Judgment : The accused in C.C.No. 562 of 1990 on the file of Judicial Magistrate, Kodaikanal, have filed this petition under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. praying to call for the records in the above case and quash the same. .2. Short facts are: The respondent has filed the charge sheet against the petitioners for offences under Secs.447, 427, 379 and 109, I.P.C. On 11. 1989 at about 6 a.m. at Ananda Ashramam near Fairy Falls Road, accused 1 to 4, voluntarily with the criminal intention trespassed into Srinivasagam’s pathway and entered into his premises and demolished his compound wall measuring about 250 ft. x 5 ft. valued at about Rs.25,000 and demolished the pillars at the entrance. Thus, the accused have caused damages to P.W. 1’s compound wall and pillars and hence, they are liable to be punished under Secs.447 and 427, I.P.C. In the course of the same transaction, the above accused, voluntarily with intention to commit theft have taken the two iron gates dishonestly from the possession of P.W.1 and the value of the same is Rs. 10,000 and, thus, they are liable to be punished under Sec. 379, I.P.C. Accused No. 5 owner of the Ananda Ashramam New Cottage, and neighbour of P.W.1, has abetted accused 1 to 4 to commit the offence, and hence, accused No. 5 is liable to be punished under Sec. 109, I.P.C. 3. Mr.M.K. Srirangam, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, would submit that in respect of the very same property a civil suit was filed by the accused in O.S.No. 204 of 1987 on the file of District Munsif, Kodaikanal and interim injunction was obtained and consequently the suit ended in a compromise, by virtue of which the accused have purchased the disputed property and have also agreed that the complainant should take steps for withdrawal of the case and that in view of the above circumstances and material on record the entire proceedings are liable to be quashed. Per contra, Mr. Raja, learned Government Advocate, would submit that the materials placed before the court below are overwhelming to substantiate the charge. The Court below had rightly dismissed the petition praying for discharge and there are no grounds to quash the proceedings. 4. I have carefully considered the submissions made by rival counsels. .5. I have already given in brief the allegations made in the charge sheet. The Court below had rightly dismissed the petition praying for discharge and there are no grounds to quash the proceedings. 4. I have carefully considered the submissions made by rival counsels. .5. I have already given in brief the allegations made in the charge sheet. The First Information Report was given by P.W.1 Srinivasagam. In the F.I.R. he has stated that one Raju is employed by him as watchman for looking after his bungalow, and that the said Raju is staying in the bungalow and is taking care of it. On 11. 1989 at 4p.m.Raju contacted him over phone to Madurai and informed him that the accused 1 to 5 trespassed into the premises of his bungalow and had damaged the front gate and two pillars and his compound wall to a length of 200 ft. and requested him to immediately come over there. On receiving this information, he rushed to Kodaikanal and on the way he had informed the Deputy Superintendent of Police at Nilakkottai and then reached the scene place. He found that at the instigation and supervision of the accused, his compound wall was demolished and in its place they have been constructing a wall of their own and he had suffered damages to an extent of Rs.25,000 because of the damage of his properties. The value of the gate which was removed by them was Rs.10,000. Hence the complaint. The complaint was registered and the respondent had investigated the case. From the copy of the observation Mahazar I find that the damages to the compound wall and missing of the iron gate at the entrance were all noted in the observation mahazar. The complainant was examined and his statement was recorded under Sec. 161(3), Crl.P.C. Raju, the watchman, who gave the information to the complainant was also examined and his further statement was recorded under Sec.161(3), Crl.P.C., so far as the complainant is concerned, he had repeated what he had stated in the F.I.R. so far as Raju is concerned, he has stated about the damages caused to the compound wall of the complainant and removal of the iron gates by them and about the trepass into the premises of his employer by the accused. Thus, there are materials available from the statements recorded under Sec. 161(3), Crl.P.C. .6. Thus, there are materials available from the statements recorded under Sec. 161(3), Crl.P.C. .6. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, there was a pending suit with regard to the same property. The copy of the plaint in O.S.No. 204 of 1987 is filed in the typed set. In para 8 of the plaint it is averred that the suit is laid for an injunction to restrain the defendants, their agents, men and servants from in any way interfering with the plaintiff’s right to use the common road north of his property to reach the suit property. The prayer in the plaint includes permanent injunction restraining the defendants from preventing the plaintiff from using the pathway and also for permanent injunction restraining them from in any way interfering with the plaintiffs possession of ‘A’ schedule property and for a mandatory injunction to restore the wire fence, casuarina poles to the original condition, demarcating the plaintiffs property on the north side. ‘A’ schedule property is given as T.S.No. 2 with an extent of 50 cents on the south out of 8 acres and 53 cents. The four boundaries are given. ‘B’ schedule property is the pathway situated north of the above suit property measuring 20 ft. x 193 metres. I am unable to see any connection between the compound wall in respect of which it is alleged that the accused had caused damages and about the iron gate fixed in the compound wall and the suit. At this juncture, on the materials placed before me, I am unable to hold that the compound wall and the gate in respect of which the offence was said to be committed are all subject-matter of the suit. Hence, the pendency of that suit at the time of the occurrence or the compromise entered into therein cannot have any impact on the charge filed in this case. 7. The copy of the compromise entered into between the parties in O.S.No. 204 of 1987 in para.6 it is stated as follows: “In view of the compromise, the second defendant’s husband shall withdraw the criminal case filed by him against the plaintiff which is pending in C.C.No. 562 of 1990 on the file of the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Kodaikanal, by moving the District Collector, Dindigul and before the Superintendent of Police, Dindigul. Further, the defendant undertakes to see that the criminal case is withdrawn, or else, she or her husband complainant will not give evidence against the plaintiff.” That is a thing which has to occur in future and on that clause in the compromise, this proceeding cannot be quashed. 8. Learned counsel relied upon Kalyani Ammal v. Krishnaswami Gounder, 1993 L.W. (Crl.) 648, in which my learned brother Thangamani, J. has held that when civil court has passed a decree prior to the initiation of proceedings under Sec.145, there is no scope for the Magistrate to take action and decide question of possession and that the decree of the civil court is binding on the Criminal Court. He also relied upon Premalata v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 69, in which the Apex Court had held that proceedings against the accused are liable to be quashed as no useful purpose would be served by continuing them. In that case the incident was fifteen years old. It was alleged that the accused persons obstructed process server from serving summons and on those allegations the accused was proceeded with for offences under Secs. 353, 506, 173, 186 read with 34, I.P.C. Suit in which the disputed summons was issued was compromised. Taking into account all these factors the Apex Court had quashed the proceedings. The facts of this case are different and the above rulings are not applicable to the facts of the instant case. It may be that the complainant who is a party to the compromise if summoned, may not depose. This is a matter which is yet to be seen, but on that possibility I cannot say that the proceedings should be quashed. 9. In the result, the petition fails and shall stand dismissed.