MATHUR, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revision Application arises out of an old litigation which has vexed the parties for over three decades. Now the petitioner seeks direction to quash judgment dated 5-5-1989 passed by the Extra Asstt. Judge, vadodara upholding the order dated 6-12-1983 passed by the Addl. Small Causes court, Vadodara in execution proceedings initiated in the year 1965 for execution of a compromise decree passed in the year 1963. ( 2 ) NON-PETITIONER No. 1, who will now be referred to as the original plaintiff had filed Rent Suit for possession of the premises described in para 1 of the plaint, situated in Gajrawadi in the City of Vadodara against deceased Joravarsinh Chhatrasinh, who was the father-in-law of the present petitioner-Dhirajben Hariprasad, who will now be referred to as original defendant. The said suit registered as Civil Suit No. 741 of 1963, was decreed as compromise decree dated 7-11-1963. As per the compromise the defendant was allowed two years time for vacating the premises. But, the defendant did not vacate the suit premises and therefore, the plaintiff filed an Execution Application in the Court of Civil Judge (J. D.) Vadodara, which was registered as Execution Application No. 309 of 1965. This application was renumbered as Rent Darkhast No. 11 of 1975 in the Small causes Court, Vadodara, which was established in the year 1975. The possession of the suit room was delivered on 16-3-1982. During the pendency of the execution application, the original plaintiff filed application exh. 75 with a prayer that the possession of the open land surrounding the suit room may be handed over to him as the said open land was appertained to the rented premises. The executing Court after holding enquiry including recording of evidence, arrived at a conclusion that the open land surrounding the suit room was a land appertained to the rented premises, and as such he issued a possession warrant below Exh. 5 of the execution application. The original defendant preferred an appeal against the said order to the Court of the Assistant Judge, Vadodara. The Learned assistant Judge, after examining the entire matter in depth and detail, arrived at a conclusion that the original plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the open land which was appertained to the rented premises. 5 of the execution application. The original defendant preferred an appeal against the said order to the Court of the Assistant Judge, Vadodara. The Learned assistant Judge, after examining the entire matter in depth and detail, arrived at a conclusion that the original plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the open land which was appertained to the rented premises. The learned judge was of the view that the open land in question is only for the common use rented to the original defendant, i. e. , to say, for the better use of the room rented to the original defendant. The learned Judge negatived the contention that there was a separate tenancy for the open land in question. While dealing with the contention of the original defendant with respect to the rule of natural justice, the learned Judge observed as follows :"the original defendant has claimed Rule of natural justice. But at the same time, the original defendant forgets the Rule of equity. The Rule of natural justice says that fair trial should be done and for that every party should be given a chance to produce the evidence and to produce their proper presentation in the matter. But at the same time, the Rule of equity says that if the plea taken by one party, on flimsy ground or unsustainable reason, such grounds or pleadings should be stopped and at the same time, such abuse of the process of the Court should be stopped. Not only that, but in such a matter, the Court should not be a party to such abuse of the process of law. So in the case before me, as discussed above, when the pleadings of the separate tenancy is not tenable as per Regular Civil Suit No. 190 of 1989 then, the original defendant cannot be given chance to waste the time and to drag the original plaintiff in unnecessary litigation on unsustainable grounds taken in previous litigations and also in Regular Civil Suit No. 130 of 1982 and after such a long time, if this process should be stopped and execution proceedings should be proceeded further. "in view of the finding, the learned Judge dismissed the appeal. "in view of the finding, the learned Judge dismissed the appeal. ( 3 ) BEFORE proceeding to examine the case on merit, it will be necessary to recapitulate the facts with respect to different suits and applications filed by or at the instance of the original defendant during the pendency of the execution application. It may be recalled that the original suit No. 741 of 1963 was decreed on 17-6-1963 and the execution application was filed in the year 1965. During the pendency of the said execution application, one hariharprasad Shankarprasad, a friend of the original defendant filed a Suit which was registered as Civil Suit No, 973 of 1965 stating that he was the tenant in the suit premises. The said suit was dismissed and the appeal filed against the same was also dismissed. The Second Appeal filed by the said hariharprasad Shankarprasad was also dismissed by order dated 1-6-1968. In the second spell, Hariprasad Thakor, son of the original defendant filed a suit which was registered as Civil Suit No. 1894 of 1971 stating that the decree in the Regular Civil Suit No. 741 of 1963 from his father was collusive. In the said suit Application Exh. 5 was filed. The application was rejected by the order passed below Exh. 5. An appeal was preferred which was registered as Appeal No. 10 of 1972, but the said appeal was also dismissed and ultimately the suit was withdrawn. In the third spell the original defendant filed a Civil suit which was registered as Civil Suit No. 515 of 1973 stating that the decree obtained in Civil Suit No. 741 of 1963 was nullity as the plaintiff obtained the same by fraud. The matter came up before the High Court in Second appeal. It was found that the compromise decree was passed as a result of a lawful agreement entered into between the parties. While disposing the Second appeal, this Court, (Coram : A. M. Ahmadi, J. as he then was) observed as follows :"the appellant after entering into a compromise and after having obtained time to vacate, has started this second cycle of litigation to postpone the evil day. "in the fourth spell the original defendant filed application Exh. 65 in Execution Application No. 11 of 1975 which was also rejected. In the fifth spell a Suit No. 103 of 1982 was filed by the original defendant. "in the fourth spell the original defendant filed application Exh. 65 in Execution Application No. 11 of 1975 which was also rejected. In the fifth spell a Suit No. 103 of 1982 was filed by the original defendant. In this suit the defendant has obtained ex-parte stay order restraining the defendant in that suit from executing the original decree with respect to the open land. This ex-parte injunction was vacated by order dated 1- 12-1983. Thereafter the impugned order dated 6-12-1983 was passed by the Additional Judge, Small Causes Court, Vadodara, issuing the warrant for possession. ( 4 ) SHRI A. J. Patel, learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Courts below had no jurisdiction to entertain application Exh. 75 for issuance of warrant for possession because the Darkhast for execution of the consent decree was already disposed of on 8-3-1982. There was nothing left which was required to be done in the said Darkhast which would have entitled the decree-holder to make an application for possession of the premises in question. He has invited my attention to Exh. 73 to show that the consent decree was fully satisfied inasmuch as the possession of the room was delivered and so the decree was fully satisfied. Nothing further was required to be done in pursuance of the said decree. It is also contended that the Court below committed an error in holding an enquiry with respect to the open land and returning the finding that it was the land appertained to the room rented out to the original defendant. It is urged that it was not open for the executing Court to go beyond the decree. The learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1961 SC 137 in the case of K. M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay. Mr. Patel has also brought to my notice the statement of the original plaintiff, Chimanlal Shah in Regular Civil Suit no. 515 of 1973. The said Chimanlal had deposed that he had not given on rent any other space except one room to the plaintiff. He has also stressed on the memorandum of possession dated 16-3-1982 in which the plaintiff has stated that there does not exist any dispute with respect to the possession of the suit room. 515 of 1973. The said Chimanlal had deposed that he had not given on rent any other space except one room to the plaintiff. He has also stressed on the memorandum of possession dated 16-3-1982 in which the plaintiff has stated that there does not exist any dispute with respect to the possession of the suit room. The memorandum is in Gujarati and the english translation of the relevant portion reads as follows :"i, Harshadbhai Chimanlal, on behalf of the plaintiff pass this receipt that the vacant possession of the suit-room described in the possession warrant Exh. 5 has been received in the presence of the Panchas today through the intervention of the Court, and I have applied my own lock after closing the door of the said room, and has taken over possession of the suit room in the presence of the Panchas on the spot. and now there does not exist any dispute with respect to possession of the suit-room. "mr. Patel has also invited my attention towards the prayer clause of the suit. ( 5 ) ON the other hand, the learned Counsel for the original plaintiff mr. P. B. Majmudar has argued that the learned Court below was right in holding enquiry with respect to the open land as to whether it was a land appertained to the rented premises or not, under Sec. 47 of the code of Civil Procedure and all objections relating to the execution, satisfaction and discharge of the decree can be decided by the executing court. He has also invited my attention to application Exh. 68 filed by the original defendant in Darkhast No. 11 of 1975 in which it was prayed that for handing over the possession of the suit property, he may be granted one months time. The English translation of the relevant part of the application is extracted and reproduced as under :"that against the order passed by this Honble Court for handing over of possession and for payment of additional costs of Rs. 1,000. 00, we had preferred Revision application Appeal in the Honble High Court of Gujarat which is partly allowed by the Honble Gujarat High Court and the order for payment of additional costs of Rs. 1,000. 00 is set aside and ordered to hand over possession. 1,000. 00, we had preferred Revision application Appeal in the Honble High Court of Gujarat which is partly allowed by the Honble Gujarat High Court and the order for payment of additional costs of Rs. 1,000. 00 is set aside and ordered to hand over possession. We, the defendants, hereby prays that for handing over the possession of the suit property, we want some time. Therefore, one months time may be given for handing over possession. We hereby give specific undertaking to this Honble Court that the possession of the suit property is with us and that we will without any dispute, hand over the same to the plaintiff and that we would not hand over the same to any other person. Therefore, one months time may kindly be granted for handing over possession of the suit premises. " ( 6 ) MR. P. B. Majmudar, learned Counsel for the respondents has strenuously urged that the history of the case exposes the conduct of the original defendant, which, on the Rule of equity disentitles him to any relief from the Court. ( 7 ) I have considered the rival contentions of the parties. So far as the proposition of law that the execution Court cannot go beyond the decree or amend the decree is concerned, there is no dispute over it. There can also be no dispute with regard to the proposition that once a decree is satisfied, it cannot be put to execution again. But the executing Court to identify the property, possession of which is to be delivered for the satisfaction of the decree, can hold necessary enquiry. By doing so the executing Court would not incur any reproach that it is going behind the decree under Sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure; all objections relating to the execution, satisfaction and discharge of a decree can be decided by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. Therefore, the executing Court was right in holding an enquiry to identify as to whether the open land in question is a land appertained to the suit premises, i. e. , the room. Premises has been defined in Sec. 5 (8) of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rates Control act, 1947 which reads as under :"5. Therefore, the executing Court was right in holding an enquiry to identify as to whether the open land in question is a land appertained to the suit premises, i. e. , the room. Premises has been defined in Sec. 5 (8) of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rates Control act, 1947 which reads as under :"5. In this Act unless there is anything repugnant to the subject or context : (8) premises means- (b) any building or part of a building let separately (other than a farm building) including - (1) the garden, grounds, garages and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building. "thus, the premises includes garden, grounds, garages and out-houses if any, appurtenant to such building or part of the building. Both the courts below have arrived at the conclusion that the subject open land is only for the use to come and go to the room rented to the original defendant and as such it may be considered as ground appertained to the rented premises. This fact does not call for any interference by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. ( 8 ) IN the above view of the matter, the Supreme Court authority as cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in DO way helps on the facts of this case. So far as the admission of the original defendant is concerned, this has to be read in the context in which the statement was made. The said statement was made by the original plaintiff in a suit filed by the original defendant claiming that the open land was rented out to him by a separate tenancy. The son of the original defendant in his deposition Exh. 107 has not accepted the suggestion that the disputed room and partly open land were given on rent to them separately. English translation of the relevant portion of his statement is extracted and reproduced as under :"the say of the defendant that the disputed room and partly open land were given on rent to them separately and that they were separately givin rent is not correct. The day on which we got possession of the disputed room through the Court or on the next day. deceased Hariprasad filed Civil Suit No. 130 of 1982 and obtained stay that we should not take possession of the disputed land in this matter. The day on which we got possession of the disputed room through the Court or on the next day. deceased Hariprasad filed Civil Suit No. 130 of 1982 and obtained stay that we should not take possession of the disputed land in this matter. The Court had vacated that stay and against that order, deceased Hariprasad preferred Misc. Appeal no. 252/8 and asked for stay and the Court granted stay but afterwards, vacated and also dismissed the appeal. Appeal memo and the judgment therein are at 106/1 and 106/2 and they are given at Ex. 108, 109. " ( 9 ) IT is next argued that at worst the original defendants stay on the land would be that of a trespasser and in such eventuality, he can be dispossessed only in accordance with law, i. e. , by way of separate suits. It may be stated that it is evident from the different suits and applications filed by the original defendant during the pendency of the execution application that there is a categorical finding of the Civil Court that there was no separate tenancy with respect to the subject open land. On the contrary there is a finding of fact that the open land is a land appertained to the rented premises. The Supreme court in the case of Board of Mining Examination v. Ramjee, reported in air 1977 SC 965 while dealing with grievance with respect to compliance of principles of natural justice, observed as follows :"natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cureall. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. " ( 10 ) IN the present case, it would be unjust to expose the parties to a fresh round of litigation. Whatever objections possible which the original defendant can have, has been raised by way of filing suits and applications and has successfully abused the process of the Courts by delaying the execution of the decree which was passed way back in 1963. Whatever objections possible which the original defendant can have, has been raised by way of filing suits and applications and has successfully abused the process of the Courts by delaying the execution of the decree which was passed way back in 1963. ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this Revision application and the same deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly. Rule discharged. There shall be no order as to costs. After pronouncement of the above order, Mr. J. M. Patel appearing for mr. A. J. Patel, learned Counsel for the petitioner prays that the interim order granted by this Court be continued for a period of two months. Mr. P. B. Majmudar. learned Counsel for the respondents says that he has no objection if a short time is given. In view of the matter, following further order is passed : that the petitioner shall not be dispossessed from the subject-premises for a period of two months, provided - (a) the petitioner furnishes an undertaking to the effect that she will not transfer or alienate the subject-property; (b) she will handed over the vacant possession of the subject-premises on expiry of two months, i. e. , on or before 30/09/1994; (c) the petitioner shall file such undertaking in this Court within a period of 10 days from today. In case she fails to do so within a period of 10 days, the order of Addl. Small Causes Court, Vadodara dated 6-12- 1983 will sustain. .