Managing Committee; H. P. D. Jain School v. State Of Bihar
1994-04-01
INDU PRABHA SINGH, S.N.JHA
body1994
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment S. N. Jha, J. 1. The Managing Committee of the H, P. D Jain School, arrah (hereinafter referred to as the School) and its Secretary have, in general, questioned the authority of the State to interfere with the administration of the school and, in particular, questioned the legality of the order of the District Education Officer dated 13th January 1994 as contained in the memo portion of Annexure-1 directing the outgoing headmaster of the school to hand over the charge of the office to respondent No.7 Brahmadeo Singh, on his superannuation from service with effect from 31st January 1994. 2. The school founded by Sri Adi Nath Trust, a Jain Religious Trust of arrah town is said to be a minority institution. In support of its minority character, reliance has been placed on the order of the then Director of public Instructions, dated 10th November, 1965 declaring the school as a minority institution under the provisions of Rule 2 (Ka 13) of the Bihar High schools (Constitution, Powers and Functions of Managing Committee) Rules, 1964, Mr Awadh Bihari Ojha, learned counsel for respondent No.7, attempted to challenge the minority character of the school on the ground that it has not been so recognised under Sec.18 of the Bihar Non-Government secondary Schools (Taking Over of Management and Control) Act, 1982. However, in view of the aforesaid order the Director issued in exercise of statutory powers we are not inclined to go into that question simply because a formal order in terms of Sec.18 (2) of the said Act not been issued, when the institution has all along been recognised as a minority institution for about three decades by now. 3. Counsel for the parties have made lengthy submissions regarding inter se seniority between respondent No.7 and Shailendra Kumar Jain, who has been authorised to act as the incharge headmaster by the managing committee mr. Ojha in support of his contention that respondent No.7 is senior to Shailendra Kumar Jain referred to certain orders as contained in annexures A/7, F/7 and B/7 by which respondent No.7 has been held to be senior and granted senior selection grade earlier in point of time. Mr. K. D. Chatterjee, learned counsel for the petitioners; on the other hand, submitted that the aforesaid orders touching upon the management and administration of a minority institution are without jurisdiction and not binding on the managing committee.
Mr. K. D. Chatterjee, learned counsel for the petitioners; on the other hand, submitted that the aforesaid orders touching upon the management and administration of a minority institution are without jurisdiction and not binding on the managing committee. Counsel placed reliance on Annexure-3, a gradation list said to have been prepared by the managing committee sometime in 1991 as per which the said Shailendra Kumar Jain has been held to be senior to brahmadeo Singh and, in fact, the seniormost teacher of the school on the basis of their dates of appointment in the school Mr. Ojha contended that the aforesaid order, to wit Annexures A/7, F/7 and B/7 having not been challenged by the managing committees for all these years by the managing committee on any other person they must be deemed to have acquiesced in the authority of the State and its officers in issuing the orders. He, accordingly, urged that respondent No.7 having been held to be the seniormost teacher of the school, this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction should not interfere with the impugned order authorising him to act as the headmaster. 4. The question as to whether the State or its officers have jurisdiction to appoint an incharge headmaster or to decide the inter se seniority of the employees of the school in question are two aspects of the same dispute. It is true that the right of the minority to establish and administer educational institution of their choice is subject to regulatory measures for achieving and promoting academic excellence. The question, however, is whether the power to regulate the management of the minority institution extends to making appointment The answer, In our opinion, has to be given in the negative. 5. Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the provisions as contained in clauses (b) and (j) of sub-section (3) of Sec.18 of the said Act. Clause (b) provides that the managing committee of the minority secondary schools shall appoint teachers with the concurrence of the School Service board and while considering the question of approval the Board is competent to scrutinise as to whether the proposal of appointment is in accordance with the rules laying down qualification and manner of appointment framed by the State Government have been followed or not.
Clause (j) empowers the state Government to issue instructions for achieving efficiency in the management and for improving standard of education in the minority schools. What is significant to notice is that the power of scrutiny under clause (b)or the power of issuing instructions under clause (j) are limited in scope. While under clause (b) the only thing that the School Service Board has to see is whether the proposed appointment is in accordance with rules framed by the State Government "and no more", under clause (j) instruclions may be issued by the State Government "not inconsistent with the provisions as contained in Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution". The provisions as contained in clauses (b) and (j), therefore, are of no avail to the respondents. We may add here that so far as clause (b) is concerned, the stage has yet to reach since the managing committee is yet to make regular appointment. 6. It is not the case of the private respondents or the State that Shailendra kumar Jain does not possess the necessary qualification for his appointment as headmaster x temporary or regular basis. We may mention in this connection here that the managing committee has already taken steps to make regular appointment and issued advertisement. We are satisfied on the facts of the case that the impugned order of the District Education officer, Bhojpur, dated 13th January 1994 amounts to interference and infringement on the right of the minority to administer the school. 7. Before we conclude we may briefly refer to another submission of Mr. Ojha. Drawing inspiration from the decision of the Apex Court in Miss mohini Jain V/s. State of Karnataka and ors. (AIR 1992 Supreme Court 1858)and Unni Krishnan, J. P. and ors. V/s. State of Andhra Pradesh and ors. (AIR 1993 supreme Court 2178) he contended that an institution discharging public duties cannot be permitted to act arbitrarily and, therefore, respondent No 7 having been declared to be senior by the officers of the State decision of the managing committee authorising Shailendra Kumar Jain to act as the incharge headmaster cannot be said to be proper. There is nothing in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court to curtail the rights of the minoritism to administer institutions of their choice. We, accordingly, do not find any merit in the aforesaid submission either. 8.
There is nothing in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court to curtail the rights of the minoritism to administer institutions of their choice. We, accordingly, do not find any merit in the aforesaid submission either. 8. Before we part with this order, we would like to high-light the desirability and, indeed, necessity of framing rules in the light of the provisions as contained in clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Sec.18 of the Act regarding service conditions of teachers keeping in view the principles of natural justice and the prevalent law in the matter, we have been informed at the bar that no such rules have been framed by the school. We would, accordingly, direct the authorities of the State to take necessary steps to ensure compliance of the said provisions in accordance with law without any delay. 9. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order of District Education officer, Bhojpur, dated 13.1.94 as contained in Annexure-1 cannot be said to be in accordance with law. It is, accordingly, set aside. The application is thus, allowed. Application allowed