JUDGMENT : The defendant is the appellant. The trial Court in S. C. Suit No. 50 of 1976, decreed the suit by judgment and decree dated 12-4-1982. On appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in Appeal No. 1011/83 by order dated 7-7-1983, dismissed the appeal summarily holding that the reasons given in paragraph 10 of the judgment of the trial Court are eloquent and therefore need no interference. It would be obvious that the counter part of the appellant counsel here had argued only on the point dealt with by the trial Court in paragraph 10. The High Court was satisfied with the reasoning given by the trial Court and accordingly dismissed the appeal. 2. Mr. Goswami, learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 14 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. It is contended that when the goods were delivered, the cause of action arises on the date when the goods were delivered and that, therefore, the Suit was filed beyond the date of delivery and was barred by limitation. We find no force in the contention. 3. Admittedly, the suit was filed on 10-8-1976. Ex-93 was found to be the agreement of sale under which the appellant had undertaken to pay the suit amount. In para 7 thereof, he had undertaken to pay the balance amount on 10-5-1973. Thereby, though the suit was based on the delivery of the goods, the cause of action had been determined by the parties by their contract to make the payment on August 10, 1973. When default was committed in making the payment on that date, the cause of action had arisen to the respondents to file the suit within three years from that date. It is found by the trial Court that on August 8 and 9, 1976, the Court was closed for holidays and was reopened on 10-8-1976. On the same day the suit was filed. Under these circumstances, it was filed within time. 4. It is next contended that though the agreement was executed on February 9, 1973, it was typed on the stamped paper on 13-4-1973, and that therefore, it is only a fabricated document and the appellate Court ought to have gone into that question and given proper finding on due consideration of the facts and circumstances. 4. It is next contended that though the agreement was executed on February 9, 1973, it was typed on the stamped paper on 13-4-1973, and that therefore, it is only a fabricated document and the appellate Court ought to have gone into that question and given proper finding on due consideration of the facts and circumstances. We find no force in that contention as well. 5. It is stated that according to the agreement to sell the document had to be executed within seven days from the date of settlement of the terms and acceptance by the parties. Admittedly, the terms were settled on 9-2-73. Therefore, under Clause 21 of the agreement the stamp papers were to be purchased within 15 days from the date of demand being accepted. Accordingly, the stamp papers came to be purchased on 13-4-1973 and the agreement was typed thereon. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the agreement is a fabricated document and not a genuine one. The trial Court had elaborately considered this point in paragraph 12 under issue No. 2 and had given cogent reasons for finding against the appellant. We do not find any ground warranting interference. 6. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.