Anil Dev Singh ( 1 ) THIS is a writ petition challenging the order of thelabour Court, Delhi dated 5/10/1974 whereby the second respondent (workman) was held entitled to receive back wages for the period September 1,197 1/07/1973, at the rate of Rs. 144. 00 p. m. amounting to Rs. 3,292. 00, from thepetitioner (employer ). Facts as appear from petition are as under:- ( 2 ) PETITIONER is a manufacturer of Hosiery goods at Delhi. Respondent No. 2was working with the petitioner as a cutter. On 12/07/1972 respondent No. 2 filedan application before the Labour Court, Delhi, in the form of a "statement of claim",with the allegations inter-alia, that he was appointed as a cutter by the management on piece rate basis with effect from 19/10/1970, that the petitionerrefused to give him work from 1/09/1971 and that his monthly wagesranged between Rs. 250. 00-350 per month. On 24/10/1992 statement of thesecond respondent was recorded by the Labour Court wherein he stated that hewas appointed as a cutter and was earning Rs. 250. 00 to Rs. 350. 00 per month on piece rate fbasis. On 18/07/1973 Labour Court made an award whereby it was inter-alia heldthat the second respondent was entitled to half the back wages from the date of hisremoval till 1/08/1973 and also directed that he will be continued in service. According to the award the monthly wages of the petitioner were required to becalculated by taking his three months average salary, preceding the date on whichhe was removed. It is the case of the petitioner that after the award, the secondrespondent was approached by the petitioner to join duty but he failed to do so andinstead filed an application under Section 33-C (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947 (for short the Act ). However, the Labour Welfare Officer advised the saidrespondent to move an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act. Consequently,the respondent moved an application under Section 33-C (2) before the Labourcourt. The Labour Court by its order dated 5/10/1974 directed the petitionerto continue the second respondent in service and to pay a sum of Rs. 3,292. 00 to himfor the period for which he was refused work. The petitioner feeling aggrieved bythe order of the Labour Court, moved the present petition and this is how thematter is before this Court. ( 3 ) MR. 3,292. 00 to himfor the period for which he was refused work. The petitioner feeling aggrieved bythe order of the Labour Court, moved the present petition and this is how thematter is before this Court. ( 3 ) MR. Aggarwal, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits thatthe application of the second respondent under Section 33-C (2) before the Labourcourt was not maintainable inasmuch as the same was filed pursuant to the awardof the Labour Court and the respondent could have moved only under Section 33-C (1 ). It is the submission of the learned Counsel that the application lay to thecentral Government only as is provided in Section 33-C (1) itself. ( 4 ) THERE is no one present on behalf of the second respondent to oppose thepetition. In the circumstances, I have no option but to decide the matter in absenceof the Counsel for the said respondent. ( 5 ) IN order to appreciate the submission advanced by the learned Counsel forthe petitioner, it would be appropriate to extract Section 33-C of the Act in so far asit is relevant, for the purpose of the resolution of the controversy. " (1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under asettlement or an award or under the provisions of (Chapter V-A orchapter V-B), the workman himself or any other person authorised byhim in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman,his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode ofrecovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for therecovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Governmentis satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for thatamount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in thesame manner as an arrear of land revenue:provided that every such application shall be made within one yearfrom the date on which the money became due to the workman fromthe employer:provided further that any such application may be entertained afterthe expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not makingthe application within the said period. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer anymoney or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms ofmoney and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or asto the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then thequestion may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, bedecided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by theappropriate Government (within a period not exceeding three months):provided that where the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court considers it necessaryor expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend suchperiod by such further period as he may think fit. " ( 6 ) ACCORDING to Section 33-C (1) a workman to whom any money is due froman employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter 5 Aor 5b may move an application to the appropriate Government for recovery ofmoney due to him. Therefore, for invoking Section 33-C (1) a workman has todemonstrate that money is due to him under a settlement or an award or under theprovisions of Chapter 5 A or 5b of the Act. On the other hand under Section 33-C (2)of the Act a claim before the Labour Court not based on settlements, awards ormade under the provisions of Chapter 5a or5b thereof may also be competent butthe aforesaid three categories of claims mentioned in Section 33-C (1) are notexcluded therefrom and fall within its purview and field of operation. Section 33-C (2) has a wider scope than Section 33-C (1 ). The words limiting the area ofoperation of Section 33-C (1) are not to be found in Section 33-C (2 ). Section 33-C (2)applies when a workman has an existing established right to receive from theemployer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms ofmoney and in such an eventuality he can move the Labour Court for realisation ofthe amount due to him. ( 7 ) THE history of the legislation, as noticed by the Supreme Court in Thecentral Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. R Rajagopalan etc. ( 7 ) THE history of the legislation, as noticed by the Supreme Court in Thecentral Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. R Rajagopalan etc. AIR 1964 S. C. 743, indicatesthat Section 33-C of the Act was inserted for providing speedy remedy to enforcethe individual existing rights of the workmen falling within its purview, withouthaving to take recourse to Section 10 (l)of the Act or without the aid of their unionsto espouse their cause. As already noticed the words of limitation which are foundin Section 33-C (1) are missing in Section 33-C (2) to make its operation go beyondthe operation of Section 33-C (1) and give it a wider magnitude. If the operation ofsection 33-C (2) is wider than Section 33-C (1), it does not stand to reason why a casewhere the workman who has an existing right to recover the money due to himunder the award, settlement and under Chapter 5a and 5b or otherwise cannotinvoke Section 33-C (2) especially when the employer does not dispute the right ofthe workman. The Supreme Court in The Central Bank of India v. P. S. Rajagopalan (supra) has laid down that the three categories of claims mentioned insection 33-C (1) also fall under Section 33-C (2):- "it is unnecessary in the present appeals either to state exhaustively or even to indicate broadly what other categories of claims can fall undersec. 33-C (2 ). There is no doubt that the three categories of claims mentioned in Sec. 33-C (1)fall under Sec. 33-C (2) and in that sense. Sec. 33-C (2) can itself be deemed tobe a kind of execution proceedings; but it is possible that claims not based onsettlements, awards or made under the provisions of Chapter VA, may alsobe competent under Sec. 33-C (2) and that may illustrate its wider scope. " ( 8 ) THEREFORE, it follows that classes of claims which are mentioned in Section33-C (1), can still attract the provisions of Section 33-C (2) especially in a case like thepresent one. As is apparent from the impugned order the petitioner in its affidavitbefore the Conciliation Officer admitted that the average earning of the workmanfor the months of June, July and August, 1971 be taken as Rs. 28,799. 00. In view ofthere being no controversy over this aspect, the claim would squarely fall undersection 33-C (2) of the Act. As is apparent from the impugned order the petitioner in its affidavitbefore the Conciliation Officer admitted that the average earning of the workmanfor the months of June, July and August, 1971 be taken as Rs. 28,799. 00. In view ofthere being no controversy over this aspect, the claim would squarely fall undersection 33-C (2) of the Act. Once there is an admission of the existing right of theworkman by the employer in regard to the benefit which the former is entitled toreceive from the latter. Section 33-C (2) of the Act would come into play. Learnedcounsel for the petitioner cited various decisions of the Supreme Court and of thiscourt as also of the Patna High Court namely, Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. K. L. Kharbanda, AIR 1963 S. C. 487, U. P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. R. K. Shukla and Others, 1970 3 Labour Industrial Cases 276; S. Manomani v. The Labour Courtquilon and Another, 1969 2 Labour Industrial Cases 1448 and Bharat Kalakendra Private Limited v. Ved Prakash Agarwal and Others, 1974 28 Indianfactories and Labour Reports 244, in order to draw a distinction between theprovisions of Section 33-C (1) and 33-C (2 ). These authorities are of no assistance tothe learned Counsel for the petitioner as in none of the above cases there was avirtual admission of the right of the workman by the employer before the Labourcourt as in the present case. In any event, before the Labour Court the petitioner didnot plead or urge that Section 33-C (2) of the Act was not attracted or the Labourcourt did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the second respondentunder it. Before the Labour Court there was not even a whisper of the plea that theclaim of the respondent would fall under Section 33-C (1) and not under Section 33-C (2 ). The petitioner is raising the controversy for the first time in the writ petition. A small man had been held entitled to a small sum of money 20 years back by thelabour Court. He cannot be denied this sum on a hypertechnical plea, which wasnot raised before the Labour Court. ( 9 ) I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order of the Labour Court. Consequently the petition is dismissed but without any order as to costs.