VK Khanna, C.J.- This appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 12th July, 1994 in Civil Rule No. 3105 of 1993. 2. At the very out-set we may note that at the admission stage we have heard Mr. AK Phukan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-petitioner and Mr. KC Das, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent No. 3. As interpretation of the Assam Excise Rules (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') was also involved we have heard Mr. SN Bhuyan, learned Advocate General, Assam appearing for the State of Assam. The present appeal is being finally disposed of after hearing the -learned counsel for the parties. 3. The short controversy which has been raised in the present appeal is in respect of settlement of country liquor shop No. 13 Sarusarai CS Shop for the term 1993-96. The shop was settled for the aforesaid years in favour of the petitioner-appellant. Three appeals were preferred by unsuccessful tenderers before the Assam Board of Revenue against the decision of the Deputy Commissioner, Jorhat settling the aforesaid shop in favour of the appellant-petitioner. The Board of Revenue by its order dated J 5.10.93 set aside the settlement which had been granted in favour of the petitioner-appellant after recording the finding that of all the tenderers who had submitted tenders for settlement of the country liquor shop for the years 1993-96, the tender of respondent No. 3 Mr. Iftaqul Hussain was only valid and thus the shop has been ordered to be settled with him. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the Board of Revenue, Civil Rule No. 3105 of 1993 was preferred by the petitioner-appellant. The learned Single Judge under the impugned order rejected the writ petition and has upheld the decision given by the Board of Revenue. 4. Mr. Phukan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant has challenged the order passed by the learned Single Judge and the Board of Revenue on the ground that along with the tender filed by the petitioner-appellant complete evidence was filed which clearly proved the financial viabi­lity of the petitioner-appellant and the findings recorded to the contrary by the Board of Revenue and by the learned Single Judge are liable to be set aside. 5. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties first on the question as to what are the matters which ought to have been taken into consideration by the Board of Revenue at the time of adjudication of the appeal for the purposes of finding out as to which of the tenderers was entitled to get settle­ment for the relevant years 1993-96. 6. It is not disputed that in the present appeal the controversy is confined only to the category of unemployed youth which has been given a preference under Rule 223 of the Rules. For a ready reference Rule 223 is being repro­duced below : "223. (1) Settlement of country spirit shops shall be made giving adequate representation to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Of the total number of shops to be settled in a sub-division, a minimum quota of such shop to be settled with persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall be fixed on the basis of population of those communities in the sub-division. (2) In making settlement to any person preference shall always be given to the educated unemployed youth or to co-operative firms formed by such educated unemployed youth. Preference shall also be given to the persons belonging to the more backward community of the Other Backward Classes. (3) While making settlement to such persons due considerations shall be given to the economic backwardness of the person seeking settlement. No person shall be considered economically backward unless the annual income of such person or his parents is less than Rs. 5,000. The direction issued by the State Govt. in this respect shall be scrupulously followed. (4) The dependants of the persons who held any country spirit shop for a total period of fifteen consecutive years shall not be entitled to settlement of such or any other country spirit shop. Note : The term 'educated unemployed youth' as mentioned in sub- rule (2) of Rule 223 means a person not exceeding 35 years of age who has passed the HSLC or its equivalent examination and is without any employment." 7. Note : The term 'educated unemployed youth' as mentioned in sub- rule (2) of Rule 223 means a person not exceeding 35 years of age who has passed the HSLC or its equivalent examination and is without any employment." 7. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid Rule it is clear that under sub-rule (I) of Rule 223 the settlement of the country spirit shop has to be made by giving adequate representation to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and minimum quota has also to be fixed on the basis of population of those communities in the sub-division. Under Rule 223 (2) the preference has been given to the educated unemployed youth or to co-operatives and co­operative firms formed by such educated unemployed youth. Under the afore­said clause preference has also been given to the persons belonging to the more backward community of the Other Backward Classes. 8. As would be evident from reading of Rule 223 (1) and (2) that preference has been given in respect of various categories of persons, the pert­inent question which arises for consideration is as to amongst these preferred categories what would be the guideline for preferring persons who fall specially under the category created under Rule 223 (2). 9. Rule 223 (3) gives a clause as to how the competent authority while making the settlement out of the tenderers falling in the preferred category will take a decision for the purpose of settling the country liquor shop. A bare perusal of Rule 223 (3) would show that no person shall be considered economically backward unless the annual income of such person or his parents is less than Rs. 5.000/-. The aforesaid guideline becomes important as the category for which preference has been given under Rule 223 (1) and (2) has been made only on the basis of economic backwardness. We are therefore of the opinion that the primary settling authority as well as the appellate authority while considering the question as to in whose favour the settlement should be made should advert itself to the important guideline which has been laid down in Rule 223 (3). This precise question along with other questions came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rajkumar Dilip Narayan Siugha vs. The Assam Board Revenue & others, ILR Gauhati Series 1980, Volume XXXII, page 99. This precise question along with other questions came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rajkumar Dilip Narayan Siugha vs. The Assam Board Revenue & others, ILR Gauhati Series 1980, Volume XXXII, page 99. In the aforesaid case it was held as follows: "Whether financial soundness is essential ? It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that if sub-rules (2) and(3) of Rule 223 are read together, as they have to be, the answer to the question whether financial soundness of an educated unemployed youth is essential for the purpose of getting settlement of an excise shop has to be negative, inas­much as sub-rule (3) in particular has shifted the emphasis which was from rich to richer, when auction system was prevalent and, when hammer used to fall in favour of the highest bidder, to poor 10 poorer. It was contended that when sub-rule (3) speaks of 'such person', it has reference to 'any person' mentioned in sub-rule (2). This seems unexceptionable. Though sub-rule (3) in terms does not speak that while giving settlement, say to an educated unemployed youth, he shall be preferred on the ground of his economic backwardness, which yardstrick has been mentioned is annual income of his or his parent being less than Rs. 5.000/-, it cannot perhaps be doubted from the language of sub-rule (3) itself that economic backwardness of an educated unemployed youth would be a very relevant consideration while making settlement. When this is read along with sub-rule (4) of Rule 36, which speaks of reservation in favour of 'educated unemployed youth with particular reference to their economic backward­ness', the matter would beyond the pale of controversy that in between two educated unemployed youths, the one who is economically backward, or more economically backward than the other has to be preferred, other things being equal." 10. As far as the case put forward by the petitioner appellant is conce­rned, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that along with the tender adequate materials had not been filed which may have shown the financial condition of the petitioner-appellant. As far as the case put forward by the petitioner appellant is conce­rned, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that along with the tender adequate materials had not been filed which may have shown the financial condition of the petitioner-appellant. Finding recorded by the Board of Revenue that the affidavit of the father of the petitioner-appellant had not been filed, in our opinion, has no relevance inasmuch as the petitioner-appellant had make out a case that the money which the father had given to him on an earlier occasion had been given to him for good and that money belonged to him. In view of the aforesaid fact it was not at all necessary for the petitioner-appellant to have filed a fresh affidavit of his father along with his tender. 11. The finding recorded by the learned Single Judge, in' our opinion, that the finding recorded by the Board of Revenue could not be interfered with as it was a finding of fact is not correct inasmuch as a finding of fact which has been recorded on the basis of evidence may not be interfered with by the writ Court unless the same is based on no evidence or is perverse. The finding which has been recorded by the Board of Revenue was on the ground that the affidavit of the father had not been filed. In view of the fact that we have observed above that the affidavit of the father was not at, all essential, we are of the opinion that the finding recorded by the Board of Revenue on that question is liable to be set aside. 12. However, the pertinent question which still remains for determination in this appeal is as to whether after recording this finding, the settlement for the years 1993-96 should remain in favour of the petitioner-appellant. In view of what we have observed, we are of the opinion that the settling authority and l\so the appellate authority have to address themselves to the guideline which has been laid down in Rule 223 (3) of the Rules. A bare perusal of the order of the Board of Revenue would show that it has not at all adverted itself to the aforesaid question neither in respect of the petitioner-appellant nor in respect of the contesting respondent No. 3 and other tenderers. 13. A bare perusal of the order of the Board of Revenue would show that it has not at all adverted itself to the aforesaid question neither in respect of the petitioner-appellant nor in respect of the contesting respondent No. 3 and other tenderers. 13. In our opinion the Board of Revenue has also to advert itself to the fact as to how much finances would be required for the purposes of running the shop which was being sought to be settled for the years 1993-96. In this connection, we may usefully refer to the provisions of Rule 246 of the Rules and also the provisions of Rule 296 of the Rules which provide a guideline to the settling authority as well as to the appellate authority for the purposes of knowing as to how much finances would be required for running a country spirit shop during the continuance of the settlement. Rule 246 precisely gives an idea of the money which would be required to be deposited towards security money, towards annual and monthly fees, towards advance deposit, etc. Rule 296 would also precisely gives an idea as to how much adequate stock has to be maintained as the stock of intoxicant shall not fall below a minimum of six days average consumption. Besides this the settling authority has also to take into consideration the amount which will have to be spent by the person in whose favour the shop is settled for paying to the out-going lessee for the purpose of purchasing stocks of liquor and also for the purpose of maintaining the establishment from where the business of selling country spirit will be undertaken by the person in whose favour the shop is settled. 14. Before parting it may also be observed that the authorities are expected to make adequate enquiries while considering the question as to whether a person falling in the category enumerated under Rule 223 (1) and (2) can be called to be economically backward. For example in the case of petitioner-appellant it has to be seen as to whether during the currency of the previous settlements of shops in his favour, he has been able to earn enough money so as to take him out from the category of preference. For example in the case of petitioner-appellant it has to be seen as to whether during the currency of the previous settlements of shops in his favour, he has been able to earn enough money so as to take him out from the category of preference. This obser­vation we are specially making in view of the fact that it has been placed before us that the present shop had been settled with the petitioner-appellant for the preceding two terms, that is, for a period of six years. 15. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 12.7.94 is set aside and the judgment of the Board of Revenue dated 15.10.93 is also set aside. The Board of Revenue will now hear the three appeals afresh in the light of the observations made by us in this judgment and in accordance with law. 16. A certified copy of this judgment will be sent to the Board of Revenue, Guwahati within a period of two weeks from today and the Board will take up the appeals for consideration within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this judgment. Till the Board of Revenue takes a final decision in all the three appeals, the shop in question will be run by the Department itself. 17. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. However, looking to the entire facts and circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.