a drunkard and that he was heaping bones of human skeleton and other articles before the house of the respondent, that such complaint was given on account of prior animosity and that on account of this complaint his reputation in the eyes of the public was lowered. Maheswaran, J. has held that even assuming that the allegations made against the appellant were found to be false, the complaint only disclosed an offence of giving false information to a public officer or of making a false accusation and will not amount to defamation within the meaning of Sec.500, I.P.C. Simply because some portion of the complaint was found to be defamatory, it cannot be said that the respondent was guilty of offence under Sec.500, I.P.C, because under the 8th Exception to Sec.499, I.P.C, it is no defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority with respect to the subject matter of accusation. 9.In re. P. Ramaswami Mudaliar, (1938)1 M.L.J. 810 , the petitioner was accused as a man of dangerous character and it was the duty of the police to protect law-abiding citizens and in support of it the respondent therein was mentioned as one of those gentleman liable to be imperilled. The police officer required the accused to submit a written statement in answer to the allegation. The petitioner submitted accordingly his answers on the strength of which the respondent lodged a complaint against him for defamation. The police officer required the accused to submit a written statement in answer to the allegation. The petitioner submitted accordingly his answers on the strength of which the respondent lodged a complaint against him for defamation. Venkataramana Rao, J., has held that the statements having been made on a privilege occasion under Sec.161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, they would certainly come within the Exception of Sec.499 of the Indian Penal Code. 10. In Bapalal and Co. v. Krishnaswami Iyer, A.I.R. 1941 Mad. 26, King, J., has held that a complaint to a police officer from its very nature as a statement which the complainant is prepared later, if called upon to do so, to substantiate upon oath is absolutely privileged. On the same principles it is evident that in the present case also no offence under Sec.500, I.P.C. is made out against petitioner Gopalaswami even if we are to take that the accusations in Cr.No. 183 of 1990 are false. 11. No doubt, the High Court ought not to interfere ordinarily by way of quashing a complaint by invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Sec. 482, Crl.P.C. But when the charge appears to be prima facie groundless, it is an obvious duty to interfere without subjecting a person to the unnecessary harassment of a trial. I think this is a fit case in which I ought to interfere and quash the proceedings. 12. In the result, the petition is allowed and the proceedings in C.C.No. 153 of 1990 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Porto Novo are accordingly quashed.